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Abstract 
Since 1993, the European Union has dramatically increased the scope and volume of its 
procurement regulation; particular increases have been made in terms of the procurement 
procedures made available, and the obligations that national contracting authorities have in light 
ofEU law. This thesis examines the influence that recent developments in EU public 
procurement law have had on national procurement regulation in the UK, the Netherlands, and 
France. 
To assess this influence, three 'case study' areas were selected for investigation: the new 
procurement procedure 'competitive dialogue', made available for the procurement of complex 
contracts; the ability to repeat purchase using 'framework agreements', recently made available 
for purchasing in non-utilities sectors; and the Court of Justice's use of 'general principles of 
equal treatment and transparency', which has created new obligations for national contracting 
authorities. 
The thesis found that, in the areas examined, the influence of EU secondary legislation is 
substantial and-in two of the three countries examined-also plays a visible role in national 
regulation where EU law is not mandatory. The Court of Justice jurisprudence evaluated has had 
its most significant impact on the national judiciary: courts were found to reinforce the Court's 
judgments in all countries. Soft law issued by the European Commission had little perceivable 
influence on the formal legal regulation of the Member States examined, but may have influenced 
approaches taken to guidance or legislation more generally. 
The thesis also observed that harmonization of national laws, despite not being an objective of 
the EU rules, has increased in recent years-but even now, national differences (usually 
reflective of historical approaches taken to procurement regulation) are visible in those areas 
where the EU rules are optional, rather than mandatory. 
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The EUl directives on public procurement regulate the award procedures for major public 
contracts in Member States in order to prevent discrimination against suppliers and products 
from other EU Member States, and to implement a degree of transparency that will make this 
discrimination difficult to conceal. The Member States are individually responsible for 
implementing the EU directives and abiding by any relevant European legal rulings, but baseline 
standards are identical for all countries. 
With the introduction of the EU public procurement directives in the 1970s, Member States were 
obliged to change their national procurement rules. However, because the legislation set only 
minimum standards and allowed supplementary regulation by Member States2, and because 
certain contracts were not regulated at all, there was substantial scope for Member States to 
implement the directives in a way that matched-rather than ended-their traditions in 
regulating public procurement. In addition, flexibility was enhanced in practice by the fact that 
the EU rules were uncertain. The amount of regulation present at the national level, and the 
source of that regulation, varied between Member States. 
Twice in relatively recent history, in the 1990s and 2004, the European Union has supplied its 
Member States with detailed new legislative packages on public procurement law. As new 
legislation has been adopted, the obligations on Member States have become more detailed and, 
in many respects, reduced the flexibility available.3 Further, the scope for Member States' 
discretion has been reduced by i) strict judicial interpretation of the legislation at Court of Justice 
(Cl) level ii) the development of general principles of equal treatment and transparency (first by 
the C), later written into the legislation), that supplement the written rules and iii) the extension 
1 For simplicity, the abbreviation HEU" will be used consistently in this thesis, replacing the earlier "EC· (European 
Community). ' 
2 Case C·31/87 Gebroeders Beentjes BVv Netherlands [1988] ECR 4635 
3 Sue Arrowsmith, "The Past and Future Evolution of EC Procurement Law: from Framework to Common Code?" (2006) 
35 PCLI 337 
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of EU procurement regulation into new areas that were excluded from the directives. Particular 
examples of the latter expansion are the C}'s Telaustria4 decision, which ruled that contracts 
outside of the directives had transparency obligations under the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), and its decision in Commission v. Spain 5, which determined that Article 
346 TFEU did not automatically exempt 'hard' defence procurement from the Treaty or the 
directives. 
The procurement directives, when correctly implemented and followed, entail a certain degree of 
uniformity in procurement rules across the EU. Greater uniformity may promote trade in that 
suppliers find it easier to operate in markets t h ~ t t are regulated by similar rules; the attainment of 
a degree of uniformity for this reason is in fact the rationale behind the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Procurement, which provides a model to be used in regulating procurement systems that is used 
by many developing countries.6 However, in contrast with UNCITRAL, achieving uniformity in 
procedures is not per se an objective of the EU rules-this is merely a consequence of the 
implementation of minimum transparency standards. It is doubtful whether the EU has legal 
competence to regulate procurement merely to achieve uniformity-there is no general power 
under the TFEU to impose harmonized EU regulation on Member States econo,rt1ic systems for 
the sake ofuniformity.1 
January 2006 was the, implementation deadline for the most recent set of EU directives on the 
, 
, subject of public procurement (2004/17/EC on the utilities sector and 2004/1B/EC on the public 
sector).8 At the time of writing, nearly all Member States have implemented the rules in the 
directives.9 
4 Case C-324/98 Telaustria Verlags GmbH and Telefonadress GmbH v Telekom Austria and Herold Business Data AG [2000] 
ECR 1-10745' " 
5 Case C-414/97 Commission v Spain [1999] ECR 1-10745 
6 For an introduction to the UNCITRAL model law on procurement, see R. Hunja, "The UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services and Its Impact on Procurement Reform", Chapter 5 in S. Arrowsmith 
and A. Davies, Public Procurement: Global Revolution (Kluwer: The Hague, 1998); and, on recent developments, see S. 
, Arrowsmith (ed), Reform of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement: Procurement Regulation/or the 21st Century (West: 
Eagan 2009). ' 
7 Case C-376/98 Commission v Germany [1998) ECR 1-8419 , 
,8 Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement 
procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors [2004] 0) L134/1 and 
Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures 
" for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts [2004] 0) L134/114 
9 See, for a summary of the EU Member States' current procurement regimes Hans-Joachim Priess (ed.), "Getting the Deal 
Through: Public P r o c u r e m e n t ~ ~ (2009) <http://www.gettingthedealthrough.com> (last accessed 1 November 2010) 
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1.2 Research Questions 
The aim of this thesis (the research question) is to examine the manner and extent to which EU 
regulation of procurement has influenced the regulation of public procurement in Member 
States, including the extent to which this has led to a more uniform approach in the Member 
States. This will involve looking at: 
i) the nature and extent of formal legal implementation of the detailed obligations in 
the directives; 
ii) the regulatory response in Member States to the less specific and more uncertain 
obligations imposed by: 
a) the TFEU, as developed by the CJ in Telaustria and related rulings 
b) the general principles of transparency and equal treatment, where their detailed 
requirements have not yet been spelled out by the C); 
iii) the influence of EU rules in areas not strictly covered by EU obligations. 
There are examples of situations in which EU law has influenced domestic regulation even when 
this is not required-for example, where Member States have followed the directives even for 
procurement that is not covered by those directives. The thesis will explore the scope and nature 
of such phenomena. 
In addressing the question the thesis will explore such issues as: 
a) the extent of divergences in interpreting the EU rules in national regulatory instruments 
in different Member States; 
b) the influence of EU-Ievel soft law-in the form of European Commission (Commission) 
guidance-both in transposing the EU rules and in influencing the approaches taken in 
areas outside the EU rules; . 
3 
c) the relative impact of obligations imposed in secondary legislation and those developed 
through case law; 
d) the extent to which transposition ofEU law is affected by national procurement 
'traditions' (for example, the existence of prior national rules on the subject in question). 
The study will commence with assessing the state of national legislation prior to extensive EU 
regulation in public procurement This will provide insight both into any pre-existing 'traditional 
national approach' to regulating public procurement and into what the effect of EU regulation has 
been in these systems. The setup of the thesis does not, however, require looking back further 
than the 1970s as the purpose of the thesis is not to provide a historical overview of national 
procurement legislation. 
It should be noted that there has already been extensive work assessing the transposition of the 
1993 EU procurement directives (see section 1.3.1), and so this will be briefly discussed to 
illustrate that there has been a progressive increase of EU-Ievel regulation affecting the Member 
States. The analysis in this thesis, however, will focus on the most recent law produced by the 
European Union: recent decisions by the q, the 2004 Public Sector Directive, and recent 
materials issued by the Commission. 
1.3 Contributions a/the Project 
1.3.1 National Responses to EU Procurement Regulation 
.i{ 
The study will, first, enhance understanding of national responses to EU procurement regulation, 
building on earlier studies that cover aspects of this subject10 The present study: however, 
approaches the question of national response from a different angle than previously done work, 
10 For instance: I.M. Fernandez-Martin, The Ee Public Procurement Rules: A Critical Analysis (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 1996), from a comparative perspective dealing with the remedies sector in 1993; S. Arrowsmith, "An Evaluation of 
the Legal Techniques for Implementing the Public Procurement Directives", Chapter 24 in P. Craig and C. Harlow (eds), 
Lawmaking in the European Union (Kluwer: London 1998) dealing with methods of implementation; and S. Arrowsmith 
(ed. and co-author), "EC Measures on Public Procurement and their Implementation in the Fifteen Member States" 
(1996), prepared for EuroStrategy Consultants, for the European Commission Oanuary 1997), dealing with 
Implementation in Member States. . 
, . 
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and has distinctively new developments at a European level to consider. Specifically, since 
previous comparative work analyzing national transposition has been conducted, there have 
major legislative changes as well as a judicial.extension of regulation into new areas. Moreover, 
the EU public procurement 'environment' has generally changed greatly since the 1990s, and 
now includes an enhanced awareness and enforcement ofthe legal rules as well as a very 
prominent role for soft law. This has a consequence that the specific questions that will be dealt 
with this in comparative analysis are automatically different from those discussed in earlier 
studies-for instance, procedures such as competitive dialogue did not exist at the time similar 
work was conducted. 
There have already been several texts covering the content of the new EU directives in detail, but 
there has thus far not been significant analysis of Member State responses to the new legal 
developments in the EU from a comparative perspective. This study thus moves beyond a survey 
of current national laws on public procurement-which has been done for most Member 
Statesll-and instead focuses on how (and which) EU developments have affect.ed national 
regimes. 
1.3.2 EU Policy Development 
The study will also be of immediate value for EU policy makers in providing information on the 
transposition process. It will enhance understanding of the impact of different techniques of 
regulation, which will be relevant to future EU initiatives for dealing with areas that are currently 
partly outside the directives (such as public-private partnerships and low-value procurement). 
Specifically, by examining different EU law sources as well as three Member States that have 
historically had different approaches to regulating public procurement law (see section 1.5), the 
study will e x p l o r ~ ~ if a single regulatory choice can have different impacts in different Member 
States. Findings along these lines will help the EU shape not only the content but also the form of 
its procurement policy. 
11 See. for instance. S. Arrowsmith. -Implementation of the New EC Procurement Directives and the Alcatel Ruling in 
England and Wales and Northern Ireland: a Review of the New Legislation and Guidance" (2006) 15 PPLR 86 on the 
United Kingdom; E. Pijnacker Hordijk. G. W. van de Bend and J. F. van Nouhuys. Aanbestedingsrecht (4' druk) (Sdu: Den 
Haag 2009) on the Netherlands. . 
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1.3.3 The Wider Influence of EU Law on National Law 
The thesis generally aims to discover the extent to which recent changes to EU procurement law 
have influenced national procurement regulation. The concept of 'influence' is not intended to be 
measured, but rather is used to describe situations in which a national legislator or national 
judge opts to use an EU-originating rule to either replace a national rule or to create a rule where 
none existed before. Two general types of 'influence' will thus be discussed in this thesis: 
• Situations where EU law has to be applied, ie, "implementation studies" 
• Situations where EU law does not have to be applied, ie, "voluntary application" 
1.3.3.1 Implementation Studies 
Various EU directives-recently, environmental law directives12, but also directives on freedom 
of movement of persons13 and taxation 14-have been the subject of implementation studies, 
which in part aim to describe how a European law has been transposed into nationallaw.1s This 
thesis will be a valuable contribution to the study of formal-legal implementation of EU law, by 
examining very specific parts of EU law sources and their national transposition in detail. It will 
particularly build understanding of the transposition process of EU procurement directives, and 
the'role specific pieces of Commission soft law play in domestic procurement regimes. 
1.3.3.2 Voluntary Application 
This specific study of procurement will also contribute to the broader picture of how Member 
. . , . , ~ ~
States respond to EU obligations and the impact that EU regulation has on national regulation 
, , 
and policies, especially when this is not mandated. To illustrate what is meant by the voluntary 
. . . 
,12 See. for i n s t a n ~ e , , R. Beunen, W. van der Knaap, and G. Biesbroek, "Implementation and Integration of EU Environmental 
. Directives: Experiences from the Netherlands" (Z009) 19(1) EPG 57, and A. Ross, H. Nass and C. Reid, "The 
Implementation of EU Environmental Law in Scotland" (2009) EdinLR 224. 
13 See A. Hunter. "Family members: an analysis of the implementation of the Citizens Directive in UK law" (Z007) ZI(3) 
)IANL 191· '. . 
. 14 See ). Englisch and A Schutze, "The implementation ofthe EC Parent Subsidiary Directive in Germany - recent 
developments and unresolved issues· (ZOOS) 45(11) EuroTax 2005 488. 
15 General studies into the nature of directives and what the concept of 'implementation' of European law entails are less 
prevalent; the only current academic text in this field is S. Prechal, Directives in EC Law (OUP: Oxford Z006). 
, . 
.,.. "< > - . , ~ . ~ ~ .A""_. ~ " " , , , , , , , , , . . __ . ~ ~.... - : ' ' ' _ . n L 4 ~ ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' . ' ' - J ~ , , , . : . . . _ _......... ~ , , , ,.. ~ i . . . . : : r . . ..... ~ ~ ~ ~ . .
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application of EU law, it is useful to consider how EU law has influenced national administrative 
law even in areas where EU law plays no mandatory role; here, it has been observed that .the 
national judiciary in particular has embraced EU-Iaw concepts (such as the principle of 
proportionality, or the principle oflegitimate expectations) in deciding cases outside of the ambit 
ofEU law, creating a more European-like national regulatory regime.16 
1.4 Method 
The research aims to answer the above research question through a doctrinal legal approach, 
examining the hard and soft law regulatory responses to EU procurement legislation in three EU 
Member States. A doctrinal approach was selected based on the aim of the research question, 
which is not to evaluate the effectiveness of any particular piece of EU legislation, but rather to 
gain insight into the overall changes that have taken place in the formal rules of hard and soft law 
in national legal systems as a consequence of increased EU-Ievel regulation. A doctrinal approach 
allows for a concrete analysis of the laws of the countries that will be examined. 
Traditional doctrinal research may not necessarily incorporate soft law into the analysis, but this 
is crucial in the area of public procurement as hard law is only one element of the legal material 
that the EU has produced in recent years. Jurisprudence of the CJ has always played an important 
role in the interpretation of that hard law, but in recent years, the Commission has also begun 
issuing guidance on EU directives and on CJ rUlings. 
To illustrate the role EU soft law is capable of playing at the national level, it can first be observed 
that several of the Commission's positions have been adopted by the C) and thus been 'made' into 
law-an example of this occurring in the field of procurement is the Commissionis argument that 
the principle of equal treatment applies to the Treaty as well.17 Examples of the CJ following the 
/ , 
16 See, on how EU administrative principles have affected administrative law in a variety of Member States, ,. Schwarze 
(ed), Administrative Law under European Influence: on the Convergence of the administrative laws of the EU Member States 
(Sweet & Maxwell: London 1996). See also I. H. lans, R. de Lange, S. Prechal and R.I.G.M. Widdershoven, Europeanisation 
of Public Law (Europa Law Publishing: Groningen 2007). 
17 This is controversial, as the Commission (in its Interpretative Communication on Concessions Under Community Law 
[2000] 01 C121/2) actually refers to the equal treatment principle and related case law based on the directives. 
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Commission's perspective can be found in other areas oflaw as well.18 In light of these 
occurrences, Member States may give more weight to Commission guidance than its non-binding 
nature technically requires.19 
On the other hand, there are also instances of the CJ not following the Commission's guidance; a 
key procurement example of the CJ developing a different approach can be found in Concordia 
Bus Finland20, where the CJ indicated that environmental considerations could be used to 
establish award criteria, overruling previous Commission guidance which indicated this would 
not be possible.21 Instances where the Commission's guidance is not followed by the CJ are also 
of interest to Member States-this may, in fact, persuade them to take a cautious approach to 
adopting the Commission's perspective in their national laws. 
Thirdly, it must be remembered that the Commission is the institution that can start proceedings 
before the CJ against Member States when it considers that they have violated EU law22• 
Commission guidance offers Member States an indication of what it will consider a violation or 
not, and may persuade them to legislate in line with Commission suggestions. Member States 
may also opt to follow (parts of) Commission guidance for other reasons, such as it being an 
appropriate or useful starting point for developing national policy on an issue if no such policy 
exists yet 
Given that the Commission's soft law can thus influence the national legal order, it is appropriate 
to define the EU soft law examined in this thesis as "rules of conduct that are laid down in 
instruments which have not been attributed legally binding force as such, but nevertheless may 
Nonetheless, the CJ in a recent case (Case C-410/04,ANAVv. Comune di Bari [2006] ECR 1-3401) supported the 
Commission's view that the equal treatment principle applies to the ,Treaty as well. 
,'18 See, for instance, Case C-194/94 CIA Security International v Signalson and Securitel [1996] ECR 1-2201, discussed in L. 
Send en, Soft Law in European Community Law (Hart: Oxford 2004), p. 345., 
19 Senden in fact states that "the transposition of and compliance with Community soft law by the national legislature may 
in certain cases definitely be worthwhile and prevent damage"; ibid. 
20 Case C-513/99 Concordia Bus Finland v. Helsinki [2002] ECR 1-7213. , 
21 For a discussion, see P. Kunzlik, "The Procurement of 'Green' Energy", Chapter 9 in S. Arrowsmith and P. Kunzlik, Social 
and Environmental Considerations in Public Procurement: New Directives and New Directions (CUP: Cambridge 2009), at p. 
388-389. .. 
22 As Senden discusses, the idea that the Commission will use its own interpretations as the basis for proceedings is not 
hypothetical; an explicit example is Case C-290/94 Commission v Greece [1996] ECR 1-3285, wherein the Commission 
brought Infringement proceedings against Greece for (in essence) not following the Commission's interpretation of ex 
Article 48(4) of the EEC Treaty. Other examples are cited in Senden (n 18), p. 345-346, note 71. . 
8 
have certain (indirect) legal effects ..... 23 It is these legal effects that will be examined in Chapters 
3-5. 
A reliance on national policy documents (such as explanatory memoranda to legislation) may go 
beyond the scope of what is traditionally considered 'doctrinal'. However, given the political 
nature of the transposition process, it is extremely necessary to consider these kinds of materials 
in this thesis-differences in transposition may remain completely inexplicable unless the 
relative political processes underlying the transposition process are examined as well. This type 
of approach can be classified as 'doctrinal-plus', and will result in a more robust understanding of 
the law examined than a strict doctrinal approach would. 
Lastly, background discussions will be conducted with policy makers where necessary, in order 
to allow the author to gain a better understanding of the history of a particular piece of national 
legislation or guidance. 
1.5 Methodology 
The research question will be answered by an examination of three EU Member States as 'case 
studies' of the transposition phenomenon. 
The three Member States that will be examined in answering this research question are the 
United Kingdo'm, the Netherlands and France. These three countries were selected because they 
provide an interesting mixture of regulatory approaches. France has a history of legislating 
beyond the scope of the procurement directives and therefore has to consider how to integrate 
EU legal rules with existing national rules. The United Kingdom has a tradition of regulating 
procurement using a 'soft law' approach, only implementing in law the exact rules in the 
directives and dealing with other aspects of procurement regulation through guidance and 
policy. The Netherlands,like the UK, has generally only legislated where required by the 
directives, but ongoing proposals to revise the national procurement legislation indicate an 
23 Senden (n 18), p. 112. 
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interest in expanding regulation to procurement not covered by the directives. The Netherlands 
thus appears to be moving towards a system closer to that of France, and will act as an 
interesting comparator in light of the other two countries. 
The chosen countries also provide examples of both common law and civil law systems. 
The three countries were selected from amongst those countries that could provide the 
appropriate mix on the basis that the author has the language skills to study them. New Member 
States Goining the EU after 1993) were not included since the study will be confined to 
considering the issues from the perspective of Member States with longstanding involvement in 
implementing EU procurement rules; to include the different perspective of new Member States 
would broaden the study beyond what is possible within the confines of a PhD. It would also not 
be possible with the author's language skills. 
In these three countries, the study examines transposition in two respects: 
The first is transposition of the detailed procedural rules in the 2004 directives. The main focus 
'of the thesis will be on the Public Sector Directive (2004/18/EC); the thesis does not aim to 
examine the Utilities Directive (2004/17/EC), as it is expected that transposition approaches 
between the two directives will be similar. Where substantial differences do exist-either in 
transposition, or in the development of case law or national/Commission guidance"":-'these will 
be discussed. ' 
" . The study ~ o n s i d e r s s a number of key areas in which the 2004 directive makes important changes 
or clarifications to the law:-' 
i) - ' the competitive dialogue procedure (an entirely new procedure; which will 
demonstrate how Member States respond to legislation in areas where no previous 
, , legislation exists);' ',' 
'. 
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ii) framework agreements (the rules on which regulate possibilities that probably 
already existed under the old directives, with the aim of providing both legal 
certainty over their use and regulatory controls; this will demonstrate how Member 
States respond to changes in pre-existing (both national and European) legislation); 
iii) the general principles of equal treatment and transparency (which have now been 
made explicit in the directives, after earlier Cl rulings that applied them to the 
directives; examining these will demonstrate how Member States respond to 
clarifications and changes to existing European norms that were primarily 
developed outside oflegislation). 
These case studies permit an observation of Member States' responses to specific new 
requirements, both in terms of implementing their obligations in law (for example, the extent of 
implementation and differences in interpretation) and in terms of the influence ofEU norms on 
areas outside EU regulation, such as below-threshold contracts. Wherever appropriate, an 
analysis of both hard law and soft law responses to these issues will be considered. 
The second area of regulation that will be examined will be the Cl's jurisprudence on contracts 
not covered by the directive. Specifically, it will be examined how the subject countries have 
responded to the ruling in Telaustria indicating the existence of previously unacknowledged 
obligations in the Treaty to follow transparency rules in awarding below-threshold contracts, 
services concessions and certain other contracts outside the directives. Telaustria provides an 
opportunity to compare responses to "regulatory" decisions of the Cl with responses to explicit 
legislation, and to consider the role of soft law (both at the EU and the national level, as a 
'response') which has been prominent in this area. It also provides an opportunity to study the 
extent to which the Member States have drawn on rules contained in detailed EU secondary 
legislation, first, to regulate areas that were previously considered outside EU law and, 
secondly-since Telaustria-to implement their uncertain obligations in these areas. 
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The study will be confined to considering transposition through the adoption of national 
regulatory rules, covering those in legislation, in jurisprudence and in soft law form such as 
governmental guidance to contracting authorities. 
The contracting authorities that will be considered in this thesis will be central government 
departments. Local government authorities are, in the cases of the UKand the Netherlands, not 
subject to uniform regulation where the EU directives do not apply, meaning that sub-central, 
regional, and local authorities have all constructed individual public procurement policies. A 
brief examination of UK practice revealed that there are no consistent approaches in place 
outside of regulation (in the form of standardized 'standing orders'). Assessing the procurement 
policies in place for a great number ofindividual contracting authorities proved beyond the 
scope of the thesis. It is further unlikely that this type of analysis would have contributed 
generally to the research questions asked in the thesis, as individual examples of policies rather 
than overall trends in regulation would have to be cited as evidence of EU law influence. For 
these reasons, non-central government authorities were excluded from the present study. 
It should be emphasized that in the three Member States examined, central government 
departments are subject to all national procurement legislation24, and most national guidance 
produced is addressed to central government purchasers. Examining central government alone 
. will thus permit a substantial analysis ofthe national regulation in place in the subject countries. 
, The study examines the primary sources of these regulatory rules (ie, legislation and guidance), 
relevant background documents (such as explanatory memoranda to legislation) and legal 
literature. It will also examine judicial interpretation of the rules, both at a European and at a 
. national level, as part of the 'transposition' process. I ~ ~will not, however, involve analysis of the 
. application of the rules in Individual procurements. This would detract from the focus of the 
thesis, which deals with national transposition of the rules-not any subsequent compliance with 
them. 
24 The exceptions being specific rules addressed to local government only; however, these only exist in France, and are 
identical to the rules applicable to central government (see section 5.1). 
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2. THE EU'S PUBLIC PROCUREMENT RULES 
2.1 Overview of EU Public Procurement Regulation 
2.1.11ntroduction 
This section ofthe thesis will highlight important changes to the extent and manner in which the 
EU has regulated public procurement since the 1970s, with a focus on the changes that have 
taken place since 1993. 
The material in section 2.1 serves to highlight first of all the growth EU procurement regulation 
has seen since 1993, and secondly, how different EU legal materials have played a role in its 
development. It aims to provide a general understanding of the EU's regulatory goals and 
approach, and is complementary to the more detailed discussions of specific procedures and 
principles discussed in subsequent sections of this chapter. 
2.1.2 The Reasons and Competences for ReBulatinB Procurement in the EU 
The starting point of any discussion of EU regulatory practice regarding public procurement-
generally, the purchase of goods, works or services by a public body from the private sector25-is 
analyzing what place it has in the EU and why it is regulated in the first place. 
The European Economic Community (EEC) was established to eliminate discriminatory trade 
barriers between its Member States, achieved through the abolition of quotas, tariffs, and other 
restrictive practices.26 The EEC Treaty27 (now TFEU28) therefore dealt with the.abolition of 
discriminatory economic practices in a very general sense, but nonetheless had as a consequence 
25 For general discussion, see S. Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (2nd edition) (Sweet & Maxwell: 
London 2005); P. Trepte, Public Procurement in the EU: A Practicioner's Guide (OUP: Oxford 2007); P. Trepte, Regulating 
Procurement: Understanding the Ends and Means of Procurement Regulation (OUP: Oxford 2004); C. Bovis, EU Public 
Procurement Law (Edward Elgar: Cheltenham 2008); F. Weiss, Public Procurement in European Community Law (The 
Athlone Press: London 1993). 
26 This principle is upheld, as indicated by the preamble of the TFEU, which calls among other things for "the removal of 
existing obstacles calls for concerted action in order to guarantee steady expansion, balanced trade and fair competition." 
27 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (25 March 1957) 298 UNTS 11 
28 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning oCthe European Union (30 March 2010) 0) 2010/C 83/47 
13 
that public procurement practices of Member States were subjected to non-discrimination 
clauses, as part of the wider goal of opening up the 'internal market'. 
To this day, the TFEU remains the primary source of public procurement legislation in the EU as 
well as the basis for all secondary legislation,29 which has been adopted under the EU's powers 
to legislate in support of opening up the internal market30 The historical purpose of EU 
procurement regulation is thus to prevent restrictions on intra-market trade. This 'trade-based 
ideology' frequently clashes with the desires of Member State governments in their public 
purchasing, as will be discussed next 
2.1.2.1 Tensions between EU Procurement Regulation and National Procurement Regulation 
In many national jurisdictions, even where EU law does not mandate regulation, public 
procurement is a regulated activity. There are several reasons for this; for one, the government 
may regulate so as to achieve better value for public money. Another common reason for 
regulating public procurement is to set aside certain contracts to pursue social policy aims, such 
as limiting unemployment in specific regions of the country.31 
:, ' 
Prior to the development of extensive EU legislation on public procurement, many national 
g o v e r n ~ e n t s s u ~ e d d public spending as a means of promoting social policy objectives, even at the 
r 
expense of cost-effective purchasing. More recently, public procurement has been considered 
one of the methods through which environmental policy goals can be achieved-however, 
national legislation promoting 'green' buying is not necessarily compatible with EU legislation 
. aimed primarily at o p e n i ~ g g up trade through increased competition.32 
. . 
29 For general information about EU law. see P. Craig and G. de Burca. EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (4th edition) (OUP: . . 
Oxford 2008).' .. 
· .30 See primarily the old Article 95 EC. under which the 2004 directives were adopted. which refers which explicitly to the 
'power to adopt secondary legislation in support of the 'establishment [or] functioning of the common market'. ; 
31 For more information. see S. Arrowsmith.). Linarelli and D. Wallace, Regulating Public Procurement: National and 
International Perspectives (Kluwer: The Hague 2000), Ch.2. 
· 32 This study does not deal with the EU regulatory regime's scope for social and environmental policy objectives; for more 
information on these. see, inter alia, Arrowsmith and Kunzlik (n 21); Christopher McCrudden, Buying Social Justice: 
equality. government procurement and legal change (OUP: Oxford 2007); Arrowsmith 2005 (n 25). Ch.19 and the 
'literature cited there; J-M. Fernandez-Martin and O. Stehmann. "Product Market Integration v. Regional Cohesion in the 
· Community" (1991) 16 ELRev 216; R.C. Tobler, "Encore: 'Women's Clauses' in Public Procurement under Community 
Law" (2000) 25 ELRev 618.' ". . .'. .' . .., . .' 
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There are thus differences between what the EU can do in the field of regulating public 
procurement, and what national governments may want to pursue. In practice, there can be 
overlaps between the EU trade-based approach to legislating public procurement and value-for-
money approaches as outlined above; for instance, increasing competition is likely to be a goal of 
both.33 However, this overlap is not seen with regard to social policy considerations, for which 
there has traditionally been very little room in the EU r e ~ u l a t o r y y regime.34 It is therefore 
important to remember that EU initiatives in the field of public procurement are based on 
provisions in the TFEU aimed at opening up the internal market to trade-and the goals of 
national governments are not always going to be compatible with the EU's regulatory aims. 
2.1.3 The TFEU: Baseline Standards 
Before secondary legislation in the field of public procurement was issued, the EEC Treaty (now 
TFEU) was the sole source ofEU procurement regulation. However, there has only ever been one 
explicit mention of public procurement in the EEC Treaty and its later successors, dealing with 
investment by the Community in non-Member countries that enjoy special relations with 
Member States.3S The effect of this provision is limited; instead, it is the general rules on free 
movement-inter alia, prohibiting discrimination on grounds of nationality-that govern public 
procurement in Member States. These provisions have direct effect in Member States, meaning 
that they do not have to be implemented in national legal systems in order to be enforceable In 
national courts.36 
33 See Arrowsmith 2005 (n 25), p. 171. 
34 For a general discussion of EU competences, see Craig and de Burca (n 29), Ch. 3; it should be noted also that in the 
2004 Directives, the scope for social policy considerations appears to have (controversially) increased. For a discussion 
see Arrowsmith and Kunzlik (n 21); J. Arnould, ·Secondary Policies in Public Procurement: the Innovations of the New 
Directives· (2004) 13 PPLR 187; Kunzlik 2009 (n 21); S. Arrowsmith, • An Assessment of the New Legislative Package on 
Public Procurement" (2004) 41 CMLRev 1277 at 1315-1322. 
3S Article 199(4) TFEU, aimed at non-discriminatory tendering for the financing of projects in 'overseas associates' of 
Member States. ., . 
36 For more information on 'direct effect', see Craig and de Burca (n 29), Ch. 5. 
15 
The provisions of the TFEU contain negative obligations, which prescribe what contracting 
authorities cannot do when awarding contracts. There are three provisions of particular 
relevance for public procurement: Article 34 TFEU, Article 49 TFEU, and Article 56 TFEU.37 
Article 34 TFEU deals with freedom of movement of goods. It prohibits measures that result in 
restrictions on the import of goods from other Member States; this includes public procurement 
measures which discriminate against products from other Member States. Article 34 deals with 
direct discrimination-ie, measures that openly encourage purchasing from national markets 
only38-and measures that are discriminatory in their effect (ie, which have as their end result 
the favouring of domestic products). 
Moreover, Article 34 applies to non-discriminatory measures that affect trade if they are 
measures relating to the characteristics of the product being procured. To illustrate, in the Unix39 
case, the CJ indicated that the fact that restrictive specifications did not differentiate between 
. domestic and foreign products did not matter; an undue restriction on trade that is non-
discriminatory will also be caught by Article 34, unless justified.40 
Article 56 TFEU aims to open up the market in a Member State for nationals of a different 
• Member States who want to provide services there, while operating from their home Member 
State. This coversboth t e m p o ~ a r y y travel abroad in order to provide the services and providing 
those services from their h o m ~ ~ States. The effect of Article 56 in public procurement is to 
, , 
prevent public authorities from discriminating against firms operating in another Member State 
,. , 
when awarding services contracts. Examples of violations of Article 56 are acts such as reserving 
contracts for domestic service providers, or subjecting foreign suppliers to more onerous 
qualification criteria. 
37 Using public procurement as a disguised form of state aid is also prohibited under the TFEU, where (with few' 
, exceptions) state aid is prohibited in general terms. [For a discussion see Arrowsmith 2005 (n 25). Chapter 4.] 
38 Case 21/88. Du Pont de Nemours Italian a SpA v. Unita Sanitaria Locale No.2 Di Carrara [1991] 3 CMLR 25. 
39 Case C·359/93, Commission v. Netherlands [1995] EeR )·157 
40 See the TFEU Articles cited at (n 43). . 
Recently, the CJ has indicated that even measures that do not discriminate between domestic and 
foreign suppliers but simply restrict access to the market in a disproportionate manner without 
justification are also caught by Article 56.41 
Article 49 TFEU prohibits restrictions on the movement of persons from one Member State to 
another in order to permanently set up business there-a process referred to as 'establishing'. 
Both measures that a) restrict the process of establishment itself and b) restrict 'established' 
firms' access to public contracts are caught by Article 49.42 
It is important to note that Articles 34, 49 and 56 all have corresponding derogation articles 
(namely, 36, 51·52, and 62) which allow for an exemption from the free movement articles in 
certain circumstances, such as where public morality or public safety justifies it However, "such 
prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or 
a disguised restriction on trade between Member States", indicating exemptions are subject to 
scrutiny by the CJ.43 
Moreover, there is a specific exemption in Article 346 TFEU for the purchase of 'hard' defence 
equipment such as missiles and tanks. This is not merely an exemption from one of the free 
movement principles, but rather from the TFEU as a whole. Article 346(1) states that Member 
States may take "measures they consider necessary for their essential security interests" when 
producing or trading in hard defence equipment The meaning of this provision has only recently 
been addressed by the CJ (see section 2.1.5.1). 
2.1.4 The Directives 
In the 19705, the approach to public procurement in the EU changed. It was recognized that the 
negative provisions in the Treaty could not effectively open up public procurement markets in 
Member States, as they had no influence on national administrative practice and general 
41 See Case C-234/03. Contse v lnsulad [200S] ECR 1-9315. 
42 Arrowsmith 2005 (n 25), p. 210. 
43 An example of how the CJ may examine an Article 36 exemption in practice is Case C-252/01 Commission v. Belgium 
[2003] ECR 1-11859. on public security. . 
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procurement policies that, 'as interpreted at that time, were not discriminatory In practice.44 
Member States were free to pursue their own policies, meaning there were different time limits, 
advertising obligations, qualification criteria, and so forth, in every single Member State. Even 
though discrimination was forbidden, it was impossible to see whether or not any discrimination 
was taking place in Member States. 
The Commission realized that the only expedient way In which to advance policy so as to 
overcome these obstacles and create the transparency necessary to detect discrimination was 
through positive measures, in the form of directives.4s 
We will first briefly consider how EU directives interact with national law, as that interaction will 
be re-examined in light of the specific approaches taken to procurement regulation in the UK, the 
Netherlands and France (section 2.1.4.1 and 2.1.4.2). After this, we will consider the EU's 
procurement directives and how these have changed over time (section 2.1.4.3 onwards). 
2.2.4.1 What is Implementation? 
EU directives have to be implemented into the national legal order (Article 288 TFEU). Generally, 
. implementation refers to the manner in which EU legislation is made a part of national 'law'. 
However, it has been argued that the implementation process does not stop at the point when a 
)" 
national rule m i ~ i c s s an EU ruie: implementation also depends on how the national rule is applied 
in practice by either practitioners or the judiciary.46 The following overview deals with 
, 'implementation' in the former, formal legal sense; however, the role the judiciary may play in 
, completing the implementation process will be considered in Chapter 3-5. 
The obligation to 'implement' requires the creation of national rules that effectively secure the 
objectives of a given directive.47 In public procurement, the rules of the procurement directives 
44 Fernandez-Martin (n 10), p. 10. 
45 A perspective that it upheld at later dates; see, for instance, Commission, Public Supply Contracts. Conclusions and 
Perspectives. COM (84) 717 at 4. 
46 Prechal (n 15), p. 78 onwards. 
47 On implementation techniques in public procurement, see Arrowsmith 1998 (n 10). 
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extend rights to third parties (ie, tenderers). The fact that such rights are extended means that 
the only correct form of implementation is one that provides legal rights of enforcement within 
the national legal system. To secure these enforcement rights, normally legislation has to be 
adopted, unless the national legislation in place already adequately protects the rights in 
question. 
We will see that some jurisdictions formerly implemented the procurement directives using 
administrative circulars (see section 3.1.2 on the UK); as these have no binding or enforceable 
consequences, they are not an adequate measure of implementation.48 
2.2.4.1.1 Formally Implementing EU Procurement Directives: Two Methods 
There are two possible implementation techniques that meet the requirement of enforceability in 
the national legal order: implementation by transposition or by reference.49 
Implementation by reference, until recently used in the Netherlands and Denmark, is the simpler 
method of implementation. This technique involves enacting national legislation that 'refers' the 
reader to the directive, stating that the rules therein need to be followed. Detailed obligations are 
only found in the directives themselves. It is only an appropriate method of implementation 
where the rules in a directive are sufficiently clear and precise so as to trigger direct effect; 
however, this is generally accepted to be the case for the public procurement directives.so 
The more complex method of implementation is implementation by transposition into the 
national legal order. The particular form that this can take varies; one form of transposition, 
used in the UK, involves 'copy-pasting' a directive's content into a piece of national legislation. 
However, an alternative approach to transposition (taken by France) involves including the 
obligations of the directive into a pre-existing national legal order. 
48 Case 239/85, Commission v Belgium [1986] ECR-3645; Case C-59/89, Commission v Germany [1991] ECR 1-2607. 
49 Arrowsmith 1998 (n 10), p. 496-497. 
50 Ibid. 
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2.1.4.1.2 Advantages and Drawbacks of Implementation by Transposition 
There are many potential advantages to implementing by transposition. It has been recognized 
that through transposition, ambiguous language of the directive can be clarified; the European 
(procurement) rules can be coordinated with any coexisting national (procurement) rules 
(applying to contracts not covered by the EU rules); and accessibility to the EU rules can be 
improved in a variety of ways (including increased awareness and understanding, translating 
'European' language to 'national' language, and improving the presentation of the rules).Sl 
However, there are also risks attached to most of the noted advantages. First of all, adjusting EU 
legislation to a national regulatory regime is complex. There is a risk of erroneous transposition; 
if clarification of the directive's language is pursued, there is always a possibility that changes 
made are invalid or inadequate in pursuing the directive's goals.52 Implementation by 
transposition thus requires a careful approach to be successful. 
2.1.4.1.3 Advantages and Drawbacks of Implementation by Reference 
The above problems do not normally arise from implementation by reference; however, there are 
also significantly fewer advantages to implementing in this way. When implementing by 
reference stricto sensu, it is not possible to clarify any points in the directive that are unclear; the 
EU rules are not integrated with any existing domestic legislation; and the EU rules may not be 
" 
perceived as or experienced as 'as accessible' as corresponding national rules would be.s3 
However, the advantages of implementation by transpOSition may also be greatly exaggerated . 
. , The extent to which Member States do attempt to clarify the wording of the directives or actually 
successfully integrate national and European procurement rules has been questioned 54; section 
5.1 ofthis thesis will add to that discussion when considering France's historic difficulties with 
implementing the EU rules. Implementation by reference, on the other hand, is a 'safe' method of 
Sl Ibid, p. 498 onwards. 
52 Ibid. p. 506. 
53 Ibid, p. 508 onwards. 
. 54 Ibid, p. 500. 
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implementation; there are thus understandable reasons as to why the Netherlands, for instance, 
opted to implement the public procurement directives by reference until 2004 (see section 4.1). 
2.1.4.2 Interpretation of EU directives 
Where a directive is transposed into national law, the national courts may have to consider the 
appropriateness of national implementing measures, and may have to compare these to the 
original EU directives the national laws are based on. 
EU law has brought with it a specific interpretation problem for national courts. In assessing 
national implementation that implements EU law, the judiciary is required to interpret all 
national provisions in a manner that is usually referred to as 'conforming with' EU law.55 
The incorporation of EU law into national regimes has thus resulted in courts relying heavily on 
an EU-focused teleological approach: for our purposes, in reconciling the differences between 
national procurement rules and their EU directive origins, the national judge will have to 
consider the directive's purpose. We will see that the Netherlands and France have made 
changes to the wording of the procurement directives when implementing them-but a 
conforming interpretation with EU law would generally result in these changes having no 
practical effect (see, in particular, Chapter 4 on the Netherlands.) 
2.1.4.3 The First Procurement directives 
In the 1970s, the Commission issued two directives regulating public procurement of works 
(Directive 71/305) and supplies (Directive 77/62).56 A primary objective of the directives was to 
. 
55 See Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrehin-Westfalen [1984) ECR 1891; there are some limits to this 
requirement, see Craig and de Burca (n 29). p. 287 onwards. 
56 Council Directive 71/305 of21 July 1997 concerning the co-ordination of procedures for the award of public works 
contracts (OJ 1971 L18S); Council Directive 77/62/EEC of 21 December 1976 co-ordinating procedures for the award of 
public supply contracts (OJ 1977 L13/1). It is worth noting that these were preceded by two General Programmes on 
public procurement, discussing problems and the Commission's goals, and several so-called 'liberalization' Directives 
aimed at stopping the most obvious violations of the Treaty. These are discussed in detail in Weiss (n 25), p. 29-39. 
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establish transparent procurement procedures.s7 However, any attempt to harmonize national 
legislation was cautious, as the directives themselves (in Article 2 of both directives) indicated 
that national procurement measures were to remain generally applicable insofar as they did not 
breach the provisions of the directives. 
The limited way in which the directives attempted to harmonize policy is demonstrated by what 
the directives covered. Firstly, they did not regulate beyond the award of the contract 
Moreover, the directives introduced 'threshold values' meaning that their rules would only apply 
to contracts above a certain monetary worth.58 There were also significant exclusions in the 
directives: they did not apply to any utilities.59 Other types of contracts, such as concession 
agreements, were also excluded from the first set of directives.60 
The directives did introduce three European 'methods' of procurement: the open procedure, the 
restricted procedure, and the (not generally available) 'single tendering' procedure (now 
referred to as the 'negotiated' procedure} As is true today, the negotiated procedure was only 
available under very strict grounds listed in the directives and any direct award without 
competition was subject to high scrutiny by the CJ.61 
The directives also intro'duced two new positive rules: first, the obligation to advertise European-
wide for contracts through the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU), and secondly, the 
, 
. obligation to use objective criteria when selecting qualifying firms and 'winning' tenders. These 
positive rules still exist in the 2004 directives, and have not changed extensively since the 1970s . 
. 51 See the preambles ofDirectives 77/62 and 71/305. 
58 Article 5 of Directive 77/62 and Article 7 ofDirective 71/305. 
59 Fernandez-Martin (n 10), p. 15, has argued that the utilities were likely excluded In the first instance because of a 
. difficult political climate at the time, In which Member States were not willing to compromise their control over the > 
utilities sectori the official reason (given in the directive's preamble) related to differing legal status of utility companies 
> in different Member States, meaning that regulation would apply unequally in different Member States. 
60 See Weiss (n 25), p. 45. " > • ,,' . '. '. > 
61 Articles 6a-6h ofDirective 77/62 and Articles 9a-9h ofDirective 71/305. On strict application, it c ~ n n be noted that the 
CJ has never accepted a justification of the use of direct award: see, for instance, Case 199/85 Commission v. Italy (1987) 
: ECR 1039 and Case C-24/91 Commission v. Spain [1992] ECR 1-1989. ' . . 
I 
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Fernandez-Martin has described the first EU procurement directives as a half-way approach 
between interventionism and minimalism in the field of national procurement regulation.62 All 
policy not discussed in the directives remained at the discretion of Member States. At the same 
time, new regulation on advertising, qualification, and award obligations indicates the beginnings 
of an interventionist policy. 
2.1.4.4 Amendments Leading up to 1993 
In the early 1980s, the Commission found that its procurement regulatory efforts were largely 
unsuccessful. It was due to report on the effects of the directives to the European Council in 
1980. This report was delayed until 1984, as the Commission had difficulties obtaining the 
information it needed to actually write the report in question, which dealt mostly with the 
operation of the 1977 Supplies Directive.63 The findings of the report indicated what the 
problems with EU policy were perceived to be. 
First of all, the Commission found that there was no consistency to approach in implementation 
among Member States; some, such as the UK, even implemented the directives as a form of 
administrative guidance rather than as law. The Commission's findings criticized the Member 
States for failing to implement the directives correctly, resulting in very little practical impact in 
opening up the internal market64 
The findings also criticized that the directives failed to cover important sectors-such as the 
utilities-and were ambiguous in many respects. The thresholds set in the original directives 
were determined to be too high, and far too many contracts were not regulated. However, it is 
arguable that the real problem was that there were no rules on aggregation of related contracts 
and so contracts were 'split' to avoid the thresholds; this explanation is supported by later 
legislative changes, in which the thresholds for supplies contracts were not substantially altered, 
but aggregation has become strictly regulated. 
62 Fernandez Martin (n 10). p. 14. 
63 See Commission. Communication to the Council on public supply contracts COM(1984)747 final. 
64 For a discussion see Weiss (n 25). p. 73. . 
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Public authorities were criticized for failing to comply with the obligations to advertise contracts 
in the OJEU, to hold some form of open or restricted competition, and to set objective 
qualification criteria. The consequence oflimited compliance was that 'buying national' 
continued in many ofthe Member States.65 
The Commission thus conduded that further action was needed: application of the existing 
directives had to be improved somehow; the existing directives had to be modified so as to 
prevent abuse through interpretation; and lastly, regulation had to be extended into non-
regulated sectors such as the utilities. 
The Commission's findings were supplemented two years later by a similar study of cross-border 
trade in public procurement66, and very shortly thereafter, the Cecchini report was published, 
one section of which was devoted to the costs of non-international public procurement67 
Though heavily criticized because it deals mostly with speculative losses that stem from failing to 
open up the common market, these two reports on the ineffectiveness of the 1970s directives 
provided the impetus for greater European action in the area of public procurement68 
The Commission planned extensive legislative changes as part of its wider '1992 Common 
Market'strategy. Firstly, the original works and supplies directives were expanded upon, 
producing the additional Directive.88/295 on Supplies and Directive 89/440 on Works.69 
These two directives codified CJ decisions on which bodies were public authorities for the 
, purpose of applicable EU law. The applicability thresholds were also amended, In particular with 
regard to works, where the existing threshold was deemed too low to take into account the cost 
of most works projects. Other pre-existing rules were tightened; for instance, the use of 
65 Ibid, p. 74. ' , 
66 Commission, Public Procurement in the Community COM(1986)375. 
67 Commission, "The Cost of non-Europe in Public Sector Procurement" In The Cost of Non-Europe, Basic Findings, vol. 5/a 
and vol. 5/B, study carried out by WS Atkins Management Consultants (Luxembourg, 1988). 
68 See. for Instance. A. Cox. "Implementing the 1992 Public Procurement Policy: Public and Private Obstacles to the 
Creation ofthe Single European Market" (1992) 1 PPLR 139; see also Weiss (n 25). p.12. citing other criticisms. 
69 Directive 88/295 (amending Directive 77/62) [1988) OJ L127 /1. and Directive 89/440 (amending Directive 71/305) 
(1989) OJ L210/1; the amendments. however. were not consolidated into a new directive and instead the original 
directive and their amending directives had to be read side by side (see Fernandez-Martin (n 10). p. 27). 
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procedures other than the open or restricted procedure-such as the negotiated procedure 
without advertising-had to be justified and was limitedly available. A new obligation for public 
authorities to inform losing tenders as to why they lost the contract, and to generally advertise in 
the OJ what the results of any competition were, was also included. 
In 1993, the existing works and supplies directives were consolidated into Directives 93/36 on 
Supplies and 93/37 on Works; these replaced the previous legislative rules and realigned 
provisions in the 1970s and 1980s directives so as to create a more uniform legal regime.7o 
Changes to the regime did not stop with amending the existing directives, however; the 
Commission determined that a directive in the field of services was also needed. The Services 
Directive (92/50)11 was in most respects identical to the works and supplies directives, with the 
exception that it divided services into two categories: Part A and Part B services. Part B services, 
such as hairdressing and legal services, were subject to a more flexible regime, which was 
justified by the reasoning that they were less likely to be subject to cross-border interest72 
A second major innovation was the introduction of a Remedies Directive73• As observed in the 
Commission's evaluations in 1984 and 1986, compliance with the European rules was poor, and a 
lack of redress available was determined to be one of the reasons why public authorities 
essentially 'got away' with not applying the rules. The Remedies Directive set out to assure 
tenderers that they would be able to get recourse in national courts in the event that the 
procurement rules were not followed. It provided for the types of remedies that were to be 
available to bidders (interim measures, setting aside of unlawful decisions, and damages) and 
'. r indicated what types of procedures and forums had to be available in Member States for the 
proper enforcement of public procurement rules. 
70 Council Directive 93/36 coordinating ~ r o c e d u r e s s for the award of public supply contracts [1993] OJ L199/1 and 
Council Directive 93/37 coordinating procedures for the award of public works contracts [1993] OJ L199/S4. See 
Fernandez-Martin (n 10). p. 28. . I 
. 71 Council Directive,92/50 relating to the coordination of procedures for the award of public se;"ice contracts [1992] OJ 
L209/1. _ 
7Z These services are listed in Annex I B to the directive; see also, Article 9 of the directive. 
73 Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts 
[1989] OJ L395/33. 
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Lastly, the public procurement regulatory regime was extended into the utilities sector.74 Its 
incorporation occurred in two stages; first, in 199075, through a directive regulating works and 
supply contracts issued by public utilities, and secondly, in 1993, via a consolidated Utilities 
Directive that also incorporated services.76 In 1992, a separate remedies directive (the Utilities 
Remedies Directive77) was introduced for the utilities sector.78 It has been noted that, although a 
step forward, the Utilities Directive was too flexible to curtail national buying policies to any 
great extent-the positive obligations in the directive are limited to publication of notices in the 
OJ and informing the Commission of the award process and decision.79 
2.1.4.5 Changes in Law since 1993: the 2004 Directives 
< Though regulation In the field of public procurement experienced significant growth in the late 
f 
19805 and the early 1990s, it became clear at the end of the 1990s that the implemented changes 
were still not sufficient The Commission itself, in the 1990s, observed three shortcomings: lack 
of modernity, lack of flexibility, and lack of clarity.8o 
With regards to lack of modernity, the legislative changes introduced in the 1990s failed to take 
account of technological changes in the 1990s: new developments such as electronic 
procurement were not addressed.Bl 
Lack of flexibility was a criticism geared particularly at the severe restrictions placed on the 
negotiated procedure in the 19805. Other complex contracts, not qualifying for the use ofthe 
.. t; 
negotiated procedures, had to be tendered through the open or restricted procedures, which call 
for detailed specifications in t ~ e e contract notice. In practice, this led to difficulties for public 
74 Fernandez-Martin (n 10). p. 32; Weiss Cn 25).'p.118-120; Arrowsmith 2005 Cn 25). section 3.24. 
75 Council Directive 90/531 (1990] OJ L297/I. 
• 76 Council Directive 93/38/EEC coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water. energy, 
transport and telecommunications sector [1994] OJ L82/40. . . 
77 Council Directive 92/13/EEC of25 February 1992 coordinating the laws. regulations and administrative provisions 
relating to the application of Community rules on the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy. 
transport and telecommunications sectors (1992) OJ L76/14. 
78 For a discussion, see 1.. Gormley. "The New System of Remedies in Procurement by the Utilities· (1992) 1 PPLR 259. 
79 Fernandez-Martin (n 10). p. 33.' . 
80 Commission. Public Procurement in the European Union: Exploring the Way Forward COM(1996)583 , 
81 M_ Larsen, "The New EU Public Procurement Directives·, Chapter 1 in Treumer and Nielsen (n 34). p. 11-12. 
. , 
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authorities when tendering certain complex contracts, and legal change was deemed necessary to 
prevent authorities from simply breaching the directives' rules.82 
Lastly, the provisions of the 1993 consolidated directives remained confusing. Several types of 
purchaSing-such as purchasing through framework agreements, or in-house purchasing-were 
simply not addressed adequately.83 
These three criticisms led to the repeal of the 1993 consolidated directives, and in 2004, two new 
directives were issued. Rather than separating directives on works, supplies, and services, one 
general directive on Public Sector Contracts was produced. The 1993 Utilities Directive was 
replaced with an updated 2004 version as wel1.84 
The 2004 directives are substantially different from the 1993 directives in a number of respects, 
and respond directly to the criticisms launched at the 1993 directives.8s A new procedure was 
introduced so as to increase flexibility; e-procurement was incorporated into the new directives; 
and an attempt was made to clarify existing obligations both through Simplification and 
elaboration. Both framework agreements and in-house contracts are now expressly mentioned 
in the directives.B6 Lastly, general principles of public procurement such as equal treatment and 
transparency have now explicitly included in the directives-this is a development that can be 
traced to C) interpretation of general statements concerning transparency and non-
discrimination in the recitals of earlier directives.87 
82 Ibid, p. 12. 
83 Ibid, p. 11. 
84 Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council coordinating the procurement procedures of 
entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors [2004] OJ L134/1 and Directive 2004/18/EC 
of the European Parliament and the Council on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, 
public supply contracts and public service contracts [2004] OJ L134/114. , 
85 For a general discussion see Arrowsmith 2004 (n 34). 
86 See section 2.3.4 on framework agreements. 
87 See, for instance, Recital 2 of Directive 71/305. The principles of equal treatment and transparency can now be found 
in Article 2 of Directive 2004/18/EC and Article 10 ofDirective 2004/17/EC. 
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Since 2004, the Commission has pursued even more procurement legislation; a new Remedies 
Directive was due for implementation at the end of 200988, and a new directive on defence 
procurement has been adopted and will need to be implemented by 2011.89 Most recently, the 
Commission has launched a consultation regarding the possibility of amending the current 
legislative provisions applicable to concessions, which may result in even more EU procurement 
legislation.9o 
2.1.5 The C)'s and the Commission's Contributions 
So far, the discussion of the development of EU public procurement law has been limited to a 
• discussion of legislation; this is not a question of oversight Prior to the late 1990s, there was 
little revolutionary jurisprudence n,or important guidance issued in the field of public 
procurement However, in the years since 1996 especially, there has been a vast increase in both. 
2.1.S.1]urisprudence· 
Recent jurisprudential developments can be divided into three areas: developments in the field 
of the TFEU, developments in the field of remedies, and developments relating to the procedural 
rules contained in the directives, as well as their coverage. 
Developments in the field of the TFEU refer to interpretations by the CJ that apply positive 
.; 
obligations to contracting authorities under the TFEU. There have been two cases in particular 
. i 
that mark significant departures from previous interpretations of the Treaty. The first, 
Telaustria9l , is a landmark case in which the CJ decided that there is a general duty of 
transparency that applies to the Treaty, resulting in the necessity of 'a degree of advertising' even 
88 Directive 2007/66/EC ofthe European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2007 amending Council 
Directives 99/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC with regard to improving the effectiveness of review procedures concerning the 
award of public contracts [2007] OJ L335/31 
89 Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of procedures 
for the award of certain works contracts. supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in 
the fields of defence and security. and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC [2009] OJ L216/7 
90 See httg:/Iec.euroga.eu/internal market/consultatjons12010/concessjons en htm (last accessed 1 November 2010) 
91 Te/austria (n 4). . 
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for contracts to which the directives do not apply. The second, Commission v. Spain92, interpreted 
Article 346 TFEU as not granting an automatic exclusion from the Treaty for all hard defence 
procurement contracts. Instead, security concerns c l a i m e ~ ~ under Article 346 have to be justified 
by Member States. Though both of these obligations were established by the CJ, neither has been 
satisfactorily elaborated on to date. 
With respect to remedies, a landmark decision by the CJ imposed an obligatory 'stand-still' period 
prior to the conclusion of a contract The decision made in Alcatel93 had significant consequences 
for the traditional processes of contract conclusion in several Member States (notably, Austria 
and the United Kingdom) where no such period existed. Furthermore, the Remedies Directives in 
effect at the time of the decision did not specify a need for any sort of interim period between 
awarding and concluding a contract, meaning that the CJ's decision was not based on existing law 
as such. The new Remedies Directive has codified Alcatel into law. 
Lastly, the CJ has significantly developed the procedural rules relating to EU public procurement 
law as well as the coverage of the directives. The development of the general principle of equal 
treatment as applicable to the procurement directives falls into the former category, as do 
various other judgments relating to the principle and its applicability to, among others, selection 
and award criteria.94 Regarding coverage of the directives, there has been significant case law 
interpreting in a broad manner, for instance, the definition of a "body governed by public law", 
which has resulted in bringing many commercially active undertakings under the ambit of the 
procurement directives9S; the second coverage area that the C) has developed in recent years 
concerns the applicability of the procurement rules when awarding contracts to another 
procuring entity. The general rule established is that the procurement rules do apply here, but 
92 Case C-414/97 Commission v Spain [1999] ECR 1-5585 
93 Case C-81/98 Alcatel Austria v Bundeministerium!ur Wissenscha[t und Verkehr [1999] ECR 1-17671 
9. For a discussion see Arrowsmith 2006 (Evolution. n 3). p. 354 onwards and section 2.4.2 of this thesis. 
, 95 See. for instance. Joined Cases C-223/99 and C-260/99 Agora Sri vEnte Autonomo Fiera Internazionale di Milano [2001} 
ECR 1-3605; Case C·373/00 Adolf Truly v Bestattung Wien [2003] ECR 1·19131; Case C·18/01 Arkkitehtuuritoimisto Riita 
Korhonen Oy v Varkauden Taitotalo Oy [2003} ECR 1·5321. For a discussion see Arrowsmith 2006 (Evolution, n 3). p. 373 
onwards. 
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the CJ has also established that in-house procurement can be excluded from the application of the 
procurement rules.96 
2.1.5.2 Soft Law 
In the past decade, Commission guidance has been issued on various subjects; notable guidance 
for the purpose of this study is the 2006 Interpretative Communication97 on contracts falling 
outside of the directives, which offers the Commission's perspective on positive obligations 
stemming from the Treaty.98 Also in 2006, the Commission issued an interpretative 
communication on the functioning of Article 346 TFEU on defence procurement.99 Other 
interpretative communications have commented on social policy objectives and their 
. . 
compatibility with EU rules, concession agreements, and the application of community 
procurement law to institutionalized public-private partnerships (lPPPS).lOO 
The Commission has also issued several "Explanatory Notes", also of no legally binding value, on 
i issues such as competitive dialogue and framework agreements and the definition of several 
concepts in the 2004 Utilities Directive.10l 
Lastly, the Commission frequently develops 'Green Papers' on public procurement, indicating 
what it perceives as the purpose of regulating public procurement at the European Union level, 
, and how to improve existing regulation. Recent Green Papers have emerged in the field of 
, 
96 See Case C-I07/98 Teckal Sri v Comune di Viano and Azienda Gas-Acqua Consorziale (AGAC) di Reggio Emilia [1999] ECR 
1-08121, Case C-458 Parking Brixen GmbH v Gemeinde Brixen, Stadtwerke Brixen AG [2005] ECR 1-08612, Case C-324/07 
Coditel Brabant SA v Commune d'Uccle and Region de Bruxelles-Capitale [2008] ECR 1-8457. The exemption is, however, 
defined limitedly - see Case C-26/03 Stadt Halle and RPL Recyclingpark Lochau GmbH v Arbeitsgemeinschaft Thermische 
Restab/all- und Energieverwertungsanlage TREA Leuna [2005] ECR 1-00001. For a discussion: F. Avarkioto, "The 
application ofEU public procurement rules to "in house" arrangements" (2007) 16 PPLR 22 
97 Commission, Interpretative communication on the Community law applicable to contract awards not or not fully subject 
to the provisions o/the Public Procurement Directives [2006] OJ C176/02. 
98 This piece of guidance was challenged by Germany (with support of various other Member States); however, the CJ 
determined that it did not 'create'law but merely stated it and hence the Commission had not overstepped its boundaries 
in issuing the guidanc.e document. (Case T-258/06 Germany v Commission, judgment of20 May 2010.) 
99 Commission,lnterpretative Communication on the application 0/ Article 296 of the Treaty in the field of defence 
procurement COM(2006)779 .. ' , 
100 Commission, Interpretative communication of the Commission on the Community law applicable to public procurement 
and the possibilities/or integrating social considerations into public procurement COM(2001)S66; Commission, . 
Interpretative communication on the Community law applicable to public procurement and the possibilities/or integrating 
environmental considerations into public procurement COM(2001)274; Commission, (2000) 0) C121/02 (n 17); 
Commission, Interpretative Communication on the application 0/ Community law on Public Procurement and Concessions to 
Institutionalised Public-Private Partnerships (IPPP) COM(2007)6661 
, 101 For details, see httg; lIec,euI-Qp3.ey/internal market!gyblic;grocyrement/explan-nOtes en htm (last accessed 1 . 
November 2010). . ' 
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defence procurement102 and public-private partnershipslo3, preceding legislation in the former 
case and an interpretative communication in the latter; of more interest for the present study are 
several older Green Papers, which comment on legislative changes that have already taken place, 
such as the development of the 2004 directives.104 
2.1.6 Conclusions 
This section has described changes in the Ell's approach to public procurement regulation. 
Starting with a very limited system of negative obligations up to the mid-1980s, the institutions 
of the Ell have progressive increased the scope and volume of 'law' directed at the public 
procurement regulation. The obligations of Member States under the Ell regime have thus 
increased significantly in the past 30 years; moreover, it can be noted that despite the intended 
period of stability following the 1993 legislative push, the Member States have been subjected to 
the greatest European 'push' in the field of public procurement in the past decade. This push will 
now be illustrated further by an examination of three newly developed areas ofpuhlic 
procurement regulation: competitive dialogue (section 2.2), framework agreements (section 2.3) 
and the general principles of equal treatment and transparency (section 2.4) 
102 Commission, Green Paper on De/ence Procurement COM(2004)608 
103 Commission, Green Paper on Public-Private Partnerships COM(2004)327 . . . 
104 See, for example, COM(1996)S83 (n 80) and Commission, Communication/rom the Commission on Public Procurement 
COM(1998)143. 
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2.2 Case Study 1: Competitive Dialogue 
2.2.1 Introduction 
The first 'case study' that will be examined in this thesis is the competitive dialogue procedure. 
Competitive dialogue is an interesting case study because it is one of the few entirely new 
additions to the 2004 directives. All that exists on the procedure in terms of clarification from 
the EU is an Explanatory Note from the Commission which (as discussed in section 1.4) has no 
binding legal value, but may nonetheless produce legal effects. lOS 
2.2.2 Legislative History & Purpose 
The possibility of a new, more flexible procedure was first mentioned in the Commission's 1996 
Green Paper entitled "Exploring the Way Forward"106, where the Commission observed that 
industry was not willing to work on its own Private-Public Partnership (PPP)107 infrastructure 
" project (the T r a n ~ - E u r o p e a n n Network, or TEN) if there was no room for technical discussions 
prior to tendering. The responses the Green Paper received revealed that the standard 
procedures available under the procurement directives were perceived to be too inflexible to 
accommodate large complex contracts. lOB. The UK, for instance, used the negotiated procedure 
with a notice-use of which has to be justified by the technical or financial complexity ofa 
project-for all of its own PPP projects (hospitals, major new IT system contracts, schools, etc) 
, -, ' "" 
under the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) . 
. ' 
The Commission never formally brought a case against the United Kingdom for its use of the 
negotiated procedure for thes'e'PFI projects, but did send two r e a ~ o n e d d opinions about this 
practice.109 Though never formally stated and not pursued through action against a Member 
105 Commission, Explanatory Note on Comp;titive Dialogue, CC;200S/04_rev 1 ofS.lO.200S' . 
t06 COM(l996)S83 (n 80), p. 34. '.... ' . . ' " " . 
107 A PPP is a contract in which the public sector collaborates with the private sector and transfers the'risk of a project to 
. the private sector, which has to obtain funding for the project privately. . , ' 
108 A. Rubach-Larsen, "Competitive Dialogue-, Chapter 5 in Treumer and Nielsen (n 34), p. 67-68.' " 
109 See A. Brown, "The Impact of the New Directive on Large Infrastructure Projects: Competitive Dialogue or Better the 
Devil You Know" (2004) 13 PPLR 160, p. 163, referring to Commission Press Release IP /00/869 of July 27, 2000. , 
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State, the Commission's perspective appeared to be that the negotiated procedure with a notice 
was not available for repeat PPP projects of the type the UK was setting up under the PFI scheme. 
The respondents to the Green Paper argued these repetitive PFI projects could still not be 
feasibly procured without some discussion with bidders. Negotiation was deemed necessary in 
order to bridge the gap between the contracting authority's knowledge and the tenderers' 
abilities to provide innovative solutions: requiring contracting authorities to write detailed 
specifications and to use the restricted procedure ignored that they may have lacked the 
technical knowledge to write these specifications at all, or to the best possible solution. 
, Additionally,there were other perceived legal and financial reasons for needing negotiation in a 
PFI contract. As an example,it was common in UK practice to leave the 'details' for the winning 
tenderer alone-such as room design in buildings-so as to cut down tendering costs for other 
participants.110 Under the restricted procedure, this would not be possible. 
The Commission, after both comments on its Green Paper and experiences with PPPs through the 
TEN project, came to r.ealize that the restricted procedure was not appropriate for complex 
procurement.111 It first alluded to the introduction of more flexible procedures in its 
Communication on Public Procurement from 1998.112 The first draft of the new procedure was 
highly criticized, both by academics and involved parties,113 and it was redrafted twice114 prior to 
taking the shape it has in Directive 2004/18/EC. 
Competitive dialogue, as included in the directive, offers a compromise between the negotiated 
procedure and the restricted procedure. Where it falls between these procedures, however, is 
110 For a discussion of UK PFI practice, see C. Kennedy-Loest. "What Can be Done at the Preferred Bidder stage in 
Competitive Dialogue?" (2006) 1S PPLR 317, at p. 319-320. See also Arrowsmith 200S (n 2S). Chapter 8 (on the 
negotiated procedure with a notice and its use in UK PFl) and Chapter 10 (on competitive dialogue). 
111 Commission, Communication o/the European Commission to the Council. to the European Parliament, to the Economic 
and Social Committee and to the Committee o/the Regions on Public Private Partnerships in Trans-European Network 
Projects COM(97)453. section 2.1. . 
112 COM(199B)143 (n 104), section 2.1.1.1. 
113 Rubach-Larsen (n 108). p. 69; for criticism. see S. Arrowsmith. "The European Commision's Proposals for New 
Directives on Public and Utilities ProcurementN (2000) 9 PPLR NA12S, at 129 as well as R. Boyle, ·Critique of 
Commission's Proposals for a New Directive on the Co-ordination of Procedures for Public Contracts COM(00)27S final 
as updated by the discussions in the Working Group· (2001) 10 PPLR NA6S. at 66. ' 
114 Commission. COM(2002)236 final and COM(2003)583 final. 
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subject to debate. Details of the procedure, such as when it is available for use, what can be done 
during it, what can be done after it, and what are the effects of its existence on 'surrounding 
procedures' are unclear to differing extents.llS 
This section will not discuss the entire process of the procedure in depth.116 Instead, the 
subsequent discussion will focus on choices that the national legislator faces when approaching 
competitive dialogue. 
2.2.3 National Implementation a/Competitive Dialogue: Implementation Choices Available 
The competitive dialogue procedure is optional, meaning that it does not have to be made 
available according to the directive.' The national legislator thus prinCipally starts out with two 
choices: to either implement the procedure as in the directive, or to not make it available in 
national legislation. 
Within these two choices, there are other choices to be made: the national legislator retains the 
freedom to determine which contracting authorities can use the competitive dialogue procedure, 
or for which types of contracts the procedure can be used. Moreover, he can also opt to make the 
procedure more limited than it is drafted in the directive-for instance, post-tender negotiations 
could be banned altogether, or subjected to strict requirements. Other areas of the procedure 
can also be supplemented: for instance, while bid payments are permitted in the 2004 directive, 
it offers no guidance on when they can be used. National laws implementing the directives may 
engage with this issue in more detail, by stipulating the value of the bid payment or at which 
stage of the dialogue bidders become eligible for them. Similarly, the directive highlights that 
confidentiality must be maintained at all stages of a comp;titive dialogue, but does not elaborate 
on how; this is,again an area that may be supplemented at the nationallevel. 
, 115 For general commentary as well as critical perspectives on the competitive dialogue procedure, see Rubach-Larsen (n 
108): Arrowsmith 2005 (n 25). Chapter 10: S. Treumer, ·Competitive Dialogue" (2004) 4 PPLR 178: C. Bovis. "The New 
Public Procurement Regime of the European Union: a critical analysis of policy. law and jurisprudence" (2005) 30(5) 
ELRev 607. ','
116 This has already been done: see the materials cited ibid. In particular. Arrowsmith 2005 and Treumer 2004. 
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The above issues all have to be considered by the national legislator when implementing the 
directive. However, it should also be remembered that the directive does not cover all types of 
procurement contracts potentially concluded by Member State authorities (see section 2.1.4). 
When contracts are not covered by the directives (because they are, inter alia, services 
concessions, or low value contracts), the national legislator can look to the competitive dialogue 
procedure for inspiration-either by making it available in the exact same form that it exists for 
contracts covered by the directive, or by amending it in some manner. This thesis will thus 
explore not only how competitive dialogue has been approached at the national level for those 
contracts covered by the directive, but also whether or not competitive dialogue has been made 
available for procurement not regulated by the directives. 
2.2.4 Competitive Dialogue in the directive: Rules on Availability 
Competitive dialogue is made available under the directive in limited conditions. First, Article 
29(1) stipulates that "in the case of particularly complex contracts ... where contracting 
authorities consider that the use of the open or restricted procedure will not allow the award of 
the contract" competitive dialogue becomes available. [Emphasis added.] 
Article l(ll)(c) then states that a contract may be considered particularly complex in two cases: 
H_ where the contracting authority is not "objectively able" to define the 
technical means that will satisfy their needs with regard to the contract117 
- where the contracting authority is not "objectively" able to specify the 
legal and/or financial make-up of the given contract" 
Recital 31 of the directive offers some examples of particularly complex contracts. One of these 
examples refers back to the Commission's TEN project; the other two are the non-specific 
examples of "large computer networks" or "projects involving complex and structured financing". 
117 This definition refers back to Article 23 (3) (b), (c), and (d), which prescribe the contents oftechnical specifications for 
contracts. 
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This condition for use is the first of several grey areas found in the directive's provisions on 
competitive dialogue. Both criteria for use as listed in Article 1(11) (c) mention that a contracting 
authority has to be "objectively" unable to define specifications or legal/financial dimensions of a 
project "Objectively" is not defined elsewhere in the articles ofthe directive; all there is to rely 
on in deducing the meaning of the word "objectively" in this context are the Recitals and the 
Commission's original proposal, which offer different impressions. The Recital indicates that 
competitive dialogue can be used when a contracting authority is not able to produce a best 
possible solution llB, whereas the Commission's original proposal implied that competitive 
dialogue became available when it was "objectively impossible" to set specifications.ll9 
Most commentators have tentatively arrived at the conclusion that the contracting authorities 
ought to enjoy a degree of discretion in deciding when to use the procedure 120-not necessarily 
because this is clear from the text, but because the alternative interpretation would leave very 
little room for the procedure. However, national legislators will have to construct their own 
interpretation of this provision, and this could result in different levels of availability in different 
Member States . 
. 2.2.S Legal Uncertainties in the Competitive Dialogue Procedure 
In brief, the competitive dialogue procedure commences as the restricted procedure-by inviting 
a limited number (minimum 3 as opposed to minimum 5) oftenderers to participate in the 
procedure-but then deviates; by allowing for dialogue between contracting entity and tenderers 
. . 
prior to the submission of final tenders. Here, the procedure is also different from the negotiated 
procedure with a notice, where no such 'final tender' is required prior to contract award. 
,118 See S. Treumer, "The Field of Application of Competitive Dialogue" (2006) 6 PPLR 307, p. 312, commenting on Recital 
31's phrase "or of assessing what the market can offer".·: ." , ; 
119 Commission, Proposal for a Directive on the coordination of procedures for the award of public supply contracts, public 
service contracts and public works contracts, COM(2000)275 final, part III, on Chapter 4, Article 29; this interpretation is 
broader than it seems because the Commission offers, as an example, that the use disproportionate money and time 
would trigger availability. . . .. . ,. 
,120 See Arrowsmith 2005 (n 25); Brown 2004 (n 109); Rubach-Larsen (n 108); For t h ~ ~ opposing perspective, see Treumer 
. 2006 (n 11B) and 2004 (n 115). ' . 'J 
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Uncertainty can be found in various stages of the competitive dialogue process. In Article 29, the 
process for eliminating tenderers prior to the final tendering stage is left ambiguous; Article 
29(4) indicates that successive stages of tendering can take place, but does not address whether 
or not a contracting authority can eliminate competitors during the dialogue stage without 
arranging for a formalized tendering round to take place. True clarity on this issue can also not 
be found in the Commission's Explanatory Note, where only reference to use of award criteria is 
made; this could arguably be done without formal tendering.121 
Further uncertainties are found with respect to the 'final tender' stage required by Article 29(6). 
The number of participants required during the final tendering round is unclear-if the 
minimum number of participants in a procedure is 3, and successive elimination is possible, one 
could argue that it is implied that at the final tender stage, less than three participants may 
suffice.122 Article 44(4), however, merely indicates that a number of tenderers that allows for 
"genuine competition" (not defined) must be retained. 
The difficulties continue with the very concept of 'final tenders', as it is unclear how complete 
these offers have to be. The directive states that the finalized tender must have in it "all elements 
required and necessary for the performance" of the contractl23 This implies that a very complete 
tender is required at this stage-a perspective also adopted in the Commission's Explanatory 
Note. 124 Arrowsmith has noted that such an interpretation is highly discouraging for potential 
tenderers because of how much time and money will have to go into a tender at a stage where 
award of the contract has not yet been determined, and may for that reason be undesirable.125 
Moreover, the directive itself casts some uncertainty onto what is meant by a 'final tender' by 
stating in Article 29(6) that final tenders may be "clarified, specified and fine-tuned" ifthis is 
necessary and will not distort competition. From the wording of the Article it is clear that further 
121 Explanatory Note on Competitive Dialogue (n 105) p. B. 
122 Brown and Arrowsmith recognize this reasoning; Brown 2004 (n 109). p.174 and Arrowsmith 2004 (n 34), p.1286. 
123 Article 29(6). 
124 Explanatory Note on Competitive Dialogue (n 105). p. 9. . 
us Arrowsmith 2004 (n 34). p. 1286; she notes that in particular. in UK PFI practice, it is accepted that some important 
parts of the tender (such as risk allocation) are finalized through negotiations with the winning bidder only. The 
C o m ~ i s s ~ o n . . in its judg",lent o ~ ~ ~ e e London Underground case (Commission. Case N 264/2002, London Underground 
PublIC Private PartnershIp, DeCISion of2 October 2002-dealing with state aid). accepted that negotiations on such points 
could be held under the negotiated procedure with a notice. 
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negotiation between contracting authorities and the final tenderers is not allowed; however, it is 
unclear what the three above terms do mean. 
Finally, post-award discussions are permitted to an unclear extent Article 29(7) allows that "the 
[winning] tenderer may be asked to clarify aspects of the tender or confirm commitments" 
providing that this does not modify "substantial aspects of the tender." As discussed in section 
2.2.2, it has been UK practice to leave elements of the contract (such as obtaining planning 
permission) for only the winning tenderer to deal with. Where such an element results in 
substantial changes to the contract, it follows from the wording of the Article that the 
competition will have to be re-opened, ifnot restarted.126 
However, it is unclear what the article permits in terms of minor post-award changes. One 
perspective is that the final steps can fall under the provision of "confirming commitments" or 
"clarifying", but this is a stretch of the directive's language.127 Alternatively, these types of 
changes can be considered from the perspective of competition-as every bidder would have t ~ ~
obtain planning permission upon winning the contract, undertaking this step at the very end is 
, unlikely to impact on the status of the winning tender.12B 
It has been argued that some details are best filled in following the conclusion of the contract-
this includes not only the obtaining of planning permission, but also, for example, the filling in of 
, patient rooms in a contract for a hospital.129 Whether or not these changes are permissible under 
the wording of Article 29(7), however, is a subject of debate.13o . The Explanatory Note again does 
not address this issue to any great extent; instead, it simply notes that there is no room for actual 
126 Arrowsmith 2005 (n 25), p. 662, argues that an additional round ortendering is ·probable", providing the eliminated 
bidders still want to participate. '.
U7 Arrowsmith, ibid, indicates that while it is debatable if the concept of'confirming commitments' covers steps such as 
obtaining planning permission, it ought to if the procedure is going to be suited to complex contracts. 
128 This logic does not necessarily apply to all steps that are usually completed at the end of a procedure; for instance, if 
funding competitions are to be held, these can have a very deliberate impact on the quality of the bid. (See Kennedy-Loest 
(n 110), p. 322). . 
U9 See Arrowsmith 2005 (n 25), p. 651. . 
130 See Kennedy-Loest (n 110), p. 324, who argues that the ·cumulative effect of such changes in any particular deal" have 
, to be considered, as well as that what at first can be perceived as a 'minor change' may in the end fundamentally change 
the bid. , . . 
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negotiation post-award, as this was rejected in the drafting process.l3l The precise scope for 
changes following the award of the contract is thus left relatively unclear. 
2.2.6 Conclusions 
Competitive dialogue offers national legislator a new, Commission-sanctioned option for the 
procurement of complex contracts-but is it more like the restricted procedure, or more like the 
negotiated procedure? 
As illustrated above, there are both narrow and wide interpretations of competitive dialogue 
possible-when it comes to scope of application as well as it when it comes several steps in the 
procedure itself. The fact that are to date no real 'legal' answers to the questions raised in this 
section means that for the most part, Member States are fully reliant on sparse guidance issued 
by the Commission as well as their own interpretations of the directive's text In addition to 
having to interpret these legal uncertainties, the Member States also have significant leeway in 
deciding how to integrate the procedure into the national legal order. How the three subject 
countries have dealt with these choices will be discussed in Chapters 3 through 5. 
131 Explanatory Note on Competitive Dialogue, (n 105). p. 10. 
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2.3 Case Study 2: Framework Agreements 
2.3.1 Introduction 
The second 'case study' that will be examined in this thesis is the possibility for concluding 
framework agreements under the Public Sector Directive. Framework agreements have newly 
been regulated in the 2004 Public Sector Directive, although they were already 'permitted' under 
the 1993 Utilities Directive. They were included ,as a case study because various jurisdictions 
were already concluding public sector framework agreements prior to 2004, and it will be 
interesting to see ifand how EU legislation on the procedure has changed national rules. 
This section will begin with an explanation of what framework arrangements are (section 2.3.2) 
and what their status was under the old directives (section 2.3.3). Thereafter, the new directive's 
provisions on framework agreements will be discussed (section 2.3.4), with a focus on options 
and uncertainties Member States are presented with in implementing the directive's provisions. 
2.3.2 What is a Framework? 
A framework arrangement132 is an arrangement between a contracting entity and a supplier, 
where the contracting entity agrees on terms to purchase from the suppliers over a period of 
time. It can take various shapes: 
• one contracting entity, one supplier (single provider framework) 
• 'one contracting entity, several suppliers (multi-provider framework) 
• '. several contracting entities, several suppliers (multi-user framework) 
One element that distinguishes these types of arrangements from regular 'contracts' is that they 
m The term 'framework arrangement' will be used in this discussion to describe all possible configurations of the 
framework; this is done to distinguish all hypothetical arrangements from those actually permitted under Article 32(1) of 
the Public Sector Directive. which are referred to as 'framework agreements'. (Adopted from Arrowsmith 2005 (n 25), p. 
669). 
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can be concluded in a manner that leaves all parties, either party, or no parties 'bound' by the 
agreement made. 
At the EU level, framework arrangements were not referred to at all in the public sector 
directives prior to 2004133; however, this did not mean that they were perceived to be 
unavailable under the old directives. l34 The benefits of framework arrangements for regular bulk 
off-the-shelf purchasing, as well as for ensuring security of supply, were appreciated by several 
Member States, and so framework arrangements were used insofar as that they did not conflict 
with the 1993 directives.13S 
In 1997, however, use of a particular multi-prOVider framework was objected to by the 
Commission, leading to general uncertainty over their availability under the public sector 
directives.136 The debate that followed this incident led to several Member States requesting the 
inclusion of framework arrangements in the 2004 Public Sector Directive.137 The final version of 
the 2004 directive contains provisions on what it has termed framework agreements in Articles 
1(5) and 32, as well as references to these framework agreements in various other articles. 
2.3.3 Types of Framework Arrangements: a General Taxonomy applicable to the Old Directives 
Sue Arrowsmith has created a useful taxonomy for framework arrangements, resulting in ten 
different 'types' of framework arrangements that are available.13B The table below summarizes 
the most common forms of framework arrangements, based on Arrowsmith's taxonomy. 
133 The Utilities Directive has at all times included provisions on framework arrangements; for a discussion, see 
Arrowsmith 2005 (n 25). Chapter 11. 
134 On framework agreements under the old directives, see, S. Arrowsmith. "Framework Purchasing and Qualification 
Lists under the European Procurement Directives: Part 1" (1999) 8 PPLR 115 and S. Arrowsmith. "Framework Purchasing 
and Qualification Lists under the European Procurement Directives: Part 2" (1999) 8 PPLR 161. 
135 An example of this is the United Kingdom; for an analysis. see Arrowsmith. ibid. 
136 Commission. Press Release IP/97/1178, 19/12/97; the case at hand. dealing with a framework set up by the Northern 
Ireland Department of the Environment, did not proceed to the CJ. 
137 A r r o ~ s m i ~ ~ 2005 (n 25). p. 671: see also S. ~ r r o w s m i t h . . "Framework Agreements and Dynamic Purchasing Systems: 
the EC Directives and the perspective of the UK, paper presented at conference Public Procurement: Global Revolutions 
III (Nottingham, June 2006) and S. Arrowsmith., "Methods for Purchasing On-Going Requirements: The System of 
Framework Agreements and Dynamic Purchasing Systems Under the EC Directives and UK Procurement Regulations. 
Chapter 3 in Arrowsmith 2009 (n 6). . • 
, 138 S ~ e e A r r o w ~ m i t h h 1 9 9 ~ ~ (Part 1, ? 134): p. 115 onwards; the taxonomy presented in that article is significantly more 




A: Two Step Process139 Pl.lrchaser buys from Purchaser buys from 
supplier; afterwards suppliers; afterwards set 
agree on terms for future up terms for future 
purchases purchases 
B: Binding Contract Purchaser undertakes to Purchaser undertakes to 
buy; supplier undertakes buy; suppliers all 
to provide undertake to pro',(ide 
C: Supplier Bound Purchaser does not Purchaser does not 
undertake to buy; undertake to buy; 
supplier undertakes to suppliers all undertake 
provide to supply 
D: Purchaser Bound Purchaser undertakes to Purchaser undertakes to 
buy; supplier does not buy; suppliers do not 
undertake to supply undertake to supply 
E: No Binding Contract Purchaser and supplier Purchaser and suppliers 
discuss supply, but discuss supply, but 
, neither commits to a neither commit to a 
, , 
binding agreement binding agreement 
, Table 2.3.3 - A Taxonomy of Framework Arrangemen ts 
There was little controversy regarding single-provider framework arrangements under the old 
directi,ves: both the open and restricted procedure could be easily used in order to arrive at the 
framework arrangement 
, ! 
139 The first purchase is. from the perspective of the EU directives. a stand-alone ·contract'. T h e ' a r r a n g e m ~ n t t for future 
purchases can take any of the forms deSCribed in B-E. ' , " ' 
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Contractually, as described in the above table, various arrangements of single provider 
frameworks were possible. What distinguished procedures A, Band C from procedures D and E 
was when a "contract" was concluded from the perspective of the directives. In situations A 
through C, the framework arrangement itself was the "binding contract", as there was a binding 
commitment to purchase from a given provider.l4O Providing that the framework arrangement 
was concluded in line with the directives, these types of arrangements were not contrary to EU 
law. Under scenarios D or E, on the other hand, no 'f;ontract' existed until an order was placed 
and the contracting entity itself became bound by the agreement-but if the original framework 
was set up in line with the directives, and the orders were placed in line with the framework 
agreement, there would again be no violation of EU law. l41 Member States thus had significant 
discretion in deciding what contractual terms to apply to framework arrangements, as the EU 
directives appeared to permit all forms described above. 
Multi-provider frameworks were more complicated under EU law, largely because of the fact that 
in a multi-provider framework, a second stage of award (a 'call-off) is needed in order to 
determine which of the suppliers actually will supply the good/work/service in question at the 
time that the contracting entity requires it 
The old directives clearly allowed for the situation where a call-off under the framework 
agreement was placed based on the original tenders the suppliers used to enter into the 
framework agreement In this scenario, the Commission has argued that the framework 
agreement itself is the contractl42; it is supported in this perspective by the C).H3 Providing the 
original framework agreement was concluded in line with the rules in the directives, these 
framework arrangements were permissible. 
140 Arrowsmith 2005 (n 25), p. 677. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Commission, Explanatory Note on Framework Agreements, CC/ZOOs/03_rev 1 of 14.7.2005; it argues that orders 
placed under these types of framework agreements are not subject to the directive's award criteria as the framework 
agreement itself is the relevant public contract (section 3.2 and 3.4). 
143 C a s ~ ~ ~ - 1 1 9 / 0 6 6 Commission v Italy [2007] ECR 1-00168 ("Health Care"); see also its earlier judgment In Case C-79/94 
CommIssIon v Greece. [1995] EeR 1-01071 ' 
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A second variety of the multi-provider framework required that a 'mini-competition' was held 
before the order was awarded to any of the suppliers under the framework. In this scenario, 
again, a contract existed only at the point when (post-mini-competition) the order was placed 
with the winning supplier. The difficulty with these kinds of framework arrangements was that 
they implied a round of discussion or negotiation (leading to re-tendering) between the 
contracting entity and the suppliers, in order to determine which supplier was best suited to the 
particular needs of the contracting authority at the time.144 This would be permitted under the 
negotiated procedure, but it is uncertain whether or not this was permissible under the 
restricted or open procedure. 
A third possibility was a framework arrangement under which the suppliers were allowed to 
modify and improve their tenders at any point in time, leading to a situation where the 
contracting entity simply chose the best 'tender' available at the time of its purchase. While 
permitted under the negotiated procedure, this would not have been permitted under the open 
or restricted procedure.14s 
Lastly, there was the option of setting up a framework arrangement that 'rotated' the award of an 
order among the suppliers; this was clearly forbidden under the old directives as it fails to 
consider which supplier has the lowest/most economically advantageous offer at the time the 
order is placed, and consequently ignores the directives' set award criteria.146 
Barring the setup discussed last, there was scope for all of these different types offramework 
arrangements under the old EU regime. Prior to 2004, national legislators thus had to determine 
if and how national contracting authorities could conclude framework arrangements. 
The position of the EU on framework agreements is clarified to an extent by the 2004 Public 
Sector Directive-primarily in that it now expressly permits for both single-provider frameworks 
and multi-provider frameworks to be used, thus dismissing earlier uncertainties on this paint 
144 See Arrowsmith 2005 (n 25). p. 681-683, discussing how the restricted and open procedures approach iterative 
tendering processes. ' ' " ' " " . , ' , 
145 Arrowsmith 2005 (n 25), p. 684; the process is not transparent and could result in collusion. ' 
146 The wording of the 2004 Directive insinuates that these kinds of frameworks are now permissible; this is also the view' 
adopted by the Commission in its Explanatory Note on Framework Agreements (n 142), section 3.2. 
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Still, the 2004 directive does not discuss the variants of multi-provider frameworks that are 
outlined above to any great extent and so the legality of several of the scenarios discussed above 
remain unclear. These uncertainties, as well as general choices left to Member States on the 
implementation of framework agreements, will now be analyzed. 
2.3.4 Framework Arrangements under the 2004 Directive 
2.3.4.1 National Implementation ChoiceS 
As with the competitive dialogue procedure, the first thing to note about the provisions on 
framework agreements is that they are optional: 
"Member States may provide that contracting authorit!es may conclude framework agreementsN• 
(Article 32(1), emphasis added). 
It is further left to the Member States to structure and categorize the availability of framework 
agreements to their contracting entities: framework agreements do not have to be made 
available to all contracting authorities under all circumstances. 
The directive is silent on t ~ e e contractual setting-up of frar,nework agreements, as discussed in 
section 2.3.3-the issue of whether or not a framework agreement contains any or exclusively 
binding obligations is not addressed. The consequences of this are two-fold: firstly, the various 
framework agreements outlined in section 2.3.3 in principle all seem available, but the directive 
also does not make it clear when a particular contractual form would be useful,. The extent to 
which "binding obligations" are established can also differ; for instance, there may be 
requirements to buy the entire supply from a single supplier, or to only require buying supply up 
to a certain amount. The national legislator may decide to engage with these issues even though 
the directive does not 
45 
More generally, the directive also does not comment on when, for instance, a single-supplier 
framework is preferable to a multi-supplier, and vice versa. It is possible that the national 
legislator will wish to establish rules that relate these different types of framework agreements 
to types of purchases (ie, supplies versus services) or even different products (ie, energy supply 
versus stationary), even though the directive does not restrict use of framework agreements in 
this way. 
There are several other situations where the directive opts to not set out strict rules, but where 
national entities might For instance, Article 35 on contract award notices makes it clear that 
only award of the framework has to be publicized, but the award of orders under the framework 
does not As the CJ stated in the Beentjes case, nothing precludes a Member State's right to 
legislate beyond what the directives require.147 As such, Member States can opt to make contract, 
award notices mandatory even for orders placed under the framework. 
What this means in practice is that existing national approaches-both in procurement and in 
contract law-can have a great influence on how framework agreements are implemented after 
2004; if a Member State determined that it was illegal (or perhaps plain unwise) to use a specific 
contractual form ofinulti-provider frameworks under the old directives, and the new directives 
remain silent on their appropriateness, it may lead to a Member State opting to continue not 
making that type of framework arrangement available. Conversely, Member States that did not 
, legislate on the use of framework arrangements at all under the old directives may now adjust 
, the national regime to allow for various, if not all, possible framework arrangements. 
\' 
, 2.3.4.2 Awarding & Using Framework Agreements under the 2004 Directive 
The EU rules on framework agreements relate to procedures to be followed in concluding and 
operating framework agreements. The first observation to be made is that framework 
a g r ~ e m e n t s s are not considered to be a separate 'procedure' as such; instead, the directive (in 
..', ,,' , 





Article 32(2)) clearly indicates that in setting up a framework agreement, the normal 'rules of 
procedure' (ie, open or restricted) will be followed.148 
The 2004 directive's rules on awarding and using framework agreements are as follows: 
a) Single Supplier Framework (Article 32(2) and 32(3)) 
When a contracting authority wishes to award a single-supplier framework, they advertise the 
procurement as they would any other contract covered by the directive. Interested bidders then 
submit tenders on an estimate of the overall requirement, and the contracting authority 
, 
identifies the winning bidder using the same award criteria as they would for any other contract 
under the directive. The contracting authority then can either immediately conclude a 
contractual arrangement with the supplier for regular requirements, or they can arrange to 
purchase specified goods or services under the agreement only as requirements arise. 
b) Multi-Supplier Framework (Article 32(2) and 32(4)) 
As with single-supplier frameworks, under a multi-supplier framework, the advertising of the 
contract takes place under the directive's general advertising rules. Interested bidders then 
submit tenders on an estimate of the overall requirement; from these bidders, the contracting 
authority selects the suppliers that will become part of the framework agreement (known as the 
'framework suppliers'; the directive requires at least 3 suppliers are admitted, where available). 
When a call-off under the framework agreement is then made in the future, there are two 
methods to determine which supplier will actually provide the requested supply: 
By using the terms of the 'estimated tenders' the bidders supplied to access the 
framework; or 
148 Arrowsmith 2005 (n 25): p. 696. 
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By holding a new 'mini-competition', in which bidders submit new 'miniature tenders' 
that specifically respond to the call-off requirements. 
While the majority of the rules on framework agreements are found in Article 32, some other 
subject-specific rules can be found in other places in the directive. The remaining rules on 
framework agreements are generally found 'per topic' -so, for instance, Article 9 on aggregation 
of contract value has a specific clause on framework agreements, as does Article 35 on contract 
award notices. 
2.3.4.3 Legal Uncertainty in the directive's Provisions on Framework Agreements 
. 
Several procedural elements regarding framework agreements remain unclear from the wording 
of the directive, the most significant of which are: 
1) The application of Article 53 (on award criteria) to framework agreements. The 
application of Article 53 is expressly mentioned in Article 32(2), which deals with the 
award oftheJramework agreement. A first question is whether or not price always has 
to be considered when selecting the framework suppliers; in markets with very volatile 
prices, for instance, it may not be possible or realistic to request binding prices when 
tenderers apply to join the framework agreement149 A second concern is that the 
... application of Article 53 is not discussed with respect to orders placed in multi-provider 
..• 'c' ~ ~ frameworks in Article 32(4). One possible interpretation of this is that for orders placed 
under the framework, the award criteria do not apply; the Commission adheres to this' 
view.1SO It can, however, also be argued that Article 53 would apply regardless so as to 
'. make the ·entire framework agreement more transparent and to make framework 
agreements appear more consistent with other types of contracts awarded.l51 The first 
interpretation potentially allows for the 'rotating' award of contracts that was forbidden 
, " 
149 Arrowsmith 2009 (Methods. n 137). p. 160. 
ISO Explanatory Note on Framework Agreements (n 142). section 3.2-3.4. , 
. lSI Whether this is a goal of the EU legislation. however, is debatable; moreover, awarding a contract on the basis of pre-
stated criteria In the framework agreement is not 'untransparent' by definition. [Arrowsmith 2006 (Frameworks. n 
137).] , , . , 
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under the old directives (providing the award is transparent and treats suppliers 
equaUy)lS2; the second interpretation, however, probably does not 
2) The use of and disclosure of award criteria in framework agreements. The law on 
the use of different award criteria and sub-criteria and weighting mechanisms has been 
complicated immensely in recent years by CJ jurisprudence on this issue. The fact that 
the 2004 directive thus does not explicitly state whether award criteria at the call-off 
stage need to be made public, and whether or not they can differ from those used at the 
framework award stage, means that the C)'s case law has to be consulted in trying to 
determine what is permissible. To illustrate the potential problem, consider that where 
a call-off is urgent, speed of supply will playa bigger role than it will under normal 
circumstances (when, for instance, cost may be more important)-but it is unlikely that 
criteria and weightings used at the framework award stage will consider 'urgency'. The 
Commission's Explanatory Note here suggests that at the call-off stage, different award 
criteria- may be used; problematic, however, is the CJ's case law in A TIl 53 and LianakislS4, 
where the general principle of transparency was used to require contracting authorities 
to disclose their award criteria and weightings in advance. Under framework 
agreements, if different criteria for particular call-offs are permitted, advance disclosure 
will be quite difficult as the circumstances and requirements of each individual call-off 
may be slightly different 
3) Multi-User Frameworks. The directive is silent on these. Nothing in the directive in 
principle appears to forbid their use, but how they are operated in practice is 
complicated by the aforementioned silence. For instance, the rules on contract value 
aggregation (Article 9(9)) indicate that for a framework agreement, the value of the 
contract will be the value of all contracts concluded under the framework during its 
existence. This, however, presumes that only one contracting authority is using the 
framework. How this is dealt with for mUltiple users has direct bearing on the rules on 
advertising the contract-it can occur that all users individually do not cross the 
152 Arrowsmith, ibid, notes that as there Is no jurisprudence on what the general principles of the directives require in 
terms of award criteria, there is no certainty as to what types of award criteria (outside of Article 53) would be 
permissible. 
153 Case C-331/04ATI EAC S : ' A V ~ a 9 9 i i di Maio Snc and others v ATCV Venezia SpA and others [2005] ECR 1-10109 
154 Case C-532/06 Emm.G. L,anak,s AE and others v Dimos Alexandroupolis and others [2008) ECR 1-251 
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thresholds on their purchases, but that the framework as a whole does. Depending on 
how multiple users are treated (separately or as a whole), the rules of the directive will 
or will not apply.155 
4) Identification of parties to the framework. Article 32(2) indicates that the normal 
rules on advertising the contract will apply to framework agreements. However, the 
directive is not clear on the extent to which entities that will be party to the framework 
agreement have to be identified in the original contract notice. As the directive only 
refers to the "contracting authority", it is unclear what has to be done in the event that 
the framework is to be used by several contracting entities. Article 32(2) also indicates 
that no additional parties can be added to the framework agreement following its 
conclusion, which seems to imply that all parties have to be identified-but whether this 
is by name, or more generally (ie, 'all central government bodies') remains unclear.156 
The Commission has taken an intermediary position on this issue, by noting that while it 
is inappropriate to identify framework users as "all contracting authorities" in a given 
Member State, it is possible to set up a multi-user framework with a description of, ie, 
"all UK universities", providing these are then clearly identifiable on a secondary 
document (like a list).157 
5) Information Requirements in Article 41 and call-offs. Article 41 ofthe directive 
requires that, in order to assure that losing tenderers can protest an award decision in a 
. timely manner, all tenderers are notified when a 'contract' or 'framework agreement' is 
awarded. Article 41, however, does not refer to call-offs; it is thus unclear whether or 
~ o t t all parties to a framework agreement have to be notified when a particular call-off is 
awarded.158 
There are thus, as with competitive dialogue, several 'grey areas' in terms of the procedural 
aspects of concluding and operating framework agreements. It will be up to national legislators 
155 The logical Interpretation is that aggregate value of the framework is the value of all contracts awarded, independent 
of how many contracting entities are party to the framework. (See Arrowsmith 2006 (Frameworks, n 137).) 
. 156 Arrowsmith 2009 (Methods, n. 137), p. 155; see also Arrowsmith 2005 (n 25), p. 701. . 
157 Explanatory Note on Framework Agreements (n. 142) at 3.2. 
. ISS Arrowsmith 2009 (Methods. n 137), p. 174-175, argues that the information obligations apply to call-offs because 
these are 'public contracts' per the Directive's definitions. .' . 
so 
or guidance institutes to interpret these provisions and steer contracting entities towards what 
they consider best practice within the boundaries of EU law. 
2.3.4 Conclusions 
The EU rules on framework agreements are intended to be skeletal. This leaves the Member 
States with significant discretion in deciding whether or not to allow the use of the procedure at 
all; which incarnations of the procedure will be allowed; which contracting entities may use the 
procedure, and in which circumstances. One extreme possibility is that a Member State disallows 
all framework agreements, but as they are considered beneficial in various circumstances-such 
as when ensuring security of supply, or saving time and cost when making off-the-shelf 
purchases-this is unlikely. However, it is also possible that individual Member States will build 
their own rules with regard to framework agreements, and thus variation between Member 
States will be detected. Chapters 3-5 will consider the choices made in the Member States 
discussed in this thesis. 
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2.4 Case Study 3: The General Principles of Equal Treatment and Transparency 
2.4.1 Introduction 
This section will discuss the development of the general principles of equal treatment and 
transparency and how these principles are (or can be) applied to a) contracts covered by the 
directives and b) contracts not covered by the directives. 
The general principles were selected as a case study because the post-1993 case law of the CJ has 
imposed positive obligations on Member States beyond those that are explicitly stated in the 
directives; this includes obligations extending to below-threshold contracts, part Il-B service 
contracts, and service concession agreements ("non-directive procurement"), but also obligations 
for above-threshold procurement that are not stated in the directives themselves ("directive 
procurement"). What the obligations entail is largely unclear, primarily because the CJ has 
developed the obligations on a case-by-case basis. 
The section will commence with a discussion of the development of the general principles under 
the directives and what types of obligations have been superimposed onto the directives through 
application of the general principles (section 2.4.2). In section 2.4.3, the impact of the principles 
on the Treaty, and the Commission's Interpretative Communication on this relationship, will be 
examined. 
2.4.2 The General Principles under the Directive 
There are two general principles recognized by EU law that have a direct bearing on public 
procurement: first, the European Courts have been consistently referring to the principle of equal 
treatment(equality in the past ten years of procurement case law. In the 1993 directives, the 
S2 
principles were generally not stated 159 and were thus found only in the Courts' case law, but as of 
2004 they are made express in both the Utilities and the Public Sector Directives.16o 
The principle of equal treatment under the directives was first referred to in Storebaelt161 in 
1993, but not expanded on beyond indicating that contracting authorities had to treat tenderers 
equally. Between 1993 and 2005, the principle was referred to in various cases, but not defined 
further.162 The first judgment that offers a workable definition of the ~ q u a l l treatment principle 
under the directives is Fabricom163, where the Court stated that "the equal treatment principle 
requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations 
must not be treated in the same way, unless such treatment is objectively justified".164 The q 
further stated that there does not have to be a cross-border element before this principle applies; 
the principle can thus be invoked by any bidder if it feels it has been treated unequally, 
independent of whether it is domestic or foreign.165 
In Fabricom, the Court demonstrated a willingness to scrutinize the choices made by contracting 
authorities and to subject them to a test of proportionality-ie, is the unequal measure 
proportionate to what it proposes to aim-in assessing equal treatment of tenderers.166 
Fabricom concerned a Belgian law excluding all tenderers who participated in the preparatory 
work for a contract from the bidding process, which was deemed to be disproportionate for 
ensuring equal treatment of tenderers. According to the q, equal treatment only required that a 
tenderer was excluded if they could not rebut the presumption that they had gained a 
competitive advantage from the preparatory work. The judgment thus essentially established a 
new obligation for all Member State to not automatically exclude all tenderers who assist in 
preparatory work. 
159 The exceptions here are the 1993 Utilities Directive (which contained a reference to non-discrimination. of which 
equal treatment is one example) and the 1993 Services Directive. 
160 Article 2 of the Public Sector Directive; Article 10 of the Utilities Directive. 
161 Case C-243/89 Commission v Denmark [1993] ECR 1-3353 ("Storebaelt") 
16Z See. for instance, Case C-87/94 Commission v Belgium [1996] ECR 1-2043 ("Walloon Buses") 
163 Joint C a . s e ~ ~C-21/03 and C-34/03. F a b r ; ~ o m m v.Etat BeIge (2005) ECR 1·1559. See also S. Treumer, "Technical dialogue 
and the pnnclple of equal treatment - deahng With conflicts ofinterest after Fabricom" (2007) 16 PPLR 99 
164 Fabricom, ibid. para. 27. 
165 Storebaelt (n 161). para. 33 and Walloon Buses (n 160). For a discussion see Arrowsmith 2006 (Evolution n 3) p. 
354-55. ' , 
. 166 Ibid. p. 355-357. 
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The Fabricom judgment illustrates how the general principle of equal treatment can be used by 
the CJ to create new positive obligations; it can be assumed that the CJ may rely on the same 
general principle to regulate other areas not addressed in the directives at the moment 167 
Examples of where the equal treatment principle could apply, even when the directives are silent, 
include whether or not it is possible to accept late submissions of tenders or pre-qualification 
questionnaires (PQQs); the directive does not address either of these situations, but the CJ 
jurisprudence on equal treatment suggests that the equal treatment principle would prohibit 
accepting late tenders/PQQs, as this would give an 'unequal' advantage to the tenderer 
submitting information past submission deadlines. 
The principle of transparency has been established to a lesser extent under the directives. Its 
primary role is to support the principle of equal treatment by ensuring that 'unequal treatment' 
can be easily recognized. Arrowsmith has identified four separate aspects of the transparency 
principle under the directives: "publicity for opportunities, publicity for the rules governing each 
procedure, ... rule-based decision making, and opportunities for verification and enforcement".168 
A clear example of the application of the principle of transparency is found in Universale-Bau 169, 
where a contracting authority had informed the tenderers of the award criteria to be used during 
a procedure, but had failed to disclose the 'scoring system' it had developed in order to make its 
assessments.' The CJ in this case stated that transparency would have required that where a 
weighting system is decided on in advance, the tenderers must be made aware of what those 
weightings are. More recently, this line of case law has been developed by ATJ and Lianakis, 
, wherein it was established that the transparency rules on award criteria and weightings also 
generally apply to sub-criteria and the weightings of sub-criteria.170 
In a recent decision, the General Court (GC) clarified the relationship between the equal 
treatment principle and the transparency principle by a s s ~ s s i n g g both in the same case. In 
167 Ibid. 
169 Ibid, p. 358. 
169 Case C-470/99 Universale·8au v EBS [2002) ECR 1·11617: , 
170 In ATI (n 153), it was determined that assigning weightings to sub-criteria at a late, but pre-bid-submission, stage did 
not violate the transparency prinCiple, providing that these weightings did not distort competition; in Lianakis (n 154), on 
the other hand, setting weightings and sub-criteria after bid submissions did violate the equal treatment and 
transparency principles. See also T. Kotsonis, "The nature of award criteria and the subsequent stipulation ofweightings 
and sub-criteria: L1anakis v Dimos Alexandroupolis (C-532/06)" (2008) 17 PPLR 128. " 
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European Dynamicsl7l , the GC had to determine if having an incumbent service provider bid on a 
contract violated the equal treatment principle. It concluded that such a provider had a de facto 
advantage, but this would not necessarily violate equal treatment; problematic was the fact that 
the incumbent provider had access to documentation and information that other bidders did not 
In order to satisfy the equal treatment requirement in this case, the GC concluded that the 
transparency principle had to be satisfied172, and so the available information had to be made 
available to all parties, so as to counteract a competitive advantage for the incumbent provider. 
The most recent development in equal treatment under the directives can be found in the 
Michaniki173 case, where the CJ determined that "in addition to the grounds for exclusion [in 
procurement procedures] based on objective considerations of professional quality", 
(proportionate) exclusionary measures could also be taken to preserve the equal treatment of 
bidders in procedures.174 This builds on the general principle established in Fabricom, whereby 
national laws or measures that aim to guarantee equal treatment and transparency between 
bidders will be tested as to their proportionality. 
From these cases, we can see that the CJ will use the general principles as a means of evaluating 
an award procedure, and that the potential freedom for Member States to interpret the directives 
flexibly is restricted by a narrow application of both principles.175 
Still, the two general principles under the directives are not generally perceived as a source of 
controversy. While the CJ developed them, they are now a part of the legislation, Indicating that 
171 Case T·345/03, Evropaiki Dynamiki - Proigmena Systimata Tilepikoinonion Pliro!orikis kai Tilematikis AE v Commission 
[2008] ECR 1l·00341. See also P. Braun •• Addressing the competitive advantage of an incumbent provider: Evropaiki 
Dynamiki· Proigmena Systimata Tilepikoinonion Pliroforikis kai Tilematikis AE v Commission (Case T ·345/03)" (2008) 
17 PPLR NA140. 
I7Z The C) has stated that transparency is necessary for the equal treatment principle to be satisfied before; see also. for 
example. Case C·448/01 EVN AG and Wienstrom GmbH v Republik Osterreich [2003] ECR 1·14527. 
173 Case C·213/07 Michaniki AE v Ethniko Simvoulio Radiotileorasis and Ipourgos Epikratias [2008] ECR 1-09999. See D. 
McGowan, "Exclusion of bidders on grounds of holding media interests: Michaniki AE V Ethniko Simvoulio Radiotileorasis 
and Ipourgos Epikratias (C·213/07)" (2009) 18 PPLR NA79. 
17. Michaniki. ibid, has since been further developed in Case C-538/07 Assitur SrI v Camera di Commercio Industria 
Artigianato e Agricoltura di Milano [2009} ECR 1·04219 wherein the CJ determined that a national m e a s ~ r e e that ' 
absolutely prohibited ·simultaneous and competing participation in the same tendering procedure by undertakings 
linked by a relationship of control" was, while aiming to achieve equal treatment of tenderers, not proportionate to the 
aim pursued. [Para 33.} . 
175 Arrowsmith 2006 (Evolution, n 3), p. 357-358. 
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Member States support the general principles and the way in which the CJ interprets their 
application to procurement under the directives. 
2.4.3 The General Principles under the TFEU 
As mentioned in section 2.1.5.1, prior to a landmark case in 1998, the Treaty was believed to only 
apply to public procurement by setting negative obligations, prohibiting any discrimination 
against bidders from other EU Member States. In 1998, however, the CJ stated in Telaustria 176 
that the general principle of transparency applied not just to the procurement directives, but also 
to procurement under the TFEU. The Court's reasoning was that in order to abide by the non-
discrimination provisions in the Treaty, contracting authorities are obligated to be transparent in 
their procurement decisions. To fulfil this obligation, the Court concluded, "a degree of 
advertising sufficient to enable ... competition and [judicial review of the procurement 
procedurer is needed.l71 
Whether or not the general principles have always applied to the TFEU has been a subject of 
debate17B-some commentators believe that as the CJ has, since the 1970s, recognized that there 
is a principle of 'equality' or equal treatment under the TFEU and its predecessorsl79, the 
recognition of a principle of transparency to uphold this principle follows logically. Others 
maintain that the source of the general principles is most definitely the directives, as the TFEU 
0" 
only recognizes equal treatment in specific contexts/provisions, and in any event, none of the 
general principles found in the TFEU have been interpreted previously by the CJ to hold positive 
, II 
obligations for Member States.lBO We will now consider what these positive obligations are. 
176 Te/austria (n 4). . 
177 Ibid, para 62. 
'178 For discussions on the general principles and the TFEU, see L. Richer, L ' E u ~ o p e e des marches publics (LGJD: Paris 2009), 
Chapter 3.2; F. Neumayr, "Value for Money v. Equal Treatment: the Relationship Between the Seemingly Overriding 
National Rationale for Regulating Public Procurement and the Fundamental EC PrinCiple of Equal Treatment" (2002) 22 
PPLR 215, which offers the perspective that the general principles are naturally derived from the Treaty; for contrasting 
, opinions, see P. Braun, M A Matter of Principle(s)-The Treatment of Contracts Falling Outside the Scope of the European 
Public Procurement Directives· (2000) 9 PPLR 39; Arrowsmith 2005 (n 25), p. 197, E. Pijnacker Hordijk and M. 
Meulenbelt, • A Bridge Too Far: Why the European Commission's Attempts to Construct an Obligation to Tender outside 
the Scope of the Public Procurement Directives should be Dismissed" (2005) 14 PPLR 123. , 
179 See Neumayr, ibid; for more information on general principles under the TFEU, see Craig and de Burca, (n 29), Chapter 
11. ' 
180 Arrowsmith 2005 (n 25), p. 198; Braun 2000 (n 178), p. 45. 
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2.4.3.1 Transparency & Advertising Obligations 
The CJ's case law on 'the principle of transparency' did not commence with Telaustria. In two 
judgments in 1999, the Court referred in more general terms to transparency. The first, RISAN, 
indicated that the Treaty imposed an obligation "to ensure equal treatment and transparency."l8l 
The Court built on this general idea by stating, in Unitron Scandinavia, that "the principle of non-
discrimination ... implies ... an obligation of transparency in order to enable the contracting 
authority to satisfy itself that it has been complied wi*."l82 Following these two preliminary 
cases, the Telaustria judgment introduced the 'how' of complying with the obligation for 
transparency: 'advertising'. 
Telaustria, which concerned a services concession contract, demanded a "degree of advertising" 
that met two criteria: the enabling of competition and the operation of a judicial review 
procedure to assess the impartiality of the award process. The fact that the decision failed to be 
more .specific about the degree to which these criteria had to be met, or in what circumstances 
they had to be met, led to speculation as well as criticism because of legal uncertainty.l83 
Further c1arificat,ion on the scope and applicability of the transparency obligation would not 
come until 2005. Coname184 concerned a service concession awarded directly to a local 
undertaking, failing primajacie on the 'advertising' requirement Nonetheless, in its analysis of 
the facts the case, the CJ (in a full-court jUdgment) provided some further guidance on the 
requirement for advertising. 
It first considered the size and value of the contract, and stated that if the contract had had "a 
very modest economic interest at stake", there would be no reason to presume cross-border 
181 Case C-108/98 RI.SAN. Sri v Comune di Ischia,ltalia Lavoro SpA and Ischia Ambiente SpA [1999] ECR 1-05219, para 20. 
182 Case C-275/98 Unitron Scandinavia AjS and 3-5 AjS, Danske SVineproducenters Servlcese/skab v Ministeriet!or 
Fedevarer, Landbrug og Fiskeri [1999] ECR 1·08291, para. 31. 
183 Arrowsmith 2005 (n 25), p. 197. 
184 Case C-231/03 Consorzia Aziende Metano (Coname) v Cinoia de' Botti [2005] ECR 1-07287. See also A. Brown, 
"Transparency obligations under the EC Treaty in relation to public contracts that fall outside the procurement 
Directives: a note on C-231/03. Consorzio Aziende Metano (Coname) v Comune di Cingia de' Botti" (2005) 14 PPLR 
NA153. 
57 
interest in it, and as such there would not have been an obvious infringement of the freedom of 
movement provisions. lSS The CJ did not indicate whether or not there are additional, non-
economic circumstances that would have made the contract not of cross-border interest 
After determining that the contract in Coname was not of a very modest economic interest, the 
Court indicated that it was for a national court to determine if the transparency principle was 
satisfied. It added that the transparency criteria do not necessarily imply an obligation to issue a 
formal invitation to tender: what is required of a contracting authority, under the principle of 
transparency, is making available "appropriate information regarding [a contract] before it is 
awarded" in such a way that foreign bidders would be able to access it.186 
In some ways, Coname appears to have reduced the advertising requirements-though it by no 
means clarifies them. 'Instead of relying on the word 'advertising', the Court in Coname stressed 
the availability of information about a contract-which can be accomplished by, for instance, 
posting information about the contract on a public website. However, the Court failed to indicate 
in what circumstances 'information provision' would suffice in satisfying the transparency 
criteria. As the CJ determined whether or not advertising was required by examining the value of 
the contract, it is possible that the extent of advertising required is also affected by contract 
. value-but true guidance is not found in Coname • 
. Cases that followed Coname did not elaborate greatly on this point: in Parking BrixenlB7, the CJ 
. ~ , ,
indicated that individual contracting authorities must decide on a case-by-case basis to what 
extent a formal 'call for tenders' was needed. Of course, ~ h e r e e is significant scope between a 
'formal call for tenders' and 'no call for competition at all', leaving great questions for contracting 
authorities on what is expected of them.18B 
,85 Ibid, para 20. 
186 Ibid, para. 21. 
.187 Parking Brixen (n 96) . 
• 188 On this pOint, see also Case C-260/04 CommiSSion v Italy [2007] ECR 1-7083. See also A. Brown, "The obligation to 
advertise betting shop licences under the EC principle oftransparency: Case C-260/04 Commission v Italy· (2008) 17 
PPLRNAl.· . 
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Additional relevant cases were decided in 2007189, and further detailed the scope of application 
of the transparency principle. The first of these, Commission v Finland190, made it clear that the 
transparency principle also applied to contracts below the directives' thresholds, though the case 
itself was dismissed on procedural grounds.191 The next case, Commission v Ireland (An Post)192, 
was the first Part II B services contract to be the subject of infringement proceedings. The case 
concerned a non-advertised contract awarded to the Irish Post Office, whereby social welfare 
benefits could be collected from the post offices. The CJ again dismissed the case, this time 
because the Commission failed to sufficiently support its case. The CJ reasoned that it was for the 
Commission to demonstrate that there was cross-border interest for the contract in question; as 
the Commission, in its proceedings, had acted on a presumption of cross-border interest, the case 
was dismissed.193 Identical reasoning on burden of proof was used to reject the Commission's 
complaint in Commission v Italy (Health Care)194, which concerned framework agreements for 
healthcare transport services.195 
Finally, Commission v Ireland (Ambulances)196 concerned a verbal agreement between a city 
council and a health authority to provide ambulance services. The Commission initiated an 
infringement proceeding on the basis of this verbal agreement as it had not been advertised and 
thus vi?lated the transparency obligation. Ireland, on the other hand, asserted that as there was 
no contract in writing and the ambulance service was provided according to a statutory right, no 
public contract exited. The Court accepted that Ireland's argument was 'conceivable' and as such, 
for a third consecutive time, failed the Commission's claim on the basis that they had made a 
presumption that it did not back up with evidence. 
189 For commentary, see D. McGowan. ·Clarity at last? Low value contracts and transparency obligations· (2007) 16 PPLR 
274 
190 Case C-195/04 Commission v Finland [20071 ECR 1-03351. 
191 One of the criteria of Article 258 ofthe Treaty. which enables the Commission to bring an action before the Court, is 
that a clear and specific summary of the pleas in law has to be submitted; the CJ determined the Commission failed to do 
this in this case. For a discussion of the case see T. Kotsonis. "The Extent of the Transparency Obligation Imposed on a 
Contracting Authority Awarding a Contract Whose Value Falls Below the Relevant Value Threshold: Case C-195/04. 
Commission v Finland. April 26. 2007" (2007) 16 PPLR NA119, p. NA120. 
19Z Case C·507/03 Commission v Ireland [20071 ECR 1-09777 ("An Post"). See also A. Brown. "The European Commission 
fails to prove that an Irish contract for Part B services was of cross-border interest: a note on Case C-507/03 Commission 
v Ireland" (2008) 17 PPLR NA35 and D. McGowan, "Commission v Ireland: post offices. proof and transparency" (2008) 
17 PPLRNA48 
193 An Post. ibid. para. 32 . 
.. 4 See Health Care (n 143). 
195 For a discussion. see A. Brown. "Application of the Directives to Contracts with Not-For·Profit Organisations and 
Transparency under the EC Treaty: a note on Case C-119/06 Commission v Italy" (2008) 17 PPLR NA96. 
196 Case C-532/03 Commission v Ireland [2007] ECR 1-11353 ("Ambulances"). See also A. Brown, HThe Commission loses 
another action against Ireland owing to lack of evidence: a note on Case C-532/03 Commission v Ireland" (2008) 17 PPLR 
NA92. 
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While the obligation to 'advertise' was not clarified by the 2007 cases, the CJ did consistently 
require a demonstrable 'cross-border interest' to trigger any advertising requirements-
providing slightly more guidance to national legislators and contracting authorities on what is 
required under the Treaty. 
2.4.3.2 Other Cases on the General Principles outside of the Directives 
The general principles have also been used to comment on equal treatment and transparency , 
obligations outside of the specific context of advertising. Of particular interest is APERMC197, 
wherein the CJ said the following in paragraph 77: 
"Furthermore, it follows from Article 86(1) EC that the Member States must 
not maintain in force national legislation which permits the award of public 
service contracts without a call for tenders since such an award infringes 
Article 43 EC or 49 EC or the principles of equal treatment, non-
discrimination and transparency (see, by analogy, Parking Brixen, paragraph 
52, ... )." 
This judgment has been interpreted in the Netherlands198 as potentially meaning that legislation 
that permits the award of public contracts without advertising is generally contrary to the 
general principles of equal treatment and transparency. Legislation that establishes thresholds 
below which advertising obligations do not exist, for instance, would by that definition run 
contrary to the TFEU. 
Other important cases on the general principles were decided in 200S. The first of these, 
Commission v Italy199, explicitly stated that legislation is not required for contracts falling outside 
.' , - " , 
" , \. { 
, ofthe directives in order to comply with the general principles under the TFEU. This general 
191 C-220/06Asoclaclon Pro/esional de Empresas de Reparto y Manipulado de Correspondencia v Administraci6n General del 
Estado [2007} ECR \·12175, rAPERMC"), para. 77. ' " " -' 
19a Pijnacker Hordijket al (n.11), p.172-173. 
199 C-412/04 Commission v Italy [200B} ECR \-00619. See also J. Knibbe, "Commission v Italy (Case C-412/04): f 
classification of mixed works/services contracts, the treatment of below threshold contracts, and the rules on aggregation 









conclusion has since been followed by Cj judgments that determine that generally applicable 
rules, intended to comply with the general principles of equal treatment and transparency, which 
do not consider individual circumstances of contracting authorities are actually contrary to the 
TFEU. A key example of such a case is SECApzoo, wherein an Italian rule that banned all 
abnormally low tenders for contracts that fell below the directive's thresholds was deemed 
contrary to the TFEU because it did not consider that economies of scale in other Member States 
might produce lower offers than would be considered 'normal' in Italy.2ot Another example is 
Serran ton iZoz, which follows the Michaniki judgment on mandatory exclusion rules (see section 
2.4.2 above) and applies it to contracts falling outside of the directives, by saying that mandatory 
exclusion rules established in the view of safeguarding the equal treatment of all tenderers 
nonetheless have to be proportionate to their aim. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning here the Wa1l203 case, which considered the general principle of 
transparency's role in the amendment of an existing service concession contract The directives 
have explicit rules on the extent to which concluded contracts can be amended, recently clarified 
in the pressetext204 case, which were not believed to apply to the TFEU. In Wall, the Cj effectively 
applied pressetext to a non-directive procurement, using the general principle of transparency to 
justify that "substantial amendment to the essential provisions of a service concession contract" 
may in some cases necessitate the re-awarding of that contract As Brown has said, it can be 
suggested that due to the Cj's use of the general principles, the rules in the directive and the TFEU 
are coming closer together.20s 
200 Joined Cases C-147/06 and (-148/06 SECAP SpA and Santarsa Soc. coop. arl v Comune di Torino [200B] ECR )-03565. 
See also T. Kotsonis, "Italian law on the automatic exclusion of abnormally low tenders: SECAP SpA v Commune di Torino 
(C-147/06)" (2008) 17 PPLR NA26B. 
201 SECAP effectively applies an explicit rule in the directive-that abnormally low tenders cannot be rejected outright-
to the TFEU. [See A. Brown, "EU primary law requirements in practice: advertising, procedures and remedies for public 
contracts outside the procurement directives· (2010) 18 PPLR 169, at 177.) 
202 Case C-376/08 Serranton; SrI and Consorzio stabile edili Serl v Comune di Milano, judgment of23 December 2009 
203 Case C-91/08 Wall AG v La ville de Francfort-sur-[e-Main and Frankfurter Entsorounos- und Service (FES) GmbH, 
judgment of 13 April 2010. See also A. Brown, "Changing a sub-contractor under a public services concession: Wall AG v 
Stadt Frankfurt am Main (C-91/08)" (2010) 19 PPLR NA160. 
204 Case C-454/06 pressetext Nachrichtenagenrur GmbH v Republik (jsterreich and others [2008] ECR 1-04401 
205 Brown 2010 (EU, n 201), p.l77. 
61 
2.4.3.3 The Commission's Interpretative Communication 
The Commission has issued its own opinions on the obligation of transparency as well as the 
general principles of equal treatment and transparency, and has initiated proceedings against 
several Member States on the basis of its understanding. 
In the Interpretative Communication on Concessions206, the Commission commented on Te/austria 
judgment and outlined what it believes is required under the 'general principles' of the Treaty. 
Where the Te/austria judgment does not refer to 'equal treatment', the Commission addressed it 
as both separate from and related to the principle of transparency in its communication. 
The Commission's main determination in the Interpretative Communication is that procurement 
under the Treaty is subject to rules very similar to those stated in the directives: "choice of 
candidates must be made on the basis of objective criteria, ... the award procedure must be 
conducted in accordance with the procedural rules originally set, and ... the intention to grant a 
concession must be advertised."201 
The Commission's approach in this first Communication has been heavily criticized as 
introducing undue administrative burdens on Member States for those contracts that were 
excluded (for whatever reason) from the (burdensome)directives.208 However, the Commission 
has not recanted its initial position. 
It issued a second Interpretative Communication in 2006, this time addressing the law applicable 
to contracts not (or not fully) subject to the provisions of the directives.209 This Communication 
aims to offer ' g u i d ~ m c e ' ' to Member States on how to abide by the Treaty principles.210 Unlike the 
2000 Communication, the 2006 Communication does refer to a requirement for cross-border 
" ~ ~ ~ . . , < - , 
206 Commission. [2000] OJ C121/2 (n 17). . . 
207 M. Krugner, "The Principles of Equal Treatment and Transparency and the Commission Interpretative Communication 
on Concessions' (2003) 12 PPLR 181. at p. 181. . , . . ..' . . . 
208 See Arrowsmith 2005 (n 25). p. 197-198. as well as A. Brown. "Seeing Through Transparency: the requirement to 
advertise public contracts and concessions under the EC Treaty" (2007) 16 PPLR 1 and Pijnacker Hordijk and Meulenbelt 
(n 178). . 
209 Commission. Interpretative Communication on contracts outside ofthe Directives (n 97). 
210 Ibid. Section 1. . 
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interest before a violation of the transparency obligation can be found.2l1 It also indicates that 
how to determine and respond to cross-border interest is for individual contracting authorities 
to decide.212 
Generally, however, the Commission does not deviate from its earlier position. It requires active 
publicity in the form of advertising without exception, and while it suggests several possible 
placements for an advertisement (ranging from the authority's own website to the 0JEU), it does 
not offer any suggestions on when a particular type of advertising is appropriate.213 
With regards to equal treatment, the Commission requires a non-discriminatory description of 
the contract's subject matter; equal access to the contract; mutual recognition of all relevant 
qualifications; appropriate time-limits; and a transparent and objective 'approach'. Limiting the 
number of potential candidates is permissible providing done in a transparent and non-
discriminatory fashion.214 If followed literally, this guidance would result in procedures very 
similar to those contained in the directives, albeit with more freedom for contracting authorities 
to determine issues such as time limits. 
The legitimacy and potential importance of the Commission's guidance has increased recently, . 
when a German challenge215-supported by the Member States examined in this thesis-to the 
2006 Interpretative Communication failed before the CJ. The Court determined that "the 
Communication does not contain new rules for the award of public contracts which go beyond 
the obligations under Community law as it currently stands" and consequently declared 
Germany's challenge as inadmissible, as the Communication did not produce binding legal effects. 
While a dismissal on technical grounds, the C]'s detailed considerations of all contested parts of 
the Communication and conclusion that they did not produce 'new law' can be read as implicit 
211 Ibid, Section 1.3. 
ZIZlbid. 
213 Ibid, Section 2.1. 
Z14lbid, Section 2.2. 
215 Germany v Commission (n 98). 
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agreement with the Communication. In this light, it may be that this piece of soft law will have a 
significant impact on national regulation.216 
2.4.4 Conclusions 
The q's case law on the general principles of equal treatment and transparency is a particularly 
dynamic area of EU procurement law. The above discussion highlights how the q has used the 
principles in a variety of situations, both for contracts covered by the directives and not covered 
by the directives, to add onto the explicit rules established by the EU legislator. It also 
demonstrates that despite significant amounts of case law, the specific obligations that stem from 
the jurisprudence are not always clear. 
Uncertainty about specific obligations is especially prevalent in the Te/austria line of case law, 
which has been further complicated by strong suggestions that cross-border interest must be 
determined on a case-by-case basis. Such a rule would preclude setting a general threshold 
below which contracts do not have to be advertised. National governments are also faced with 
the Commission's perspective, which may be of significant influence given the number of 
infringement procedures the Commission has started in this area and the fact that the q 
, , considers its opinion to be purely reflective of existing law. Chapters 3-5 will thus assess in what 
form and to what extent the Member States examined in this thesis have responded to the CJ's 
jurisprudence on these principles." 
2l6Germany v Commission was only decided in May 2010; any'effects of the i u d g ~ e n t t have not r e ~ e a l e d d themselves prior 
to the submission of this thesis. 
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3. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
3.1 The Development of UK Public Procurement Regulation 
3.1.1 Introduction 
This section will discuss the development of public procurement regulation in the United 
Kingdom from the 1970s onwards. It describes major developments and standard practice so as 
to provide an overview of UK policy and how it changed, especially as the EU directives were 
nationally implemented. Such an overview of procurement regulation in the UK is necessary to 
answer the thesis' primary question of whether or not recent developments at the EU level have 
altered the UK's approach to regulating procurement A secondary purpose of the section is to 
provide a general background to the UK's procurement legal framework, which will assist 
understanding of following specific sections on competitive dialogue, framework agreements and 
the general principles in the UK. 
3.1.2 UK Procurement Regulation in the 19705 and 19805 
In the United Kingdom, no formal laws dealing with public procurement existed in the 1970s for 
either central or local government 
The administration of procurement contracts was subject to the general private law on contract 
In the event of disputes, the normal civil courts would adjudicate; no separate tribunal or 
'administrative law' court has ever existed for public procurement in the United Kingdom.217 
There were very few specific rules on contract award; public law is a relatively underdeveloped 
area of UK law even today, and in the 1970s only a few specific 'government contract' rules 
Z17 C. Turpin. Government Procurement and Contracts (Longman: Guildford 1989), p. 84 and 101; this is still the case 
today. see Arrowsmith 2005 (n 25). p. 9. 
6S 
existed, the foremost of which related to the requirements for Parliament to approve the budget 
prior to any contracts being signed.2IB 
More recently, additional rules affecting contract award have been established through the 
private law doctrine of the 'implied contract', developed in Blackpool Aero Club.219 This case 
determined that if a contractor was excluded from being considered for a contract despite having 
submitted a tender on time, this would constitute a breach of an implied contract to have 
rightfully submitted tenders considered. 
Moreover, providing that a 'public law' element to a contract award decision can be 
demonstrated, judicial review of public contracts award decisions can be applied for (see section 
3.1.3.4). In the 1970s, however, both 'public' and 'private' law mostly proved tangential to public 
procurement practice, which ~ a s s regulated almost exclusively by government-issued guidelines, 
as we will now see. 
3.1.2.1 Central Government 
Departmental guidelines formed the basis of central government public procurement regulation 
for many years, up to and including 1991. Rather than implementing the original 1971 Works 
Directive and the 1977 Supplies Directive in law, the goyernment issued "administrative circulars 
Instructing procuring entities to comply" with these new European rules.220 The Commission (in 
Its 1984 report on the procurement directives221) objected to this, as it expected Member States 
~ ~
to implement the directives in such a way so as to create legally binding obligations (see section 
2.1.4).222 Administrative circulars of the kind produced in the United Kingdom were not 
enforceable by contractors and were thus not a proper method of 'implementation'; moreover, 
the use of circulars is likely to have undermined the effectiveness of the EU rules. 
218 Turpin, ibid, p. 91, describing the formal procedures that resulted in budgetary approval; Turpin further discusses 
other elements specific to government contracts. relating to the special nature of the Crown and the inability of Crown 
agents to fetter their statutory responsibilities, at p. 85 . 
. 219 Blackpool and Fylde Aero Clubv Blackpool Borough Council [199012 All ER 25; [1990] 1 WLR 1195 
220 Arrowsmith 2006 (Implementation. n 11). p. 89-90. 
221 COM(1984)747 (n 63). • 
m I. Harden. "Defining the Range of Application of the Public Sector Directives in the United Kingdom" (1992) 5 PPLR . 
362. p. 362. . I 
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Even after this substantial criticism was raised at the EU level in 1984, the UK continued to rely 
on non-binding guidance as its main regulatory instrument in the field of public procurement 
until 1991, when the first national regulations were adopted. As late as 1987, the directives were 
only alluded to within national guidance: "the present guidelines should at all times be read in 
the light of the UK's international obligations, with which they are intended to be fully 
consistent".223 The 1987 consolidated [procurement] guidelines issued to government 
departments indicated how the 1988 EU directives would be implemented: "arrangements will 
be made to ensure that those contracting authorities which are affected know of the new 
requirements".224 Formal implementation did not seem to be scheduled at any time. 
Lack of implementation, however, did not result in total non-applicability of EU law in the 1970s 
and 1980s. All EU directives have direct effect when their provisions are specific and clear 
enough, and domestic case law at the time reflected that this was recognized in the UK; 
specifically, in 1983, the Court of Appeal ruled on Burroughs Machines Ltd v Oxford Regional 
Health Authority22S, which dealt with the question as to whether or not a damages remedy would 
be considered an adequate remedy under EU rules as well as domestic rules. There is therefore 
some indication that the directives played a role in the UK legal system despite not being 
implemented. 
The UK's non-legislative approach to central government procurement regulation up to the 
1990s may suggest to readers from a more legislation-based jurisdiction that procurement 
regulation was underdeveloped in the United Kingdom. The lack of hard law, however, is not an 
indication of a lack of regulation: "over many years a substantial body of prinCiples and 
recommended practices has evolved, under Treasury guidance-now including that of the 
Central Unit on Purchasing-for the conduct of procurement and contracting"226. The term 
'guidance' is misleading, as the guidance resulted in policy for the most part-meaning that the 
223 Consolidated Guidelines, published as Appendix C to RB. Brown et aI, Government purchasing: a multi-department 
review of government contract and procurement procedures; report to the Prime Minister (HMSO: London 1984). 
224 Ibid. 
225 Burroughs Machines Ltd v Oxford Regional Health Authority [1983] ECC 434 
226 Turpin (n 217), p. 64. 
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guidance contained practices that were made mandatory for procurement officials by the 
departments for which they procured. Although not outwardly enforceable, the guidance meant 
that internal standards were consistently applied.227 
One of the main policy objectives in the 1980s was to increase competition in procurement, in 
order to achieve better value for money as well as provide a stimulus to industry. From 1981 
onwards, competition was officially encouraged in all procurement practice; this included '" 
opening up national procurement to foreign suppliers so as to maximize competition.228 
Competition officially became a Treasury focus in 1984 after departments proved to be 
somewhat slow in prioritizing competition over maintaining close contacts with national 
suppliers.229 In the 1980s, more generally, in-house procurement was determined to be 
ineffective from a value for money perspective and the untying of government procurement 
became official policy.230 This led to a situation whereby, even with the EU directives not being 
implemented through legally binding provisions, similar-competitive-methods of 
procurement were required in practice. 
3.1.2.2 Local Government 
The preceding discussion relates to the acts of central government departments; regulation of 
local government procurement has always been separate. Where prior to the implementation of 
European regulatory measure,s on a national level, central government procurement regulation 
relied almost exclusively on guidance, law did have playa role in the procurement regulation of 
local government Section 135 of the Local Government Act 1972 stipulates that "standing orders 
providing for competitive procedures" have to be made available by local government purchasers 
for the sake of obtaining vahle for money. Revised rules on locus standi for judicial review post-
1976231 have meant that these standing orders are likely to be enforceable by tenderers.232 
227 Ibid. 
228 Ibid, p. 69-71. -
229 Ibid. 
230 This policy has gone on existing. , 
2]1 See also R v Hereford Corporation ex p Harrower [1970] 1 WLR 1424, dealing with procurement standing orders and 
the Issue of standing. 
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This one provision was supplemented with additional regulation in the Local Government 
Planning and Land Act 1980, which introduced a compulsory obligation to contract out to local 
government in the fields of construction and property purchasing. This programme became 
known as "Compulsive Competitive Tendering" (CCT). 
The Local Government Act 1988 extended the CCT regime to other local government purchases, 
as part of an effort to ensure that "local and other public authorities undertake certain activities 
only if they can do so competitively".233 The LGA 1988 obliged local authorities to contract out 
(as supposed to award in-house) whenever this was more economically advantageous.234 
However, it applied only to local government and only applied if one of the tenders submitted 
was an in-house one; CCT thus did not result in competitive procurement where there was no in-
house provision to begin with. 
3.1.2.3 Early Regulation: Conclusions 
The preceding discussion shows that the arrival of formal regulations in 1991 would change 
procurement regulation in the UK. As opposed to the 'guidelines', the regulations that 
implemented the 1993 consolidated directives into UK law were both uniformly applied and 
legally enforceable. 1991 thus marked the start of a new era of public procurement regulation in 
the UK. 
232 Ho.wever, Section 135 ~ p e c i f i e s s that n o n ~ a d h e r e n c e e to the standing order cannot invalidate a contract: • A person 
entermg Into a contract WIth a local authonly does not have to Inquire whether the standing orders of the authority 
which apply to the contract have been complied with.· 
233 LGA 1988, preamble. 
234 For elaboration. see S. Arrowsmith, · D e v e l o p m e ~ t s s in Compulsory Competitive Tendering" (1994) 4 PPLR CS153·172. 
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3.1.31991 and Onwards 
3.1.3.1 Implementation o/the EU Rules 
The most notable changes after 1991 were in the legal source, rather than the practice, of the UK 
public procurement regulation. In order to comply with the obligation to implement the 
directives in law, the UK issued formal procurement regulations which contained the substantive 
content of the EU rules. The UK did not, however, implement the 1989 Remedies Directive as a 
separate instrument; rather, specific provisions in the Works, Supplies and (later) Services 
Regulations implemented the requirements of the Remedies Directive. 
The 1991 regulations (and all
,
those following) were made under powers conferred by 
Parliament in section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 as amended, which provides 
that "any designated Minister or department may by regulations make provision ... for the 
purpose of implementing any Community obligation of the United Kingdom." The designated 
Ministry in the case of public procurement was the Treasury. 
The implementation method chosen was to 'copy out' the provisions in the directive into a 
. national law. However, the attempt at verbatim transpOSition nonetheless resulted in a few 
'errors; for instance, the UK regulations (The Public Supplies Contract Regulations235 and the 
. . 
Public Works Contracts Regulations236) failed to copy out that the negotiated procedure would be 
, ' 
available in cases of urgency only when said urgency was not attributable to the governing 
1. 
authority.237 
The UK implementation also elaborated in a minor way on the explicit requirements of the 
o directive: the regulations specified w h ~ t t contracting authorities within the UK would be covered 
by the directives, both by listing examples within the regulation and by providing detailed 
annexes indicating what these bodies were. 0 
235SI1991/2679'. 
236 SI1991/2680. 0' 
m N. O'Loan, Mlmplementation of the works, supplies and compliance Directives' (1992) 2 PPLR 88, p. 89. 0 
[ 
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From 1991 onwards, the UK has implemented all European directives in the field of public 
procurement in law, using the same mechanism for implementation and following the same 
pattern in implementing: an almost literal translation of the directives. Chronologically, the UK 
implemented the Utilities Directive and its corresponding Remedies Directive in 1992 (with an 
entry into force in 1993)238. In 1993, the Public Services Contracts Regulations239 implemented 
the 1992 Services Directive, again in similar style to the preceding Works and Supply 
Regulations. The 1993 Supplies Directive was implemented as an entirely new instrument, 
repealing the previously existing Public Supply Contracts Regulations and introducing the Public 
Supply Contracts Regulations 199524°. Similar revision was not conducted in light of the 1993 
Works Directive, which simply led to amendments of the 1991 Works Regulations where needed. 
This can be explained by the fact that the Supplies Directive was amended more su bstantially 
than the Works Directive in consolidation, and one of the aims of consolidation was to bring the 
Supplies Directive in line with the Works and Services Directives. Lastly, the Utilities Contracts 
Regulations 1996241 implemented the amended Utilities Directive (93/3B/EC) and Utilities 
Remedies Directive (92/13/EC). 
The above summary is very succinct for a reason: the UK has maintained a very minimalist 
approach to implementing EU-Ievellegislation nationally. Government policy throughout the 
1990s was to implement what was strictly necessary but to allow for as much discretion in 
purchasing practice as possible; this is illustrated by the fact that none of the aforementioned 
regulations contain any restrictions on procedures that a contracting authority may use. 
Guidance remained of crucial importance-one could argue that its importance actually 
increased in light ofthe implemented EU obligations, as these had to be clarified to purchasing 
departments. 





To truly understand what UK public procurement policy was like in the 1990s, it is insufficient to 
examine the UK's implementation of the directives; other developments are much more 
illustrative of the UK approach to public procurement in the 1990s. These will be discussed next. 
3.1.3.2 Local Government Procurement Policy in the 1990s 
Local government procurement policy developed significantly in the years following 1991. As 
noted in section 3.1.2.2 above, CCT became mandatory in the 1980s when it was discovered that 
local government proved less willing to sacrifice close relationships with potential contractors in 
their regions for the sake of competition.242 CCT persisted well into the 1990s: a new Local 
Government Act in 1992 extended CCT to the procurement of professional services.243 It bears 
reminding, however, that CCT was only ever applicable to tendering procedures involving an in-
house bid and its overall effects were limited. 
By the 1990s, significant criticism was levelled against not so much the purpose of the CCT 
regime, but its ineffectively rigid setup.244 Government reviews in the late 1990s thus led to 
change to the regime. In 1997, the Department of Transport, Environment and the Regions 
issued a Green Paper entitled Modernising Local Government-Improving Local Services through 
.: Best Value24s, which accepted that the CCT regime had become too inflexible to be upheld, 
particularly as local government purchasers had demonstrated that they had come to realize 
what the benefits were to procuring competitively.246 The Local Government Act 1999 officially 
led to the abandonment of CCT and introduced the concept of "Best Value", which imposed a 
more general duty to procure in a cost-effective way as well as an obligation on local authorities 
to establish performance plans on. how to achieve 'best value'.247 A 2006 review of the Best Value 
regime led to an even less onerous regime; the Local Government and Public Involvement in 
242 See Arrowsmith 1994 (Developments, n 234), at CS153, and the sources cited there at n.1. 
243 Local Government Act 1992, s. 8. 
H4 See P. Badcoe, "Best Value-an overview of the United Kingdom's Government Policy for the Provision and Procurement 
of Local Authority Services· (2001) 10 PPLR 63; see also S. Cirell and J. Bennett, "Best Value: Law and Practice" (Sweet & 
Maxwell, looseleaf), Ch. B2. . . 
245 Department of Transport, Environment and the Regions, Green Paper, Modernising Local Government-Improving 
Local Services through Best Value (March 1998): see also Arrowsmith 2005 (n 25), p. 15, 
H6 Arrowsmith, ibid. . 
247 See section 3(1) of the LGA 1999. 
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Health Act 2007 scrapped most rules on 'performance plans', instead encouraging best practice 
through guidance.248 
3.1.3.3 Central Government Procurement: Changes in the 1990s 
The late 1990s also saw a reshaping of public procurement policy in general; the Labour 
government in 1997 implemented many changes to public procurement regulation in order to 
make it more efficient than it had been under the previous ConserVative government. The 
Treasury remains to this date the body ultimately responsible for public procurement policy, but 
the various bodies that were responsible for providing either policy or purchasing for the entire 
government that had existed in the 1970s (such as Her Majesty's Stationary Office) were 
abolished. 
In 1999, the Office of Government Commerce (OGC) was established; it held final responsibility 
for public procurement strategy, published all government guidelines for central government 
departments other than the Ministry of Defence, and trained procurement officers across the 
government249 Further, a separate agency called Buying Solutions was established within the 
OGe to provide advice to the public sector and to coordinate framework agreements for 
procuring entities to use-thus assuming a similar role to the specific product-based agencies 
that existed in the Westminster government in the 1970s and 1980s.250 The role of the OGC will 
be discussed in more detail in section 3.1.4.2. 
The 1990s also saw the development of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI). In PFI procurement, 
the risk of funding major infrastructure projects is transferred to the private sector, which 
becomes responsible for both the construction of the work in question and the operating of it 
over time.251 There are several different schemes of funding available under the PFI, which aim 
248 Though there are legal obligations: see LGA 1999 section 3(1). The current guidance from the Department of 
Communities on Best Value can be found here: 
h t t l l ; l / w w w , c o m m u n i t i e s ' I : Q y , u k / p u h \ j c a t i Q n s ! l Q c a l ~ Q y e r n m e D t / s t r o n ~ s a f e l l r o s p e r Q l I s s (last accessed on 1 November 
2010.) 
249 Arrowsmith 2005 (n 25), p.10-11. 
250 Ibid, p.12. 
251 Ibid, p. 26 onwards. 
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to suit the specific needs for major works and services projects (such as hospitals, prisons, and, 
extensive road works). 
The PFI was launched officially in 1992, though by then the strategy for procurement envisaged 
by the PFI was already being engaged in by government departments. The regime again 
underwent significant changes with the arrival of the Labour government In 1997, which was 
supportive of the concept of PFI but aimed to improve it following an official review.2s2 As a 
result, a special body within the Treasury was established to provide general as well as project-
specific advice regarding PFI projects. This Treasury Taskforce was incorporated into the aGe in 
1999 and continued being the lead policy maker in the field of PFI. The Taskforce has published 
several PFI-specific guidelines, such as operational guidelines relating to PFI procedures 
(including how to apply the directives) and s t a ~ d a r d i z e d d contract terms for many of the more 
common types of PFI projects.2S3 
3.1.3.4 Other Laws Affecting Public Procurement: An Overview 
Several other laws have also impacted on public procurement policy in the United Kingdom.2s4 
The first worth mentioning is the Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994, which (in brief) 
" deals with the legal consequences of contracting out of certain government services that used to 
be provided in-house. The Act aims to guarantee certain rights for citizens in the event that a 
government service is contracted out to a general public body; this means both that where the 
citizen would have the right to pursue judicial review against a government body in a given 
instance, it retains it with respect to this public body, and that where the public body commits 
2SZ This review is known as the "First Bates Report" and is unpublished; for more discussion, see ibid, p. 28. 
m See Operational Taskforce, Guidance Notes and Standardisation of PFI contracts (sope) at http://www.hm-
. treasury.goy.uk/ppp index htm (last accessed on 1 November 2010) " . 
ZS4 An example of a law with limited consequences for procurement Is the Human Rights Act 1998, which states that it Is 
unlawful for any public authority to act contrary to the rights listed in the European Convention on Human Rights, . 
(ECHR). The right not to be discriminated against in the Convention, however, cannot be relied upon by individuals on its 
own, meaning that a violation of a secondary provision (ie Art 9, freedom of religion) would have to be violated for the 
HRA 1998 to apply. For our purposes, tenderers are unlikely to be discriminated against grounds such as religious belief; 
if they were, however, this would also be caught by the EU procurement directives as discrimination on the ground of 
\ ' religious beliefs could only materialise if qualification criteria not permitted by the directives were used. ' 
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negligence towards a person this will be perceived as negligence on the part of the 
government255 
Public procurement is also potentially affected by the Freedom of Information Act 2000. The FOI 
requires that public authorities must pass information to any party requesting it within 20 days 
of the request or upon payment of the appropriate fee, where required. This is particularly 
relevant to those tenderers who have failed to win a given contract; noteworthy is that the FOI 
requires for far more extensive information to be made available than the EU rules dO.256 
Moreover, the FOI applies to all government contracts, including those not covered by the EU 
directives or the regulations for either exclusion or threshold reasons.257 Further, the FOI also 
applies to generally interested parties who are not tenderers-meaning its scope is significantly 
wider than that of the EU requirements to disclose award information.258 Guidance on the 
application of this law to public procurement practice has been issued by the OGC2S9 as well as by 
the Ministry of Defence.26o 
Lastly, the UK courts have d e v ~ l o p e d d several common law principles to help control the exercise 
of administrative power, commonly known as 'judicial review'.261 While judicial review can in 
principle apply to procurement contracts (as they are a form of administrative decision), the 
courts have been reluctant to acknowledge that there is a special element of "public law" to these 
contractual decisions-thus taking them outside of the scope of judiCial review.262 A few cases, 
however, have been admitted for review, without a clear assessment of this "public law" element; 
255 Arrowsmith 2005 (n 25), section 2.48. 
256 Ibid, p. 99. 
257 Ibid. 
2SB Ibid; this can include interested citi2ens and pressure groups hoping to gain information about the government 
procurement process. 
259 OGC, "FOI and Civil Procurement: Policy and Guidance" (November 2008, available at 
h t t p : / / w w w , o g q ~ o v . u k { d o c u m e n t s { O G C C FOI and Cjyil Procurement guidance Ilde last accessed on 1 November 2010) 
260 Where applicable to defence procurement. Arrowsmith 2005 (n 25), p. 98, mentions original guidance entitled 
"Freedom of Information Awareness": this has since been replaced by a document in the MOD Commercial Toolkit 
entitled "Freedom of Information" (September 2010, available at 
http'lIwww aor mod uk/ao[contentltactical{toolkjtldownloadsjndexed /fon {full fon Ildf.last accessed 1 November 
2010). 
261 It Is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss judicial review In detail, largely due to its limited application to 
procurement law; for more detail see P. Craig, Administrative Law (6th ed), (Sweet & Maxwell: London 2008). and S. 
Bailey, "Judicial review of contracting decisions" (2007) (Autumn) Public Law 444 
262 For a discussion, see Arrowsmith 2005 (n 25). at p. 81.84. 
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meaning that the law on judicial review of procurement decisions is both inconsistent and 
unclear.263 
Since the 1990s, there has thus been a tremendous increase in the amount of 'law' dealing with 
public procurement in the UK. However, the preceding summary may suggest that law has 
largely superseded the role of guidance in the UK, and this is a misrepresentation. The OGe has 
been extremely active and has offered extensive guidance, especially regarding the developments 
that will be assessed as part of this thesis. The most recent and relevant contributions will be 
outlined in section 3.1.4.2. 
3.1.4 2006 Onwards 
3.1.4.1 Legislation 
The UK implemented the 2004 directives264 by repealing all pre-existing public procurement 
legislation and condensing the new regime-in similar fashion to the EU itself-to just two sets 
of regulations: the Public Contracts Regulations 2006265 and the Utilities Contracts Regulations. 
2006266. 
As with all preceding regulations, the new regulations in large parts follow the EU directives to 
the letter, and the availability of procedures in the directives is not restricted in national law in 
anyway. 
263 See, for instance, R. v Leiwsham London BC Ex p Shell UK [1988] 1 All ER 938, DC and R v Enfield London BC Ex p Unwin 
[1989) C.O.D. 466, DC, both discussed in Arrowsmith 2005 (n 23) at p. 80.' , 
26. See M. Trybus and T. Medina, ·Unfinished business: the state of implementation of the new EC Public Procurement 
Directives in the Member States on February 1, 2007" (2007) 18 PPLR NA 89. For a discussion on the implementation of 
the new directives in the UK, see Arrowsmith 2006 (Implementation, n 11). 
26S Public Contracts Regulations 2006, SI 2006/5, recently amended by The Public Contracts (Amendment) Regulations 
2009, SI2009/2992, which implements the 2007 Remedies Directive. ' , 
266 Utilities Contracts Regulations 2006, SI 2006/6, recently amended by The Utilities Contracts (Amendment) 
Regulations 2009, S12009/3100, which implements the 2007 Remedies Directive. ' 
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3.1.4.2 Guidance 
The OGe has been active since its creation, and has offered significant amounts of guidance to 
public authorities. The guidance ranges from quite general-OGe, EU procurement guidance: 
Introduction to the EU procurement rules267-to very specific guidance that only covers certain 
types of contracts or procedures. For the current thesis, the most relevant, recent guidance 
documents are26B: 
• Framework Agreements: OGC Guidance on Framework Agreements in the new 
Procurement Regulations (issued in 2006, revised in 2008) 
• Competitive Dialogue Procedure: OGC Guidance on the Competitive Dialogue in the new 
Procurement Regulations (issued in 2006) 
• Competitive Dialogue Procedure: OGC/HMT 2008 guidance on competitive dialogue 
The importance of the guidance should be stressed again at this point: "in the UK [the] function of 
clarification [of EU law] is performed largely through the guidelines, rather than the legislation 
itself, and thus it is an important supplement to the legislation."269 The importance of guidance is 
heightened in the UK by the fact t ~ a t t it sees very limited case law on procurement; in 
jurisdictions such as France, where case law is frequent (see section 5.1.8), contracting 
authorities obtain significant legal clarification through jurisprudence and guidance may thus 
playa smaller role. 
Other guidance issued by the OGe has reflected on UK government policy; its "Best Practice" 
guidance page indicates that recent government focus was on SME procurement, sustainability 
and green purchasing. social issues and innovation.270 The OGe also has issued regular 
"Procurement Policy Notes" (PPNs) that update on new legal developments, such as CJ 
jurisprudence or changes to the UK legislation. 
261 Available at http://www o ~ c c ~ o v v uk/documentsllntroduction to the Ell rules pdf (last accessed 1 November 2010) 
268 An OGC-issued guidance up to June 2010 can be found here: 
h t t p ' l l w w w , o ~ c c ~ o v v uk/procurement policy and application of eu rules ~ u i d a n c e e 00 the UK re&ulatloos asp (last 
accessed 1 November 2010). 
269 Arrowsmith 2006 (Implementation. n 11). p. 89. 
270 See http'llwww o ~ c c ~ o v vUk/procurement documents best practice ~ u i d a o c e e asp. (last accessed 1 November 2010). 
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Several recent changes have taken place in the summer of2010 that should be noted here. 
Firstly, in June 2010, the OGe and Buying Solutions became part of the Cabinet Office's Efficiency 
and Reform Group (ERG), which was established to generate savings by centralizing government 
procurement271 The most recent g u i d ~ n c e e published on central government procurement has 
been in the name of the ERG (OGC) on the OGe website.27Z 
Secondly, the 2010 Conservative/Liberal Democrat government has indicated that the guidance 
published by the OGe prior to June 2010 may not reflect their policy.273 The fact that the 
guidance may be revised in the future, however, will not affect the analysis in forthcoming 
sections, which considers all guidance published prior to 2010 as being indicative of UK 
government policy at the time. 
3.1.4.3 Jurisprudence 
Historically, there has been very little jurisprudence on procurement in the UK, but since the 
mid-2000s, a steady flow of approximately ten to fifteen procurement-related cases per year has 
been decided by the UK courts. 
Most of these cases have focused on the incorrect application of award criteria and related 
technical matters; however, as discussed in section 3.1.2, the UK courts have also developed the 
doctrine of the so-called 'implied contracts'.274 The principle was first developed in Blackpool 
.i, 
Aero Club; since this first case, there have been several cases that have indicated which procuring 
entities the doctrine applies tom, what other contractual obligations arise from the implied 
271 See http:{/www.cabjnetoffice.gov.uk/newsroom/news releasesI2010/100615-shakeup.aspx (last accessed on 1 
November 2010) 
, 272 See http://www.oec.eoyuk/policy and standards framework transparency.asp (last accessed on 1 November 2010) 
273 See http://www.ogc.gov.uk (last accessed 1 November 2010). ' . 
274 See Arrowsmith 2005 (n 25), p. 107-113; S. Arrowsmith, ·Protecting the Interests of Bidders on Public Contracts: the 
Role of the Common Law· (1994) 53 Cambridge Law}ournall04 
Z7S See Deane Public Works Ltd v Northern Ireland Water Ltd [2009] NICh B, where a state-owned utility's purchasing 
procedure was submitted to the doctrine. . 
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contract doctrine276, and what remedies are available if an implied contract is breached.277 The 
significance of Blackpool has diminished with the increasing influence of the general principle of 
transparency at the EU level, however-where contracts are covered by the directives, the 
transparency rules in the directive mandate that tenders are considered when submitted 
according to the directives' rules.278 
It may be observed that in some of the areas discussed in detail in this thesis-such as 
framework agreements-the UK courts have issued significant judgments; this, however, must be 
contextualized by stating that the UK still only sees a fraction of the amount of case law in 
procurement that France (several hundred cases) and the Netherlands (close to a hundred) see 
on a yearly basis. 
3.1.5 Conclusions 
To summarize the findings of this chapter, several general observations about the UK approach 
to implementing EU regulations and regulating procurement can be made at this time: 
1) The UK has consistently adopted a minimalist approach to implementation of EU 
directives, implementing them as broadly as pOSSible, so as to leave as much freedom as 
possible to procuring entities. 
2) Guidance has always been important in the UK and in large part not only supplements, 
but creates the national procurement policy. Guidance has ranged from being the only 
existing form of regulation to being consistently issued to make other existing regulation 
clearer to procuring entities. 
3) The ordinary law of contract does apply to public procurement. Public procurement 
contracts are perceived to be private contracts for all intents and purposes, and the 
276 Interesting cases are Pratt Contractors Ltd v Transit New Zealand (2003) UKPC 83 (from New Zealand); Fairclough 
Building Ltd v Port Talbot Borough Council [1991] 62 BLR 82 and Scott v Belfast Education and Library Board (High Court 
of Northern Ireland; judgment of 15 June 2007). 
277 See Harmon CFEt:t Facades (UK) Ltd. v The C o r p o ~ a t e e ~ f f i c e r r o/the House o/Commons (No.1) 67 Can. L.R. 1; (2000) 2 
L.G.L.R. 372. where It was conSidered that the EU Directive's usual remedies apply. 
278 It is Simultaneously very unlikely that in the UK. contracts not subjected to the Directives are subject to precise and 
advertised tendering procedures. at which point no implied contract would come into existence. 
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applicability of public law principles to public procurement proceedings has been very 
limited at most 
4) Other legislation, such as the FOI 2000, as well as common law principles of judicial 
review also affect public procurement There is thus a greater role for hard law in 
procurement now than there was in the 1970s, leaving aside EU obligations to 
implement the directives. 
5) There is a great discrepancy between the regulation aimed at central government-
which is still primarily guidance, though government departments have to follow the 
regulations where appropriate-and at local government-which has been regulated 
through legislative obligations since at least the early 1980s. Both regimes however still 
leave significant freedom for contracting authorities to determine their own policy, thus 
enhancing again the role of guidance. 
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3.2 Competitive Dialogue in the UK 
3.2.1 Introduction 
This section will discuss the UK's approach to the implementation of competitive dialogue. It will 
first examine legislative steps taken, if any, and will then evaluate any jurisprudence or guidance 
issued since 2006. 
3.2.2 Legislation 
It is first necessary to recall here that the UK used the negotiated procedure with a notice in 
order to procure complex contracts prior to the introduction of competitive dialogue; this use 
was criticized by the Commission and, eventually, led to the introduction of a separate procedure 
for these types of procurement contracts (see section 2.2.2). While there was thus no procedure 
in UK legislation that resembled competitive dialogue prior to 2006, a procedure quite similar to 
competitive dialogue was being used in practice. 
In 2006, however, the UK legislator opted to implement the EU's competitive dialogue procedure. 
As noted in section 3.1.4, the Public Contracts Regulations 2006 preserve the full scope and 
number of optional procedures available in the directives.279 This means that not only is 
competitive dialogue available, but its use is also not restricted in the Regulations. In contrast 
with France (section 5.2.3) and the Netherlands (section 4.2.3), there are (as is the UK legislative 
• tradition) no provisions whatsoever either permitting or forbidding the use of the procedure for 
contracts not covered by the directives. 
In general, a few minor changes to the directive have been made in the UK's transposition. Unlike 
in the directive, a single regulation (Regulation 18) contains all tDe relevant provisions regarding 
the competitive dialogue procedure. Otherwise, however, the regulations themselves do not 
, address any of the ambiguities found in the directive's proviSions. Any clarifications or 
Z79 Arrowsmith, 2006 (Implementation, n 11), p. 91. 
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conditions of use for the procedure-where available-are likely to be found in case law or in 
guidance offered by the OGC. 
3.2.3 Jurisprudence 
At the time of wri ting, no case law dealing specifically with the com peti tive dialogue proced ure 
has emerged from the UK courts.280 Since, as explained in section 3.1.4.3, the UK has not 
traditionally seen a lot of public procurement jurisprudence, this is unsurprising. 
3.2.4 Guidance 
As discussed in section 3.1.4.2, the Office for Government Commerce (OGC) has developed and 
, advised on central government procurement policy as well as the requirements of EU 
procurement law. Since January 2006 it has published several pieces of guidance specifically 
devoted to the competitive dialogue procedure.28t The most recent guidance, published in June 
2009, was written in partnership with the Treasury and offers input on some of the more 
contentious elements of the competitive dialogue procedure. This guidance is in part based on 
practical experience with the procedure to date.28Z 
The OGC also acknowledges on its website that other, more specialist bodies have issued 
guidance to specific parts of the public sector.283 The Department of Health, for instance, held a 
, consultation in October 2006 with a view to produce a guidance document specifically for NHS 
PFI procurement; as of yet, however, this guidance is not yet publicly available.2B4 On the other 
, hand, Partnership for Schools, the organization at the head of a central government initiative to 
, .' 280 In June 2010. a strike out application relating to a dispute about a competitive dialogue procurement was decided; 
however, the judge presiding did not comment on the merits of the case. [See Montpellier Estates Ltd v Leeds City Council 
. [2010] EWHC 1543.]' . 
281 See http://www,ogc,gov,uk/proCurement poliO' and application of eu rules Specific application Issues,asp.last 
accessed 1 November 2010.', ' 
. 282 OGC and HM Treasury, ·Competitive Dialogue in 200S" (June 2008) (see 
http://www,ogc,goV,uk/documents/OGC HMT 2008 Guidance on Competitive Dialogue,pdf ,last accessed 1 November 
2010), ' . . 
283 See (n 281), " . , 
284 See 
http://www db,gov,uk/en/Aboutus/Procurementandproposals/PubliqJrivatepartnershjp/Prjvatefinancejnjtjatjve/lnves 
.. tmentGujdanceRouteMap/DH 4133181. last accessed 1 November 2010. . , 
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rebuild or remodel secondary schools in the United Kingdom, has issued guidance on competitive 
dialogue where used for its Building Schools/or the Future285 (BSF) PFI projects in 2006.286 
Another organisation that has issued guidance on competitive dialogue is 4ps (now absorbed into 
Local Partnerships, a joint venture between the Local Government Association (LGA) (a local 
government lobby organisation) and Partnerships UK (a PPP formed out of HM Treasury)). 4ps 
works in p a r t n e r s ~ i p s s with all UK local authorities, helping them set up and run PFI schemes, 
public-private partnerships, and other complex contracts. 4ps has thus issued guidance aimed at 
. local authorities, but the guidance is general enough to be of assistance to central government 
departments as well. 
The following sections will assess these listed guidance pieces in light ofthe EU law on 
competitive dialogue discussed in section 2.2. 
3.2.4.1 Availability: Relationship to Negotiated Procedure 
As the 2006 regulations do not pose any restrictions on the use and availability of the 
competitive dialogue procedure (beyond those restrictions found in the directive), guidance in 
the UK serves the important function of steering contracting authorities in a particular direction 
without actually legally binding them.287 
aGe guidance issued in 2006288 and 2008289 suggests that even though this is not stated in the 
legislation, the negotiated procedure with a notice should no longer generally be used for PFI (or 
285 See http'lIwww,partnershjpsforschools on:,uk/about/aboutbsf,jsp (last accessed 1 November 2010): the BSF 
programme has been scrapped by the new UK government (see 
httP-llwww,educatjon 20Y u k / a b o u t d f e / s p e n d i n ~ r e y j e w / a 0 0 6 S 4 7 0 1 2 0 1 1 0 1012 last accessed 1 November 2010). 
286 See http·llwww.partnershjpsforschools o r ~ , u k / a b o u t / a b o u t u s s jsp (last accessed 1 November 2010); the future of 
Partnership for Schools is unclear at this time, as current government initiatives are reconsidering its remit (See 
httP'/lwww buildjn2 co,uk Isectors leducation lanalysjs I t h e · Q u a n ~ o s · a n d · s p e n d j n 2 · c u t s · w h j c h · o n e s . .
suryjved/S007796,artjcle, last accessed 1 November 2010). 
287 This has been observed to be particularly true with regards to guidance that encourages or permits desired 
procurement practice; see P. Braun, MThe practical impact of E.U. Public Procurement Law on PFI/PPP Projects in the 
United K i n g d o m · ~ ~ Dissertation 2001, University of Nottingham, School of Law, 2001 (see 
h t t p ; l / w w w . n o t t l O ~ h a m . a c . u k / p p r 2 / d o c u m e n t s / l l h d t h e s e s / p h d d peter braun pdf. last accessed 1 November 2010). 
288 OGC, ·Competitive Dialogue Procedure: OGe guidance on the Competitive Dialogue Procedure in the new Procurement 
Regulations· Oanuary 2006) (see http://WWW 0 2 C . ~ o y , u k / d o c u m e n t s / 2 u i d e e competjtjve djaIQ2Ue,pdf.last accessed 1 
November 2010). 
289 OGC 2008 (Competitive Dialogue, n 282). 
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other, equally complex) contracts. Both guidance pieces state that "[the Commission expects 
that] the negotiated procedure should only be used in very exceptional circumstances."290 PFS, in 
a guidance note entitled "Guidance on classification of the contract and choice of procedure 
under the EU procurement rules for the Building Schools for the Future Programme"291 
concludes that "in ... light of the OGC Guidance, PFS is of the view that the competitive negotiated 
procedure is not available for BSFprogrammes and the competitive dialogue procedure should 
be used."292 4ps takes a different approach; its guidance293 first observes that "the use of the 
Negotiated Procedure is only available in exceptional circumstances ... This issue, however, has 
less relevance following the introduction of the Competitive Dialogue process which is expected 
to be the procurement route used for the majority of local authority PFI and PPP schemes post 
January 2006."294 
The guidance examined thus perceives the introduction of competitive dialogue as restricting the 
availability of the negotiated procedure, offering one possible interpretation of an issue left 
unclear at the EU level. 
3.2.4.2 Availability: Competitive Dialogue versus the Open/Restricted Procedure 
The directive also leaves unclear when the competitive dialogue procedure can be used instead of 
the open and restricted procedures. As discussed in section 2.2.4, competitive dialogue is 
available for a 'particularly complex contract', where it is impossible to objectively define either 
'technical means' capable of satisfying the contract needs or the 'legal/financial make-up' of the 
i contract295 
( k , 
290 OGC 2006 (Competitive Dialogue, n 288), p. 3. It then cites the London U n d e r g r ~ u n d d PPP as an example of such an 
'exceptional' procurement project. , 
.291 PFS, "Guidance on classification of the contract and choice of procedure under the EU procurement rules for the 
Building Schools for the Future Programme" (February 2006) (see' .' ' 
http://www,partnershipsforschools,orC,uk/documents/BSf Guidance Documents/GuidanceNoteonClassificationofContr 
. actO/026ChoiceofProcedureFebruary2006,doc,last accessed 1 November 2010). ' . , 
292 Ibid, para 19. ' , ' 
293 4ps, "The competitive dialogue process·, (April 2007) (see . 
http://procurementpacks.localpartnerships,org,uk/guidance.aspx?secid=9&ppid=L last accessed i November 2010). 
294 Ibid, p. 6. ,.'. ' ' 
295 Article 1 (l1)(c) ofthe Directive; Regulation 18(1). ' 
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The 2006 OGC guidance does not address the definition of a 'particularly complex contract', but 
instead offers examples of what technical and legal/financial complexity may be.296 The 2008 
OGC guidance, instead of reciting original examples, refers to the Commission's Explanatory 
Note297 for guidance-citing as the Commission's main relevant point that technical complexity 
encapsulates both inability to find a solution and inability to find the best solution-and further 
refers to PFS guidance298 for more particular examples of legal/financial complexity. 
There, PFS first states that in its view, the 'broader' definition of a particularly complex contract 
should be adhered to so as to not contravene the "spirit ofthe legislationH and so as to permit 
market innovation wherever possible.299 Regarding "technical complexity", it cites the 2006 OGC 
guidance and the Commission's Explanatory Note and concludes that a contract is technically 
complex when this 'best solution' cannot be detailed by the contracting authority. In discussing 
financial and legal complexity, the PFS guidance again cites the 2006 OGC guidance and the 
Explanatory Note and from these sources extrapolates that BSF projects and other types of 
"design-build-finance-operate" (DBFO) projects are all to be considered financially and/or 
legally complex.30o 
The 4ps guidance does not address the concept of particularly complex contracts, but merely 
indicates that the competitive dialogue procedure "is expected to be used for most local authority 
PFI and PPP projects post January 2006". 
To summarize, the PFS and OGC guidance conclude that competitive dialogue ought to be 
available in those cases where the 'best possible' solution to a need is not immediately clear, thus 
conforming to the broad interpretation also allowed for by the Commission's Explanatory Note 
and generally supported by academics, as discussed in section 2.2.4. The guidance makes no 
effort to further define technical or legal/financial complexity, but at least offer-like Recital 31 
296 aGC 2006 (Competitive Dialogue, n 288). p. 4. 
297 Explanatory Note on Competitive Dialogue (n 105). 
298 PFS 2006 (Guidance, n 291). 
299 Ibid, para. 29-30. 
300 Ibid, para. 36. 
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of the directive-some clear indications of what types of situations can be deemed 'complex' in 
light of those provisions. 
3.2.4.3 Use: Successive Tendering & Elimination 
As discussed in section 2.2.5, the directive and the regulations allow for successive stages of 
tendering to be used in order to eliminate some 'solutions' during the course of the dialogue 
phase, but does not explain how this 'elimination' should take place. 
The OGC's 2006 guidance only addresses the issue of successive tendering by stating that "on the 
basis of written proposals (these ~ o u l d d be "outline solutions," "project proposals" or "tenders,") 
the number of solutions can be reduced by applying the award criteria in the contract notice or 
the descriptive document"301 
The 2008 OGC guidance states that "the Contracting Authority can structure the dialogue into a 
number of different phases if this suits its purpose" and that Hit may require bidders to provide 
submissions during ... the dialogue phase [and] it can evaluate these submissions using the pre-
stated award criteria."30z The OGC thus in both instances seems to suggest documented or 
written tender rounds, as the Commission's Explanatory Note does. 
-. 
The PFS gUidance on how to organize a competitive dialogue303 does not address the 
organization of successive tendering rounds.304 
. 4ps offers perhaps the most conclusive solution to the problem of how to organize successive 
tendering. Its 38-page summary of the 'competitive dialogue process' details several steps in the 
'dialogue' process that are not discussed at all by the legislation.305 This detailed process outline 
301 OGC 2006 (Competitive Dialogue, n 288), p. 5. 
302 OGC 2008 (Competitive Dialogue, n 282). p. 20. 
303 PFS. "BSF Guidance Note on how to Conduct a Competitive Dialogue Procedure" (January 2006) (see 
http://www.partnershipsfo[schools.O[2.uk/documents/BSF Guidance Documents/zipped appendices/Guidance on Ho . 
w to Conduct a Competitive Dialogue Procedure.doc.last accessed 1 November 2010). '. 
304 Ibid. p. B. 
305 4ps (n 293). p.lB. 
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recommends a semi-formal elimination strategy: from the start, bidders are asked to prepare 
written submissions, which are then discussed with contracting authorities, and-when 
appropriate-evaluated in line with award criteria. 
Like the OGC's guidance, 4ps thus adopts the Commission's perspective as well, but offers further 
advice by recommending a 'best practice' elimination strategy that contracting authorities can 
rely on. 
3.2.4.4 Use: Number of Final Tender Participants 
As discussed in section 2.2.5, the directive and the regulations are not clear on the number of 
participants required to participate in the final tendering phase, merely alluding to the existence 
of "genuine competition". 
The 2006 OGC guidance does not address this point, but the 2008 guidance states that at the final 
tender stage, "there must be genuine competition ... which normally requires at least two bids 
from credible bidders."306 The PFS guidance similarly states with regard to successive tendering 
that "at the end of the dialogue [there must be] sufficient bidders to allow for a genuine 
competition (usually a minimum of 2)" (emphasis added).307 4ps is less explicit than the other 
two guidance issuers, but recommends starting the dialogue with 3 participants and recognizes 
that at the end of the 'detailed submission' phase, "one or more" of the bidders can be de-
selected. This implies that they, too, foresee the possibility of entering into the final tendering 
stage of the competitive dialogue procedure with only two participants. 
3.2.4.5 Use: Completeness of Final Offers 
In section 2.2.5, it was highlighted that the directive and the regulations require 'final tenders' in 
the competitive dialogue procedure to contain "all elements required and necessary for the 
306 OGC 2008 (Competitive Dialogue, n 282), p. 26. 
307 PFS 2006 (BSF, n 303) p. 7. 
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performance" of the contract308, but nonetheless permit 'clarification, specification and fine-
tuning' ofthese final tenders as long as this does not distort competition.309 It is thus largely 
unclear how 'final' a final tender has to be. 
The 2006 OGC guidance generally states that "it is sensible for these [final] tenders to be as 
complete as possible" in light of the restrictions on further discussion.31o On the subject of what 
is permitted under 'clarifying, specifying and fine-tuning', the 2006 guidance notes that small 
changes are possible "as long as fundamental aspects of the offer, such as price and risk 
allocation, are not altered".311 
The 2008 guidance more firmly states that "the final bid must be final and not subject to change 
or negotiation".312 Regarding clarification, fine-tuning and speCification, the OGC has taken a 
more reserved approach in 2008. First, it states that "the legal meaning and interpretation of 
these terms In the directive are ultimately matters for the courts to determine" and that the 
guidance will not attempt to define the terms themselves, as this could be "potentially 
misleading".313 It then proceeds to quote the Commission's position on these terms, as derived 
from the Explanatory Note, by stating that the terms have to be interpreted 'narrowly' and any 
discussion taking place must not amount to negotiation on fundamental aspects of the contract or , 
price. From this, the OGC concludes that it is therefore impossible to consider or allow for the 
amendment of non-compliant bids. 
On the subject of finality of tenders more generally, the 2008 guidance offers some examples of 
minor Issues that are unlikely to be resolved by the final tender stage. The examples it offers, 
which are all Included on the basis that they are either unduly costly to prepare when award of 
the contract Itself is not yet a certainty, or just not possible to prepare at this stage, are: 'detailed 
108 Article 29(6) of the Directive; Regulation 18(25). 
109 Article 29(6) orthe Directive; Regulation 18(26). 
310 aGC 2006 (Competitive Dialogue, n 288). p. 5. 
311 Ibid, p. 6. -
3U aGC 2008 (Competitive Dialogue. n 282). p. 26. 
- 313 Ibid, p. 28. 
88 
'Ai "'.., .,.-0 
information on subcontractors', 'complete design detail', 'detailed planning applications', and 'the 
lender's financial swap rates'.314 
Generally, we can see that the 2008 guidance is more reserved than the 2006 guidance. Where 
in 2006, the aGC indicated that some change was possible under the provisions of Regulation 
18(26), its 2008 guidance stresses that actual change should not occur as a result of clarification, 
specification or highlighting and that these provisions have to be interpreted as narrowly as 
possible. It is worth noting here that the aGC might not wish to offer guidance on issues not yet 
clarified at the EU level, presumably for fear of the Commission disagreeing with its 
interpretation and initiating proceedings before the CJ. This is not uncommon; it is worth noting 
at this point that a similar fear of misinterpreting the directives resulted in the Netherlands not 
copying their content out into national law for almost 30 years (see section 4.1.3). 
The PFS guidance also stresses the importance of fully-developed final tenders, as under 
competitive dialogue "there is far less flexibility to leave matters open and/or negotiate with 
bidders once final tenders have been submitted" than there was under the negotiated 
procedure.315 The guidance then considers what contracting authorities may be able to do under 
'clarification, specification and fine-tuning', and notes that "there is scope to leave some matters 
of detail open for resolution after Final Tenders have been submitted", provided these do not 
change the basic features of the tender, distort competition, or have a discriminatory effect316 
It notes again that the scope for amendment is more limited than that available in the negotiated 
procedure, but that "it should still be interpreted in the context of a procedure which has been 
specifically designed to deal with 'particularly complex projects' and which therefore demands a 
greater degree of flexibility than would be permitted, for example, under the open or restricted 
procedures."317 After warning that the Commission is likely to interpret these terms very 
narrowly, the PFS guidance then offers some examples of scenarios covered by the ability to 
'clarify, specify or fine-tune': clarifications to the standard contract conditions (clarification); 
314 Ibid. p. 29. 
31S PFS 2006 (BSF, n 303). p. 9. 
316 Ibid, p. 11. 
317 Ibid. 
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"minor improvements to Final Tenders" (fine-tuning); inconsistencies or errors in the tender 
(clarification or fine-tuning); provision of additional information/detail (specification or fine-
tuning); responses to changes in the specifications by the contracting authority (fine-tuning).318 
The PFS guidance further provides the following examples of 'details that can be left open': 
design development; detailed site surveys; investigation oflegal title; lenders and due diligence; 
detailed planning application; performance mechanism; finance; and the lender's financial swap 
rates.319 It thus offers a number of additions to the examples that the aGC cited in 2008, and 
motivates these by saying that to include them in the tender prior to contract award would either 
be unduly costly or plainly impossible. 
4ps does not specifically deal with the issues of how complete final tenders need to be and in 
what ways they can be amended, beyond noting generally that "once Competitive Dialogue is 
closed, only limited fine tuning of Final Tenders is allowable".320 
It is difficult to summarize the guidance on this subject, primarily because the aGe (in 2008) and 
PFS (in 2006) have adopted substantially different perspectives. The aGC has offered very 
conservative guidance that does not attempt to define any of the legally unclear terms in the 
directive, and only offers a limited number of examples ofissues that can be left out of'final 
tenders' for the preferred bidder to deal with. The PFS guidance, on the other hand, seems to be 
aware of the fact that the Commission is likely to severely restrict amendment of final tenders, 
r 
but nonetheless offers an interpretation of Regulation 18(26) that even permits minor 
improvements tc) tender. Similarly, it lists a great number of more specific examples of issues 
that 'can be left for the preferred bidder to resolve and thus requires less complete 'final tenders' 
; than the aGC guidance appears to. 
318 Ibid. p. 11.12 .. 
319 Ibid. p.12.15. 
3Z0 4ps (n 293). p. 25. 
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3.2.4.6 Use: The Preferred Bidder 
As elaborated on in section 2.2.5, one final procedural difficulty in the directive is found in Article 
29(7), which discusses the possibility to request the preferred bidder to "clarify aspects of the 
tender or confirm commitments".321 Like 'clarifying, specifying and fine-tuning', the concepts of 
'clarifying and confirming' are not further defined in the directive or in the regulations. 
Parts of this issue have already been discussed in section 3.2.4.5 above; the aGC 2008 and PFS 
guidance both make it clear that there are some parts of the final tenders that can be left for the 
preferred bidder to deal with, such as filling in design details or applying for planning 
permission. These comments are, in both sets of guidance, made outside of the context of a 
discussion of 'clarifying' and 'confirming commitments'. 
The aGC 2006 guidance here argues that a reference to not changing 'substantial aspects' of the 
tender implies that "some change is expected at this stage" and that certain issues are best left to 
be resolved with the preferred bidder alone-such as deSign detail or financial due diligence.322 
The 2008 aGC guidance, on the other hand, highlights that a further definition of the terms 
'clarify' and 'confirm commitments' has to be left to the judiciary, but that "it seems clear that this 
represents a further narrowing of the scope for any discussion between the Contracting 
Authority and the preferred bidder."323 
The PFS guidance interprets these concepts as meaning that "there should be some scope for 
amendments and discussions with the Preferred Bidder prior to contract conclusion", which 
more closely corresponds to the 2006 aGC guidance.324 Lastly, 4ps takes a more specific 
approach, and states that "the final discussions [between contracting authority and preferred 
bidder] should be limited to fixing the final detail of the transaction documentation and satisfying 
321 See also Regulation 18(28). 
322 OGC 2006 (Competitive Dialogue, n 287). p. 6. 
323 OGC 2008 (Competitive Dialogue, n 281), p. 30. 
m PFS 2006 (BSP. n 303). p. 15. 
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the reasonable requirements of the service provider's board and funders", which again implies 
very limited discussion and coincides more with the OGC's 2008 view.325 
One observation that can be made is that guidance published in 2006, when the procedure was 
first introduced, appears quite optimistic about the possibility for discussing/filling in some parts 
of the final tender with the preferred bidder. Guidance issued in 2007 or later, on the other hand, 
seems to have adopted a more conservative perspective of what is possible at both this stage and 
the final tender stage, which could mean that practice revealed that it is not advisable to suggest 
that there can be "some change" at this stage of the procedure.326 What is interesting is that these 
reservations have come about without specific prompting from the Commission, either through 
additional guidance or infringement procedures against authorities that are adopting the less 
restrictive perspective of how much change can occur after the winning bidder' is chosen. 
3.2.4.7 Use: Reserve Bidders? 
Prior to the development of the competitive dialogue procedure, it was common practice in the 
UK to appoint a 'reserve bidder' at the end of the negotiated procedure, primarily to ensure that if 
a financial close with the 'preferred bidder' fell through the entire procedure would not have to 
be restarted. The OGC, in its 2006 guidance, has interpreted the 2004 Directive's Recital 31, 
which states that non-MEAT tenderers cannot be involved in preferred bidder discussions, as 
meaning that the keeping of 'reserve bidders' is "discouraged" by the competitive dialogue 
, procedure.327 4ps has expressed disagreement with this perspective, and notes that "whilst it is 
not appropriate to keep more than one bidder in the final clarification stage (post selection of the 
, Preferred Bidder), in the event that the Preferred Bidder cannot clarify aspects of the final bid or 
confirm commitments, it remains open to the local authority to cease discussions with the 
Preferred Bidder at an appropriate stage and go back to the next best bidder." It does note that 
this will happen rarely and only in exceptional circumstances, but should nonetheless be retained 
325 4ps (n 293), p. 26. " \ 
326 The OGC 200B guidance ;s based on practice; it is unclear if the' 4ps guidance is. 
327 OGC 2006 (Competitive Dialogue, n 28B). p. 6. 
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as a possibility.328 The 2008 OGe guidance no longer comments on the use of a reserve bidder, 
perhaps indicating a change of opinion on whether or not reserve bidders can be (in some way) 
retained-this remains unclear, however. 
3.2.4.8 General Guidance: Confidentiality 
The directive and the regulations attempt to prevent breaches of confidentiality and cherry-
picking (ie, taking the best parts of tenderers' individual solutions, without consent), by stating 
.. 
that the contracting authority "shall not reveal to the other participants solutions proposed or 
any confidential information communicated by a participant without that participant's 
agreement"329 How confidentiality is to be preserved in the competitive dialogue process, 
however, is not addressed. 
The 2006 OGe guidance suggests only that where a contracting authority wishes to make use of 
the possibility to share solutions between participants, it is best to indicate this "at the outside of 
the dialogue phase."33o The 2008 OGe guidance recommends that in order to counteract bidder 
concerns that their discussions during the dialogue are not confidential, contracting authorities 
should "set out in detail" how they will conduct the dialogue.331 Furthermore, the guidance 
recommends that the contracting authority asks the bidders what parts of their solutions they 
perceive as confidential, and which parts can be shared, so as to not 'accidentally' breach 
Regulation 18(21)(c). 
PFS does not make any specific recommendations in its guidance, but 4ps notes that discussions 
in the 'detailed solution' phase of the dialogue generally "should be confidential to each bidder, 
unless they result in any modification to the project documentation".332 This caveat is not placed 
in the 'outline solution' stage, so it can be presumed that 4ps presumes more 'solution sharing' at 
that stage than at the later stage-possibly because the outline solutions are unlikely to be 
32B 4ps (n 293). p. 31. 
329 Article 29(3) of the Directive: Regulation 18(21)(c). 
330 OGC 2006 (Competitive Dialogue, n 288). p. 6. 
331 Ibid. 
332 4ps (n 303). p. 22. 
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detailed enough to result in breaches of confidentiality or to present intellectual property right 
considerations. 
3.2.4.9 General Guidance: Payment of Bid Costs 
The 2004 directive and the regulations both contain express provisions permitting the payment 
of bid costs in the competitive dialogue procedure, but without offering an indication of when 
and how these bid payments should be issued. 
The 2006 OGe guidance notes that the possibility exists, but concludes that there is nothing in the 
competitive dialogue procedure-if carried out appropriately-that would result in higher bid 
costs than existed under the negotiated procedure in the past.333 The 2008 guidance, written in 
conjunction with the Treasury, adds the following: "HMT Policy, however, remains that there 
should be a strong presumption against contributing to bid costs-though it can be justified 
where there are legitimate concerns about competitive tension that cannot otherwise be 
addressed-and needs to be judged on a case by case basis."334 The OGe thus discourages the 
payment of bid costs. 
PFS offers a neutral opinion; it states that "the contracting authority 'may' agree (but is not 
obliged) to make payments to bidders participating in the dialogue".335 The 4ps guidance, on the 
other hand, does not mention bid payments at all. 
The fact that payment of bid costs is thus now explicitly mentioned in the directive does not 
. mean that the British policy makers have concluded that it is actually n e c ~ s s a r y , , and in this case, a . 
. change in legislation does not appear to have resulted in a change in policy. Interesting to note 
here is that a similar 'legislation: yes, policy: no' method of dealing with the issue of bid payments 
was adopted in the Netherlands, despite quite different historic approaches to procurement 
regulation (see section 4.2.2.3). 
333 OCC 2006 (Competitive Dialogue, n 288), p. 6. 
334 OCC 2008 (Competitive Dialogue, n 282). p.14. 
335 PFS 2006 (BSF, n 303), p. 7. 
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3.2.5 Conclusions 
The UK has not legislated beyond what the directive contains on the competitive dialogue 
procedure, and has not made competitive dialogue available in legislation for procurement not 
covered by the directive. We have also seen that there to date has been no case law on 
competitive dialogue in the UK at all. Iflegislation and case law were the only two sources oflaw 
in the UK, then, it would appear that there is very little regulation of competitive dialogue beyond 
that what the directive requires. 
However, the extensive and highly detailed guidance published by various government bodies 
means that there is actually substantial material available on the procedure; we will see that this 
can be contrasted with the Netherlands and France (see sections 4.2 and S.2), where there is 
equally sparse legislation but more limited guidance to assist public procurement officers in 
using the procedure. 
In light of the findings in this section, it is perhaps unsurprising that the UK has had so many 
more competitive dialogue contracts advertised in the OJEU than every other country in the EU 
aside from France336-not only did it already have Significant practical experience with a 
competitive dialogue-like procedure (through its use of the negotiated procedure, see section 
2.2.2), but it is has issued substantial guidance on the procedure-guidance that addresses issues 
that the EU law on competitive dialogue does not address well, or at all. 
336 S e e ~ . . de Mars and.R. Craven, ·Competitive Dialogue in the EU·, presented at Global Revolution IV In Nottingham, UK 
on A p ~ 1 1 1 9 9 2 ~ 1 0 ; ; their research demonstrates that the UK had used the procedure 1390 times prior to 2010, and France 
1446 times - In France, however, the procedure was implemented in 2004 (see section 5.2.3). 
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3.3 Framework Agreements in the UK 
3.3.1 Introduction 
This section will examine how the UK has approached the provisions for framework agreements 
found in the 2004 Public Sector directive. To properly highlight any legal changes since 2004, the 
UK approach to framework agreements for public sector contracts prior to 2004 will first be 
considered (section 3.3.2). Secondly, implementation of the 2004 framework agreement rules 
will be discussed (section 3.3.3). 




As discussed in section 2.3.1, the old Works, Services and Supplies Directives did not address the 
possibility of concluding framework agreements; only the Utilities Directive explicitly permitted 
the use of framework agreements prior to 2004. 
As with the new Public Sector Directive, the UK implemented the old classic sector directives by 
copying them out without making any substantial amendments or additions-see section 3.1. 
Consequently, there were no provisions on the use of framework agreements in the public sector 
regulations prior to 2006.337 
Section 2.3.3 highlighted that a various types of framework arrangements are possible, ranging 
from binding commitments between just one supplier and one contracting authority to non-
binding agreements between several suppliers and one (or several) contracting authorities. As 
legislation in the UK was silent on the issue as to whether any, and if so, which combinations 
were permitted, government guidance again proved important here-in particular after the 
331 The Utilities Works and Services Regulations, however, retained the Utilities Directive's prOvisions on f r a m e w ~ r k k











Commission issued its press releases casting doubt on the possibility of multi-provider 
framework agreements under the classic sector directives (see section 2.3.2). 
3.3.2.2 Guidance 
In April 2003, the OGC issued guidance on framework agreements in anticipation of the 2004 
directives' incorporation of the procedure, though the guidance effectively dealt with the pre-
2004 legal situation .. The guidance acknowledged the Commission's concerns about the legality 
of multi-supplier framework agreements-see section 2.3.2-but nonetheless concluded that 
most types of framework agreements were permissible under the classic sector directives. 
First, the guidance discussed whether or not framework agreements could be construed as 
'public contracts'. It indicated that in the event where there is consideration between the 
contracting authority and the supplier, the 'framework agreement' itself would be a public 
contract and could thus be treated as any other contract under the classic sector directives.338 It 
then stated that "the term [framework agreement] is normally used to cover agreements" which 
do not place binding obligations on the contracting authority to actually purchase. The OGC note 
concluded that "with this approach, contracts are formed, in [EU] directive terms, only when 
goods, works and services are called off under the agreement"339 
Following this, the guidance highlighted that "the UK has always taken the view that the only 
sensible approach to such framework agreements is to treat them as if they are contracts in their 
own right for the purposes of the application of the EU rules."340 This indicates both that 
framework agreements were used in the UK prior to 2006, and that the official government 
position on their legality was that there was nothing precluding their use in the classic sector 
directive. The guidance elaborated on UK practice by noting that standard practice under the 
classic sector directives was to advertise the framework agreement in the QJEU and to follow the 
338 OGC, "Framework Agreements and EC Developments" (April 2003) (see 
http·/Iwwwo2C·20V.uk/documents/Framework A2reements and EC Developments doc, last accessed 1 November 
2010). 
339 Ibid, para. 3. 
340 Ibid, para. 5. 
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EU rules for award of the framework itself; subsequent call-offs would then no longer need to be 
advertised, but the overall procedure was nonetheless transparent341 
The guidance additionally discussed some practical aspects of operating framework agreements. 
First, it indicated that pricing mechanisms and the global scope of purchasing imagined needed 
to be established prior to closing the framework agreement342 It is unclear whether or not the 
guidance recommended this due to legal considerations or just as 'good practice'; however, 
setting out quantity and pricing mechanisms is likely required by the principles of equal 
treatment and transparency as developed by the CJ.343 
Secondly, the guidance noted that strictly speaking, it is not necessary to advertise the framework 
. itself under the EU rules: 
"If the framework approach ischosen, it will be necessary to advertise the framework itself in the 
[OJEU], ifits estimated maximum value over its lifetime exceeds the relevant EU threshold and 
the procurements in question are not covered by one of the exclusions set out in the directives. If 
the framework itself is not advertised in [OJEU], in cases where the procurements are subject to 
the EU rules, an [OJEU] notice may be required for individual call-offs .... It is far better, 
therefore, to advertise the framework itself..."344 
\. 
This is very similar to what the Explanatory Note to the Dutch BAO contemplates (see section 
.; 
4 . ~ . 3 . 1 . 2 ) , , but the 2003 OGe guidance explained the repercussions ofthis possibility far more 
.F 
clearly: if the framework agreement was not advertised and the call-offs were of a high enough 
value, each individual call-off would have to be advertised. In effect, a framework agreement 
would be functionally useless if individual call-offs had to be advertised, meaning that sensible 
practice would be to advertise the f r a m e w o r ~ ~ and not the call-offs, regardless of what the law 
- permits. 
3'1 Ibid. 
342 Ibid. para. 8. 
34] See section 2.4.2. 
]44 OGe 2003 (n 338). para. 9. 
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Thirdly, the guidance briefly discussed the more practical differences between single-supplier 
and multi-supplier frameworks, and in particular, how to organize call-offs under multi-supplier 
frameworks. It noted that regardless of whether call-offs were on the basis ofthe original tender 
or on the basis of a mini-tender, there could be "no substantive change to the specification or on 
the terms and conditions agreed at the time that the framework is awarded."345 
Interestingly, if (in a multi-supplier framework) call-off award was to be on the basis of the 
original tenders, and the 'winning tenderer' was not available, the OGC suggested in 2003 that the 
next best tenderer could be awarded the call-off. 346 It took the view that the award criteria 
applied to these types of multi-supplier frameworks are the award criteria "used at the time the 
framework was established" (emphasis added), implying that these had to be award criteria 
stated in the old directives. This can be contrasted with the view propagated by the Commission 
in its Explanatory Note on Frameworks347, which argued that the call-offs in multi-supplier 
frameworks on the basis of the original tender are not 'public contracts' and as such, award 
criteria outside of those permitted in the directive can be used to award these call-offs. The Issue 
of changing award criteria was presumably dealt with explicitly in this guidance document 
because it was at the root of the Commission's Northern Ireland complaint348 
The guidance also considered the option of holding a mini-competition for call-offs. The OGC 
guidance stated that the only type of change possible during the mini-competition would be a 
"supplementing or refining" of the basic terms to the specific call-offin question-but it rejected 
the possibility that the tenders could be Benerally improved on price at this stage. In the 
examples it mentions of terms that could be supplemented, general prices are not mentioned; 
instead, the guidance notes that 'pricing mechanisms' are likely to require 'filling in' at the call-off 
stage.349 
3451bid, para. 16. 
346 Ibid, para. 18. 
347 Explanatory Note on Framework Agreements (n 142). 
348 See (n 136). 
349 OGC 2003 (n 338). para. 19. 
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Lastly, the guidance noted that according to the proposals for the 2004 directives, framework 
agreements would be limited in duration to four years-but "that restriction cannot be said to 
apply now, since ... the existing public sector directives are silent on the use of frameworks."350 
The 2003 guidance primarily served to announce the introduction of explicit rules on 
frameworks in the new Public Sector Directive, but in doing so clarified the UK position on 
whether or not framework agreements were permitted prior to this new directive. The aGe 
demonstrated that according to the UK government, both single supplier frameworks and multi-
supplier frameworks were permitted under the classic sector directives, subject to the 
restrictions placed upon procurement procedures in those directives. It implicitly approved both 
mUlti-supplier frameworks based on original tenders and those using a mini-competition by 
discussing their operation, but did not offer any particular guidance on when either type of 
framework agreement would be beneficial from a policy perspective. While the guidance was 
thus very useful from a legal perspective-in particular as it was released prior to explicit 
regulation of framework agreements in classic sector procurement legislation-it did not 
attempt to guide procuring entities in their determination of when a particular type of 
framework arrangement would be beneficial for achieving, for instance, value for money. 
3.3.2.3 Jurisprudence 
Of note in terms of case law on framework agreements was the High Court decision of DenjIeet351, 
in which the court condoned the permissibility of a specific type of multi-supplier framework. 
. 
The DenjIeet case concerned a multi-provider framework agreement awarded using the 
restricted procedure. The framework in question awarded call-offs on the basis of a mini-
r 
competition, which was treated as permissible by the high court judge in question; Arrowsmith 
argues that it is logical to assume that if mini-tendering call-offs are permiSSible, frameworks in 
350 Ibid. "Introduction" • 
. 351 Denj7eet v NHS Purchasing and Supply Agency [2005] EWHC 55 (Admin) 
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which call-offs are based on original tenders would also be permissible.3S2 This case thus 
legitimated the use of framework agreements in the UK prior to the introduction of national 
legislation regulating framework agreements. 
3.3.2.4 Prior to 2006: Conclusions 
Prior to 2006, there was no legislative regulation of framework agreements in the United 
Kingdom. However, both guidance issued by the aGC and the one High Court case dealing with 
framework agreement discussed the permissibility of certain variations of framework 
agreements and determined that framework agreements (both single and multi-supplier) were, 
in principle, possible under the old classic sector directives. That said, the aGC guidance did not 
address the policy dimension of operating framework agreements to any noticeable extent and 
only discussed a few specific legal restrictions in detail, and Denfieet merely concluded that 
revision of tenders through a mini-competition was in principle permitted. 
3.3.3 Framework Agreements under the 2006 Regulations 
3.3.3.1 Legislation 
The Public Contracts Regulations 2006 have implemented the 2004 Public Sector directive in the 
UK. In line with past UK approaches to implementation, the regulations 'copy out' the majority of 
the directive's provisions without substantial changes, thus leaving the maximum discretion 
permitted under EU law to contracting entities.3S3 This approach has led to the inclusion of the 
directive's provisions on framework agreements without any substantial additions or 
limitations-with one notable exception. 
The 2006 Regulations stated explicitly that the Alcatel stand-still was not applicable to call-orrs 
under a framework agreement (Regulation 32(7)), and did so before the 2007 Remedies 
3SZ Arrowsmith 200S (n 25). section 11.10. 
3 ~ 3 3 The regulations do in various places omit or add minor points and change language; for more information on these 
minor changes. see Arrowsmith 2006 (Implementation, n 11). section 4. 
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Directive came into force and permitted the same derogation. This is one of the rare times when 
the UK has supplemented the directives; it is likely (though not explicitly stated by the OGC in its 
guidance) that this particular change was motivated by an effort to preserve the functionality of 
framework arrangements, whereby abiding by a 10-day delay after every call-off is awarded 
would be overly burdensome. 
The provisions on framework agreements, however, are not altered from those in the directive 
beyond this. Consequently, the UK legislation permits the use all types of framework agreements 
permitted by the directive, by all contracting authorities and for any contract The regulations 
also do not address the various grey areas or legal uncertainties-discussed in section 2.3.4.3-
that the directive's provisions bring with them. Reading the regulations as opposed to the 
directive itself thus provides little additional clarity or guidance to contracting authorities in the 
UK when using framework agreements; once more, the role of guidance and jurisprudence 
become significantly important in developing national procurement policy. 
3.3.3.2 OGC Guidance 
The OGC initially issued guidance on framework agreements in January of 2006, when the 
regulations first entered into force.354 This guidance was updated in September 2008, following 
more practiCal experience with framework agreementS under the new regulations.355 The 2008 
guidance revises the 2006 guidance on several points, where the OGe has changed its perspective 
. on either legal possibilities or best practice. The noteworthy content in both pieces of guidance 
will now be discussed. 
354 DGC. ·OGC Guidance on Framework Agreements in the new procurement Regulations· Oanuary 2006) (see 
http://www.9i:c.goy,uk/documents/guide framework agreements.pdf.last accessed 1 November 2010). 
355 DGC. "OGC Guidance on Framework Agreements in the Procurement Regulations· (September 2008) (see 
http://www,ogc.goy,uk/documentsIDGC Guidance on Framework Amements$ept Q8,pdt last accessed 1 November 
W ~ ~ .. 
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3.3.3.2.1 Thresholds: Multi-User Frameworks 
As neither the directive nor the regulations explicitly address how multi-user frameworks should 
function, guidance on this issue is welcome. The OGe in 2006 did not expressly address the issue 
of multi-user frameworks, but the 2008 guidance states that "when assessing the total value of 
the framework .. , it is important that the estimate should include all the potential call-offs over 
the lifetime of the agreement that may be made by all contracting authorities that are permitted 
to use the framework" (emphasis added).356 It thus concludes that in determining whether or not 
a multi-user framework agreement meets the EU thresholds, the total purchases of all framework 
users determine what the threshold value is. This perspective on how the aggregation rules 
apply to multi-user frameworks has also been adopted by Arrowsmith.357 
3.3.3.2.2 Advertising: Identifying the Framework Parties 
One area left grey by the directive, as discussed in section 2.3.4.3, is how closely the potential 
users of a framework agreement have to be identified: for instance, do they all need to be listed 
by name in the contract notice, or does a generic description of the type of authority that will be 
using the framework suffice? 
The OGe in 2006 stated that parties to the framework agreement "can be individually named, or a 
generiC description may be used",358 In 2008, however, the same sectiol\ of the guidance reads 
that "the authorities can be individually named, or a recognisable class of contracting authority 
may be used", Alternatively, where there is no recognisable class of contracting authorities, the 
relevant authorities could be compiled onto a list that is publically accessible; this list would the 
need to be included in the contract notice.359 Between 2006 and 2008, then, the OGe appears to 
have concluded that it is in fact not legal under the directive or the regulations to 'generically' 
identify parties to a framework agreement The 2008 perspective is very similar to that 
3S6 OGe 2008 (Frameworks. n 355). para 3.3. 
357 See. most recently. Arrowsmith 2009 (Methods. n 137). section 3:9. 
3SB OGe 2006 (Frameworks. n 354). para 4.5. 
359 OGe 2008 (Frameworks. n 355). para 3.6. 
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expressed in the Commission's Explanatory Note on framework agreements360, which also 
stresses the explicit identification of the potential users of the framework. In this sense, it is 
possible that the Commission's Explanatory Note influenced the revised guidance. 
3.3.3.2.3 Selection 0/ Framework Suppliers: Price as Award Criteria 
As discussed in section 2.3.4.3, the directive does not make entirely clear how the award criteria 
listed in Article 53 have to be applied to both the award of a framework agreement It is unclear 
from the directive itself is whether or not price has to always be an award criterion at the first 
stage of award, where suppliers are admitted to the framework 
The OGC commented on the issue of price as an award criterion for multi-supplier framework 
agreements in both 2006 and in 2008. In 2006, it noted that "the framework should be capable of 
establishing a pricing mechanism" that will be applied whenever call-offs are requested over the 
duration of the framework. This reflects on the rule that can be generally surmised from the 
directive's award criteria, and thus does not address the specific issues arising out of markets 
. with volatile prices as described above. In 2008, however, the OGC has amended its position to 
deal specifically with the "few limited circumstances" in which pricing structures cannot be 
established at the outset of the framework agreement, such when procuring "energy or fuel" or 
other highly price-elastic commod"ities. In this case, the OGC observes that a framework can 
appropriately be awarded on the basis of quality criteria alone-which must by proxy mean that 
.. it considers this w o ~ l d d be legal. 
3.3.3.2.4 Multi-Supplier Frameworks: Award Criteria/or Call-OIls 
" 
As section 2.3.4.3 discussed, the directive is unclear on how (and which) award criteria have to 
, 
be applied to the award of call-offs under multi-supplier frameworks. Where a call-off is 
a w ~ r d e d d on the basis of original tenders, Article 32(4) requires award on the basis of "the terms 
laid down in the framework agreement". Similar word,ing is when describing a call-off on the 
360 Explanatory Note on Framework Agreements (n 142), section 2.1 •. 
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basis of a mini-competition. It is unclear in both cases what types of 'terms' are appropriate to 
apply at this second stage of award: as discussed in section 2.3.4.3, Arrowsmith believes that the 
usual award criteria in Article 53 apply at this stage, whereas the Commission argues that 
different but stated award criteria are permitted.361 
The aGC in 2006, as in 2003, appears to have argued for the application of the Article 53 award 
criteria. It noted that "in order to ensure value for money, the authority should award the call-off 
to the provider who is considered to provide the most economically advantageous (vfm) offer 
based on the award criteria used at the time that the framework was established."362 It is unclear 
if this is purely a policy recommendation or if the aGC believed that the Article 53 award criteria 
are the only legally permitted award criteria at this stage. The 2008 guidance is even less explicit 
on this point, only noting that it is important that the framework agreement contains information 
on "how the contracting authority would select the supplier to which an award is made,for 
example by ... [applying] the award criteria used at the time that the framework was 
established".363 (Emphasis added). Neither piece of guidance addresses the legality of this 
method or other methods of awarding call-orfs at all; however, the 2008 guidance is possibly 
following the Commission's approach more closely, as it appears to suggests that other, non-
Article 53 award criteria can be used as long as they are clear and objective. 
3.3.3.2.5 Mini-Competitions: Weightings of Award Criteria 
Largely due to the directive's unclear references to 'award criteria' at the call-off stage, there Is 
significant uncertainty regarding whether or not contracting entities can vary the weight given to 
certain award criteria at the call-off change. Section 2.3.4.3 noted that It is also unclear whether 
or not the award criteria' themselves can be changed per specific call-offunder a framework. 
The aGC 2006 guidance only addresses the possibility of varying weightings at the call-off stage, 
,and states that this "may need" to happen; it is unclear whether this is only best practice advice, 
361 See Arrowsmith 2009 (Methods. n 137). section 3:16 and Explanatory Note on Framework Agreements (n 142) section 
3.3 respectively. • 
362 OGC 2006 (Frameworks. n 354). para. 5.5. 
363 OGC 2008 (Frameworks. n 355). para. 4.6. 
lOS 
=1'; t4 .. t 
or if the OGe believed it would be legal to vary weightings where appropriate. The 2008 
guidance states that "it may be permissible to vary the weightings of the award criteria provided 
that the intention to do this was publicised in advance and ranges are given for each criterion."364 . 
It also states that "criteria used for mini-competitions may differ from the award criteria used to 
set up the framework if they are related (i.e. derive from) the original award criteria", 
presumably allowing for call-off sub-criteria as long as the 'parent' award criteria are announced 
in advance. The guidance thus indicates that it may be possible to change both weightings and 
actual criteria themselves. However, it bears reminding here that the CJ has, in recent judgments, 
stressed the advance disclosure of award criteria so as to comply with the general principle of 
transparency36S-to the extent that the OGe's position is correct, then, it should be presumed 
that any differences in award criteria at the call-off stage have to be announced clearly in the 
contract notice and cannot be introduced on an ad-hoc basis. 
3.3.3.2.6 In/ormation Requirements 
The OGe guidance on framework agreements does not address the directive's information 
requirements-most relevantly, it does not discuss the post-award information obligations 
contained In Article 41, which mayor may not apply to call-offs (see section 2.3.4.3). It can be 
argued that in order to have effective remedies, provision of information on awards is 
necessitated at the call-off staee, but the OGe does not express an opinion on whether or not this 
.' 
. is legally required or recommended. 
3.3.3.2.7 Guidance: Conclusions 
Generally, the OGe 2006 and 2008 guidance on framework agreements does not differ greatly 
from the 2003 guidance; for instance, all three guidance documents refer to the same examples of 
'types of framework agreements' and follow similar structures. It is thus likely that the guidance 
notes have primarily been amended several times in order to deal with changes of position 
364 OGC 2008 (Frameworks, n 355), section 4.1 
365 See, for Instance, Universale-Bau (n 169) and ATI (n 153) and most recently, Lianakis (n 154), discussed in section 2.4.2 




within the OGC or in order to respond to case law determinations at the CJ or High Court level. 
Globally, however, no significant progress in terms of the development of an expansive national 
policy or best practice guidelines on framework agreement has been made since 2003. 
3.3.3.3 Jurisprudence 
In section 3.2.3, it was noted that there had been no relevant case law on competitive dialogue in 
the UK and that likely this followed from a lack of procurement cases being adjudicated in the 
first place. Surprisingly, however, a significant number of the UK's infrequent procurement cases 
concern framework agreements. Two cases from 2008 have particularly developed the law and 
will be discussed here.366 
The first of the two relevant High Court cases is McLaughlin and Harvey Limited367• The procuring 
entity in this case announced their award criteria and sub-criteria in advance, but had set an 
evaluation methodology (whereby some of the sub-criteria set were specified and assigned 
weightings) that was not disclosed to the tenderers in advance. The judge ruled that the sub-
criteria used to evaluate the tenders were arguably foreseeable, but the varying weightings 
assigned to them were most definitely not, and this constituted a violation of EU law368 as well as 
the regulations. 
Following this ruling, the parties to the case were unable to agree upon an appropriate 
remedy.369 In deciding on what remedy s h ~ u l d d be awarded, the judge emphasized that the 
regulations specified available re'medies for public contracts, but not what remedies were 
available or appropriate for an improperly concluded framework agreement-an issue since 
resolved by the UK's implementation of the 2007 Remedies Directive, wherein a framework 
366 Other cases involving framework agreements concerned disputes about time limits to bring proceedings (Amaryllis Ltd 
v HM Treasury [2009] E W ~ C C 962 (TCC)) and interim measures in procurement (B2Net Ltd v HM Treasury [2010] EWHC 
51 (QB); European DynamICS SA v HM Treasury [2009] EWHC 3419 (TCC)). but did not develop the law On framework 
agreements specifically. 
3b7 McLaughlin and Harvey Limited v Department of Finance and Personnel [No.2) [2008] NIQB 91. 
368 Ibid. para 57; the judgment specifically cited Lianakis (n 154) and ATI (n 153). 
369 McLaughlin and Harvey Limited v Department of Finance and Personnel [No.3} [2008] NIQB 122. 
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agreement is treated as a 'contract' for the purpose of remedies (Regulation 47 of the amended 
Regulations). 
In McLaughlin, however, the judge determined that framework agreements were not 'contracts' 
as discussed in then-Regulation 47(9); consequently, nothing precluded setting the framework 
agreement aside. It is unclear if the framework would still have been set aside if contracts had 
been concluded under it-but nothing in the judgment precludes this. The currently applicable 
rules, as set by the 2007 Remedies Directive, would have prevented the contract being set aside, 
so McLaughlin here proves an interesting example of a UK interpretation of a concept not 
corresponding to a subsequent EU interpretation at all. 
The other important case, Henry 8ros370, concerning the award of a framework for major 
construction services, discussed pricing mechanisms used in awarding framework agreements. 
-[ 
The plaintiffs argued that the pricing mechanism used to evaluate tenders-which evaluated the 
c o n t r a ~ t o r s ' ' fee percentages, but did not assess the construction costs themselves as it had 
concluded these would be invariable among all tenderers-was contrary to the regulations' 
requirement to award to the 'most economically advantageous tender'. The judge, after 
considering relevant information and-importantly-the Commission's Explanatory Note on 
Framework Agreements, concluded that the pricing mechanism employed in this case was 




However, the judgment did not expressly rule that using only fee percentages in order to 
.. determine the most economically advantageous tender was de facto contrary to the regulations; 
it merely determined that in the current case it was an inappropriate pricing mechanism as there 
would be no competition 'on price at the second stage of the competition.371 
370 Henry Bros (MagheraJelt) Ltd and others v DepartmentoJEducationJor Northern Ireland [No.2} [2008] NIQB 105. 
371 Ibid, para. 28. . ' 
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The judge also commented on the role of price in award criteria more generally, albeit not as part 
ofthe ratio of the decision. On the role of price in tender evaluation, he noted that " .... unless the 
cost or price of the relevant goods or service was fixed or not in dispute, it would be very difficult 
to reach any objective determination of what was or was not economically advantageous without 
some reasonably reliable indication of price or cost in relation to which other non-price 
advantages might be taken into account"372 This seems to indicate that the judge in question 
considers that a pricing mechanism is normally necessary in order to award a framework 
agreement; this may conflict with the 2008 OGC guidance discussed above (section 3.3.3.2.3), 
which advises against price as an award criterion in certain exceptional circumstances. 
To summarize, the judgments arising from McLaughlin and Henry Bros developed the UK law on 
framework agreements Significantly. McLaughlin analyzed the nature of the 'framework 
agreement' itself and concluded that it itself was not a 'concluded contract' as defined in the 
regulations. The McLaughlin proceedings thus suggested that framework agreements warrant a 
different approach to remedies than regular public contracts. This judgment is more striking 
now that the EU (in the 2007 Remedies Directive) determined.that framework agreements are 
public contracts for the purpose of remedies, and McLaughlin has essentially been 'overruled' 
from above. 
Henry Bros, on the other hand, offers more general observations that guide on the use of price as 
an award criterion for long, multi-staged contracts such as framework agreements. As such, the 
judge observed in passing that it is 9nly in exceptional cases that a priCing mechanism does not 
have to form part of the evaluation of tenders awarded on the basis of most economically 
advantageous offers. Also interesting about Henry Bros is the fact that in arriving at a judgment, 
the judge referred expressly to the Commission's Explanatory Note as a source of authoritative 
information-demonstrating influence of this document despite its non-binding nature. In 2008 
in particular, case law thus helped develop the law on framework agreements in the UK; it 
remains to be seen if this was an exceptional year for the development of the law in this area. 
m Ibid, para. 25. 
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3.3.4 Framework Agreements in the UK: Conclusions 
Where prior to 2006, no legislative rules on framework agreements existed in the UK, the 2006 
Regulations implement the directive's words verbatim; however, as we saw with competitive 
dialogue in section 3.2, no legislation was introduced to apply the directive's provisions to 
contracts not covered by the directives. 
The UK's sparse legislative provisions have been supplemented by national-level guidance and a 
limited amount of jurisprudence. The influence of EU law on both the pre-and-post 2006 
guidance is clear; there are direct cross-references to, where appropriate, the directive and 
Commission guidance. However, in examining the UK case law, it was seen that the judgments in 
both McLaughlin and Henry Bros develop the law on framework agreements beyond what the EU 
had stated about their operation at the time, particularly with regards to award criteria used in 
staged, long-term procurement and the relationship between framework agreements and EU 
remedies for procurement 
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3.4 The General Principles of Transparency and Equal Treatment in the UK 
. 3.4.1 Introduction 
In section 2.4, we saw that from the 1990s onwards, the CJ has used the general principles of 
equal treatment and transparency to create new positive obligations for Member States; firstly, 
by reading obligations into the directives that are not e x p l i c i ~ l y y stated there, and secondly, by 
inferring positive obligations from the TFEU, which traditionally has been understood to contain 
only negative obligations. 
The following section will consider the how, if at all, the UK regulator has responded to the 
additional obligations stemming from the general principles of equal treatment and transparency 
under the directive (section 3.4.2) and under the Treaty (section 3.4.3). 
3.4.2 Contracts Covered by the Directives 
3.4.2.1 Legislation 
It has been observed in previous sections of Chapter 3 that the UK does not traditionally legislate 
beyond what the directives require, and prefer instead to advise contracting authorities on 
appropriate behaviour through guidance and policy. It is thus unsurprising that the 2006 
Regulations state the general principles of equal treatment and transparency (as required by the 
2004 directive), but there are no additions made to UK legislation that can be attributed to the 
Crs use of the general principles under the directives. 
3.4.2.2 Guidance 
We have seen in earlier sections that the UK generally.offers guidance to contracting authorities 
on how to approach EU law obligations; however, as discussed with regards to competitive 
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dialogue and framework agreements, this guidance generally focuses on supplementing EU 
legislation with 'best practice' approaches. 
Given that the C)'s case law on the general principles and their application to the directives has 
thus far not led to a coherent regime of positive obligations for the Member States to follow, it is 
understandable that the OGC has not (yet) attempted to determine how contracting authorities 
have to behave; this does, however, mean that there is no specific OGC guidance that attempts to 
anticipate the consequences of the equal treatment and transparency principles under the 
directives. 
There are a few mentions of the concepts of equal treatment and transparency in the OGC's other 
guidance, but these do not elaborate on the requirements very specifically. As an example, the 
competitive dialogue guidance (see section 3.2.4) states that the general principles "are 
embodied most notably in a general requirement for public procurements of an appropriate type 
and value to be advertised openly in the Official Journal of the EU. They should also be used as the 
main guide to interpreting the meaning o/more detailed requirements where there is any 
uncertainty, including the new provisions!orCompetitive Dialogue."373 This is followed by several 
reminders to ensure "equal treatment" at various points of the process-such as confidentiality 
. of solution-but the guidance does not attempt to outline how such equal treatment can be 
assured: 
More helpful have been recent Procurement Policy Notes, which deal with the consequences of 
specific CJ cases; the most relevant one of these is PPN 04/09, which discusses the consequences 
of Lianakis and related cases on the publication ofweightings and selection criteria.374 
Interestingly enough, this note itself does not reference the general principles at all; it discusses 
the need to publicize weightings and selection criteria if developed as if these are set 
requirements not linked to the general principle of transparency at all. Compared to guidance 
37J OGC 2008 (Competitive Dialogue, n 282). 
374 OGC, ·Procurement Policy Note 04/09" (April 2009). see http://www02c,2oyuk/documents/PPN0409,pdf(last 
accessed 1 November 2010). . 
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available on, for instance, competitive dialogue, then, the OGe has not produced a significant 
amount of material on the general principles and their application to the directives. 
3.4.2.3 Jurisprudence 
The UK courts have applied CJ jurisprudence on the general principles for contracts covered by 
the directives; particularly visible in recent years are the Lianakis and ATI judgments, which 
require the publication ofweightings and sub-criteria where they are used (see section 2.4.2). 
The cases Henry Bros and McLau9hlin, discussed in detail in section 3.3.3.2 on framework 
agreements, and Lettin9lnternationaJ37S all concern disputes relating to award criteria applied in 
a given contract-Lianakis, in fact, was cited in all cases as an authority for the need to publicise 
weightings assigned to sub-criteria.376 
Four other cases moved beyond the issue of how transparency requires the publication of sub-
criteria and relevant weightings, but nonetheless relied on the general principles in order to 
determine what behaviour was required by EU law. 
In Lion AppareJ377, the court dealt with an application for interim measures, in anticipation of a 
pending trial regarding the award of a contract for fire-proof garments for firemen. In the award 
process, all tenderers were permitted to improve their original tenders on price, but not on 
quality. The plaintiff, who scored poorly on quality, argued that this was contrary to equal 
treatment as those who had scored poorly on price could improve their offers. However, the 
court denied the application for interim measures; part onts reasoning was that a determination 
that there had been no violation of equal treatment as all tenderers were treated equally with 
respect to price (which they could revise) and quality (which they could not), and as the testing 
375 Letting International Ltd v London Borough of Newham [2008] EWHC 1583 (QB). 
376 Also ofinterest here are Lightways (Contractors) Ltd v North Ayrshire Council [2008] CSOH 91. where the judge 
acknowledged that the applicant had a prima!acie case to be tried on account of the defendant's unclear scoring and 
award mechanism system. Interim measures were, however, ultimately not awarded; and] Varney & Sons Waste 
Management L ~ d d v Hert!or1shire County Council [2010] EWHC 1404, where it was determined that following an invitation 
to query a SCOring mechamsm by the contracting authority, there could be no violation of the principles of transparency 
or equal treatment as no bidders did query the scoring mechanism; and the European Dynamics SA v HM Treasury [2009] 
EWHC 3419 (TCC) case. wherein the plaintiff argued that the scoring or marking of tenders which led to the rejection of 
their tender was non· transparent and resulted in unequal treatment . 
377 Lion Apparel Systems Ltd v Firebuy Ltd [2007] EWHC 2179 (Ch). 
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of the quality of the garments had proven to be expensive in the first round of tendering, not 
allowing an improvement of quality was deemed to be a proportionate measure.37S 
In Law Society v Legal Services Commission379, the High Court concluded that a unilateral clause 
for amendment of a contract, as long as advertised in the contract notices, would not violate the 
principle of transparency, even ifit could lead to widespread changes to the original contract 
entered into with the bidder. The judge determined this on the basis of an assessment of CJ case 
law on the subject of transparency, citing judgments such as Telaustria and SIAC380. This 
decision, however, was overturned on appeaP81; it was there noted that CJ jurisprudence382 was 
'not to be interpreted as unequivocally permitting amendment clauses, and that the one in the 
dispute in question was so unlimite,d in breadth that it could not be deemed to be 'transparent'. 
Using a similar method of analysis, the Court of Appeal thus arrived at the opposite conclusion of 
the High Court on the facts of this particular case-but did confirm that amendment clauses do 
not necessarily violate the principle of transparency. 
Another interesting case is J B Leadbitter383, in which a contracting authority refused to consider 
a tender because parts of it were submitted after the submission deadline, although the 
submission deadline had been extended for another tenderer who experienced a power failure. 
The court decided that as the extended submission deadline benefitted all tenderers, this was not 
a violation of equal treatment-however, accepting documents after deadline could violate equal 
treatment 
mIn 200a, Firebuy sought for summary judgment on some of Lion Apparel's heads of challenge; equal treatment was 
referenced again in this application, but summary judgment was not given in favour of Firebuy regarding equal treatment 
on pricing information and deemed this fit to go to trial. [Lion Apparel Systems Ltd v Firebuy Ltd [2008] EWHC 122 (Ch). 
379 The Law Society. R (on the application of) v Legal Services Commission & Drs [2007] EWHC 1848 
380 Case C·19/00 SIAC Construction v Mayo County Council [20011 ECR 1-07725 
381 R. (Law Society) v. Legal Services Commission [20071 EWCA Civ 1264. See also P. Henty, "The decision of the Court of 
Appeal In R. (Law Society) v Legal Services Commission" (2008) 17 PPLR NA10a. . 
• 3DZ In particular, Case C-496/99 Commission v Succhi di Frutta SpA [2004] ECR 1-03801. 
383 Although interestingly. as the missing submission was only pre-created case studies and did not materially alter or 
Improve the general tender, which had been submitted before the deadline, Richards J concluded that accepting the late 
tender here would not have resulted in unequal treatment - but the contracting authority was nonetheless, on account of 
the general principle of equal treatment, permitted to reject the 'late' tender. See] B Leadbitter & Co Ltd v Devon County 
Council [2009] EWHC 930 (Ch). . . , .. ' , , 
114 
Most recently, Azam & C0384 discussed information obligations in light of the equal treatment 
principle. In Azam, the contracting authority used two public media sources (a trade journal and 
a website) to announce a submission deadline for invitations to tender, and then secondarily 
contacted existing providers personally with a letter that did not itself state the submission 
deadline, but did link to the website that contained this information. The plaintiffs maintained 
that the equal treatment principle was violated as this process favoured readers of the trade 
journal over existing providers who had received the letter; however, the court rejected this line 
of reasoning as equal treatment merely required that the advertising was equally accessible, and 
nothing precluded the plaintiff from accessing the website. 
From the UK case law, we can see thatATI and Lianakis in particular have had a substantial 
impact on national litigation procedures. However, the general principles under the directives 
have also been used by the High Court to decide wholly unrelated cases; the judges are clearly 
willing to apply the general principles to new Situations, not yet considered by the q. 
3.4.2.4 Contracts covered by the Directives: Conclusions 
In summary, the effect of the general principles on procurement covered by the directives is not 
dealt with in UK legislation, but the various cases decided in the UK courts using the principles do 
indicate that there is a growing awareness (at least in the judiciary) of the breadth of 
applicability of the principles. 
A lack of legislation is normally supplemented by aGe guidance in the UK, but it may be difficult 
to provide generiC guidance on a subject that continues to be advanced by case-law, especially 
when the case law itself remains unclear and piecemeal. Lastly, regardless of method of 
'response' to these principles chosen, the case law on the development of the general principles 
may move forward too fast for either the legislature or the OGe to follow up with appropriate 
measures in a timely fashion. Given that fact, the courts' proactive approach to using the general 
384 Azam & Co v Legal Services Commission [2010] EWHC 960 (Ch) 
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principles may be key in making sure the UK procurement regime remains compliant with EU 
developments in this area. 
3.4.3 Contracts Not Covered by the Directives 
3.4.3.1 Legislation 
The UK has not opted to supplement its legislation on procurement in any way so as to 
incorporate the Telaustria family of jurisprudence into the national procurement regime. The 
2006 regulations are silent altogether on below-threshold or excluded procurement, and there 
are no separate pieces of legislation to deal with non-directive procurement 
3.4.3.2 Guidance 
The aGC, however, has issued several guidance documents on the consequences of the CJ's 
jurisprudence in this area. First, even the general introduction to the 2006 Regulations 
references the general principles and indicates that they require some degree of advertising to 
demonstrate transparency. It adds that "this is in line with the UK objective of achieving value 
for money in all public procurement-not just those covered by the EU Procurement directives" 
and then refers to the Commission's Interpretative Communication on contracts not covered by 
the directive.3as 
More specifically, the aGC also issued Procurement Policy Information Note (PPN) 10/03, 
addressing the "evolving EU case law on the need to give sufficient publicity to contracts below 
the relevant thresholds or otherwise outside of the scope of the Public Procurement 
\ directives".386 The m'ore recent PPN 03/06 discusses the Commission's 2006 Interpretative 
385 OGC, "Introduction to the EU Procurement Rules' (March 2008), see 
. http://www.ogc,gov,uk/documents/!ntroductjon to the EU rules.pdf.last accessed 1 November 2010,) 
386 As stated In OGC, ·Procurement Information Note 03/06" (July 2006). see 
http://www,ogc.goy,uk/documents/ProcurementPoUcyThresholdProcurement.pdf, last accessed 1 November 2010; the 
original guidance note, OGC, ·Procurement Information Note 10/03" (September 2003) Is not available online anymore,) 
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Communication on procurement excluded from the directive387 and indicates what its main 
consequences are for those procuring in the UK. 
In paragraph 8, PPN 03/06 discusses the importance of foreign interest in a given contract in 
determining whether or not (and if so, how much) publicity is needed. The PPN firmly places the 
responsibility of determining whether or not 'foreign interest' exists on contracting authorities, 
and states that this determination has to take place every time a procurement procedure is 
started. 
The PPN then encourages contracting authorities to use www.supply2.goy.uk an online 
procurement portal specifically geared at low-value procurement, for contracts that are not 
subject to the procurement directives in order to satisfy any advertising requirements. It makes 
this recommendation after considering the Commission's suggestions on publication for low-
value contracts, observing that while the Interpretative Communication is not binding, it is based 
on CJ case law that has made a determination of positive obligations stemming from the Treaty. 
As such, Hit is likely that the [q] would take account of the [Communication] in considering cases 
and Member States choosing to ignore this guidance may risk infringement proceedings in the 
future".3B8 
The PPN also generally notes that at central government level, all procurement practice is 
generally expected to take place 'competitively, thus satisfying the Commission's additional 
requirements as stated in the Interpretative Communication.389 However, there are no central 
government rules that require advertising of all contracts above a given value. 
New government policy emerging in PPN 13/10, aimed at increasing transparency in national 
procurement for accountability and value-for-money purposes, states that all central government 
contracts of a value of over 10,000 pounds sterling which are advertised will be placed on "a 
single website", and from January 2011 this policy will extend to all advertised contracts 
387 Commission, Interpretative Communication on contracts outside of the Directives (n 97). 
388 PPN 03/06 (n 386), para 13. 
389 Ibid, para 12. 
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regardless of their value.390 Recent information from the government confirms that this policy 
only applies when contracts are already being advertised, but does not imply an advertising 
obligation itself.391 Any policy to advertise all contracts of a given value as of now still originates 
with individual government departments. A useful example of such a policy is the Ministry of 
Defence's, which has decided that all contracts of a value over 40,000 pounds should normally be 
advertised.392 
What is the legal consequence of such a policy? As a general rule, policy does not produce . 
binding or enforceable legal effects; however, the UK courts have recently considered the EU 
principle oflegitimate expectations in the context of public procurement In Azam & C0393, the 
Court considered that despite there being no explicit statement in the procurement directives 
"'. 
that the principle of legitimate expectations applied to procurement, there was no reason to not 
oblige a contracting authority to act so as to not frustrate legitimate expectations.394 In the 
, 
current discussion, a generally advertised MoD policy to advertise contracts above 40,000 
pounds would create legitimate expectations-namely, that these contracts are in fact advertised. 
However, the principle is not limitless-and if the MoD were to indicate that it will not advertise 
" a specific type of contract, or stated that it would 'normally' advertise contracts above 40,000 
pounds the principle would not create enforceable rights for contracting authorities.395 The 
applicability of the principle to any department's commitment to advertising low-value contracts 
thus largely depends on how this commitment is phrased. 
',3.4.3.3 Jurisprudence' 
It can be observed that the C)'s jurisprudence on contracts not covered by the directives has been 
cited on a regular basis in the UK courts. Telaustria, for example, has thus been cited as defining 
. 390 OGe, ·Procurement Information Note 13/10" (June 2010). see 
http://www,ogc,goy,uk/documents/PPN 1310 New requirements for greater transparency in central Goyernment pr 
ocurement %282%29.pdf.last accessed 1 November 2010). ' ' , 
, 391 ERG (OGe), MGuidance on Publishing Tender Documents" (September 2010). see 
http://www,oCc,goy.uk/documents!Transparency - publication of Tender documentation - Imidance(lJ.pdt last 
accessed 1 November 2010). 
392 Ministry of Defence, MFreedom of Information" (September 2010). See 
http://www.aof.mod.uk/aofcontentltacticalltoolkit/content/topics/adyert.htm (last accessed 1 November 2010). 
393 Azam & Co (n 384). " . 
394 Ibid, para 32. ' 
395 Ibid. para. 39. 
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the general principle of transparency in the cases McLaughlin, Letting International, and Law 
Society, even though all these contracts were subject to the directives. There have recently also 
been several cases dealing with contracts excluded from the directives more specifically.396 
Federal Security Services397 concerned a Part II B services contract that was awarded without an 
Alcatel stand-still period. It was argued by the defendants that as the standstill provisions in the 
2006 Regulations did not apply to Part II B services, there was no obligation to provide for a 
standstill when awarding those contracts; but the judge did not accept this argument, and instead 
relied on the general principles under the Treaty (and the Commission's Interpretative 
Communication's interpretation of those, in brief) in determining that the contract had been 
awarded in violation of EU rules on transparency. The decision-making process that Deeny J 
applied demonstrated significant awareness of the many ways in which the Telaustria 
jurisprudence could affect procurement procedures; particularly, it emphasises that Telaustria 
may not stop with a requirement to advertise but rather that the general principles could have far 
wider consequences for contracts covered only by the Treaty. 
The consequences of the general principles for below-threshold procurement were recently 
considered in Chandler398• Here, the court demonstrated awareness of recent C) jurisprudence 
by indicating that the transparency requirement only applied to below-threshold contracts in the 
event of cross-border interest I n t e r e s t i ~ g l y , , In considering how cross-border interest was to be 
discovered, the court stated in para. 30 that: "we doubt whether the Court of Justice intended to 
hold that cross-border interest had been shown beyond reasonable doubt" The court thus 
concluded that in the event there was a 'realistic prospect' of cross-border interest, the general 
principle of transparency would require a degree of advertiSing. 
3 9 6 1 ~ ~ Law Societ>: (n 379, 3 ~ 1 ) ) there was ~ u b s t a n t i a l l debate on whether or not the contract In question concerned a 
seIVlces concessIOn before It was determmed that the contract was subject to the directives. .. 
397 Federal Security Services Ltd v Chief Constable for the Police Service of Northern Ireland and Resource Group Ltd (2009] 
NICh 3, Ch D(NI) 
398 Chandler, R (on the application oD v Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families (2009] EWCA elv 1011. 
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A further interesting case, Deane Public Works399, actually concerried a utilities contract, but as it 
fell below the threshold of the Utilities Directive it was only subject to the Treaty. The dispute, 
however, did not concern cross-border interest issues, but rather what was meant by the concept 
of projects that "must have been completed within the last five years" for the purposes of a pre-
qualification questionnaire. Morgan LCJ considered the general principles of equal treatment and 
transparency under the Treaty before stating that, "Although it is common case that the 
advertising of the project was sufficient to address any issue of discrimination on grounds of 
nationality by reason of notification I consider that the Treaty obligations also apply to the 
assessment and evaluation of the bids ... "400 While this cannot be held to be indicative of a trend, 
it is still striking that Morgan LCJ used the general principles to read a positive obligation into the 
Treaty where the CJ has not yet done so. 
3.4.3.4 The Scottish Approach to the TelaustriaJurisprudence 
As highlighted in the introduction to this thesis, Member States more generally have the 
possibility to legislate or to set policy that goes beyond the explicit legal requirements of the 
directives. Section 4.1 discussed that how UK prefers to regulate by guidance, meaning that it is 
. unlikely that there will ever be additional legislation dealing with non-directive procurement 
unless required by the EU. 
" Scotland, which since 2006401 has had its own procurement legislation, takes a different 
. ~ ' , ,
approach. Generally, the overlap of the Scottish regulations with the UK regulations is so 
significant that there is no need to discuss the Scottish regulations separately; however, unlike 
the UK regulations, the Scottish ones do attempt to engage directly with the Telaustria family of . 
case law. Regulation 8(21)thus recites the main "principles" of Telaustria, by indicating that 
when awarding contracts not covered by the directives, contracting authorities must ensure "a 
degree of advertising which is sufficient to enable open competition and meet the requirements 
of the principles of equal treatment, non discrimination and transparency." 
399 Deane Public Works (0 275). 
400 Ibid. para. 17. 
401 As a consequence of the 1998 devolution of Scottish Parliament For more details on this subject see C. Boch. "The 
Implementation ofthe Public Procurement Directives In the UK: devolution and divergence?" (2007) 17 PPLR 410. 
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It is worth questioning whether or not a restatement of unclear case law is a worthwhile addition 
to legislation; Boch, in investigating the effect of this provision on procurement practice, found 
that practitioners did not perceive the inclusion of such a provision as providing any advantage-
"clients needed to be alerted about the existence of Community law obligations-whether or not 
these were included verbatim in the Regulations-just as they had to be alerted about all the 
other aspects of the Court of Justice case law that may affect the conduct of their procurement 
operations".402 
3.4.3.5 Contracts Not Covered by the Directives: Conclusions 
In summary, the application of the general principles to contracts subject exclusively to the 
Treaty is not dealt with by legislation in the UK; the fact that the Scottish Regulations recite the 
Telaustria case does not appear to help with the application of the principles as the obligations 
stemming from them are not clear in Telaustria to begin with. 
The existence of positive obligations under the TFEU is acknowledged by the OGC, and it appears 
that new central government advertising requirements have as a partial consequence that the 
Telaustria line of jurisprudence will be satisfied in practice. However, the CJ and the UK courts 
have also, to a limited extent, demonstrated that the obligations stemming from the general 
principle of equal treatment and transparency under the TFEU are not only advertising 
obligations-at which point the role of guidance could continue to playa very important role in 
the UK. 
3.4.4 Conclusions 
The UK has traditionally opted to curb the influence of EU law on national procurement practice 
by implementing only that which is required and by not restricting contracting authorities in 
their freedom to procure in any other way. It is thus relatively unsurprising that the UK has 
402 Ibid, p. 427. 
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chosen not to legislative beyond what is currently required by the directives, despite a rapidly 
developing case law on the general principles. Influence of EU law in legislation here is not 
visible. 
However, whereas in other areas of law, the lack oflegislation is usually supplemented by 
guidance, the OGC here has not issued a comprehensive guide like it has done for framework 
agreements or competitive dialogue; various PPNs instead update on relevant legal provisions 
and practical requirements, with the majority of these covering developments regarding 
contracts not covered by the directive. This approach may have been taken because this is such a 
fast-developing and unpredictable area of law. 
It is also worth stressing that while the comprehensive guides on framework agreements and 
competitive dialogue offer 'best practice' approaches in the context of a discussion of what is 
permitted and required by relevant EU rules, most of the PPNs on transparency and advertising 
do not reference EU law at all. PPN 03/06 specifically considers the relevant EU jurisprudence, 
but the more recent guidance focuses on transparency in a more general sense. 
What we can observe is that the courts playa very important part in developing national law on 
the general principles. In the past few years, there have been at least 5 separate rulings that 
, demonstrate the potentially limitless consequences of the CJ's inference of additional positive 
obligations from the general principles-even, such as in Federal Security System, in scenarios 
where the CJ itself has not yet commented on the role of equal treatment of transparency. The 
significant numbers of cases are particularly striking when it is considered that the UK does not 
see more than ten procurement cases per year on average; it can thus be stated that the CJ's 
jurisprudence on the general principles of equal treatment and transparency has had a Significant 




4. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN THE NETHERLANDS 
4.1 Developments in Dutch Public Procurement Regulation 
4.1.1 Introduction 
This section will discuss the development of public procurement regulation in the Netherlands 
from the 1970s onwards. The section will describe the 'historical' approach taken to public 
procurement regulation in the Netherlands, and will highlight the specific changes that occurred 
in national policy as the EU increased its procurement regulation through the directives and case 
law. 
This section will support the later discussion of how the 2004 directives and important CJ 
decisions have been approached by the Netherlands. Generally, the section aims to provide a 
consolidated overview ofthe current public procurement regulation setup in the Netherlands 
and also highlights current proposed changes to the regime. 
4.1.2 Prior to the 1970s 
Public procurement regulation has existed in the Netherlands since 1815, when by royal decree it 
was decided that all works and supplies contracts of a value above 500 guilders would be 
procured 'publically', which is to say, openly and competitively.403 This commitment to purchase 
publically was repeated in the 1927 Comptabiliteitswet (public expenditure 'Accountability 
Law'), with an increased threshold of 2500 guilders.404 The commitment did not amount to a 
, significant 'public' procurement in practice, however, as many government departments could 
apply for exemptions to 'procuring publicly' via the second part of Article 33 of the 1927 
Comptabiliteitswet 405 By 1976, there were no exclusively national laws left in the Netherlands 
that referred to public procurement, as the 1976 revision of the Comptabiliteitswet led to the 
403 Koninklijk Besluit (KB) of 1815. 
404 Comptabiliteitswet 1927, Article 33 (Staatsblad 259, 1927). 
405 G. W. van de Meent. Overheidsaanbestedingen: de EG-rechtelijke context (Kluwer: Deventer 1995), p. 180. 
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scrapping of Article 33, out of recognition that it was not adhered to in practice. Public 
procurement at that time was no longer regulated through legislation at either central or lower 
government level. 
4.1.3 The 1970s 
By the time the first EU directive was published in 1971, a conscious choice appears to have been 
made to regulate central government procurement separately from local/provincial government. 
As actual legislation emerged in the 1970s (primarily in response to the new EU requirements), 
we see that the Netherlands perceived central government obligations quite differently from 
those ofthe 'lower governments', and was primarily concerned with establishing a compliant 
regime for central government 
The provinces, local governments, arid waterworks were notified of the 1971 Works Directive 
through a circularo6 distributed by the Ministry of the Interior in July 1972, which (similar to the 
UK circulars regarding the EU directives) had no legally binding value in the Netherlands.401 It 
took 5 years for this circular to be replaced by a binding law that implemented the directive for 
non-central government Central government departments, on the other hand, were obliged by , 
law to adhere to the EU directives from 1973 onwards, when an algemene maatregel van bestuur 
(general Order in Council)408 based on the 1927 Comptabiliteitswet was adopted. The AMvB 
made adherence to the EU rules both obligatory and legally enforceable by contractors in the 
regular court system.409 
As we saw in section 2.1.4.1; there are two possible ways to comply with the EU requirements for 
implementing directives. ' Historically, the Dutch method of implementation can be contrasted 
with the approach taken in the UK and France, where the choice was made to transpose the 
406 Circulaire F.V.72/U 559. 
407 R.N. Brummelkamp, "E.E.G.-regels voor de overheidsopdrachten veer de uitveering van werken" (1978) 15 Bouwrecht 
. 533, p. 535. ' 
409 An A.M.v.B. Is a legally binding decision that exists to further execute the requirements of a law-in the case of public 
procurement, to elaborate on the requirements of Article 33 of the Comptabiliteitswet. . 
409 Besluit aanbesteding van werken 1973 (Staatsblad 1973, 202). It should also be noted here that although 
procurement disputes could be resolved by district courts. only one case was ever deCided by a regular court prior to 
1986 (when the courts lost jurisdiction). (HR 31 mei 1985. AB 1985.480)." . 
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directives into national legal instruments; the Dutch Order in Council (entitled Besluit 
aanbesteding van werken 1973 (BA W)), on the other hand, referred readers to the original 
directives and any subsequent revisions of those directives. However, the Order in Council went 
beyond the requirements of Directive 71/305/EC and made the procurement of all works 
(including those excluded from the directive itself) subject to the directive's procurement 
procedures.410 
While this Order in Council was drafted, the Ministries of Transport, Public Works and Water 
Management, Defence, and Housing and Spatial Planning411 joined together to set up rules that 
they would bind themselves to when procuring works both above and below the thresholds set 
in the 1971 directive. The resulting Uniform Aanbestedingsreglement 1972 (UAR, 'Uniform 
Procurement Regulation') was a policy agreement between these "Construction Departments" 
(so called as they were responsible for procuring most central government infrastructure). The 
aim of the UAR 1972 was to apply consistent rules to all works procurement by these 
departments. When the BAW was drafted in 1973, it was decided that the UAR 1972 would 
further apply to all central government bodies, as a supplementary set of national rules to be 
followed during public procurement procedures. 
Under this new regime, four separate procurement procedures (defined in the BAW) were 
available to government departments; these procedures would be administered and adjudicated 
in a predetermined way (set out in the UAR 1972). Alongside the award procedures found in the 
1971 Works Directive-open, restricted and negotiated-the BAW also recognized the 
possibility of direct award for below-threshold works and other works contracts not regulated by 
the directive. The UAR regulated the operation of the procedures in practice as well as how any 
conflicts about the procedures would be resolved, and in what arena.412 The Dutch government 
did not treat it as an implementing measure413, but in practice it acted as one-the UAR actually 
410 E. Pijnacker Hordijk. "Tenuitvoerlegging van de nieuwe EG-richtlijnen inzake overheidsaanbestedingen binnen de 
Nederlandse rechtorde" (1992) 2 Bouwrecht 101. 
I 411 Now known as the t:1inistry of Housing, Spatial "lanning and the Environment 
m In the 1972 UAR. thiS was always the court system; from 1986 onwards, however, UAR-governed contracts would be 
under the jurisdiction of the Council of Arbitration for Construction Firms (see section 4.1.6). 
413 Meaning, the Dutch government did not report it (or any of its subsequent replacements) to the Commission as an 
implementing measure for any of the Works directives. 
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contained the procedures that were to be followed when procuring contracts covered by the 
directive, as well as supplementary procedures for procurement not covered by the directive 
(such as direct award). The BAW and the UAR 1972 exclusively made up central government 
procurement regulation until 1979, when the 1977 Supplies Directive was implemented. 
The Works Directive was not legally implemented for non-central government until 1977 . 
Rather than through an Order in Council, the procurement practices of/lower government' 
bodies were regulated by a separate act of parliament: Wet aanbesteding van werken lagere 
publieksrechtigelijke lichamen 1977 ("Walapuli").414 Both the BA Wand the Walapuli 
implemented the directive's content by reference; and implementation by reference was again 
used to implement the 1977 Supplies Directive, which was implemented in the form of an act 
(Wet overheidsopdrachten voor leveringen van produkten 1979415) that 'redirected' the user to 
the Supplies Directive itself. The 1979 Supplies Act, however, did ensure that the EU directive's 
rules on awarding supplies contracts could be enforced by contractors in the regular court 
system.416 Interestingly, the 1979 Act was never linked to the UAR (which remained exclusively 
concerned with works contracts). 
4.1.3.1 CritiCism o/the BA Wand the Wa/apuli 
Some commentators throughout the 1980s and 1990s noted problems with the approach taken 
in the design of both the BA Wand the Walapuli.417 They questioned whether implementation by 
reference was an appropriate implementation method for the EU procurement directives. 
, , ~ ~
414 Wet aanbesteding van werken lagere publiekrechtelijkelichamen 1977 (Staatsblad 1977,669). 
415 Wet van 13 iun! 1979 (Staatsblad 1979.334). houdende regelen voor het plaatsen van overheidsopdrachten voor 
leveringen van produkten. _ 
416 Pijnacker Hordijk 1992 (n 410), p.113. Pijnacker Hordijk etal (n 11), p. 2, indicate that this law had very little impact 
on Dutch procurement practice. - - -
411 See. among others. Pijnacker Hordijk 1992 (n 410), p. 100; P. Glazener, E. Pijnacker Hordijk en E. van der Riet, 
Application In The Netherlands a/the Directives on Public Procurement (1990) 4 SEW 194, 199; van de Meent (n 405). 
chapters 7 and 8; E. Manunza. Effectiviteit van de communautaire regelgeving inzake overheidsopdrachten voor de 
uitvoering van werken, een evaluatie van de openstelling van de markt voor overheidsopdrachten voor de uitvoering van 




However, most of the criticism was not geared generally at implementation by reference, but 
rather at the way the Dutch government approached this technique.418 
Criticisms419 geared at the Dutch approach to implementation by reference have related firstly to 
the legibility of the Dutch law: as it referenced the directives by article number without any 
further explanation, and did not annex the directives to the national law. Secondly, what rights of 
enforcement existed was also not specified in the early Orders in Council; this meant that even 
where the directives' rules could be legally enforced, this was not clear to contractors consulting 
the nationallaw.420 
However, commentators did also complain about the lack of flexibility offered by implementation 
by reference more generally. As we saw in section 2.1.4.1.3, the general drawback to 
implementing by reference is that it does not permit changes to the text in the directives. In the 
Netherlands, it was perceived as problematic that the national'laws' could not respond to 
changes that were brought about by case law unless these result in changes in the directives 
themselves421, and that unclear elements of the original directive could not be clarified in 
national law. 422 Only this point cannot be compensated for by 'proper' implementation by 
reference; but as section 2.1.4.1.3 noted, clarification is only a benefit of implementation by 
transposition when it is done correctly. 
Unofficially, it has become clear that the Dutch government did not want to transpose the 
directives because it feared doing so incorrectly.423 Critics of this attitude, however, indicate that 
this in essence is simply moving the location of the problem from central government (who have' 
to interpret if transposing) to the court system (who have to interpret if cases arise as a 
41B Denmark, for instance, was perceived to implement by reference in an effective way; see Arrowsmith 1998 (n 10), p • 
. 509. 
419 See (n 417) for sources of the criticism; in most detail, see van de Meent (n 405), p. 209, who also notes that In 1992, 
the Minister of Economic Affairs noted that the Orders In Council would be difficult to read for the Dutch, but that 
foreigners would profit from the fact that the only relevant law was the Directives themselves. [Tweede Kamer, 
Handelingen II, 1992-1993, p. 52 3783.] 
420 The UAR 1972 did refer to the possibility of conflict resolution in national courts, but was not presented as an 
implementing measure to the Commission and as such cannot contribute to the 'correct' Implementation of the Directives. 
421 Van de ~ e e n t t (n 405), p. 210 . 
. m Pijnacker Hordijk 1992 (n410), p.100 
423 Van de Meent (n 405), p. 210. 
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consequence of the 'failings' of the directives), and is not an 'acceptable' reason for not 
transposing the directives into the national legal order.424 
4.1.3.2 Criticism o/the UAR 1972 
Significant criticism also concerned the UAR 1972425, which contained the substantive content of 
the directive's award procedures, but was not intended to be an implementing measure 
according to the Dutch government 426 
Problematic here was the fact that the legal character of the UAR 1972 was solely determined by 
which contracting authority applied it; for central government, the UAR 1972 was a generally 
binding regulation427, but for Tlon-central government it had the character of a 'ministerial rule' 
(which does not have a legally binding or enforceable character).428 The UAR 1972 and its 
successors have also been termed as a "standard procedure" or "a set of pre-contractual 
conditions", which again suggests that their content is of a non-binding legal value when 
voluntarilyapplied.429 
.. " 
In practice, however, agreement by two parties to apply the UAR 1972 to a contract is treated by 
the Dutch courts as amounting to a civil law contract, and the terms of the UAR 1972 are 
mutually enforceable in practice. There appear to thus be no practical disadvantages to the fact' 
,. 
that its legal character differs between central and non-central government 430 That said, the 
"' 
likelihood that this Dutch legal construct was incomprehensible to foreign contractors is one of 
j, 
the main reasons that critics objected to Dutch approach taken to procurement regulation.431 
4Z4 Ibid. p. 211 
425 As well as the subsequent UAR 1986. UAR-EG 1991. and ARW 2004 and 2005. 
426 Van de Meent (n 405), p. 185. 
427 This was affirmed by the Dutch High Court in HR 31 mei 1985 (n 409). where the court noted that the UAR gained its 
binding legal character through its application via the BA W. . 
428 Van de Meent (n 405). p. 213. He indicates that in the event of voluntary application. it is (technically) necessary to 
make a mutual commitment to abide by the contents of the UAR. . 
429 Pijnacker Hordijk et al (n 11). p. 28.', . . 
430 This was particularly the case for cases adjudicated by the Raad van Arbitrage voor de Bouwbedrijven (see below), 
which concluded that the UAR was even enforceable by one bidder against another bidder. (RvA 1 augustus 1989. nr • 
. 14.011, BR 1990 p. 63).' . 
431 See Pijnacker Hordijk 1992 (n 405). p.101. 
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4.1.4 The 19805 
Despite criticism, the regime that was established in the 1970s was updated throughout the 
1980s, but not changed. The UAR 1971 was replaced by the UAR 1986; like its predecessor, it 
was not made mandatory on any non-central government bodies. 
It has been noted, however, that the 1986 UAR was significantly more detailed in its procedural 
requirements relating to award procedures than the 1972 UAR was.432 More importantly, in 
1986 there was for the first time an explicit mention of how bidder review of procurement 
contracts would take place under the UAR. Article 41 of UAR 1986 allocated the review of all 
procurement procedures covered by the UAR to the Raad van Arbitrage voor de Bouwbedrijven 
("RvA", Council of Arbitration for Construction Firms). The RvA is an arbitral council which 
settles disputes between parties in a legally binding fashion without involving the traditional 
judicial process. 
We can contrast the Dutch approach here to the UK and French approach to conflict resolution, 
where courts have always reviewed procurement award procedures. In the Netherlands, instead, 
a mixture of judicial and non-judicial review existed-disputes all central government contracts 
and all non-central government contracts where the UAR 1986 was voluntarily applied 
governments were 'settled' by the RvA. For all other contracts, and prior to 1986, review was 
undertaken by the Arrondissementsrechtbank (District Court), which is the Dutch national court 
of first instance dealing with civil, criminal and administrative law.433 In the national court as 
well as the RvA, the remedies of interim measures, set aside, and damages were historically 
available to aggrieved bidders; consequently no new national legislation was drawn up to 
implement the 1989 Remedies Directive.434 
432 Pijnacker Hordijk et al (n 11), p. 2. 
433 Following a terminological review of the court system in the Netherlands In 2001. Arrondissementsrechtbank has 
been replaced by the word "rechtbank" (court). 
434 For a detailed overview of the Dutch procurement remedies system prior to the 1990s, see E. van der Riet, 
"Rechtsbescherming voor aannemers onder het Europese aa,nbestedingsrecht" (1992) 2 Bouwrecht 117. 
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By granting the RvA jurisdiction over most procurement disputes, the 1986 UAR had a 
substantial impact The RvA was considered to be both cheaper and more accessible, and as it 
gained the jurisdiction over procurement cases, a new field of procurement case law quickly 
developed. 
4.1.5 The 1990s 
In the early 1990s, the BAWwas amended to refer to the 1989 directives. The remaining Dutch 
sources of public procurement (including the 1979 Services Act), however, were left unchanged. 
One commentator noted that following 1991, the Dutch procurement regulation was nearly 
incomprehensible-the BAW by then complied with the 1989 consolidated directives, but the 
UAR 1986 (the directive's procedural rules) was left untouched.435 Instead, further 
fragmentation was created by, the development of a special UAR applicable to contracts covered 
by the EU directives: the UAR·EG of 1991. By the time the 1993 directives were published, the 
Dutch procurement regulatory regime was a mess: there were now four separate legally binding 
documents applicable to central government-and, in an odd contrast, still only a single binding 
. reference to EU law applicable to non-central government 
The Dutch government appears to have viewed the arrival of the 1993 consolidated directives as 
an opportunity to 'clean up' the Dutch procurement regulation. In 1992, the government 
presented a proposal for a new 'implementation strategy' to the Dutch parliament The proposal 
,suggested 'the adoption of a general framework law (known as the "Raamwet), and two adopted 
, " 
. general Orders in Council to be based on this law. The first of these Orders in Council would 
concern the Utilities Directive-Besluit aanbestedingen nutssector, BAN-and the second-
Besluit overheidsaanbestedingen, BOA-would implement the three public sector directives. 
The purpose of the revision was twofold. Firstly, the setup of the Raamwet would ensure that all 
current and future procurement-related EU rules would be implemented under one banner.436 
435 Ibid, p. 102. 
436 Preamble of the Raamwet. ) .' 
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The separate regime for lower governments would thus disappear with the introduction of the 
two general Orders in Council. Secondly, existence of the Raamwet would lead to a faster 
implementation of the EU rules in the Netherlands, as all updated directives and other measures 
could be implemented through Orders in Council (which require minimal consultation with 
parliament). 
Both the Raamwet and its two Orders in Council came into force in 1993, with the provisions of 
the BOA dealing with supply and works coming into force in 1994. The BOA and the BAN still 
implemented solely by reference to the original directives, as all previous Dutch implementing 
measures had done. 
Despite being an improvement, the arrival of the Raamwet did not solve the complexity of Dutch 
procurement regulation immediately. For instance, the arrival of the Raamwet did not eliminate 
the existence or applicability of the BAW or the UAR-EG. It took until 2001 for the relevant 
provisions of the BAW (which, most significantly, also applied procurement procedures to below-
threshold works contracts) to be replaced by an updated document called Beleidsregels 2001. 
The Beleidsregels 2001 applied the important BAW rules, but only to the three government 
departments that conceived of them and signed them, thus leaving most of central government 
without an obligation to purchase competitively below the directive's thresholds.437 
Similarly, the UAR-EG existed alongside the BOA and the BAN but in some respects contradicted 
it, as it was based on earlier versions of the directives. The Dutch government opted to deal with 
this by giving the UAR-EG the title of 'supplementary regulation', which would apply only insofar 
that it did not conflict with the BOA and BAN rules.438 
This situation was further complicated by the introduction of several other Dutch laws which 
made it obligatory for certain types of contracts to be procured in a speCific way. An example of 
this is the Wet Personenvervoer (Law on the Transport of Persons) 2000, which contains 
437 These are the same departments that drafted the UAR 1972 (n 411), henceforth known as the Construction 
Departments. The Beleidsregels 2001 also obliged the Construction Departments to apply the UAR-EG and the UAR 2001. 
438 Nota van Toelichting op Besluit tot wijziging van het Besluit overheidsaanbestedingen (Staatsblad 1994,379), p. 9. 
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detailed procedures to be followed when procuring a public transportation concession.439 A 
more far-reaching example is the Wet 8180844°, which applies additional policy guidelines for 
procurement in the IT, environment, and construction sectors. These policy guidelines explicitly 
restate the grounds for exclusion of service providers in these three sectors that could also be 
found in the 1993 directives.441 
However, the Dutch government thought it had adequately restructured national procurement 
regulation in the 1990s. The Raamwet and its Orders in Council were perceived to be an 
adequate form of implementation; the remedies available in the courts and before the RvA were 
thought to eliminate the need to implement the Remedies directive; and there was no pressure 
from either the Commission or national contractors to revisit the regime, however complicated it 
was. 
4.1.6 The Early 20005 
In 2001, the former head of a construction firm leaked a story to the Dutch press detailing the. 
tremendous amount of cartel-forming and negotiation among bidders that dominated Dutch 
construction procurement Years of accounting audits were falsified and backed up; and 
approximately 600 construction firms were implicated in the scanda1.442 While the primary 
blame was placed with a lack of whistle-blowing among procuring authorities and other 
members of government (who were generally aware of the practices), the Parliamentary Enquiry 
on Construction Fraud which followed these findings also found fault in Dutch public 
procurement policy itself, which was deemed non-transparent and ineffective due to lax 
, enforcement 443 Particular blame was placed with the RvA, which was perceived to be too 
'friendly' towards the construction industrY.444 Only after the Parliamentary Enquiry did the 
439 Pijnacker Hordijk et al (n 11), p. 26. .. 
440 Wet Bevordering Integriteit Beoordelingen door het Openbaar Bestuur (BIBOB) (Staatscourant 2004.40). 
441 For a detailed discussion. see Pijnacker Hordijket al (n 11), p. 279 onwards. ' 
442 Enquete Bouwnijverheid. "De Bouw Uit de Schaduw· (Tweede Kamer 2002-2003, Kamerstuk 28.244 nr 6, 12 
December 2002), at 3.6 .. 4 
441 Ibid, at 2.4.1 onwards. 
444 It Is unclear whether or not the RvA was, In fact, aware, and furthermore difficult to state what it could have done 
about the situation had it been aware, given that it had jurisdiction over individual cases but not the entire construction 
sector. For criticism of this approach, see E. Pijnacker Hordijk, • Aanbestedingsrecht na de Parlementaire Enquete 
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Netherlands start considering the creation of a more elaborate procurement regulatory regime 
that would cover both directive and below-threshold procurement for all government 
departments. 
However, radical changes to Dutch procurement regulation have not as of yet taken place. 
Instead, the existing regime from the 1990s has been updated several more times. First, the 1986 
UAR was replaced by the UAR 2001445, which aimed to cut the costs of procurement procedures 
and also put a stop to price-fixing practices in the construction sector that had been declared 
illegal by the Commission and the CJ in 1996.446 Finally, in 2004, both the UAR-EG and the UAR 
2001 were replaced by the Aanbestedingsreglement Werken 2004 (ARW, Procurement 
Regulation for Works 2004), one single document that contained rules for both works contracts 
covered by and not covered by the directives. 
Simultaneously, the Beleidsregels 2001 were replaced by the Besluit Aanbestedingsreglement 
2004, which bound the Construction Departments44? of the central government to the application 
of the ARW 2004. What was interesting about the ARW 2004 is that the College bouw 
ziekenhuisvoorzieningen (College for Hospital Building and Supplies) also made its application 
mandatory for all entities listed in the Wet ziekenhuisvoorzieningen448 (Act Hospital Building and 
Supplies). All other government departments, local or central, retained the option to apply the 
ARW 2004 to their works contracts, but as has traditionally been the case, there were been no 
mandatory rules in place for their below-threshold works procurement 
Bouwnijverheid", Chapter 9 in M. Van den Berg (ed), Hoofdstukken Bouwrecht: Aangenomen Werk (Tjeenk Willink: Den 
Haag 2003). _ . '. 
445 UAR 2001 (Staatscourant 2001. 113). 
446 See the Explanatory Note attached to the UAR ZOO 1; it states that certain C)-enforced opinions of the Commission 
necessitated a revision of the UAR 1986.. . 
447 In 2004, the M.inistry of Agriculture/Nature/Food Quality (LNV) joined the previous three Construction Departments. 
448 This law has smce been repealed. The law in force at the time of the circular was Wet ziekenhuisvoorzieningen (2002) 
(Staatsblad Z005, 320). 
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4.1.7 The Current Regime 
Central Government Non-Central Government 
Above Threshold RAAMWET 1993: with Orders RAAMWET 1993: with Orders 
in Council BAO and BASS, in Council BAO and BASS 
which copy out the Optional: ARW 2005 
directives 
For 4 ministries and hospital 
construction: ARW 2005, 
which contains rules in the 
directive and rules for 
works contra!;iS not covered 
by the directives 
Below Threshold In general: NONE NONE 
.-
For 4 ministries and Hospital (Voluntary ARW 2005 & own 
Construction: ARW 2005 regime possible) 
Table 4.1.7 - Current Legislation Applicable to Public Procurement in the Netherlands 
Despite existing ambitions to revise the setup of Dutch procurement regulation, the 2004 
directives were implemented through Orders in Council set in the 1993 Raamwet This is largely 
because the results of the 2001 Parliamentary Enquiry were published only shortly before the 
.. announcement of the 2004 EU directives, and there was not enough time to design and enact a 
new law (which would have needed approval from both houses of parliament) prior to the 2006 
implementation deadline. 'The choice was thus made to comply with the EU implementation 
requirements first, and design a n ~ w w national law later. 
The new Orders in Council are known as the BOA (Besluit Overheidsaanbestedingen, for 
2004/18/EC) and the BASS (Besluit Aanbestedingen Speciale Sectoren, for2004/17/Ee). 449 
Unlike previous Orders in Council, however, the BOA and the BASS. copy out the EU directives. 
This is presumably a response to the criticism raised during the Parliamentary Enquiry that the 
previous system of cross-references to the directives was too .complex. The BOA and the BASS. 
have recently been complemented by the i n t r ~ d u c t i o n n of the WIRA (Wet lmplementatie ' I. 
449 Besluit van 16 juli 2005, houdende regels betreffende de procedures voor het gunnen van overheidsopdrachten voor 
werken, leveringen en diensten. (Staatsblad 2005, 408) and Besluit van 16 juJi 2005, houdende regels betreffende de 
procedures voor het gunnen van opdrachten in de sectoren water- en energievoorziening, vervoer en postdiensten. 
(Staatsblad 2005, 409). 
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~ ~............ , .... _., ......... '--
Rechtsbeschermingrichtlijn Aanbesteden)-an act which copies out the 2007 Remedies 
directive.450 
Changes in implementation approach notwithstanding, however, the regulatory regime in the 
Netherlands has not changed significantly since the 1990s. The practice oflocal governments 
adopting their own regimes-made possible by the optional nature of the ARW-continues to 
date. The ARW 2004 has had to be replaced by an updated version that takes the new directives 
into account-and makes allowances for procedures such as competitive dialogue-but its 
replacement, the ARW 2005, again principally only binds the Construction Departments in the 
central government.451 Like in 2004, however, the College for Hospital Works and Services opted 
to make the application of the ARW 2005 binding on procuring entities that are subject the Wet 
Toelating Zorginstellingen, which regulates the licensing of hospital construction projects.452 The 
ARW 2005 is thus in practice binding on 4 departments and a variety of (re)construction projects 
in the healthcare sector; for all other departments, it remains optiona1.453 
While they are not relevant to the research question posed in this thesis, it is worth noting that 
there are still various other laws (such as WET BIBOB) that apply to procurement. The Dutch 
procurement regime thus remains layered and complex. 
4.1.8 Current Legislative Initiatives 
As discussed above, the Construction Fraud affair prompted a government initiative to create a 
more centralized and uniform set of procurement rules, so as to make the regime both less 
complex and easier to enforce.454 Since 2004, two laws have been proposed in order to meet 
these goals; the first was rejected in the First Chamber of Parliament in the summer of2008, as it 
450 Wet van 28 januari 2010 tot implementatie van,de rechtsbeschermingsrichtlijnen aanbesteden (Wet Implementatie 
rechtsbeschermingsrichtlijnen aanbesteden) (Staatsbland 2010, 38.) . 
451 The binding nature of the ARW 2005 (Staatscourant 2005, 20711) is established in Be/eidsrege/s Aanbesteding van 
Werken 2005 (Staatscourant 2005, 207) ("Beleidsregels"). 
452 See Circulaire Aanbesteding van werken WTZi (Staatscourant 2006,77) ("2006 wrz Circular"). 
453 It has been endorsed by the VNG, however; see M. Essers. Aanbestedingsrecht voor Overheden (Elsevier: Den Haag 
2006). p. 32. 
454 See Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. Memorie van Toelichting op "Regels voor het gunnen van . 
overheidsopdrachten do.or aanbestedende diensten en opdrachten door speciale-sectorbedrijven (Aanbestedingswet)" 
(Tweede Kamer, Handehngen 112005-2006. nr. 30 501); the explanatory memorandum to the rejected procurement law. 
was perceived to be too rigid and cumbersome in its approach to exclusion of contractors 
"lacking in integrity" (expanding on the EU's policy of mandatory exclusion for contractors 
convicted for certain offenses) and in its mandatory advertising rules that would apply to all 
contracts (including supplies and services) above a value of 50.000 euros.455 This law proposed a 
radical departure from the previous regime, but such an approach was ultimately rejected. 
A new proposed law has been sent to the Second Chamber of parliament for discussion in June 
2010456; it has appropriately been described as far less ambitious457, as explicit rules on 
advertising contracts below the European thresholds have been scrapped in their entirety. The 
primary consequence of the latest proposal is that by centralizing the procurement rules and 
implementing the EU rules in the form of an act, rather than an Order in Council, further 
developments in the EU procurement rules will be more difficult to quickly implement. 
4.1.9 Guidance 
Historically, there has not been substantial use of guidance in central government procurement 
regulation. This is slowly changing, however, with the development of PIAN0()45B-a post-2004 
government initiative website that contains all relevant legislation and policy at central 
government level, summarizes important CJ and national case law, and which has recently 
started providing short explanatory notes prepared by a panel of national 'procurement experts' 
(academics, lawyers, and senior purchasing officers) that attempt to highlight procuring entities' 
. ;,. 
obligations regarding specific problems. Recent explanatory notes have discussed the legal 
. possibilities to reserve contracts for handicapped and (long-term) unemployed workers, the time 
. limits set in the directive, and the directive's information requirements and how these have been 
implemented in Dutch law.459 
455 Pijnacker Hordijket al (n 11). p. 5. 
456 All information about the new procurement law can be accessed at 
bttp:!/www.P1ANQO.nl/regelgeyjng/aanbestedingswet (last accessed on 1 November 2010): as the law will not be 
debated in parliament before the submission of this thesis, it will not be discussed in great detail in the following sections. 
457 Pijnacker Hordijk et al (n 11), p. 5. 
458 bttp·/Iwww.PlANOQ.nl (last accessed 1 November 2010) 
459 For all notes, see bttp:!/www.P1ANOO nlloyer-P1ANOOlyakgroepen/yakgroep-aanbestedjngsrecbt. (last accessed 1 ' 
November 2010.) 
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The Ministry of Economic Affairs, responsible for the development of national procurement laws 
and policy, does not offer any guidance on its website; instead, it refers readers directly to 
PIANOO, or-specifically for non-central government-to 'Europa Decentraal', an independent 
organization chaired by representative from both local, regional and central government that 
aims to expand the procurement knowledge of non-central government purchasers. Europa 
Decentraal's website contains similar information to PIANOO, but (where appropriate) discusses 
the particular requirements oflocal and regional government more explicitly.460 
One particular area of procurement where significant guidance has been issued concerns 
complex or public-private partnership procurement; however, while there is guidance to be 
found here, for instance by the Ministry of Finance or the Construction Departments461, it tends 
to focus on the total management of complex projects such as PPP projects, and does not 
generally comment on the applicable legal rules beyond listing relevant procurement procedures 
available for such projects.462 
4.1.10 Conclusions 
The Netherlands has, historically, had a complex approach to implementing the EU procurement 
directives. The system used until 2004 should have in theory been accessible, as it implemented 
EU law by reference and supplemented the EU rules with only sparing national law on works 
contracts. However, in practice, the 2004 choice to implement the directives by copying them out 
into a national law has simplified the regulatory system substantially. Current proposals for 
change again are pursuing implementation by verbatim transposition; however, as they are not 
as of yet approved, it is unclear how Dutch public procurement legislation will look in the future. 
460 For instance. in discussing the new proposed procurement law. it highlights specifically how the new regime will affect 
sub-central government departments in procurement. (See 
http://eurQpadecentraal nllcontent/2592 /l OO/Bekendmakjnl: njeuwe Aanbestedjnl:swet html (last accessed on 1 
November 2010.) 
461 Of p ~ r ? c u l ~ r r note for t,he p ~ r p o s e e ~ f f this thesis is recent 2009 guidance by the Construction Departments on 
competitive dialogue. which Will be discussed in section 4.2.6 below. 
462 See. for instance. ~ e e joint guidance offered by the Ministries of Finance, Housing, Spatial Planning and the 
E n v i r o ~ ~ e n t . . .the Society of D u . t c ~ ~ C?uncils and the Interprovincial Council on area development, which addresses 
competitive dialogue use (albeit limitedly) (see http'lIwww neprom n!fviewer/file.aspx?EilelnfolD=309, last accessed 1 
November 2010). 
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One element in the Dutch approach to procurement regulation that should be remembered when 
reading future sections is that any additional regulation of procurement that exists-ie, beyond 
what the directives require-only covers works contracts. There is thus currently no 
supplementary legislation for services or supplies contracts applicable to either central or non-
central government 
Interesting about the Dutch regulation of public procurement is the very limited role played by 
guidance. Unlike in the UK, only in recent years has some central government guidance .emerged 
that aims to complement the legislation; the earlier situation in the 1970s cannot be compared to 
this, because guidance there was the primary method of regulation. 
Lastly, there is a significant body of jurisprudence on procurement on the Netherlands, aided by 
the pre-2004 availability of an arbitral tribunal which significantly reduced the costs of disputes. 
Since 2004, exclusive jurisdiction over procurement disputes has transferred back to the general 
courts; however, we will see that this has not reduced the number of cases appearing. 
~ ' , , I 
... 
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4.2 Competitive Dialogue in the Netherlands 
4.2.1 Introduction 
This section will discuss the Netherlands' approach to the implementation of c o m p e t i t ~ v e e
dialogue. It will first examine legislative steps taken in the BAD and the ARW 2005, if any, and 
will then evaluate any jurisprudence or guidance issued since 2006. 
4.2.2 Legislation: BAD 
4.2.2.1 General Comments 
In section 2.2.3, it was highlighted that competitive dialogue is an optional procedure. However, 
given that the BAD generally 'copies out' the directive. it is not surprising that competitive 
dialogue has been made available in this piece of legislation. 
All provisions on competitive dialogue not relating to scope of the procedure are found in Article 
29. Various wordings in the directive have been changed, but in light of the principles of 
interpretation discussed in Section 2.1.4.2, it seems unlikely any ofthese would have a significant 
effect 463 Generally, then, it can be noted that there are very few changes made to t h ~ ~ directive in 
the BAD; however, there are two exceptions. The first of these relates to scope of the procedure, 
as stated in the BAD, and the second relates to bid payments. 
4.2.2.2 Scope 
The BAD does not restrict the use of competitive dialogue in terms of either contracting 
authorities that can use the procedure, or types of contracts that it can be used for. The only 
463 As an example. Article 29(3) of the Directive states that the aim ofthe dialogue phase of the procedure Is to Mldentify 
and define the means best suited to satisfying [the procuring entity's] needs·. Article 29(4) BAO, which contains the same 
provision. does not include the word 'identify'. Similar changes can be found with regards to 'clarify. specify and fine-
tune', where the Dutch BAO leaves off 'specify'. 
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restriction found in theBAO is in the retention of the definition ofa particularly complex 
contract; however, the BAD's definition is not identical to that o f ~ h e e directive. 
The BAD defines a 'particularly complex contract' in Article 1 (w), and seems to restrict use of the 
procedure more than the directive does in one key aspect. The wording of Article lew) suggests 
that contracting authorities are not allowed to use the procedure merely to ascertain what the 
best solution to their problem is, as is generally considered to be possible under the directive464, 
but only when they cannot define any solution. 
This word choice in transposition appears to have been conscious and deliberate, even from the 
Explanatory Note to the BAD, which discusses 'necessary' solutions to a given government 
'problem', rather than 'the bes"t' solutions.465 
However, as will be discussed in section 4.2.3.2, the ARW 2005, which is intended to complement 
the BAD, does explicitly refer to a possibility for 'best solutions'. This may indicate that the 
wording in the BAD is not intended to restrict the use of the procedure after all: Secondly, as 
discussed in section 2.2.4, limiting what a particularly complex contract is can have significant 
consequences for the availability of the procedure, and its potential usefulness in practice-
although it must be remembered that the judiciary is obligated to interpret the BAD in a 
'conforming' manner to the 2004 directive. The end effect of this word changes thus depends on 
how the judiciary would interpret the BAD's wording in Article lew); it may consequently be 
limited. 
A final important point on scope is that the BAD in its entirety, as discussed in section 4.1.7, is 
silent on procurement not covered by the directive; availability of competitive dialogue for these 
contracts is thus not addressed at all. 
464 See the materials cited in (n 120). 
465 Explanatory Note to the BAD, Artikel 29: "·Van een bijzonder complexe overheidsopdracht in de zin van dit besluit is . 
sprake als het objectief gezien onmogelijk is te bepalen welke middelen en oplossingen noodzakelijk zijn voor deze 
overheidsopdracht (emphasis added)". (Translation: "We are speaking of a particularly complex contract in the sense of 
this decree when it is objectively impossible to determine which means and solutions are necessary for this contract.") ) 
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4.2.2.3 Procedural Issues 
As noted, in implementing competitive dialogue, the BAO has not restricted any of the 
possibilities made available in the directive.466 As such, the possibility to make bid payments has 
been retained (Article 29(15) BAO); however, this option has been restricted in practice for 
central government purchasers.467 Compensation for what is termed 'participation' (ie, any 
standard financial calculations involved in preparing a bid)468-which is permissible under the 
directive as well as the BAO-will thus not be extended by any central government departments; 
however, the rule is retained in the BAO because it also applies to non-central government, which 
is not subject to the same policy-based restriction, and because it refers not only to payment for 
'participation' but also to payment for significant design work, which is not forbidden by this 
Dutch policy. 
Generally, the BAO has not expanded on the procedure in a notable manner, nor has it attempted 
to clarify any of the legal uncertainties highlighted in section 2.2.5. The procedure has thus only 
changed linguistically in being implemented in the Dutch BAO. 
4.2.3 Legislation: ARW 2005 
4.2.3.1 General Comments 
As discussed in section 4.1.7, the second most important piece of procurement legislation in the 
Netherlands is the ARW 2005, which is binding on the Construction Departments of the central 
government as well as any other procuring entity that opts to apply it; when applied, its 
466 This is also stressed in the Explanatory Note to the BAD, Section 4. 
467 See Explanatory Note to the BAD, Article 29; following the 2001 Parliamentary Enquiry, central government 
purchasers are no longer allowed (as a matter of central government policy) to offer compensation to bidders unless the 
bidders in question offered up a (specific to the contract) design that was requested by the procuring entity as a part of 
the missive to 'procure innovatively'. 
468 These are described in Dutch as 'rekenvergoedingen', which translates loosely to compensation offered for 
'calculations'; it refers to the costs incurred in trying to prepare the financial elements of the bid specifically which prior 
to the Parliamentary Enquiry were paid out every 1 in 10 procurements. [P. Peters, ·Onder Een Helm" Pardol PS 3 April 
2002.] , • 
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provisions are legally binding, and enforceable by private parties in the courts.469 A key point to 
remember is that it only covers works procurement, regardless of who applies it 
4.2.3.2 Scope 
As the ARW 2005 is only applicable to works contracts, services and supplies contracts are, when 
covered by the directives, regulated exclusively by the BAO, and not regulated at all when they 
are not covered by the directives. 
Regarding works procurement, however, the ARW 2005 applies to both procurement covered by 
the directive (what it terms 'European' procurement) and p r o c u ~ e m e n t t not covered by the 
directives ('national' procurement, falling below the directive's thresholds). 
Chapter 1 of the ARW 2005 contains definitions as well as rules on the scope of application of the 
provisions. Article 1.4.1 makes clear that the ARW 2005 foresees use of the competitive dialogue 
procedure for 'European' procurement, and Article 1.4.2 contains the same provision with regard 
to 'national' procurement. 
The rules applicable to 'national' procurement and 'European' procurement are not the same, 
however. Of particular interest here is Section 4.2 of the ARW 2005, discussing when 
competitive dialogue can be used. Firstly, in the 'European' column, Article 4.2.1 indicates that 
competitive dialogue is available for particularly complex contracts. The 'national' column, on the 
other hand, contains no provisions on the availability of the procedure. It thus appears that any 
restrictions placed on availability of competitive dialogue for contracts subject to the directive 
have been intentionally left out for all below-threshold and non-directive contracts. Competitive 
dialogue as defined in the ARW appears to be available for even non-complex procurement for 
contracts not covered by the directives. 
469 See section 4.1.3.2. 
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This broad interpretation is further supported by the Beleidsregels aanbesteding werken 2005-
the policy rules that make application of the ARW 2005 mandatory for the Construction 
Departments, discussed in section 4.2.4-which state that for 'national' procurement, 
competitive dialogue is to be used in all situations where it can lead to cost-efficiency. 
As mentioned in section 4.2.2.2, the ARW 2005 also discusses what a 'particularly complex 
contract' is. For both 'European' and 'national' procurement, Article 4.18.1 reads that the 
dialogue phase serves to "(author's translation) decide which means are appropriate to meet the 
needs of the procuring entity in the best way possible."470 Section 4.2.2.2 discussed the BAD's 
stricter language with regard to the scope of a particularly complex contract; as stated there, it is 
possible that the ARW 2005's less restrictive wording would be upheld by the judiciary. 
4.2.3.3 Procedural Issues 
Chapter 4 of the ARW 2005 describes the competitive dialogue procedure In full: it contains not 
only the competitive dialogue-specific provisions found in Article 29 of the directive, but rather 
all provisions dealing with the entire process of running a competitive dialogue p r o c e d u r e ~ t h i s s
includes provisions on advertising, information requirements, etc. However, only a few of these 
provisions are different from those found in the directive. 
Firstly, Article 4.19.1 states that there is a possibility for the con tracting authority to request a 
participant to make a final tender on the basis of a solution that is "(author's translation) not at 
all or not entirely" of their own invention, and that when this is done, the contracting authority 
needs to include the specifications of this solution with the invitation to submit final tenders. This 
is an interesting addition to the directive (here applied to both 'European' and 'national' 
procurement). implying that the ARW 2005 fo'resees a degree of solution-sharing. However, the 
possibilities permitted by solution-sharing are not made entirely clear by Article 4.19.1: it is not 
discussed, for instance, whether or not the only shared solutions that can be used have to come 
from other participants in the dialogue, or could even come from the contracting authority Itself. 
470 Key is the phrase ·zo goed mogelijk" which means "as good as possible". 
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A second addition can be found in Article 4.26.2, which states that a tender to which 'conditions' 
not discussed in the dialogue are attached is not valid. As we will see in section 4.3.3.3 on 
framework agreements, the ARW 2005 contains a similar provision for all contracting 
procedures, so as to prevent the possibility of tenderers manipulating contracting authorities. 
Another addition is found on the subject of variants. Article 25 of the directive stipulates that in 
the event where most economically advantageous tender (MEAT) is used as the basis for award, 
tenders can be submitted on the basis of variants if permitted by the contracting authority.471 As 
MEAT criteria are required when awarding competitive dialogue contracts, Dutch contracting 
authorities could thus decide to allow variants to be submitted. However, the ARW 2005 (in 
Article 4.23.1) forbids this possibility for both European and national procurement when using 
the competitive dialogue procedure. This is especially interesting because the ARW 2005 
permits (and actually encourages) contracting entities to allow variant submission for all other 
procedures, and indicates in the explanatory notes in part IV of the ARW 2005 that this has been 
a conscious change from the ARW 2004. The general explanatory note in Part 1II of the ARW . 
even states that it is a c c ~ p t e d d that variants can lead to innovative solutions that would be missed 
out upon if variant solutions are not permitted.472 
One possible reason for the exclusion of variant submissions in competitive dialogue is that there, 
is a presumption that variants are unnecessary in such a procedure because the dialogue phase 
will have clarified exactly which possible solution a contracting authority is interested in; but that 
. explanation is unpersuasive because variant submission is permitted under the negotiated 
procedures.473 It is thus unclear why tenderers in a competitive dialogue procedure cannot 
submit tenders on the basis of variants under the ARW 2005 .. 
'I. 
. . 
Other provisions left uncertain in the directive are left unclear by the ARW 2005, as they were 
. - left unclear by the BAD. While the ARW 2005 thus expands on directive's competitive dialogue 
471 Whether or not variants will be accepted is to be stipulated in the contract notice; Article 25(2). 
472 ARW 2005 Part III. Section 11. ' 
473 Article 5.24 of the ARW 2005. . > ! 
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procedure more than the BAD does, in particular by making the procedure available for contracts 
where the directive does not apply, the ARW 2005 also leaves a significant amount of grey areas 
unclear. 
4.2.4 Policy Rules (Beleidsregels 2005; Wet WTZ) 
4.2.4.1 General Comments 
This section has thus far discussed formal legislation. In procurement, Dutch government 
departments are also bound by 'policy rules', which regulate how government departments carry 
out tasks that they are responsible for, or that faU within their competences.474 Through the 
Algemene wet bestuursrecht (General act on administrative law), government departments will 
generally be bound by the policy rules they set for themselves.47S 
In the field of public procurement, existing policy rules usually result in the application ofa 
specific set of procurement rules. The Beleidsregels aanbesteding van werken 2005 
(Beleidsregels, see section 4.1.7) make application of the ARW 2005 mandatory for the 
Construction Departments when procuring works not covered by the BAD/directive. Similarly, 
the 2006 Administrative Circular "Aanbesteding van werken Wet Toelating Zorgstelsel" (WTZ) 
makes application of the ARW 2005 mandatory for all procuring entities engaged in the building 
and managing of health care facilities for which a permit is necessary, when such contracts are 
not covered by the BAD/directive. 
4.2.4.2 Scope 
Generally, the Beleidsregels require that for all procurement below the directive's thresholds, the 
open or restricted procedure is used. However, several scenarios in which procuring entities can 
deviate from these two procedures are presented. One of these scenarios is where "(author's 
474 Normally determined by law. , . 
475 The exception being special circumstances where folloWing the policy rule would have a disproportionate 
consequence for any concerned party; Article 4:84 Awb. . 
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translation) competitive dialogue offers an advantage."476 There is thus no reference to 
'particularly complex contracts', and from the Explanatory Note to the Beleidsregels it can be 
gleaned that this is deliberate: 
"(author's translation) [oo. in determining the grounds for use of the competitive dialogue 
procedure, it was decided to deviate from the condition in the Order that there must exist a 
'particularly complex contract'] A broad applicability has been chosen under the precondition 
that this procedure must result in a genuine advantage. The procurer will thus have to be able to 
motivate this."477 
A very similar provision can be found in the 2006 WTZ circular. It stipulates that the default 
method of procurement for 'national' procurement will be the open or restricted procedure as 
described in the ARW 2005, but adds that competitive dialogue can be used when this will 
benefit the procuring entity. Unlike the Beleidsregels, the 2006 WTZ circular defines what it 
means by 'benefit'-and indicates that this relates exclusively to works where early involvement 
on the part of the contractor is necessary for a successful procurement, such as 'turnkey' or 
design-build-operate contracts. It therefore does not appear that competitive dialogue is also 
available, under the 2006 WTZ circular for non-complex procurement generally. 
4.2.5 Jurisprudence 
'!': 
At the time of writing, no relevant case law on competitive dialogue has emerged from the Dutch 
courts; while a few cases deal with competitive dialogue disputes, the disputes in question do not 
specifically deal with competitive dialogue as a procedure but rather with general problems with 
contract award (such as non-transparent award criteria/weightings and/or incorrect award 
decisions) .. 
476 HHet een werk betreft waarvoor een aanbestedingvolgens de concurrentiegerichte dialoog voordeel biedt". 
477 ·Voor het gebruik maken van de aanbestedingsprocedure volgens concurrentiegerichte dialoog (artikeI4, eerste lid, 
onderdeel b) is afgeweken van het bepaalde in het besluit, dat er sprake moet zijn van bijzonder complexe opdrachten. 
Gekozen is voor een bredere toepasbaarheid maar wei onder de voorwaarde dat deze procedure daadwerkelijk voordeel 
biedt. De aanbesteder zal dit dan ook moeten kunnen motiveren." 
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4.2.6 Guidance 
It was discussed in section 4.1.9 that the Netherlands has not traditionally created its own 
guidance on public procurement law. However, in 2009, the Construction Departments (with 
assistance from PIANOO) have issued a guidance document called "Competitive Dialoguen , 
discussing the use of competitive dialogue in design-build-finance-operate (DBFO) procurement 
projects. This guidance is based on Dutch practical experience; consequently, it does not address 
the law on competitive dialogue in detail, and instead aims to supplement the hard law rules in 
the BAD with a practical procedural guide.478 
The guidance starts by discussing planning and risk analysis, and focuses on organization of the 
dialogue rather than the legal regime in which it is to take place. There are also explicit mentions 
that confidentiality should be maintained-but much as in the UK, there is no particular guidance 
on how this should be done (see section 3.2.4.8).479 
Similarly to the UK discussion on the 'reserve' bidder'(see section 3.2.4.7), the Dutch guidance 
contemplates the use ofa 'waiting room'-but suggests this is usually impractical, as shortly after 
being rejected, the bid consortia that participate in complex tenders are likely to disband.4Bo The 
Dutch guidance thus suggests that it is permissible to hold on to reserve bidders, but may not be 
possible in practice. 
Generally, the guidance supplements EU law to a significant extent, much like the UK guidance by 
4ps and PFS has done (see section 3.2.4), but does not address many ofthe practical and legal 
uncertainties in the procedure discussed in Section 2.2.5. It should also be noted that the 
guidance is very narrowly aimed at contracting authorities; issues such as the completeness of 
final tenders are not elaborated on, possibly because the contracting authorities do not write the 
final tenders themselves. 
478 R i j k s o v e r h ~ i d . . "De Concurrentiegerichte Dia\oog" (October 2009) (see 
http://www.ppsbiihetdjk n J / d s r e s o u r c e ? o b i e c t i d = 7 0 9 & ~ e = O r i . l a s t a c c e s s e d d 1 November 2010). 
479 Ibid. at 3.9.2. . 
480 Ibid. at 4.4. 
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A few legal uncertainties are discussed, however. The guidance firstly recommends that 
reduction of solutions can take place after a questioning of a proposed approach or "project 
vision" (at 5.4.3); it is implied that these submissions are written, as the guidance demands that 
dialogue will continue on the basis ofthe 'submitted' approach/vision. This is very similar to the 
recommended UK approach to reduction of solutions (see section 3.2.4.3). 
Interestingly, the guidance also suggests that three candidates need to be retained at all times 
until the final tender phase; this can be contrasted with UK guidance, which generally suggests 
that competition at the final tender stage can be secured by just two tenderers (see section 
3.2.4.4). In terms of the award criteria used to assess any sort of interim tender, the Dutch 
guidance merely indicates that these criteria should be 'stated' -this is very similar to the PFS 
approach in the UK (see section 3.2.4.3). 
Finally, unlike the UK guidance, the Dutch guidance does recommend best practice for 
establishing a bid (design) payment regime; the guidance (in 3.11.2) recommends considering in . 
detail the objective costs of the design, what a reasonable p r i c ~ ~ would be to pay for design work, 
and what bidders would become eligible for a payment-all bidders, or only the final two 
bidders? As we will see in section 5.2.3.1.3, these considerations are quite similar to the 
recommendations actually stated in the French eM? 
4.2.7 Rules for Contracts Not Covered by the Directives? 
It is difficult to understand why only works procurement is subject to additional regulation in the 
Netherlands; historically, it can be explained by the fact that the 1971 Works Directive was the 
. only directive implemented in the Netherlands for quite some time, but this does not explain why -
, from 1993 onwards, additional regulation for supplies and services contracts has not emerged. 
The provisions that applied to the above-threshold procurement of services and supplies, 
however, have simplynever been supplemented by rules for below-threshold or excluded 
contracts. In a complete absence of rules for services and supplies contracts, it can be assumed 
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that (much like in the UK) competitive dialogue is freely available for these contracts when they 
are not covered by the directive. 
The first proposed new procurement law foresaw a system of 'national procurement' that applied 
to works, services and supplies equally;4Bl despite various changes to the proposal that means 
that coverage is significantly less ambitious in the new proposal, a desire to create 'ARW 2005'-
like rules for services and supplies has been expressed again in the Explanatory Memorandum 
accompanying the second proposed law.4B2 However, the specifics of these rules have not been 
made clear at the time of writing and thus cannot be commented on. 
4.2.8 Conclusions 
Competitive dialogue has been brought into the Dutch legal order as it was created at the EU 
level. The Dutch legislative provisions in the BAD dealing with competitiv.e dialogue principally 
add very little to the original provisions in the directive, and even the ARW 2005 only makes a 
few additions, primarily to make it clear that under the ARW 2005, competitive dialogue can also 
be used for excluded contracts that are not particularly complex. For services and works 
contracts excluded from the directives, the Dutch legislation remains silent (much as the UK 
legislation does). 
The Dutch legislation is, despite various word changes, as limited as the UK legislation is; 
however, the Dutch government has not until recently supplemented the legal provisions with 
guidance. This is in line with the Dutch regulatory tradition, in which legal guidance has never 
played a particularly important role; even now, central government guidance focuses 
significantly more on best practice than it does on legal clarification. Lastly, much like in the UK 
and at the EU level, the courts have not yet dealt with the specific legal uncertainties of 
competitive dialogue at all-and consequently case law has played no role at all yet in the 
development of national rules on competitive dialogue. 
481 Pijnacker Hordijk et al (n 11), p. 5. 
48Z Explanatory Memorandum to the Procurement Law, Section 4.2 (see 
http'{{www P1ANOQ nl{sites{default {files/documents {documents { m e m Q r i e y a n t Q e l i c h t i n ~ a a n b e s t e d d i n ~ s w e t t pdf. last 
accessed 1 November 2010). 
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4.3 Framework Agreements in the Netherlands 
4.3.1 Introduction 
This section will examine how the Netherlands has approached the provisions for framework 
agreements found in the 2004 Public Sector Directive. In order to examine the impact of these 
rules, the Dutch approach to public sector framework arrangements prior to 2004 will first be 
discussed (section 4.3.2). Following this, responses to the 2004 rules will be examined (section 
4.3.3). 
4.3.2 Framework Agreements Prior to 2004 
The fact that framework agreements were not included in the old 'classic sector' directives (see 
section 2.3.1) led to a multitude of questions for contracting authorities as well as legal 
practitioners in all Member States, the most important two of which were: 
a) Were framework agreements permitted at all for 'classic sec;:tor' contracts? 
b) , Or, did the fact that framework agreements were not listed in the 'classic sector' 
directives mean that the rules of those directives did not apply to framework 
a g r e e ~ e n t s ? ?
4.3.2.1 Clarification on Legal Position of Framework Agreements 
'.' 
In the Netherlands, prior to 2004, no legislation addressed the legality of 'classic sector' 
,framework agreements. Because the Netherlands implemented by reference (see section 4.1),' , 
the national implementing measure (the BOA) did not address framework agreements any more 
than the directives did. Supplementary r e g u l a ~ i o n n such as the UAR-EG 1991 and the UAR 2001 ' 
also did not mention framework agreements. ' 
\ ' 
150 
4.3.2.2 Academic Writing on the Position o!FrameworkAgreements 
Very limited academic writing on public procurement regulation existed in the Netherlands prior 
to the 1990s, and most of the writing concerned Dutch public procurement law very generally. 
However, a main textbook on public procurement law in the Netherlands from 1996 offers a brief 
discussion of some of the questions stemming from a) the definition of a 'framework agreement' 
and b) whether or not they could legally be concluded under the 1993 directives.483 
Much like the OGC's guidance on framework agreements prior to 2004 (see section 3.3.2.2), the 
authors highlight the difficulties stemming the Commission's conceptual distinction between a 
framework agreement and a framework contract. According to Dutch civil law, an agreement 
that is not binding on both parties is not a 'contract'-non-binding framework agreements in the 
Commission's sense are thus not public contracts.484 
The authors then directly challenge the UK approach to framework agreements prior to 1994, by 
stating that "(author's translation) Arrowsmith [in the 1996 edition of The Law on Public and 
Utilities Procurement] points out that the British government assumes that the regulation of [non-
binding} framework agreements can also be applied to the [classic sector directives]. This 
conclusion is incorrect" In other words, the authors conclude that as non-binding framework 
agreements were not (public) contracts, they were not covered by the classic sector directives. 
However, the textbook does not make it clear whether a lack of coverage by the directives this 
was interpreted as meaning that non-binding framework arrangements were illegal under the 
directives. 
Unlike non-binding framework agreements, framework contracts can be considered 'contracts' in 
Dutch civil law because they place binding obligations on both the contractor and the contracting 
authority; the fact that they are in essence binding public contracts that have a 'repeat' element 
to them meant that these were prima facie permissible under and covered by the classic sector 
483 E. Pijnacker Hordijk and G. van de Bend. Aanbestedingsrecht: Handboek van het Europese en Nederlandse 
Aanbestedingsrecht (1· druk) (SOU: Den Haag 1996). pages 49 and SO. 
484 Ibid. p. 49. 
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directives. That said, opinion at the time was also that as these 'framework contracts' were just 
regular 'public contracts', they should not necessarily be able to benefit from the less strict 
regulation of framework agreements available under the Utilities Directive.485 
Pijnacker Hordijk and van de Bend thus summarized the Dutch opinion at the time as such: ifthe 
original 'framework contract' was awarded in line with a procedure in the directives, subsequent 
orders placed under that directive could be directly awarded.486 Conversely, however, in the case 
of a non-binding framework agreement-which was perceived as not being covered by the old 
directives-any call-offs were subject to the EU rules. 
4.3.2.3 Jurisprudence 
Shortly following the publication ofthis 1996 academic text, the CJ in Togel487 left open whether 
or not non-binding framework agreements could be concluded under the classic sector 
directives. In the Netherlands, this silence appears to have been interpreted as approva1.488 At 
least one Dutch case in the 1990s that concerned a non-binding framework agreement adopted a 
similar approach and appears to have simply assumed that the use of non-binding framework 
agreements in the classic sector was permitted.489 
With regards to the second question-as to whether or not framework agreements were subject 
to the directives-Togel supported the Dutch perspective on the difference between a non-
binding framework agreement and a framework contract The CJ appears to have implied in its 
judgment that if the framework arrangement in question-which was binding on both parties, 
and was thus a 'contract' instead of merely a non-binding 'agreement' -had been concluded 
following 1993, the agreement would have had to have been procured according to the 1993 
485 See Europa Decentraal, Factsheet Raamovereenkomsten, (January 2005, see 
http://www,europeseaanbestedingen,eu/europeseaanbestedingen/download/commonlfactsheet raamoyereenkomsten 
finale opzet.pdf. last accessed 1 November 2010), discussing the historical difficulties with the differences between 
framework agreement/contract and how these are to be resolved in Directive 2004/18/EC . 
. . 486 Pijnacker Hordijk and van de Bend (n 483), p. SO • 
. • 4B7 C-76/97 Walter Togel v Niederosterreichische Gebietskrankenkasse [1998] EeR 1-5357; the case concerned framework 
agreements for patient transport, but the CJ did not address the legality of this type of purchasing arrangement being 
r o ~ ~ d d . 
, 4BB Pijnacker Hordijk and van de Bend (n 483), p. 73. See also S. Corvers, F. van der Klauw-Koops, and W. Damste, Een 
nieuwe Europese aanbestedingsrichtlijn voor de klassieke sectoren (SOU: Den Haag 2007), p. 122. 
489 Hof Arnhem, 17 oktober 2000, rolnr. 99/264. 
152 
Service Directive. It treated the framework 'contract' in question as a regular public contract-
this coincides with the Commission's definitions49o of framework contracts versus (non-binding) 
framework aBreements as well as the Dutch academic opinion at the time. 
Following TOBel, there is at least one example ofthe Dutch courts considering the application of 
the public sector directives to non-binding framework agreements. In the Canon/Staat der 
Nederlanden491 , which concerned a multi-supplier framework arrangement of type C-
committing the supplier to supply, but not committing the contracting authority to buy492-the 
Dutch Supreme Court confirmed the High Court ruling, which had stated that having such an 
agreement does not absolve a contracting authority from following the directive's rules when 
placing call-offs. This is an important judgment in the sense that it addresses, through a concrete 
example, two specific grey areas with regard to framework agreements: 
• Are type C multi-supplier framework 'agreements' permissible? 
• How are call-offs to be treated? 
Neither the High Court nor the Supreme Court explicitly addressed the first issue, but rather 
stated that where a non-binding framework agreement was concluded, its call-offs would have to 
be procured according to the EU rules where the individual call-off was subject to the directive.493 
This essentially follows the same logic that Pijnacker Hordijk and van den Bend apply in their 
academic discussion of'framework agreements', and concludes that these non-binding 
agreements themselves are not public contracts and thus not subject to the classic sector 
directives. Consequently, any subsequent 'actual contract' stemming from such an 'agreement' 
would have to be publically procured in line with the classic sector directives. Even though the' 
court thus failed to address the inherent leBality of multi-supplier non-binding framework 
agreements under the classic sector directives, by demanding full-procedure for all call-offs the 
Canon case made them almost unworkable for contracting authorities in practice. 
490 See Commission, Draft Policy GUidelines on Framework Agreements, CC/92/91.rev of 18.12.1993; see also Arrowsmith 
2005 (n 25), p. 455 onwards, for commentary on the draft policy guidelines. 
491 HR 25 januari 2002, COO/180HR; and the High Court judgment: Hof Den Haag 16 maart 2000, NJ 2000/43. 
49Z See section 2.3.3. 
493 Para. 5.2 of the High Court judgment; the Supreme Court did not r e ~ o n s i d e r r the point. 
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The most striking element of the Canon judgment is that it took a completely different approach 
from all the RvA cases adjudicating framework arrangements in the early 2000s, where the RvA 
(implicitly) permitted the use of both single and multi-supplier non-binding frameworks without 
commenting on how the directives applied to call-offs under such agreements.494 
The general impression created by Dutch jurisprudence at this time, then, was that non-binding 
framework agreements were not impermissible, but how these interacted with the requirements 
of the public sector directives was not clarified. Framework 'contracts', on the other hand, were 
commonly accepted to be covered by the public sector directives. 
4.3.3 Framework Agreements since 2004 
4.3.3.1 Legislation: BAD 
4.3.3.1.1 Availability 
As explained in Section 2.3.4.1, the 2004 directive leaves it for Member States to decide if (and if 
so, how) they want to allow t ~ e e use of framework agreements. The Netherlands has indicated in 
the Explanatory Note to the BAO that its intent in implementing the directive is to leave all of its 
possibilities open to contracting authorities. Framework agreements have thus been made 
available without restrictions: Article l(n) of the BAO makes it clear that multi-user, multi-
supplier and single-supplier frameworks can all be concluded. 
-; , 
, ' 
494 Bindend advies 26 mei 2000, W.340, discussing the completeness of specifications on a framework; it was here 
accepted that a framework was concluded on the basis of estimated quantities that may be subject to change. See also 
Vrz. Breda 23 April 2003, rolnr. 117552/ KG ZA 03-100, wherein it was accepted that an above-threshold framework 
agreement for ambulances only contained approximate numbers of ambulances required; RvA 21 december 2000, nr. 
21.929, where It was determined that detailed discussions around a 'sample' framework agreement resulted in an 
obligation to let the bidder submit prices on the basis of the framework agreement (However, the Council did indicate 
that the agreement offered significantly less rights than an actual contract (ie, the subsequent call-off) would have); and 
RvA 29 juli 2004, nr. 26.765, discussing whether or not orders could be placed under a wrongfully concluded framework; 
the framework agreement itself had been found to be wrongfully concluded in RvA 16 juni 2004, nr. 70.878. 
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4.3.3.1.2 Mandatory rules or not? 
The procedure to follow when concluding a framework agreement is found in Article 32 BAD. A 
preliminary interesting point is that the BAD indicates that framework agreements 'may' be 
procured using the procedure outlined in Article 32. The Explanatory Note to the BAD makes it 
clear that this is for a reason: the legislator follows the Dutch case law (Canon, discussed in 
section 4.3.2.3 above) preceding the new directive in summarizing that a framework agreement 
that does not contain either binding obligations for the supplier, or for the contracting authority, 
is not a 'public contract' as defined by the directive. It then adds that where the Article 32 
procedure is not followed in awarding the framework, individual contracts awarded on the basis 
of such an agreement would have to be awarded using the normal procedures stated in the 
directive.495 
This is similar to what the OGe guidance from 2003 stated about the applicability of the directive 
to the procurement of framework agreements (see section 3.3.2.2), and the point raised there is 
worth repeating here: not awarding a framework agreement using the directive/BAD's 
procedures makes the setting up of a framework agreement pointless. It is wholly unclear why 
both the Dutch and the UK governments highlight this 'possibility' as no contracting authority 
would ever opt to establish a framework without ensuring that call-offs were not subjected to 
individual advertising requirements. 
4.3.3.1.3 Procedural Rules: Single-Supplier Frameworks 
With regards to the procedure for single-supplier call-offs, the BAD (Articles 32(7) and 32(8)) 
and the directive (Article 32(3)) follow the same wording; no relevant additions or changes have 
been introduced from the directive. ' 
495 Explanatory Note to the BAD. Article 32. 
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4.3.3.1.4 Procedural Rules: Multi-Supplier Frameworks 
The procedures for multi-supplier frameworks listed in Article 32(4) have been incorporated 
nearly verbatim into the BAD. The directive's and the BAD's provisions on call-offs based on 
original tenders are identical. Some minor changes have take place with regard to call-offs based 
on the so-called 'mini-competition', as described in Article 32(4) of the directive. 
The directive there discusses a situation where "when the parties are again in competition on the 
basis of the same and, if necessary, more precisely formulated terms", a specific procedure has to 
be followed in order to award the contract The BAD, in Article 32(10)(b), has rephrased this to 
state that if not all the terms of the framework agreement have been laid down, a new 
competition can be held in acc,ordance with the terms set in the framework agreement or its 
specifications. It is unlikely that this change is intended to result in a deliberate restriction on the 
original wording of the directive; the principles of EU law interpretation discussed in section 
2.1.3.4 once again would require an interpretation to conform to the directive's wording, and so 
in a dispute this changed wording would presumably not be upheld. 
Generally, however, the BAD does not clarify aspects concerning the mini-competition that are ' 
left unclear by the directive; in particular, complex issues (discussed in section 2.3.4.3) such as 
whether or not the weightings given to different award criteria can change at the call-off stage 
are not addressed further. 
4.3.3.1.5 BAD: Conclusions 
In summary, the BAD's provisions on framework agreements are slightly differently worded than , 
those in the, directive, but these changes are unlikely to have practical effects. Legal uncertainty 
\ 
, presented by the directive's wording is not clarified by the BAD. 
156 
":- ~ . : . . ' '~ - - - - . .
4.3.3.2 Guidance: BAD Explanatory Note 
The Explanatory Note to the BAO contains useful supplementary information on a different 
subject, namely, that of commitments stemming from framework agreements (rather than 
contracts concluded on the basis of framework agreements)496. The directive itself is fully silent 
on this; the BAO also does not contain explicit provisions detailing to what extent a framework 
agreement can be considered 'binding', or has obligations, but rather addresses the issue in its 
Explanatory Note. 
The Explanatory Note states that even though a framework agreement is not a contract, this does 
not mean that no obligations stem from such an agreement It stresses that the 'pre-contractual 
principles of good faith' and the 'general principles of good governance' require that a 
contracting authority does not simply ignore a concluded framework agreement by awarding a 
contract to an economic operator not party to the framework agreement The Explanatory Note 
states that awarding outside of the agreement would only be acceptable where market 
conditions change so substantially following the conclusion of the agreement that adhering to the 
agreement would be unreasonable.497 Even though the Explanatory Note Is not binding, inclusion 
of these comments does indicate that the legislator believes that there are binding obligations 
that stem exclusively from the framework agreement itself. 
4.3.3.3 Legislation: ARW 2005 
4.3.3.3.1 Availability 
As discussed in Section 4.2.3.2, the ARW 2005 contains the procurement rules to be followed 
when the four Construction Departments of the central government procure works. It covers 
both contracts covered by the directives ('European') and those not covered ('national'). 
496 This issue was previously considered in RvA 21.929 (n 494). 
497 Explanatory Note to the BAD, Article 32. 
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The ARW 2005 adheres to the directive's distinction between single-supplier frameworks (found 
in Chapter 9) and multi-supplier frameworks (in Chapter 10). It allows for the conclusion of both 
types of frameworks as long as procured according to the rules detailed in the stated chapters. 
The ARW 2005 also appears to allow multi-user frameworks to be concluded, but does not 
contain any rules on how these should operate. 
4.3.3.3.2 Single Supplier Frameworks 
While not changing the definition of a framework agreement, the ARW 2005 does, however, 
make some subtle changes with regards to when and how framework agreements can be 
concluded. While for 'European procurement' (Article 9.1.2), the ARW 2005 indicates that one of 
the directive's procedures has,to be followed in order for a framework agreement to be 
concluded, for 'national procurement' (Article 9.1.3), framework agreements can be concluded 
using the 'underhanded' procedure. The 'underhanded' procedure involves a direct invitation to 
2-6 suppliers to tender for a certain contract; in other words, there is no advertising or 
publication requirement498 The ARW 2005 thus gives more procedural freedom to contracting 
authorities procuring a 'national' framework agreement. 
The ARW 2005 has grouped what it terms the 'general restrictions' together, but has not changed 
their content This means that even where not covered by the directive, framework agreements . 
cannot be concluded for more than 4 years (unless duly justified), parties cannot be added to the 
framework agreement, call-offs cannot result in substantial changes to the framework 
. r' 
agreement, and the framework agreement cannot be used to restrict competition . 
. An addition to the directive/BAO is found in Article 9.5.2, which states that "(author's 
translation) a conditional tender is not valid".499 As discussed in section 4.2.3.3, a similar 
condition can be found in the ARW 2005's provisions for competitive dialogue; it ensures that 
tenderers cannot put 'demands' in their tenders. 
498 Aside from this, the procedure resembles the restricted procedure, and is thus not comparable to 'direct award'. 
However, the 'underhanded procedure' is possibly contrary to the Treaty (re/austria, n 4); this will be discussed in 
section 4.4.3,2.2. .,. , 
499 "Een inschrijving waaraan voorwaarden zijn verbonden, is ongeldig." . 
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Several other additions are found with regards to contracts awarded under the framework 
agreement. Article 9.7.1 states that for both 'European' and 'national' procurement, a party to the 
framework agreement can only be awarded a contract if they meet the requirements set out in 
the framework agreement on both the day the framework agreement was concluded, and the day 
the call-off is placed. The directive is silent on the issue of how financial and economic standing 
is to be 'measured' in terms of a framework agreement; however, the ARW 2005's provisions 
here are logical, as it is conceivable that a contractor qualifies to become a party to the 
framework agreement, but will no longer qualify when a call-off is placed in later years. 
4.3.3.3.3 Multi-Supplier Frameworks 
A few elements of note are found in the ARW 2005's provisions on multi-supplier frameworks. 
First, Article 10.1.2 indicates that at least 3 contractors (where possible) have to be party to a 
multi-supplier framework, and somewhat surprisingly-given that the ARW 2005 tends to relax 
the rules for 'national procurement' -applies this demand to both 'national' and 'European' 
procedures. However, Article 10.1.3 does once again allow 'national' framework agreements to 
be concluded using the underhanded procedure. 
Secondly, Article 10.1.5 allows for an electronic auction to be used to award a contract under the 
framework agreement where a mini-competition is held. The ARW 200S copies out the BAO's 
provisions on electronic auctions in explanation. 
Thirdly, Article 10.3.1 (discussing a mini-competition) states that a call-off can be awarded on the 
basis of "(author's translation) other terms, of which an indication is given in the specifications of 
the framework agreement." 500 This suggests that mini-competitions concluded under the 
'national' rules in the ARW 2005 can have quite different (and only later specified) terms than the 
original framework agreement spells out The same wording is used for 'European procurement', 
500· ... op basis van andere voorwaarden waarvan in het bestek van de raamovereenkomst een indica tie Is gegeven" [emphasis added] 
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but here, the rules of interpretation (see section 2.1.4.2) would require that in a dispute, the 
original wording of the directive is considered in interpreting the national im plementing 
provisions. 
Fourthly, Article 10.5.2 repeats the aforementioned prohibition on 'conditional tendering' for 
multi-supplier framework agreements.SOl 
Fifthly, Article 10.9 discusses call-off award, and has an interesting condition in it which is not 
found in the directives or the BAD. Should two of the submitted tenders be equal in all 
manners-and thus technically both win-the winning tender will be decided through a 
lottery.so2 This is comparable to the kind of 'cascading' award system permissible according to 
the Commission's Explanatory NoteS03 (see section 2.3.4.3). 
FinaJlY"with respect to notification, the ARW 2005 contains a response to one of the 
uncertainties highlighted in section 2.3.4.3. Article 10.9.3 explicitly requires the contracting 
authority to notify all 'parties to the framework agreement' in writing when a call-off has been 
awarded. The ARW 2005 thus directly applies the rules of Article 41 on 'award ofa contract' to 
call-offs under a multi-supplier framework. 
4.3.3.3.4 The Alcatel Standstill 
. ' ',' 
It is important in the case of multi-supplier frameworks with a mini-competition to highlight h o ~ ~
~ ~
ARW 2005 approaches the A1catel 'standstill requirement', as (like the UK regulations, see section ' 
, 3 ~ 3 . 2 . 1 ) ) the ARW 2005 has added to the 2004 directive's provisions. The 2007 Remedies' 
Directive has incorporated the A lea tel judgment, but the ARW 2005 precedes this directive (and 
its Dutch implementation) by a number of years. 
501 See section 4.3.3.1.4. 
soz This is also the case for the open/restricted/negotiated procedures. ' 
503 Explanatory Note on Framework Agreements (n 142). section 3.2. 
160 
For multi-supplier framework agreements, the ARW 2005 applies the standstill not merely 
following the award of a framework agreement itself, but also at the call-off phase. At the time 
that this was introduced, it was a highly interesting and potentially burdensome addition to the 
applicable EU rules-and it should be noted that the ARW 2005 has not since been amended to 
reflect the Dutch implementation ofthe 2007 Remedies Directive. 
The ARW 2005's position on standstills under framework call-offs has become problematic now 
that the 2007 Remedies Directive has been implemented, however. The Dutch law implementing 
of the 2007 Remedies Directive (the "WIRA") has made use of the option to not apply a standstill 
to framework agreements, but to instead to introduce a remedy of ineffectiveness as permitted 
by Article 2(d) ofthe directive. The rules in the ARW 2005 are now substantially different from 
those in the BAO, with the ARW 2005 imposing a more time-consuming process. 
4.3.3.3.5 ARW: Conclusions 
In general, the ARW 2005 provides limited additions to the framework agreements regime set up 
by the directive or the BAO. Uncertainties relating specifically to framework agreements are not 
generally clarified, nor does the ARW 2005 or its Explanatory Note offer any guidance as to when 
a particular framework agreement ought to be used. However, the ARW 2005 does address the 
information requirements in Article 41 and how these apply to call-offs, and considered the 
Alcatel standstill requirement and its application to call-offs under framework agreements. The 
ARW 2005 opted to apply the standstill to call-offs as well, which has recently become 
problematic, as implementation ofthe 2007 Remedies directive has introduced 'ineffectiveness' 
instead of the standstill. As ~ o t e d , , the ARW 2005 has not been updated to reflect this change. 
) 
4.3.3.4 Policy Rules 
The Beleidsregels aanbesteding van werken 2005, which make application of the ARW 2005 
mandatory for the Construction Departments, contain only two provisions on framework 
agreements. The definition ofa framework agreement, found in Article 1(1), is identical to the 
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one used in the directive, BAD, and ARW 2005. Article 3 of the Beleidsregels then indicate that 
when awarding contracts on the basis of a framework agreement, the open and restricted 
procedure will not be applicable.504 No further instructions are found in the text of the 
Beleidsregels themselves, but the Explanatory Note to the Beleidsregels adds that the framework 
agreement procedures in the ARW 2005 apply to these contracts. 
The 2006 WTZ Circular, which makes application of the ARW 2005 mandatory for all procuring 
entities engaged in the building and managing of health care facilities for which a permit is 
necessary, contains very similar provisions to the Beleidsregels; again, it is merely indicated that 
contracts awarded on the basis of a framework agreement should be awarded using the 
procedures in the ARW 2005. 
Neither set of policy rules thus expands on the Dutch legislation on framework agreements. 
4.3.4 Guidance 
\ 
At the central government level, no specific guidance on framework agreements has been issued 
either before or since 2004. 
Europa Decentraal, the organization that offers guidance on how the EU rules affect non-central 
government, published a Fact Sheet on the 2004 directive's provisions on framework agreements 
in 2005.505 
The Fact Sheet, drafted prior to the enactment of the BAD, generally limits itself to summarizing 
the procedures to be followed when awarding framework agreements under the new directives. 
However, it does offer an opinion on at least one issue that is not immediately clear from the 
directive itself. It states that when conducting a mini-competition, not all parties to the 
framework agreement have to be invited to participate-and simultaneously acknowledges that 
• 504 "Van het houden van een aanbesteding volgens de openbare procedure of de niet-openbare procedure als bedoeld in 
artikel2 wordt afgezien .. ." ' 
505 Factsheet Raamovereenkomsten (n 485). 
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other guidance institutions interpreted the same provision506 as meaning that all parties to the 
framework have to be invited to participate.507 What it actually recommends as either required 
by law or best practice is thus not entirely clear. 
4.3.5 Jurisprudence 
The majority of recent Dutch case law on framework agreement actually deals with the principles 
of equal treatment and transparency rather than the rules on framework agreements themselves. 
Other cases confirm generally understood elements of framework agreements, such as that the 
total scope of the purchases made is not known and cannot be firmly indicated at the time the 
agreement is concluded, in specific purchasing disputes.50B 
One interesting recent case is Bouw & VastgoedjUWVS09, wherein the court disallowed a third 
party to be added to a framework agreement (in an attempt to comply with Article 32(9) of the 
BAO on minimum number of parties) on the basis of the general principle of transparency-but 
did not observe that the directive and the BAD themselves do not allow parties to be added after 
the conclusion of a framework agreement 
Generally, however, the case law has not expanded on the EU rules on framework agreements to 
a great extent; and as there is no recent CJ case law on framework agreements, the Dutch courts 
also have not had an opportunity to incorporate CJ judgments into national jurisprudence. 
4.3.6 Conclusions 
In implementing the directive's provisions on framework agreements, the Dutch legislator 
changed very little; much like in the UK, there were no rules in legislation prior to 2004 and 
following 2004, the rules are identical to those in the d i r e c ~ i v e . .
506 NPPP /NVILG/ PIANOO, • Achtergrondinformatie over de opties uit de nieuwe Europese aanbestedingsrichtlijnen" (September 2004), p. 6 e.v. 
507 Factsheet Raamovereenkomsten (n 485), p. 6. 
508 See HofDen Haag 6 Maart 2008, rolnr. 01/1490, which confirms Vzr. Rb. Den Haag 16 november 2001 rolnr. KG 
07/1316. ' 
509 Rechtbank Amsterdam 15 juni 2006, rolnr. 341231/KG 06-824 P. 
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The ARW 2005 has made two interesting additions; one of which relates to information 
requirements for call-offs, and the other relates to the current provisions in the ARW 2005 on a 
standstill prior to call-off conclusion. Its inclusion in the ARW 2005 may indicate that the 
drafters of the ARW 2005 consider a standstill preferable to ineffectiveness of call-offs; however, 
the WlRA overrode these rules and consequently the ARW 2005's instructions conflict with those 
in other pieces of procurement legislation. 
While the Dutch government has recently issued a substantial guidance document on competitive 
dialogue (see section 4.2.6), they have not issued any particularly useful guidance on framework 
agreements. The Commission's Explanatory Note on Framework Agreements further is not 
highlighted on the Dutch procurement websites. Lastly, there is scant jurisprudence that deals 
specifically with issues on framework agreements; unlike in the UK, this is not an area of law that 
has been developed by the national courts beyond what the EU has already said . 
. . , 
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4.4 The General Principles of Equal Treatment and Transparency in the Netherlands 
4.4.1 Introduction 
Section 2.4 discussed how the q, through its case law, has extended the obligations that Member 
States have under both the Treaty and under the directives. 
This section will examine how the Netherlands has dealt with the development of the general 
principles of equal treatment and transparency in its national laws. We will here explore how 
the Netherlands has approached additional obligations stemming from q jurisprudence on 
contracts covered by the directives (section 4.4.2) and those obligations stemming from 
contracts not covered by the directives (section 4.4.3.). 
4.4.2 Contracts Covered by the Directives 
4.4.2.1 Legislation: BAD 
As discussed in section 4.1.7, the BAD generally 'copies out' the directive. Consequently, the BAD 
repeats the directive's provision on the general principles in Article 2: "(author's translation) a 
contracting authority treats economic operators equally and without discrimination and acts 
transparently". 
The BAD contains a further set of provisions regarding "bidders from other Member States". 
Article 5(1) indicates that a contracting authority shall 'approach' bidders from other Member 
. States (and parties to the EEA) under the same conditions that it approaches national bidders, 
and shall do so transparently. It is unclear why this provision is included, as this adds little to the 
restatement of the general principles found in Article (2). 
Beyond these two general articles, however, the BAD has not made any additions to the 
provisions of the directive in order to reflect q case law on the general principles. As discussed 
165 
in earlier sections, this is unsurprising; Dutch implementation of the directives has not involved 
going 'beyond' the requirements of implementing EU legislation. 
4.4.2.2 Legislation: ARW 2005 
As discussed in section 4.1,7, the ARW 2005 contains supplementary information to the BAD that 
is mandatory for the four construction departments and optional for all other government 
departments, 
Unlike the BAD, the ARW 2005 does not copy out Article 2 of the 2004 directive; in fact, upon 
examining the text of the ARW 2005, the only places where 'transparency' and 'non-
discrimination' are mentioned are in the Explanatory Note to the document, which comments on 
the 'increasing amount of jurisprudence [on the general principles 1 for non-European 
procurement', Following this, it highlights that contracting authorities engaged in 'national 
procurement' procedures need to be aware of the implications of the general principles; but does 
not stress this for procurement covered by the directives at all. 
The main text of the ARW 2005, however, is silent on the repercussions of the ers case law on the 
general principles as applying to 'European' procurement. 
4.4.2.3 Jurisprudence 
The previous section has made it clear that in its legislation, the Netherlands has not responded 
to any requirements stemming from the general principles as applying to contracts covered by 
the directives. As we will see, however, the Dutch national courts have dealt with the general 
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4.4.2.3.1 Selection Criteria 
Various cases, many of which predate Universale-Bau, have determined that setting advance 
selection criteria without making them known to bidders is a violation of what was then, in Dutch 
law, called the 'objectivity' principle. In cases such as EurobekesjProvincie Noord-BrabantSlO, 
where the contracting authority deposited a 'secret' weighting system with a notary, or 17.030511, 
where selection under the UAR 1986 was made by an independent panel that did not make its 
selection methodology known to the bidders, the courts ruled that contracting authorities had 
violated the 'objectivity' principle. Though the 'transparency' principle was not called as much 
until 2001, case law from 1994 onwards has required advance notification ofweightings and 
methodology to bidders is necessary in order to secure fair procurement512• Until recently, the 
Dutch courts have adjudicated on selection criteria without reference to C) jurisprudence.m 
4.4.2.3.2 Award Criteria 
Dutch jurisprudence on award criteria jurisprudence also mimics closely to the C)'s application of 
the general principles; for instance, Dutch courts have ruled that award criteria cannot be altered 
partway through the 'award' procedure and must correspond to those listed in the contract 
notice514, nor can new 'procedural rules' be applied at the tender evaluation stage where tenders 
could not have possibly prepared themselves for these changes.5t5 It can again be observed that 
some of these cases were decided prior to seminal EU-Ievel cases such as Lianakis.S16 
Consequently, we see here also that the Dutch courts have applied the general principles to 
award criteria before the C) issued similar judgments. 
510 Pres. Rb. Den Bosch 10 juli 2001, rolnr. 66393/ KG ZA 01-0377, BR 2002, p. 97. 
511 RvA 27 juni 1994, nr.17.030, BR 1996, p. 258. 
m See also RvA 23 juni 1995, nrs. 18.020 and 18.023, BR 1996, p. 265; RvA 25 mel 1998 (appel), nr. 70.303, BR 1998, P 
696; Vz. Rb. Maastricht. 7 maart 2001, rolnr. 63600 / KG ZA 01-57, ro 3.3.1; RvA 20 februari 2002, nr. 23.750, BR 2003, p. 
639; RvA 28 December 2001, nr. 23.820, BR 2002, p. 987. . 
513 An example of where the ~ u t c h h courts do cite CJ jurisprudence directly is Rb. Zwolle-Lelystad, 3 november 2006, rolnr. 
12503/KG ZA 06-429, which In paragraph 4.2 makes reference to SIAC (n 380) and states that the comments there on 
a ~ a r ~ ~ criteria needing to be transparent enough to be easily understood should be assumed to also apply to selection 
cntena. 
514 Vz. Rb. Zwolle, 6 februari 2001. rolnr. 62524 / KG ZA 01-37, ro 2.3 
515 Vz. CBb., 17 oktober 2005, rolnr.AWB 05/565, ro 6.S. See also HofDen Bosch, 1 April 2008, rolnr.1B1903 / KG ZA 07. 
625, on sub-criteria. 
516 Lianakis (n 154). 
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More recent judgements have, however, made reference to related CJ case law such as Lianakis in 
discussing the transparency of award criteriaS17 
4.4.2.3.3 Other Issues 
Dutch courts have also used the general principles to build on related CJ judgments. For instance, 
in Connexxion Water BV /Gemeente DordrechtS18 the court set aside a contract because there had 
been unequal distribution of information between the bidders: the incumbent provider had 
information about the exploitation costs of a ferry and a competing bidder, after requesting it, 
was not given these figures. This case is contextually similar to the European DynamicsS19 case, 
but actually found that the contracting authority was remiss in ensuring an 'equal' or level 
playing field between bidders-resulting in the incumbent provider's advantage. 
Other Dutch cases consider issues that have not in any form appeared before the CJ. In Straton-
KNK VOF/Gemeente 's-Hertogenboschs20, the contracting authority had explicitly forbidden the 
use of alternative/variant submissions. It was determined that accepting one of a bidder's four 
variant bids after submission deadlines would violate the equal treatment principle, as allowing 
the bidder to select her 'actual' submission at a later date would give her a competitive 
advantage .. 
The Dutch courts have also decided cases regarding late tenders and how these interact with the 
general principle of equal treatment As an example, in CSU Schoonmaak/Politieregio Brabant 
,.,. 
Zuid OostS21, the court concluded that even though none ofthe competing tenders had been 
opened and the late tender was only 7 minutes late, the late tender was inadmissible. Recently, 
Gebr. van Kessel Wegenbouw/Gemeente Neerijnen 522 (which concerned the late submission of a 
certificate of qualification) was decided the opposite way: as this document was a standard 
, 517 See HofLeeuwarden, 6 April 2010, rolnr.107.001.752/01i this, however, can be contrasted with Vzr. Rb. 's 
Gravenhage, 16 September 2008, rolnr. 315453/ KG ZA 08-913 and Hof Arnhem, 29 juli 2008, rolnr. 107.002.674/01 
which were also decided after Lianakis (n 154) but contained no reference to it. . 
518 Vzr. Rb. Dordrecht 24 januarl2008, rlnr. 72979 / KG ZA 08-2. 
519 European Dynamics (n 171). 
520 Vzr. Rb. Den Bosch 3 juli 2007, rolnr. 160315/ KG ZA 07-390. 
521 Hof Den Bosch 24 juli 2001, rolnr. KG C0100285/HE . 
. m Rb. Arnhem, 24 juni 2008, rolnr. 171063 / KG ZA 08-353. 
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document to be prepared by third parties, and all bidders had them, there was no competitive 
advantage to be gained from handing them in late, and as such there was no violation of the equal 
treatment principle. Other, similar cases have considered the relationship between equal 
treatment and the acceptance of bids that do not meet minimum requirements setS23, and bids 
that are not compliant524-in all of these cases the Dutch courts have ruled that there cannot be 
an exercise of discretion and the bids must be rejected to secure equal treatment This line of 
national case law dates back as far as 2001.525 
The general principles have also been used to protect the rights of tenderers more generally; one 
example of this is Darthuizer Boomkwekerijen/Gemeente Groningen S26, where the contracting 
authority refused to further clarify the tender documents after a request for clarification from a 
bidder, and the court concluded this was contrary to the transparency principle. 
4.4.2.3.4 Summary 
The Dutch courts have applied the general principles to the directives for a number of years, 
although it is very sparingly acknowledged that these principles may have their origins In CJ 
jurisprudence. Only recently are there a few direct references to CJ cases like Lianakis found In 
national judgments. Taking into conSideration that the case law on selection and award criteria, 
as well as admissibility of tenders, predates similar CJ case law by a number of years, it is very 
difficult to state with certainty that EU law has had a significant impact on the Dutch courts-it is 
perhaps more appropriate to conclude that a gradual convergence of use of the general prinCiples 
can be seen here. 
523 Rb. Arnhem ~ ~ ~ o v e m b e r r 2006. r o l ~ r . . 2 ~ 0 6 / 7 7 1 1 KG; Rb. Alme)o 19 januari 2007, rolnr. 83188/KG ZA 07-9, wherein it 
was added that If It cannot be determmed If the minimum requirements are met, the tender also has to be rejected. 
524 Notably, Rb. Den Haag ~ ~ november 2006. r o l ~ r . . KG 06/1104. in which there were two competing non-compliant 
tenders. and the court deCided both had to be rejected to comply with the equal treatment principle. 
525 See. inter alia, HorDen Bosch 24 juli 2001, rolnr. KG C0100284/HE. 
526 Rb. Groningen 30 maart 2007, rolnr. 92633 / KG ZA 07-66. 
169 
4.4.2.4 Guidance 
It was noted in section 4.1.9 that has Netherlands not traditionally extended guidance at the 
central government level; this holds true for guidance on the general principles of equal 
treatment and transparency under the directives. The principles are thus not expanded on in any 
clear way on any of the government guidance websites, although PIANDO and Europa Decentraal 
do maintain a list of jurisprudence that includes mentions of the important CJ cases in this field. 
4.4.2.5 Contracts Covered by the Directives: Conclusions 
Though in terms of legislation the Dutch legal system has not responded to the CJ jurisprudence 
on the general principles, the judiciary actively adjudicates using these principles. As 
demonstrated above, it even has done so in areas where the CJ itself has been silent to date-
such as in considering equal treatment following market consultations and regarding late 
tenders. We have also seen that on subjects (such as award/selection criteria) where the CJ has 
issued important judgments, national jurisprudence frequently existed already. 
, While it can be observed that more recently, the national courts have referred to related CJ 
jurisprudence where appropriate, it is very difficult to conclude that the CJ's jurisprudence has 
had a significant influence on Dutch law in a general sense. 
,4.4.3 Contracts not Covered b/the Directives 
4.4.3.1 Legislation: BAD 
The BAD does not contain any provisions on contracts not covered by the directives; this choice 
was justified by the legislator in detail when the BAD was first issued. The Dutch Minister of 
Economic Affairs firstly indicated in 2004 that there was no reason to establish advertising rules 
, ~ ~ for Part I1-B service contracts until' a judgment from the CJ c ~ ~ f i r m e d d that the broad 
requirements of publicity and competition outlined by the Commission also applied to these 
, '. < , , "'-. ~ ~ , 
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contracts.527 This sentiment is repeated in the Explanatory Note to the BAD, which comments on 
Telaustria by saying that the CJ argued in t ~ a t t case that for concession agreements for services of 
a value above threshold, there is an obligation to provide enough advertising so as to secure 
competition.s28 The Explanatory Note goes on to say that the Commission, in its Green Paper on 
Public-Private Partnerships529, argues for an entire set of obligations as stemming from the 
general principles of the Treaty-but that "(author's translation) further jurisprudence will have 
to show if the CJ underwrites the Commission's interpretation". 
As section 2.4.3 explained, the CJ has (since 2004) decided various cases dealing specifically with 
the application of the general principles to non-concession contracts (such as below-threshold 
contracts and Part H-B services contracts). The argument that the application ofthe principles to 
these types of contracts is 'not clear' has thus lost soine of its merit530; however, to date this has 
not resulted in a change in legislation in the Netherlands. 
One possible explanation for this is that new national procurement laws were in preparatory 
stages while most of this case law was decided, meaning that no changes were planned to the 'old 
legislation'. Another explanation is that the Netherland remains unwilling to amend its national 
legislation so as to put more stringent requirements on excluded contracts unless specifically 
forced to do so at the EU level. In light of this' possibility, it is important to note that the 
Netherlands did join Germany in contesting the Commission's Interpretative Communication on 
below-threshold contracts as being 'quasi-lawmaking' that should not be permissible.531 
, 
527 Minister van EZ, 7 September 2004, Brie! aan 2e Kamer. This is in light of the fact that al\ cases prior to 2004 dealt 
with concession agreements; rather than part I1-B services contracts. 
528 Explanatory Note to the BAD, p. 64: "Voorts heeft het Hofin o.a. het arrest Telaustria (Bv) EG, zaak C-324/98, 2000, bIz. 
1-10745) geoordeeld ten aanzien van een concessieverlening voor diensten met een waarde boven de 
drempelwaarde dat de op de aanbestedende dienst ingevolge het beginsel van non-discriminatie rustende verplichting 
tot transparantie inhoudt dat aan elke potentiiHe inschrijver een passende mate van openbaarheid wordt gegarandeerd, 
zodat de dienstenmarkt voor mededinging wordt geopend en de aanbestedingsprocedures op onpartijdigheid kunnen 
worden getoetst" (Emphasis added). 
529 COM(2004)327 (n 103), para 30. 
530 It can be noted here that Advocate General Sharpston in Commission v Fjnland (n 190) considers that, taking Into 
account the principle of subsidiarity, low-value procurement should not be subject to extensive EU-originating 
advertising requirements. Firstly, she argues that such a rule ignores the divide struck in procurement between 
Community competence (ie, regulation of contracts covered by the Directive) and competence retained by the Member 
States (ie, regulation of contracts falling below the Directives' thresholds). She further argues that It Is cost-prohibitive to 
in fact investigate cross-border interest for al\ low-value contracts, as this may unduly burden local authorities In 
particular. The CJ did not consider her points in Commission v Finland (which was dismissed on procedural grounds). but 
it is possible that it will in future cases on low-value procurement and advertising. 
531 Germany v Commission (n 98). 
171 
4.4.3.2 Legislation: ARW 2005 
As discussed in section 4.2.3.2, the ARW 2005 contains procedures for both 'national' and 
'European' procurement In its regulation of , national' procurement, the ARW 2005 covers a lot 
of contracts that are only subject to the TFEU. However, it should be stressed here that the ARW 
2005 has not started regulating 'national' procurement in response to the C)'s jurisprudence on 
the general principles; the ARW and its predecessors have historically contained provisions for 
'national' procurement, as discussed in section 4.1.3. 
As always, application of the ARW 2005 is limited to works contracts. It will thus never apply to 
a services concession, or a part I1-B services contract Moreover, application is voluntary for all 
central government and local government departments that are not the four 'Construction 
Departments' or those contracting authorities covered by the 2006 WTZ Circular. The scope of 
coverage of the ARW 2005 is thus limited, and as such the fact that it does cover certain types of 
below-threshold contracts cannot lead to a conclusion that the Netherlands generally has in place . 
. competitive procedures that require advertising for contracts excluded from the directive. 
4.4.3.2.1 Approach 
Detailed rules outlining when a certain procedure in the ARW 2005 has to be followed by the 
Construction Departments are, as discussed in section 4.1.7, set out in the Be/eidsregels 
Aanbesteding van Werken 2005 (Beleidsregels) and the aforementioned 2006 WTZ Circular. Both 
of these sets of policy rules indicate that a general obligation to procure using the open or 
,restricted procedure (ofthe ARW 2005) exists for all below-threshold works contracts.532 
. . 
This obligation is waived in certain specific circumstances under the Beleidsregeis, the most 
important ones of which are: 
532 Article 2. Beleidsregelsi "Nationale Aanbestedingen". Circular. . 
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a) Public works concessions; the Beleidsrege\s makes procurement using the special 
"Concession Agreement" procedure listed in Chapter 8 of the rules obligatory, even for 
below-threshold concessions agreements. 
b) Any works contract of which the aggregated value is less than 1.5 million euros. These 
works do not have to be procured using any of the 'European' procurement procedures, 
but do have to be procured using the 'underhanded' procedure outlined In Chapter 7 of 
the ARW 2005 (discussed in section 4.4.3.2.2). 
c) Any works contract for which there are 'good reasons' to presume that procuring using 
an open or restricted procedure will not be 'in the financial interest of the state.'S33 
These contracts also have to be awarded using the 'underhanded' procedure.s3 .. 
This means that for the Construction Departments, there is no 'bottom limit' for formal 
procurement; even contracts of minor value, in this case defined as being below 1.5 million 
Euros, have to be procured using a formal procedure. 
The 2006 WTZ Circular, on the other hand, obliges contracting authorities to expressly request 
permission to use a different procedure535: 
a) Where the agreement concluded is a concession agreement 
b) Where there are good reasons to assume that using the open or restricted procedure will 
not be in the financial interest of the authority; or where there are special requirements 
to the work in question that could not be suitably fulfilled through the use of the open or 
restricted procedure, the authority can request to use the underhanded procedure. 
533 Article 4(f): ... goede gronden doen verwachten dat een aanbesteding volgens de openbare procedure of de niet-
openbare procedure niet in het financieel belang van de staat zal zijn. 
534 The last condition refers to a quality control mechanism whereby the contracting authority would be able to 
investigate if the work has been completed to a certain standard; in contracts where this cannot simply be confirmed by a 
check during and after the process, the open and restricted procedures do not have to be followed. 
535 The Circular also describes under what circumstances direct award Is possible: namely, In cases of unforeseen urgency 
contract continuity (ie using the same supplier for an additional order or unexpected restoration/maintenance). 
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When a contracting authority wants to apply for an exemption, they have to submit a written 
request for permission to use a different procedure. This is the case for all contracts of an 
aggregate value between the directive's thresholds, and 1.5 million Euros. The Circular e x p r e s s l ~ ~
notes that where the aggregate value of a work contract is less than 1.5 million Euros, such 
written permission is not required and one of the other procedures of the ARW 2005 can be 
freely used. However, application of the ARW ZOOS is again mandatory for all contracts, meaning 
that even contracts of a low value will be procured using a competitive procedure. 
4.4.3.2.2 The Underhanded Procedure 
The express permission in both policy rules to use the underhanded procedure (which involves 
directly inviting a minimum of two tenderers for a competition) is interesting in light of CJ 
jurisprudence; the CJ has stressed since 2007 that, where there is cross-border interest in a 
contract, contracting authorities need to provide for a degree of publicity (section 2.4.3.1). 
Regardless of how a 'degree of advertising', or the later concepts of 'publicity' and 'publication', 
are interpreted, the underhanded procedure appears to fail on account of not requiring any type 
of advertising at all-the contracting authority simply directly approaches two or more 
contractors it is interested in and allows them to compete for the contract 
However, the 'underhanded' procedure also has some positive qualities. The fact that the 
underhanded procedure is a structured, competitive procedure means that it in all likelihood 
1 
would satisfy the CJ's concept of "genuine competition"; it even complies with the majority of the 
Commission's proposed obligations as listed in the Green Paper on PPP.536 
536 Namely: fixing of the rules applicable to theselection of the private partner, adequate advertising ofthe intention to> 
award a concession and of the rules governing the selection in order to be able to monitor impartiality throughout the 
procedure,introduction of genuine competition between operators with a potential interest and/or who can guarantee 
completion of the tasks in question, compliance with the principle of equality of treatment of all participants throughout 
the procedure, selection on the basis of objective, non-discriminatory criteria. 
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The latest draft for the new Dutch procurement law, which contains procedures that can only be 
used in 'national' procurement, has clearly considered the pOSition of the underhanded 
procedure in more detail: it is henceforth only available for contracts that do not have any cross-
border interest (though the proposed law declines to define what cross-border interest is is, as 
the CJ itself has not yet done SOI).537 This seems like an appropriate compromise given the 
current state of CJ jurisprudence, and clearly demonstrates that this particular line of CJ case law 
has had significant influence on the new proposals for Dutch procurement regulation. 
4.4.3.2.3 Works Concessions 
With regards to works concessions, the Beleidsregels appear to require all concession 
agreements between 1.5 million euros and the current EU threshold value for public works 
contracts to be awarded using the 'concession agreement' procedure outlined in Chapter 8 of the 
ARW 2005.538 This procedure requires advertiSing-in the case of 'national' procurement, on a 
'generally accessible electronic platform', the State Gazette, or a nationally distributed 
professional journal. 
However, the ARW 2005 contains no provisions indicating how 'competition' is to be assured 
between economic operators when awarding a works concession. Aside from stating that 
advertiSing is necessary, no other provisions deal with the selection of the 'winning' concession 
holder or how many tenders have to be invited to participate In the tendering process. There is 
thus nothing guaranteeing real competition in the 'national' procedure for concession 
agreements, as appears to be required by the Commission's recently-legitimated Interpretative 
Communication on contracts not covered by the directives (see section 2.4.3.3). 
537 It is worth noting that the current proposal does not differentiate between works, services and goods, unlike the ARW 
2005 - the underhanded procedure will thus available for all three categories of purchases when falling outside of the 
Directive. [Article 1.13 of the proposal, see : 
bttp:/IWWW.PIANOOnllpy obj cache/py obj id F7BE3099FB7E3D6S820C33974DC78289D7170300/OJename/yoorstel 
a a n b e s t e d i n ~ s w e t t 0 pdf (last accessed 1 November 2010).] 
538 The Beleidsregels are not very clear on whether or not concession agreements below the value of 1.5 million euros 
also have to be procured using the concession agreement procedure; largely because the 1.5 million euro clause refers to 
a 'works contract', rather than a works concession. 
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4.4.3.3 Jurisprudence 
There have been, in recent years, various cases that have affirmed the CJ's case law in the Dutch 
courts. However, the interpretation of the CJ's jurisprudence has always been very literal-for 
instance, in 2006 (preceding An Post) a Dutch court concluded that Telaustria and Coname were 
not relevant in the consideration of the case at hand, which concerned a Part II B Services 
contract rather than a services concession.539 Prior to 2008, it thus appears attempts were made 
to limit the impact of the CJ's jurisprudence only to those contracts it had expressly considered. 
Judgments in 2005 and 2006 took variable approaches to applying the CJ's jurisprudence, 
possibly because the CJ's jurisprudence had not yet clearly established the idea that cross-border 
interest would determine whether or not advertising was required at all. Consequently, there are 
cases in this time period in which the Dutch courts concluded that all services concessions 
contracts had to be advertised regardless of cross-border interest540, and one case in which the 
Commission's Interpretative Communication was examined for guidance on how much publicity 
was needed in a specific situation.541 
However, since 2007, the Dutch courts have assessed disputes about advertising and 
transparency purely on the basis of the cross-border interest factorS42, with internet advertising 
having been accepted as an appropriate degree of advertising.543 
While using 'cross-border i n t ~ r e s t ' ' as a test has produced fairly consistent judgments, generally 
. considering the scope of the contract in question and the physical location of the contracting 
authority544, the courts do not always treat this concept in a comprehensible way-there is the 
Sl9 Rb. Dordrecht, 14 december 2006, rolnr. KG ZA 06-196. 
540 Rb. Utrecht 16 augustus 2005, rolnr.199214/KG ZA 05-788; see also Rb. Dordrecht, ibid. 
541 See Rb. Dordrecht KG ZA 06-196 (n 539). 
542 See, for instance, Rb. Amsterdam, 18juni 2008, rolnr. 380704/ HA ZA 07-2711; Rb. Amsterdam 13 november 2008, 
,rolnr. 411081 / KG ZA 08-2027. Interesting is Rb. Den Haag 21 januari 2008, rolnr. KG 07/1407, wherein the Dutch court 
determined that the applicants failed to demonstrate that there was cross-border interest in the contract and 
consequently there was no violation of the transparency principle, very Similarly to the CJ has done in An Post (n 192) and 
Ambulances (n 196). . . . 
543 See Rb. Dordrecht KG ZA 06-196 (n 539) .. 
• 544 See, for instance, Raad van State 30 juni 2010, rolnr. 200906164/1/H2; wherein the Council of State considers the 
contracting authority's location in a province that borders Belgium means it is likely that there will be interest from 
Belgian bidders. 
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example of a case concerning a 30 year concession for the exploitation of parking garages in 
Maastricht (which borders Germany and Belgium) being considered as not having any cross-
border interest545 It is worth noting again here that the proposed new Dutch procurement law 
does not contain a definition of 'cross-border interest' and it is thus of particular relevance that 
the Dutch courts are creating a significant body of jurisprudence on the meaning of that phrase. 
Also relevant is the fact that the general principle of transparency has been used more generally 
to decide disputes about contracts not covered by the directives, usually citingSucchi di Frutta: 
"the principle of transparency which is its corollary is essentially intended to preclude any risk of 
favollritism or arbitrariness on the part of the contracting authority." This concept of 
transparency has been used to consider whether or not supporting documentation could be 
submitted after the tender deadline546; whether or not a procurement procedure in general was 
clear enough to comply with the transparency principle547; and that the transparency 
requirements of the Treaty cannot be more onerous than those of the directive.548 
In summary, we thus find that the Dutch courts have recently embraced the C)'s jurisprudence on 
advertising to a greater extent The courts are starting to develop an interesting line of case law 
wherein the concept of 'cross-border interest' is given meaning in the specific Dutch geographical 
context (ie, a small country that shares borders with two other EU member states). 
The influence of the CJ on the development this line of case law is very clear-in 2005, there was 
still judicial resistance to the idea that Telaustria could be applied to contracts such as Part lI-B 
services or below-threshold contracts, but by 2008, a variety of 'transparency' cases on these 
types of contracts have been decided. However, it should also be observed that the Dutch courts 
use the general principle of transparency in a far more general manner to also decide disputes-
though in defining the transparency principle there, they again rely on a CJ definition. 
545 Rb. Maastricht B oktober 2008, rolnr. 119309/ HA ZA 07.419. 
546 Vz. Rb. Arnhem 12 september 2008, rolnr.173246/ KG ZA 08.475. 
547 RvA, 17 februari 2003, rolnr. 25.098, BR 2004, p. 172. 
548 In the context of award criteria, where the contracting authority's Information on 5ub-criteria would have complied 
with the Directive and consequently could not have failed to comply with transparency under the TFEU. (Vzr. Rb. Zwolle 
28 oktober 2008, ro\nr.149572/ KG ZA 08-457.) , 
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4.4.3.4 The Two Proposed New Procurement Laws 
The first proposed new procurement law had as one of its goals the harmonization of above and 
below threshold public procurement legislation in the Netherlands. It approached this by 
encouraging several changes to the existing regimes49: 
First of all, where the ARW 2005 had a lower threshold of 1.5 million euros, the proposed 
procurement law would set out the procurement rules (requiring competition, and in most cases 
advertising) applicable to all supply and service contracts above a value of 50,000 euros, and all 
works contracts above 150,000 euros. It is unclear whether or not this change was suggested in 
response to q jurisprudence or rather just a desire to provide rules for low-value contracts, so as 
to create uniformity. What is clear is that this threshold was among the reasons why this law 
proposal was rejected, as the administrative burden it produced was deemed too greatS so 
Even in preliminary discussions preceding the First Chamber vote, the Minister of Economic 
Affairs conceded that the lower threshold might have been set too low, and would be raised 
before the final law came into practice.55t Fascinating is that below these thresholds, the concept 
law was silent on the possibilities of direct award; the Dutch legislator did not address how direct 
award relates to the general principles, and whether direct award should be permissible for any 
, contracts at all as a general rule. This issue was raised by several members of the First Chamber, 
who also noted that the Commission's perspective on below-threshold contracts appeared to not 
be considered by the current law at all.552 Since the concept law was designed, the q has in fact 
suggested that general rules that establish a no-advertising-below-this-threshold policy are not 
. permissible under the TFEU.SS3 
549 The rejected proposal be viewed at 
http://www.eerstekamer.nl/behandelingI20060920/gewijzigd yoorstel van wetlf-/w30S01a.pdf (last accessed 1 
November 2010). 
SSG See Pijnacker Hordijk et al (n 11), p. 5 . 
. 551 For discussion at the time of the vote, 8 July 2008, see 
http://www eerstekamer.n!l9324000/1/j9vvgh5ihkk7kof!yhxn9xhQsazy/f=Y.pdf (last accessed 1 November 2010) . 
55l See treatment oCthe proposed law, 8 July 2008, available at . 
http://www.eerstekamer.nI/9324000/1 Ij9vvghSihkk7ko(lyhxn9yxrpiztlf=y,pdC (last accessed 1 November 2010) 
55] See APERMC (n 197); it discussed public service contracts explicitly, but there is no reason to assume this principle 
would not also apply to goods or works. 
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Secondly, and surprisingly, the proposed changes to the ARW 2005 retained room for an 
underhanded procedure, though several modifications were made to ensure that more parties 
were invited to the procedure-the minimum was set at 3. The largest correction needed-an 
inclusion of a requirement to advertise contracts-was not incorporated.554 Instead, the 
proposal contained a single provision in the underhanded procedure stating that it would be up 
to the public authority in question itself to determine what the market value and cross-border 
interest of a contract was, and to "be transparent" accordingly. This would not have been a 
change from the current regime, where the decision whether or not to advertise is also left with 
contracting authorities.S55 
The currently proposed procurement law takes a very different approach: rather than working 
with thresholds, the law merely states that the general principles also apply to all contracts that 
the law itself does not apply to-meaning, contracts not covered by the EU directives, as long as 
there is cross-border interest (Article 1.4 of the proposal). This is a similar approach to the one 
taken in Scotland, as discussed in section 3.4.3.4; the questions asked there about the practical 
effect of such provisions are relevant here as well, although in the Netherlands this provision at 
least has had interesting consequences for the availability of the underhanded procedure-as 
discussed in section 4.4.3.2.2, current proposals state the procedure will only available when 
there is no 'obvious' cross-border interest in a contract 
4.4.3.5 Guidance 
Again, as with the general principles as applicable to contracts covered by the directive, there Is 
no specific Dutch guidance prepared at either the central government or local government level 
that discusses the requirements set out by CJ jurisprudence for contracts not covered by the 
directive. The most useful pieces of information made available are again the case summaries 
554 The Minister of Economic Affairs at the time of the vote (n 551) noted that the "multiple underhanded procedure" was 
not contrary to CJ jurisprudence at that time. She also indicated express disapproval of the Commission's opinion on the 
requirements of the general principle of transparency, and said it would result in a situation where all below.threshold 
contracts would be awarded according to 'lowest price.' 
555 This criticism w a s . a l ~ o o l ~ u n c h e d d b ~ ~ Mr. Franken ofthe Christian Democratic Appel (COAl during the vote (n 551); he 
noted that the Commission s perspective on transparency regarding below-threshold contracts would likely result in a 
situation whereby ~ o w - v a l u e e ~ o ~ t r a c t s s would solely be awarded using lowest price as a criteria, as it would simplify the 
transparency requirements slgmficantly. 
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presented on PIANOO and Europa Decentraal, but as these merely restate the (unclear) 
. judgments of the CJ in brief, these case summaries do not offer true 'guidance'. 
4.4.4 Conclusions 
CJ jurisprudence on the general principles has had different effects on different parts of the Dutch 
procurement regulatory regime. For contracts covered by the directives, there are no legislative 
indications that the rules have had an impact-but we have seen that the judiciary is using the 
general principles in a very similar, if not more expansive, manner to how the CJ does, citing the 
CJ where it is relevant There are thus some signs of influence, especially in recent years; but we 
also saw that some applications of the general principles of equal treatment and transparency 
predate seminal EU cases on similar subjects. In terms of guidance, the Dutch tradition of not 
offering much if any material has prevailed in this area of law. 
The situation is notably different when it comes to the Telaustria family of jurisprudence and 
how this has affected Dutch procurement regulation. It can be noted transparency only started 
being used by the Dutch courts as a grounds for requiring advertisement of contracts not covered 
by the directives after the CJ's case law on this developed; and that in recent years in particular, 
the Dutch courts have cited the CJ's jurisprudence extensively. However, the influence of the 
general principles does not stop there-attempts were made in 2007 to revise Dutch 
procurement legislation and take the issue of advertising into account by forcing advertising on 
all contracts above a value of 50,000 euros. While this effort failed, the current proposals do still 
explicitly consider the issue of transparency on non-directive procurement, and have made 
procedures that appear contrary to the C)'s jurisprudence available only when there is no cross-
border interest 
There is once more no guidance on the role the general principles play in procurement not· . 
" , " " 
covered by the directives or the BAO, but in all other regulatory forms examined, we can clearly 
see that EU law has had a Significant impact on the Dutch approach taken. 
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5. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN FRANCE 
5.1 France: Developments in French Procurement Regulation 
5.1.11ntroduction 
This section will discuss the development of public procurement regulation in France. It will 
highlight major developments so as to provide an overview of how the regulatory regime 
changed, especially in response to the introduction of EU public procurement regulation. Most 
specifically, the section aims to provide an overview of the current public procurement 
regulatory regime, which will aid understanding of the more particular rules that will be 
discussed in the next three sections of the thesis. 
5.1.2 History: 1833 -1964 
France has legislated public procurement since 1833, when Article 12 of the Law on (State) 
Finance of 31 January 1833556 stated that further ordinances would provide rules to regulate 
state purchases. The concept of the HstateH at this time was defined so that only central 
government bodies were covered by additional purchasing rules set out in ordinances; prior to 
1964, the French communes were covered by different rules under completely separate regimes. 
Regarding central government purchasing, a first ordinance with more specific rules was issued 
in 1836. The Ordinance on State Purchasing of 4 December 1836557 stated, quite simply, that 
"(author's translation) all purchasing done in name of the state shall be done with competition 
and publicity"5sB. All later pieces of regulation (such as the 1882 Decree on State PurchasingSS9) 
have merely expanded on this principle with more specific rules. 
556 Loi de finances du 31 janvier 1833. 
557 Ordonnance du 4 decembre 1836. 
SSB "Tous les marches au nom de I'Etat seront fait avec concurrence et publiciteft• 
559 Decret du 18 novembre 1882 relatif aux adjudications et aux marches passes au nom de l'Etat. 
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Until 1960, all regulation of central government purchasing originated from the 1833 law. In 
1893, the Conseil d'Etat (Council of State) concluded that nothing in French administrative law 
indicated that the departments could not also be obliged to engage in competitive public 
purchasing on the basis of the 1833 law: at the time that law had been enacted the departements 
were in fact part of the concept of ''l'Etat''.S60 A subsequent decree, also issued in 1893, copied 
out the 1882 Decree on State Purchasing and applied it to the departements as well, resulting in a 
harmonized set of purchasing rules at sub-central and central government levels.s61 
The communes (or local governments) were also obliged to engage in competitive public 
purchasing but through a different mechanism: an ordinance passed on the basis of the Local 
Government/Municipalities Law of 18 July 1837.562 The ordinance in question (of 14 November 
1837)563 was eventually replaced by the 1884 Municipalities Law, which retained the same 
principles.564 
Further harmonization between the central government and non-central government regimes 
occurred in 1938, when a 'decret-Ioi' empowered the government to extend the current 
regulation of state purchasing to the departements and communes.565 This decret-Ioi referred to' . 
provisions of the 1882 Decree on State Purchasing, which remained the key piece oflegislation 
on state purchasing until the 1940s, when a new state purchasing decree was published.566 
Between the 1940s and the 1960s, several decrees updating the existing legislation were issued; 
, by 1956, central government purchasing was already being regulated by a decree containing . 
. more than 40 provisions.567 However, the rules applying to the departements and the communes 
. were not updated at the same time as the rules applying to central government, meaning that the 
.' p u ~ c h a s i n g g regime once more fractured between the different levels of government. 
560 CE 9 Fevrier 1912, Societe Cooperative des Ouvriers de Limoges, Recueil Lebon p.193; see also Oecret du 12 juillet 
1893 sur la comptabilite departementale. 
561 Ocret du 12juillet 1893, ibid. 
562 Loi municipale du 18 juillet 1837. 
563 Ordonnance royale du 14 novembre 1937. 
564 Loi municipaJe du 5 avril 1884. . ' 
565 Oecret-Ioi du 12 novembre 1938 portant extension de la reglementation en vigueur pour les marches de l'Etat aux 
marches des collectivites locales. . 
566 Oecret n·1082 du 6 avril 1942 relatif aux marches passes au nom de l'Etat . 
567 Oecret n· 56·256 du 13 mars 1956 relatifaux marches passes au nom de I'Etat. 
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Helpfully, in 1960 a decree was issued that consolidated all procurement rules for the 
departements and the communes applicable at the time.568 However, this still did not bring the 
regime in line with central government purchasing regulation, which would be updated one last 
time by a 1964 consolidated rules decree.S69 In 1966, the merging of these two consolidated 
rulebooks (by decree) would result in what is these days referred to as the first Code des Marches 
Publics, or the CMP 1964.570 
5.1.31964: CMP #1 
The CMP 1964 contained both rules on central government procurement (books 1 and 2) and 
non-central government procurement (books 2 and 40). It was repealed in 2001, meaning it was 
in force for almost forty years, but it was amended many times. For the purposes of this thesis, it 
is not necessary to consider all these changes in detail; rather, we will focus on how the 
interference of EU law in public procurement regulation affected the French Code. 
France clearly already had detailed legislation in place in the 1970s, and since this was similar to 
the first EU directives (which were largely inspired by French law), the introduction of the 
directives did not require extensive national action; in the words of Richer, transposition was not 
necessary as a few amendments to the CMP 1964 resulted in compliance with the first EU 
directives.S71 
The revised EU directives of the late 1980s, however, were not implemented so easily, and were 
in fact implemented through various different instruments. Firstly, amendments were made to 
the CMP in 1989 and 1990; a fifth Book was added which dealt with the contents of Directive 
568 Decret n° 60-724 du 2S juillet 1960 relatif aux marches passes au nom des departements, des communes, des 
syndicats de communes, des etablissements publics departementaux et communaux. 
569 Decret nO 64-729 du 17 juillet 1964 portant co-definition des textes reglementaires relatifs aux marcMs publics. 
570 Decrets n° 66-887 et 66-888 du 28 novembre 1966 modifiant et c o m p h ~ t a n t t Ie decret nO 64-729 du 17juillet 1964 
(modi fie) portant codification des textes reglementaires relatifs aux marches publics. , 
571 L. Richer, Droit des Contrats Administrati/s (7 th edition) (LGID: Paris 2010), p. 357; see also Decret n079-98 du 12 
janvier 1979 elatif a la mise en concurrence de certains marches publics de travaux et de fournitures dans Ie cadre de la 
CEE. 
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88/295 on Supplies and Directive 89/440 on Works.S12 However, the scope of application (in 
particular with regards to bodies covered by the directives) of the CMP and the directives 
differed. Not all bodies considered "public bodies" under the EU rules were considered public 
bodies under the CMP, which excluded bodies such as mixed economy companies (categorized as 
'private persons' in French law) and, for instance, the French national bank (Banque de France) 
from its application.S73 To fully comply with EU law, a new law was created in 1991. The 1991 
law applied the EU rules to these public bodies and also introduced general transparency and 
anti-corruption measures.574 To correctly implement the Works Directive, an additional decree 
was issued on 31 March 1992.575 
The Services Directive is a separate matter. The French government resisted implementing this 
directive to the fullest extent for many years, primarily out of a reluctance to see its own 
"devolved services" (decentralized government bodies with no legal personality of their own, 
charged with providing services to sub-national government) be put in competition with the 
private sector in providing services to local communities.576 Only in 1996, when the CJ 
condemned implementation of the Services Directive as executed prior to that pointS77, did the 
French government start transposing the Services Directive; this was completed with a law dated 
22 January 1997578 and two decrees of27 February 1998.579 
Implementation of the Utilities Directive580 took place in a similar fashion-by amending the 
CMP, and by issuing separate laws and decrees to supplement the CMP-and implementation of 
(.-
m Decret nO 89·236 du 17 avril 1989 modifiant Ie code des marches publics and Decret nO 90·824 du 18 septembre 1990 
modifiant Ie code des marches publics. . 
S73 P. Valadou, ·Contracts of ' Mixed Economy' companies and competitive procedures in France" (1992) 1 PPLR 376. p. 
376. 
574 Loi nO 91·3 du 3 janvier 1991 relative a la transparence et a la regula rite des procedures de marche et soumettant la 
passation de certains contrats a des regles de publicite et de mise en concurrence. 
S7S Decret n092·311 du 31 mars 1992 soumettant la passation de certains contrats de fournitures. de travaux ou de 
prestation de services a des regles de publicite et de mise en concurrence. 
576 Richer 2010 (n 571), p. 357. 
571 Case C·234/95 Commission v France [1996] ECR 1-2415. 
578 Lol n097-50 du 22 janvier 1997. ' -i 
579 Decret n° 98·111 du 27 fevrier 1998 and Decretd'application nO 98-112 du 27 fevrier 1998. 
S80 Loi nO 92-1282 du 11 decembre 1992 relative aux procedures de passation de certains contrats dans les secteurs de 
I'eau. de l'energie. des transports et des telecommunications and Decret 3 aout 1993; modified by Decret no 98-113 of 27 
fevrier 1998, adding Book V title 11 to the CMP. 
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the Remedies Directives was done fully outside ofthe CMP, in two separate laws (one for the 
classic sectors, one for the utilities).581 
It is clear from this overview that transposition ofEU law into the French CMP did not prove 
easy, and despite consolidation efforts, by 2001 the CMP was nearly illegible again; this was 
worsened by the fact that it was supplemented by a great number of related laws and decrees 
that also affected public procurement Foremost among these are the law on subcontractingS82, 
the law MOP (maitrise d'ouvrage publique) of 12 July 1985583, dealing with the duties of a 
contracting authority when acting as project management in works projects, and loi MURCEF of 
11 December 2001 (dealing with urgent measures of economic and financial reform) 584, which 
defines various types of procurement contracts and classifies them in French legal terms (ie, thus 
stating that all contracts concluded under the CMP are administrative law contracts). 
The illegibility of the CMP by 2001 was the most substantial problem, however: 
"The old Public Procurement Code was characterised by a complexity which 
made it very difficult to read and to apply. In particular, some parts of this 
Code applied to the State and to State bodies, whereas others applied to 
local authorities. A separate part applied to contracts falling within the 
scope of application of the ... directives; it indicated that It prevailed over 
other parts ofthe Code, but without stating explicitly which rules did not 
apply to contracts governed by the directives. In addition to this complexity 
resulting from the way the Code was drafted, the substance of the rules was 
also complex: for example, there ~ e r e e several award procedures, numerous 
thresholds."585 
581 For the classic sectors: Loi n° 92-10 du 4 janvier 1992 and Decret no 92-964 du 7 septembre 1992; for the utilities: Lol 
n° 93-1416 du 29 decembre 1993. For an English overview ofthe implementation process, see S. Ponsot, .Public 
procurement in France: transposition of the ·Remedies Directives·· (1996) 5 PPLR 29. 
582 Loi nO 75-1334 du 31 decembre 1975 relative a la sous.traitance. 
583 Loi n° 85-704 du 12 juillet 1985 relative a la maitrise d'ouvrage publique et a ses rapports avec la maitrise d'oeuvre 
privee. . 
584 Loi n° 2001-1168 du 11 decembre 2001 portant mesures urgentes de reformes a c a r a c t e ~ e e economique et financier 
~ ~ ~ . . . .. 
. 585 J. Arnould. "French Public Contracts Law after the reform of March 2001" (2001) 10 PPLR 324. at 330. 
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Two separate projects were launched to restructure French public procurement in the 1990s. 
The first of these, based on a 1996 report issued by MOP Mr. Trassy-PailloguesSB6, was sent to the 
National Assembly as a draft act, but then was not ratified before the National Assembly was 
dissolved in 1997.587 The second project did not commence on the basis of this first initiative; 
instead, in 1999, the Ministry of Economics and Finance launched a consultation prior to the 
drafting of a new act A subsequent policy paper indicated a desire for change among very 
similar lines to that of the 1996 report; namely, increasing transparency and legal certainty for 
contracting authorities, clarifying the scope of application of the law; improving the efficiency of 
procurement procedure through e-procurement; and opening up procurement to SMEs to a 
greater extent588 Eventually, this second consultation process led to the adoption of the second 
Code des Marches Publics.s89 
5.1.4 2001: eMP #2 
The main achievement met by the 2001 CMP was halving the number of articles in the old. CMP 
simply by not repeating all the regulations for the collectivites locales in separate books, but by 
integrating these into the main text relating to central government procurement: this resulted in 
only 136 articles. However, the new CMP nonetheless came accompanied by several 
implementing measures and additional texts that supplemented the rules within it, so even in 
terms of volume and overall complexity only limited improvements were found. 
More importantly, perhaps, the new CMP once again only implemented the directives insofar as 
the directives: and the C M ~ ' s s definitions of a "public body" were compatible; the contracts of 
bodies that were considered 'private persons' in French law remained subject to separate 
regulation (in the form of the aforementioned 1991 Law on Transparency). 
The CMP made some important changes to the procurement procedures; most notably, it made 
appel d'offres (open or restricted procurement on the basis of ' most economically adva'ntageous 
586 A. Trassy·Paillogues, "Rapport du 8 mars 1996" (Moniteur, 5 avril 1996). 
587 Richer 2010 (n 571), p. 349. 
SBB ). Arnould, "The reform of French public procurement law postponed again" (2000) 9 PPLR CS78. 
589 Decret n° 2001·210 du 7 mars 2001 portant code des marches publics. 
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tender' award) the default procurement procedure. It also made other concepts-such as non-
discrimination-more explicit and attempted to clarify the legal language used. On the whole, 
however, the 2001 CMP was not considered a success, as the overall goal of simplification had 
not been attained. 
Criticism came from two distinct sources: interested parties in France and the Commission.590 
First of aU, French professional bodies, economic operators and other interested parties lodged 
several actions for annulment with the Conseil d'Etat in the hopes of stimulating further reform; 
these actions first of all dealt with the method-by decree, rather than through a parliamentary 
procedure-in which the government had adopted the new CMP, which was perceived as 
undemocratic, and second of all dealt with the expanded coverage ofthe 2001 CMP, which meant 
that many services that had previously been excluded from the CMP were now covered by it, 
increasing the administrative burden for certain service providers greatly. 
The Commission, on the other hand, concluded that the new CMP violated the directives in a 
number of ways: importantly, certain types of contracts were excluded from formal tendering 
procedures where the directive did not permit this, and the directives' thresholds and publicity 
requirements were improperly implemented.591 
The Conseil d'Etat confirmed the majority of the 2001 CMP despite the annulment actionsS92, but 
nonetheless the government-partially due to EU pressure-announced it would revisit large 
sections of the CMP in order to deal with national and especially the Commission's criticism. 
5.1.52004: eMP #3 
The 2004 CMp593 commenced as an ambitious project; complaints about lingering rigidity of the 
rules meant that the drafters opted to not subject below-EU-threshold contracts to any particular 
590 See Richer 2010 (n 571), p. 350 and onwards, and J. Arnould, "The French Council of State and the reform of the Public 
Contracts Law of2001" (2004) 13 PPLR NA6. 
591 For details, see the Commission Press release IP 102/1507 of October 17, 2002. 
59Z One notable exception being the exclusion of appointment contracts, which was a provision annulled by the Conseil 
d'Etat (CE 5 mars 2003, Ordre des avocats Ii la Cour d'appel de Paris and Union nationale des services publics industriels et 
commerciaux and others, req. n° 238039). 
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procedures, but instead allowed them free choice among the available procedures without an y 
severe prescriptions. This was met by staunch resistance in-country, and after significant pro test 
the Prime Minister announced that the reform project would be subjected to a parliamentary 
consultation before it proceeded.s94 This opening up ofbelow-EU-threshold procurement wa s 
rejected by the consultation process, resulting in a more modest amendment to the 2001 CM P. 
Several changes-in particular dealing with complaints of coverage and the introduction of 
competitive dialogue-were introduced, but it is not necessary to elaborate on these; the 200 4 
CMP was due for amendment almost immediately after it entered into force, as it did not 
implement the 2004 directives. The reform process thus continued into 2006; in part becaus eas 
with the 2001 CMP, the Commission found fault with the 2004 CMP (in failure to adhere to a 
'minimum number invited' to a restricted procedure, and failure to comply with advertising 
requirements set out by Telaustria for Part II-B services by allowing these to always be award 
without pUblicity).S9S 
5.1.62006: CMP #4 and Current Developments 
Current (Relevant) Applicable 
Le islation to the State 
Deals With 
ed 
CMP 2006 [last amended in Sep. 
2009] 
Procurement of all 'public sector' bodies, excluding bo 
that have special & exclusive rights or are otherwise 
economicall active but covered b the directives. 
dies 
, 
Loi n° 91·3 du 3 janvier 1991 Public bodies not covered by the CMP, works concessi 




Decree No. 2004·16 of7January 
2004 
n02005-649 du 6 'uin 2005 
Rules that apply when public bodies purchase 'works' 
contracts that has them actin as ro'ect mana ement 
Military Procurement, where not covered by CMP. 
Loi n° 2008·735 du 28 juillet 2008 n PPP contracts; this law as well as two decrees issued i 
February 2009 modify Ordonnance n02004-559 du 17 
2004. 
Table 5.1.6: Current Legislation applicable to Public Procurement in France 
593 Decret nO 2004·15 du 7 janvier 2004 portant code de marches publics. 
, .594 Richer 2010 (n 571). p. 351. 






The 2006 CMp596 transposed the 2004 directives in full. It also dealt with the remaining 
infringements that the Commission found in the 2004 CMP, and accordingly, increased the 
number of participants required to be invited for a restricted procedure and amended the 
provisions on the advertising of Part II-B services contracts. 
Barring the combining of central government and collectivites locales purchasing, the setup of 
public procurement regulation in France has not changed drastically since 1996. The areas 
covered by the first CMP are thus strikingly similar to those of the current CMP, with the 
addendum that in some places, EU rules have required additional regulation, particularly on 
advertising and transparency. The 1991 Act that deals with transparency and the coverage of 
'private persons' covered by the EU directives, in fact, remains in force to this day simply because 
the scope of the CMP has not expanded to the point where it is no longer necessary; certain 
bodies covered by the directives thus remain not covered by the CMP, and even a more updated 
version of the same legislation-a 2005 ordinance597-does not repeal the previous 1991 Act 
More generally, since 2001, numbering of the articles and overall structure have not changed in 
any of the CM Ps. 
Other previously mentioned pieces oflegislation-such as Loi MOP and Loi MURCEF-also 
remain in force to this date. It should also be noted that (works and services) concession 
agreements have never been part of the CMP, as they are not considered 'public contracts' in 
France; their procurement is thus regulated in separate legislation, also in force since the 
1990s.598 The CMP notwithstanding, not much of the procurement landscape in France has 
changed, with one notable exception. 
A 2003 Loi D'Habilitation599 empowers the French government to directly transpose EU 
directives where these are issued, but also empowers the government to regulate the conclusion 
596 Decret nO 2006·975 du Ier aoi'lt 2006 portant code des marches publics. 
597 Ordonnance n02005·649 du 6 juin 2005 relative aulC marches passes par certaines personnes publiques ou prlvees non 
soumises au code des marches publics. 
598 Services concessions are regulated in Loi n° 93·122 (n 575), where they are treated as one type of'devolved service" 
works concessions were regulated in Loi n° 91·3 (n 574) and are now regulated by Ordonnance nO 2009·864 du 15juiliet 
2009 relative aux contrats de concession de travaulC publics. 
599 Loi n02003-591 du 2 juillet 2003 habilitant Ie Gouvernement a Simplifier Ie droit. 
189 
~ ~ _ ~ P ' > ! " · f C j } Q " " ''''1!;o'' 1 , - ~ ~ < - - " " ~ . . . - . . , . , . , , . - " , , ' " " , ~ " . : :
) 
of public/private partnership contracts. The Act (devolving power from parliament to the 
executive) was drawn up using the UK PFI initiative as a model, and has since resulted in a 
2004600 ordinance regulating the award and executing of works and services PPP contracts (both 
above threshold, and thus covered by the directives, and below threshold) as well as a law dated 
28 July 2008. 601 
Military procurement, regulated by the CMP in general terms, is also further regulated by a 
separate decree where it concerns contracts covered by Article 346 TFEU (which are then 
excluded from the applicability of EU law).602 
The CMP and related decrees were all modified by three decrees adopted in December 2008.603 
These decrees opted to raise French's 'national' thresholds relating to advertising requirements 
(for contracts below the directive's thresholds) significantly and implement other changes so as 
to promote economic recovery. Lastly, in November 2009, the 2007 Remedies Directive was 
implemented in France-again by decree.604 
5.1.7 Guidance 
In addition to extensive legislation, the French government has also consistently relied on 
guidance to supplement the hard law r e ~ u l a t o r y y framework in place. Traditionally, this has 
taken place through circulars distributed among government departments. Since 2001, also, 
'; 
'. 
each CMP has come accompanied with an "application instruction", acting as guidance in 
~ ~ . 
applying the provisions of the CMP.60S Interesting is that in 2009, following the changes to the 
CMP that were to help French economic recovery in the global recession, a completely new 
_ 600 Ordonnance n02004·559 du 17 juin 2004 sur les contrats de partenariat. 
. 601 Most recently, see Decret n° 2009·244 du 2 mars 2009 pris en application du code general des collectivites 
territoriales, which updates the Loi nO 2008·735 du 28 juillet 2008 relative aux contrats de partenariat. 
602 Decret nO 2004·16 du janvier 2004. 
60] Decrets nO 2008·1334 du 17 decembre 2008, n° 2008·1355 du 19 decembre 2008 and nO 2008·1356 du 19 decembre 
2008. 
604 Decret n° 2009·1456 du 27 novembre 2009 relatif aUK procedures de recours applicables aux contrats de la 
commande publique. 
605 See Instruction du 28 aout 2001 pour I'application du code des marches publics 00 n0208, 8 septembre 2001); 
Circulaire du 16 decembre 2004 modifiant la circulaire du 7 janvier 2004 portant manuel d'application du code des 
marches publics 00 nOl, 1 janvier 2005); Circulaire du 3 aout 2006 portant manuel d'application du code des marches 
publics 00 n0179, 4 aout 2006).', . , . 
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"Guide to Good Practice" (Guide de Bonnes Pratiques) was introduced as a governmental 
circular.606 It is significantly more detailed than the 2006 Manuel d'Application and covers, as its 
title may imply, best practice as well as the applicable law contained in the CMP. 
The main source of general central government guidance is the Ministry of Economics, Industry 
and Employment website (MinEFE).607 Aside from citing all French legislation on the subject of 
public procurement, the website offers a 'guidance for public authorities' section that explains 
individual procurement procedures in much more detail, contains answers to parliamentary 
questions on the subject of public procurement, and contains a whole specialized sub-website 
dealing with the French regulation of PPP contracts. There is also significant information 
(including guidance on what is legally permissible and not) on two current priorities of French 
public procurement, namely, the stimulation of using SMEs in government contracts and socially 
responsible procurement 
Also noteworthy is Bercy Colloc6OB,the economic affairs website of the collectivites locales. While 
providing some specific guidance for local government, the website is also a valuable resource for 
central government procurement material. Bercy Colloc reproduces all relevant procurement 
regulations and their drafting histories, where available. It also carries reports on studies carried 
out by different ministries on procurement, offers practical guidance on specific procedures 
organized by topic, and also provides updates on important jurisprudence originating from both 
the CJ and national courts. 
5.1.8 Jurisprudence 
As stated above, all contracts covered by the CMP and related decrees are considered 
administrative law contracts. This means that disputes are handled by the administrative courts 
(tribunals), courts of appeal, and the Conseil d'Etat, which serves as the highest administrative 
court in the country. 
606 Circu\aire du 29 dckembre 2009 relative au Guide de bonnes pratiques en matiere de marcMs publics 00 n00303 31 
decembre 2009) . , 
607 http://www minefe ~ o u v v frlthemes/marc:Ms pubUcs/accueU-daj htm last accessed 1 November 2010. 
608 http'//www,col1oc berc,y ~ Q U V V fc/colo stOlct marc publ/jndex html,last accessed 1 November 2010. 
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France sees a significant number of procurement disputes: over 100 between January and July of 
2009 alone.609 Interesting about French administrative law is that it is largely case-law 
developed, and this holds true (albeit to a lesser extent, due to the extensive legislation that does 
exist) for public procurement as well. Other than in dispute settlement, the Conseil d'Etat has 
obviously also had a significant influence on French public procurement by annulling various 
provisions in the CMP throughout the years. 
5.1.9 Conclusions 
The historical French approach to procurement could not be more different from those of the UK 
and the Netherlands. The volume of legislation applicable to public procurement is immense, and 
it has been supplemented by a consistent stream of case law. In terms of volume, France and the 
UK are clearly at opposite ends of the European spectrum in terms of public procurement 
regulation, but as we saw in Chapter 3, the UK compensates for a lack of hard law by a heavy 
emphasis on guidance. It would not be illogical to assume that in France, the opposite-little 
guidance, much hard law-could be found, but this is not true. French legislation and case law is 
also supplemented with a fair amount of guidance-significantly more than the Netherlands, for 
instance, provides. 
" 
The following sections will examine how the French legislator has resolved the tensions between 
an intense history of legal-both through hard and soft law-regulation and an ever-increasing 
EU presence in national public procurement law. 
, . 
609 Search conducted on http://www.legifrance.fron26July2009. 
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5.2 Competitive Dialogue in France 
5.2.1 Introduction 
This section will discuss the French approach to the implementation of competitive dialogue. 
The section will first examine legislative steps taken in France, if any, and will then evaluate any 
guidance issued as well as any jurisprudence originating from the French courts. 
5.2.2 Background: la procedure de rappel d'offres sur performances 
France is the only Member State in this thesis that had, in its pre-20041egislation, a procedure 
comparable to competitive dialogue in place; we can contrast this with the UK (see section 3.2.2), 
which developed practice similar to that of competitive dialogue through a soft law approach to 
the negotiated procedure. 
The procedure, called 'l'appel d'offres sur performances' (literally translated 'call for tenders on 
performance'), was first introduced by decree of27 March 1993610 and retained in the 2001 CMP, 
in Article 36.611 
L'appel d'offres sur performances was intended as a specific variant to the restricted procedure. 
There are therefore some aspects of the procedure that are more similar to the restricted 
procedure than to competitive dialogue or the even more flexible negotiated procedure. The 
following table outlines the French 'appel d'offres sur performances' and compares it to 
competitive dialogue and the UK use of the negotiated procedure. 
610 Decret nO 93·733 du 27 mars 1993. 
611 Richer 2010 (n 571), p. 462 onwards. 
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Procedure Number of Outline Offers? Possibility to Availability of 
Candidates Discussions on Reduce Procedure 
Required to Outline Offers? Bidders? 
Invite 
France: Appel 5 (as with No: initial bid No When contracting 
d'Offres Sur restricted submission and authority cannot 
Performance procedure) subsequent identify means to 
'clarify/specify /fine- meet its needs; 




UK: adapted 3 (as with Yes No Availability of 
Negotiated negotiated negotiated 
Procedure procedure) procedure with a 
contract notice. 
EU: Competitive 3 Yes No Particularly 





Table 5.2.2 - Pre-Competitive Dialogue Procedures in the UK and France 
Table 5.2.2 reveals that in terms of advantages offered regarding a) number of bidders, b) pre-bid' 
discussions and c) staged or iterative bidding, the UK use of the negotiated procedure is more 
similar to competitive dialogue; however, when it comes to wording of the competitive dialogue 
provisions in the directive, the French procedure appears to be the precedent for, inter alia, the 
concept of a 'particularly complex contract' and what can be done post-bid submission 
(clarifying, specifying and fine-tuning). 
Interestingly, Article 68 of the 2001 CMP states that all tenders (including prices and solutions) 
would be confidential. Article 68 also stressed that the contracting authority cannot modify its 
"functional program" or specifications in order to reflect a particular tenderer's solution without 
their express permission; these concepts are found in the directive's proviSions on competitive 
dialogue, which also transparency, equal treatment and the prevention of cherry-picking. 
In summary, the stricter conditions of operating competitive dialogue-such as the notion of a 
particularly complex contract, or very limited post-bid discussion-can be found in 'appel 
d'offres sur performance'. Generally, however, competitive dialogue ~ f f e r s s more flexibility than 
- . " 
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this French adaptation of the restricted procedure ever did, by allowing fewer bidders to be 
involved and bidders to be eliminated in stages. 
5.2.3 "Dialogue competiti/' in French Legislation 
As discussed in section 2.2.3, the competitive dialogue procedure is an optional procedure in 
directive 2004/18/EC. The first issue to consider is then whether or not France made it available 
at all in the CMP. In the case of France, where the CMP regulates not only contracts covered by 
the EU directives but also contracts falling outside of them, a second important question is 
whether or not competitive dialogue is available for, for instance, below threshold contracts. 
Lastly, it must also be stressed that the CMP does not cover certain types of contracting 
authorities (ie, certain bodies governed by public law under the EU rules) or certain types of 
contracts (such as contrats de partenariat); in evaluating the extent of an impact this EU 
procedure has had, it is thus also worth investigating its availability for non-CMP regulated 
contracts (which mayor may not be covered by the directives, depending on their value). 
The remainder of this section will first investigate the implementation of competitive dialogue 
for a) contracts covered by the CMP that are covered by the directives; it will then examine b) 
contracts covered by the CMP that are not covered by the directives, and c) rules applicable to 
specific contracting authorities or specific contracts. 
5.2.3.1 contracts covered by the CMP that are covered by the Directives 
Competitive dialogue has been made available in France-it was already elaborated on in the 
2004 CMP and has been retained in the 2006 CMP. This section will focus primarily on the 
current provisions relating to competitive dialogue, but where relevant changes have taken place 
since the 2004 CMP, these will be highlighted.612 
6U D. C h a b a n o ~ ~ J-P. Jouquelet. and F Bourrachot, Le regime juridique des marcMs publics: Droits et obligations des 
signataires des marcMs de travaux (Le Moniteur: Paris 2007), s. 789 onwards. 
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5.2.3.1.1 Definition 
Competitive dialogue is defined in Article 36 of the CMP. The definition provided is in many ways 
identical to that provided in the directive, with one minor difference-Article 36 indicates that 
the procedure becomes available when the contracting authority is not able to supply, in advance, 
a single best possible solution. This again corresponds to a 'best possible' interpretation of 
availability, as discussed in section 2.2.4. 
5.2.3.1.2 Procedure 
Article 67 describes the competitive dialogue procedure. As is typical in French legislation, 'this 
article does not merely contai'n the provisions that pertain specifically to competitive dialogue 
but rather all provisions that apply to the entire procurement. The Article thus starts by 
referencing publicity requirements, and then proceeds to repeat the directive's proviSions on 
minimum number of participants (3) unless no other suitable participants are available. Article' 
67 continues by listing the time limits for receipt of requests to participate in the dialogue; again, 
these provisions are copied out from the directive. 
Only in section VI of Article 67 does the article begin dealing with specific elements of the 
competitive dialogue procedure, namely, the start ofthe dialogue process. The following sections 
outline the process of the dialogue and follow the wording of the directive (and its time limits) 
directly. This includes a mention of equal treatment of tenderers during the dialogue process 
and a ban on solution-sharing without consent of the solution 'creator', as well as the 
requirement to announce, if this option is chosen, in the contract notice that the number of 
solutions participating will be successively reduced throughout the dialogue. 
On the subject of the award, there is an important change from the 2004 CMP. The 2004 Code 
said that the contracting authority itselfwould provide one set of final specifications.613 This 
approach, ifused improperly, could cause problems with regards to the ban on cherry-picking-a 
613 eMP 2004, Art. 67 section II. 
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'single specification' would allow competing tenderers to benefit from the solutions they each 
provided without any scope for confidentiality. The 2006 eMP deletes this provision and instead, 
as the directive permits, states that each tenderer will submit a final tender on the basis of their 
own solution or any solutions shared with permission. 
The remainder of the sections of Article 67 competitive dialogue take contracting authorities 
through the contract award and notification parts of the dialogue process. The provisions on 
these issues are again identical to those in the directive; in general, in fact, it can be concluded 
that French provisions relating to competitive dialogue for contracts covered by the directive are 
very similar to those of the directives, and procedurally there are no notable differences. That 
said, the French legislator has supplemented the directive in two interesting ways, which will be 
discussed next 
5.2.3.1.3 Additions 
The first change concerns payments for bid costs/preparations. Whereas the directive refers to 
this possibility in the abstract, the French eMP goes into more detail by indicating some 
possibilities of how to use bid payments: Article 67 thus states that bid costs can be returned to 
all bidders, or only to those bidders that reach a certain part of the process, or perhaps only to 
the highest-ranked bidders. The approach here can be contrasted with that taken in the 
Netherlands and in the UK, where not only there is discouragement of bid payments, but any use 
of bid payment is regulated through soft law (ie, policy) rather than hard law. 
Also of note, the eM? contains some provisions applicable to specific types of contracts that are 
nonetheless likely to be covered by the directive; an example of this is the so-called 'marches de 
conception-realisation' procedure which applies to public works contracts that contain both a 
design and build element These generally are awarded using a modified restricted procedure 
(discussed in Article 69 of the eMP), but Article 69(11) also indicates that where such a 'deSign 
and build' contract relates to the restoration of buildings and the conditions for use of 
. competitive dialogue are met, this procedure may be used instead: 
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5.2.3.2 contracts covered by the eMP that are not covered by the Directives 
As will be discussed in section 5.4 in detail, France operates a much more rigorous system of 
thresholds than that mandated by the directives, primarily to determine the type of contract 
publicity required and, separately, to determine what procurement procedure must be used for 
contract award. 
There are two thresholds that are relevant for the discussion of competitive dialogue. The 
highest threshold is where the EU directives become applicable (henceforth the 'EU' threshold). 
Above this threshold, the EU rules on availability of the procedure (ie, 'particularly complex 
contract') are mandatory. The second relevant threshold was a lower threshold for works 
procurement only, set at the EU threshold for supplies and services contracts614 (206,000 euros 
in 2006). Above this secondary threshold, works contracts had to be procured using a procedure 
found in the EU directives. 
Possibly to compensate for this works-only requirement for formal tendering, Article 36 of the 
2006 C¥P originally allowed all works contracts between the works threshold and the EU 
threshold to be procured using competitive dialogue regardless of the complexity of the contract 
Availability of the procedure changed in 2008, however, when the French government removed 
the 206,000 euros threshold for works, and simultaneously removed the Article 36 paragraph 
.' 
that permitted use of competitive dialogue for non-complex procurement615 This had as an 
<N 
ultimate consequence that the procedure adaptee, a simple and unrestricted procurement 
. procedure (previously only available below the 206,000 euros works threshold), was suddenly 
available for all works procurement below the EU thresholds instead. 
The 'procedure adaptee' allows contracting authorities to structure the award process however 
. they like; this includes possibilities for unrestricted negotiation. The legislative situation created 
614 When procured by non-central government; b e c a u ~ e e of the WTO's Government P r o c u r ~ m e n t tAgreement, different 
thresholds apply to central government procurement. 
615 This was part of a general economic stimulus package intended to simplify, speed up, and reduce the costs of public 
procurement in France; see decrets n02008-1355 and n02008-1356 (n 603). 
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in 2008 has made competitive dialogue less available for contracts not covered by the directive 
. (services, supplies and works contracts now all have to be 'particularly complex' before it can be 
used), and the procedure adaptee more available. As this procedure is more flexible and less 
burdensome than competitive dialogue, it seems unlikely that competitive dialogue will still be 
used to award contracts below the directive's thresholds in France. 
In summary, the current French legislation still makes competitive dialogue available for all 
contracts below the directives' thresholds, but all contracts have to be 'complex' before it can be 
used. The current French approach is far more limiting than the approach taken by the UK and 
the Netherlands to the availability of competitive dialogue for contracts that fall below the 
directive's thresholds; the UK's legislation is silent on the availability of competitive dialogue for 
below-threshold contracts, and in the Netherlands, in the case of works, competitive dialogue is 
actually more freely available. 
5.2.3.3 CMP: Conclusions 
Most of the European legislation on competitive dialogue-which is so similar that it appears to 
almost be modeled on the French 2001 CMP provisions on l'appel d'offres sur performances-
was implemented into the French code without significant changes, although the procedure's 
availability and usefulness of bid payments is considered in more detail by the French legislator 
than by the directive. 
What is interesting is that the procedure has been made de facto available for all below-EU-
threshold procurement as well, but currently can only be used if the directive's conditions of 
complexity can be satisfied. As discussed above, in reality this is likely to mean that competitive 
dialogue will not be used frequently for below-threshold procurement. 
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5.2.3.4 contracts not covered by the eMP 
5.2.3.4.1 Bodies covered by Ordonnance 2005-649 
Competitive dialogue is made available to bodies covered by the directives but not covered by the 
CMP (such as 'private law' bodies that exercise public functions) on terms that are nearly 
identical to those found in the CMP. Aside from minor word changes, there is only one notable 
aspect of how the 2005 ordinance regulating these bodies deals with competitive dialogue: the 
conditions for use for contracts that fall below the directive's thresholds are phrased very 
differently. 
Contracting authorities covered by these rules, rather than the CMP, do not have to use any of the 
'formal' procedures (ie, the EU procedures) for procurement below the directive's thresholds. 
The only comment the 2005 ordinance makes about the availability of these procedures is that 
should a contracting authority decide to use a 'formal' procedure (such as competitive dialogue), 
detailed specifications would be required (Article 7). This implies that competitive dialogue can 
be used for the award of contracts below the thresholds under this ordinance, but does not 
clarify whether or not all the rules in the ordinance (or the directive) would have to be applied in 
this case. As there is full freedom to use a 'non-formal' procedure for to award below threshold 
contracts under the ordinance, it would seem that contracting authorities are also free to use a 
'changed' version of competitive dialogue that has less rigid rules on, for instance, negotiation 
after submission of bids-but this issue is not entirely clear from the wording of the ordinance. 
5.2.3.4.2 Ordonnance 2004-559 on PPP: Le "Dialogue"616 
Design-Build-Finance-Operate contracts in France are subject to separate legislation and 
principally not covered by the rules in the CMP. Instead, an ordinance introduced in 2004 (no . 
. 2004-559) sets out the rules to be followed when awarding this particular type of public private 
616 For a general discussion of competitive dialogue and PPP contracts, as well as some practical experiences therewith, 
see T. ReynaUd and J. L ~ r a u t , , ·Pour un dialogue competitif equitable dans la passation d'un contrat de partenariat: retours 
d'experience et amorce de methodologie" (2006) 47 B)CP 236. 
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partnership (PPP) contract617 PPP contracts as defined in the ordinance are public works and 
services contracts-depending on their value, these may thus be covered by the EU directives. 
The concept of 'PPP', however, does not cover works or services concession agreements, which 
are regulated in separate pieces oflegislation and are procured using more flexible procedures 
than competitive dialogue.618 
The standard method of procurement of PPP contracts set out in this ordinance is the "dialogue". 
The process of the "dialogue" is nearly identical to competitive dialogue as presented in the eMP 
and the directive. However, there is one crucial difference. One of these is that a modification to 
the 2004 decree by a 2008 act has made the negotiated procedure with a notice freely available 
for the procurement of PPP contracts below a certain threshold (set by decree).619 The 
negotiated procedure is more flexible than competitive dialogue, meaning that competitive 
dialogue is unlikely to be used for these procedures in practice. 
5.2.3.5 Legislation: Conclusions 
As the above discussion has shown, the provisions in the directive that are specific to competitive 
dialogue have been implemented with very few changes in France. However, the provisions on 
competitive dialogue are complemented by specific 'French' additions; this is clearest from how 
France has approached the availability of competitive dialogue for contracts not covered by the 
directives. 
As a general rule, it can be noted that the French have made competitive dialogue available for 
contracts below the directives' thresholds. For contracts covered by the eMP and the ordinance 
on PPP, the procedure remains available only in the case of complexity. For contracts not 
617 Relevant provisions for local government (which are identical) are as of2009 found In the Local Authorities Code. See 
LOI nO 2009·179 du 17 fevrier 2009 pour l'acce\eration des programmes de construction et d'investissement publics et 
prives (1), which moved the provisions from the Ordonnance to the local authorities code 
619 See Loi nO 93-122 (n 575) and Ordonnance n° 2009-864 (n 598). 
619 The actual rules on this are in Article S of Decret nO 2009-243 du 2 mars 2009 re latif a la procedure de passation et a 
certaines modalites d'exckution des contrats de partenariat passes par I'Etat et ses etablissements publics ainsi que les 
personnes mentionnees aux articles 19 et 2S de l'ordonnance n° 2004-559 du 17 juin 2004. The Decret Indicates that the 
negotiated procedure can be used for below-EU-thresholds contracts as long as the primary goal of the contract Is to 
conceptualize and/or build a public work that meets needs the public authority has set out; If this Is not the goal the 
negotiated procedure becomes available below 133,000 Euros.. ' 
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covered by the CMP, the procedure is much more generally available-this may reflect on a 
general difference in approach to contracts historically covered by the CMP, and contracts that 
are regulated in France only because this is required by EU law. For the latter, there are no rules 
on competitive dialogue in place below the EU thresholds. 
5.2.4 Guidance 
5.2.4.1 MinEFE Website 
The central government, as discussed in section 5.1.7, offers public procurement advice through 
the Ministry of Economics, Industry and Employment website (MinEFE). There is significant 
information on this website, but little guidance that deals specifically with competitive dialogue. 
The website provides a walk-through map of every procedure that indicates in very broad lines 
what the steps involved in the procedure are; there is one available for competitive dialogue as 
well, though it does not add anything to the legislation.62o 
The 2009 Guide de Bonnes Pratiques, discussed in section 5.1.7, provides significantly more 
information. It has long been in development by the name of Projet du Manuel D'Application621 
and, for instance, contains a whole section titled "When and Why (to) Negotiate" (12.1). This 
section describes the usefulness of a dialogue phase in a procurement procedure and then also 
discusses competitive dialogue specifically in this context The section devoted to competitive I 
dialogue merely elaborates on the entire procedure in detail-as a walkthrough-but the 
discussion on negotiation is actually helpful as it assists the contracting authority in making 
choices about the types of procedure to use when several options are available-ie, when a 
contract'is clearly complex, but the negotiated procedure is also available. This goes beyond the 
scope of the EU law, which does not offer 'advice' to public authorities. 
620 Direction des Affairs Juridiques (DAI), "Dialogue competitif', see 
http://www.mjnefe.gouv,[r/djrections servjces/daj IconseiIs acheteurs/dialog,pdf (last accessed 1 November 2010) 
621 DAJ, ·Projet du Manuel d'Application" (2009), see ' 
http://www.mjnefe.gouv.fr/djrectjons services Idaj Imarcbes publics Iprojet-manuel-application-cmp.pdf (last accessed 
1 November 2010) 
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The PPP-specific website PPP Bercy, also run by the MinEFE, contains additional information. 
Firstly, the website links to a PPP roadmap that is significantly more detailed and helpful than the 
one provided by the central government622 It also provides additional pieces of guidance 
prepared by the Mission d'appui a la realisation des contrats de partenariat (MaPPP), a 
department within the MinEFE that deals with PPP contracts, on issues such as how to conclude 
the dialogue and what can be done if the dialogue fails to properly conclude with the anticipated 
winning tenderer,623 or what happens if the legal entity that wins the contract changes members 
at various parts of the procedure.624 These are both issues not covered by the directive, and the 
guidance here provides useful practical advice. 
Further, this website also hosts the Charte du Dialogue Competitif.625 This document, signed by 
(among others) the Minister of Economics and the Minister of the Local Territories, as well as 
approved by the Senate, sets out 10 principles that they recommend be followed during the 
process of a competitive dialogue procedure, The 10 principles are first listed and then 
elaborated on in the remainder of the chart; some ofthem are repetitions of legally binding 
commitments (such as an obligation to treat tenderers equally) but others are much more 
practical and relate to the setting up of proper project management for a competitive dialogue 
procedure, keeping the tenderers informed of the progress, setting up a proper risk management 
scheme, and finally, how to determine that a solution/candidate will not remain In the dialogue 
process. 
This Charte, albeit not legally binding, is being used in practice as a guiding line for competitive 
dialogue PPP projects and adds substantial practical guidance onto the rules contained In the 
directive. The materials found on PPP Bercy in general can be compared to the materials 
622 Mission d'appui a la realisation des contrats de partenariat (MaPPP). 'Phases du recours au contrats de partenariat" 
(2006) (see http://www.ppp.ben;ygouv.fr!complexjte/djagramme colloc djal0l:ye pdf, last accessed 1 November 2010) 
623 MaPPP. "La gestion de la fin du dialogue competitive" (2006) (see 
bttp:!/www.ppp.ben;y.goyy.Cr/ficbe fin djalogye,pdr.last accessed 1 November 2010) 
624 MaPPP, "Les contrats de partenariat et l'intangibilite des groupements candidats" (2006) (see 
bttp' !/www,ppp·berc;y.goyyfr/fic;he intangjbi1ite,pdf.last accessed 1 November 2010) 
625 MaPPP et aI, "Charte du Dialogue competitif' Oanuary 2007) (see 
http·!/www ppp berc;y goyy fr/c;harte dialogye c;ompetjtif pdf, last accessed 1 November 2010) 
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produced in the UK by, for instance, 4ps or BSF (see section 3.2.4), which also consider the 
practical side of using competitive dialogue. 
Lastly, PPP Berey contains a link to the Commission's Explanatory Note on Competitive 
Dialogue626, but rather than highlighting it or listing it first as most other central government 
procurement websites do, it just lists it in a list of other guidance pieces, included those 
mentioned above. 
5.2.4.2 Bercy Colloe 
There is no significant original material on competitive dialogue available on Berey Colloe; 
instead, it links to the PPP Bercy materials already discussed above. Generally, Berey Colloe's _ 
main selling point is its collection of jurisprudence but that is not relevant here, since, as we will 
see in section 5.2.5, there to date have been very few cases considering aspects of competitive 
dialogue specifically. 
5.2.4.3 Other 
One other organisation has issued substantial guidance on competitive dialogue; the Mouvement 
des Enterprises de France (French Confederation of Business Enterprises, MEDEF) has issued a 
38 page guide to the competitive dialogue process627. It does not aim for any legal clarification; 
instead, it recites all the applicable laws (in the directive and the CMP, as well as the ordinance on 
PPPs) and then elaborates on how practice should supplement these provisions. It is 
. consequently quite similar in setup to the 4ps guidance in the UK (see section 3.2.4) and the 
"Competitive Dialogue" guidance issued in the Netherlands (see section 4.2.6). It thus, for 
instance, indicates that confidentiality has to (by law) be maintained during the dialogue, but 
offers no particular recommendations on how to achieve this. This piece of guidance thus also 
. 
626 Explanatory Note on Competitive Dialogue (n 105). 
627 MEDEF, "Guide de Dialogue competitif' (2007) (see h®'lIarchjye medef.com/medjas/files/114468 FICHIER O.pdf .. 
last accessed 1 November 2010) . . , 
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operates next to EU law for the most part; it covers issues not addressed in the directive, such as 
best practice. 
5.2.4.4 Guidance: ConclusIons 
France, in general, has significantly more detailed legislation on the subject of public 
procurement than the UK does, and so one could assume that consequently they would have less 
guidance. Competitive dialogue proves that this is not at all the case; in many ways, the guidance 
produced is actually quite similar. Most of the French guidance, much like the UK guidance, 
focuses on elaborating on 'best practice' in running a competitive dialogue procedure. Very 
interestingly, the official government guidance actually attempts to explain what the benefits of 
negotiating are more generally-but this too is an elucidation of best practice, rather than law. 
What is most similar not only with regards to guidance issued on competitive dialogue in the UK, 
but also in the Netherlands, is that the French guidance also does not address the more difficult 
'grey areas' ofthe procedure. Consequently, the guidance produced at the national level exists 
almost separately from EU law altogether-the law itself is taken 'as is' without any real 
interpretation, and all elaboration or covers practice rather the law. Finally, it is noteworthy that 
the Commission's Explanatory Note is reproduced on the MinEFE website, but not commented on. 
5.2.5 Jurisprudence 
The French administrative courts have seen several cases dealing with competitive dialogue 
procedures to date, though only three specifically answered a question relating to the procedure 
used (rather than the procurement process as a whole). 
) 
Perhaps the most interesting case to date has been Societe Heli Union 628, in which out of9 
interested parties, seven were invited to participate in the dialogue; however, 5 did not respond 
to this invitation and so the contracting authority ended up only conducting the dialogue with 2 
628 TA Versailles 22 janvier 2008. Societe Heli Union. req n° 0800043. 
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parties. One of the non-selected parties claimed this was contrary to the ordinance on PPP, 
wherein a minimum of 3 tenderers had to be invited to participate in the dialogue unless no 
other suitable candidates were available. The Tribunal rejected this argument as the contracting 
authority itself had complied with the requirements of the ordinance (and, by proxy, those of the 
directive) by inviting more than 3 tenderers; the fact that they failed to respond to the invitations 
did not cause the contracting authority to be in violation of the ordinance. 
Additionally, in 2004629, the Conseil d'Etat considered whether or not, after the dialogue phase of 
the procedure, the contracting authority was entitled to elaborate on how it would apply its 
award criteria in light of the solutions discussed during the dialogue phase. The case in question 
concerned whether or not the Local Authorities Code was in violation of the directive by 
explicitly permitting the contracting authority to clarify its award criteria post-dialogue phase. 
The Conseil d'Etat concluded that the Code was not in violation, as long as the award criteria 
themselves and their weights were not altered from those announced in the contract notice. 
Most recently, the Conseil d'Etat determined in 2009 that there was no obligation in the Local 
Authority Code to justify the use of the competitive dialogue procedure in the contract notice, but 
merely to state that competitive dialogue was the chosen procedure.63o The case in question 
concerned a local authority PPP contract, but presumably has similar implications on the 
obligations of transparency in deciding to use competitive dialogue for central government PPP 
contracts. 
Beyond these three interesting jUdgments, there is still very little case law that specifically deals 
with competitive dialogue. Given the amount of case law dealt with by the French administrative 
courts, additional jurisprudence is likely to arrive in the next few years. 
, \ 
629 CE 29 octobre 2004, M. Sueur et autres, W269814-271119-2713S7-271362. 
630 CE 10 juin 2009, Societe Baudin Chateauneuf, N° 320037. 
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5.2.6 Conclusions 
As expected, most French regulation of competitive dialogue can be found in legislation. 
Procedurally, very little has been added to the procedural provisions contained in the directive-
regardless of whether we examine the CMP, contracts covered by the directives outside of the 
CMP, or (potentially covered by the directives) "contrats de partenariat", the rules in place are 
mostly identical to those in the directive. 
The interesting changes take place with regards to availability ofthe procedure below the 
directive's thresholds, where very different approaches are taken to contracts covered by the 
CMP, and the other French pieces oflegislation that contain provisions relating to competitive 
dialogue. Contracts covered by the CMP and by the ordinance on PPP can only ever use 
competitive dialogue for 'particularly complex contracts', and can use other (more flexible) 
/ 
procedures to award below-threshold contracts; however, contracts covered by the 2005 
ordinance on bodies not covered by the CMP do not have any rules on below-threshold 
procedures at all. There are no clear reasons for this distinction in approach. 
The influence of EU law is thus clear in the legislation, but more difficult to see in the guidance, 
which in fact primarily deals with the practical management of a competitive dialogue 
procedure-an issue not dealt with at the EU level. It can be observed that the Commission's 
own guidance has had no perceivable impact on French guidance or legislation produced, and so 
the 2004 directive is the main inspiration to the French approach on competitive dialogue; this is 
also the case for the limited jurisprudence decided at the national level, which relies exclusively 
on the legislative provisions of the CMP, directly copied from the directive. 
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5.3 Framework Agreements in France 
5.3.1 Introduction 
This section provides an overview of French law applicable to the conclusion of framework 
agreements; it first considers the approach taken for classic sector procurement prior to 2004, 
and then considers the effect ofthe 2004 directive's provisions on framework agreements. 
5.3.2 Framework Arrangements Prior to 2006 
5.3.2.1 eMP 1964 
The first mentions of a 'framework agreement' can be found in France as early on as in the 1930s, 
when purchases orders by the name of "marches a commandes" were made available. These 
purchase orders required setting a maximum and minimum, in either price or quantity, for a 
determined period of time. Marches a commandes were first made available in French legislation 
in 1956631, when they were opened up to central government, and, in 1962, extended (in part) to 
local authorities.632 
The first CMP, in 1964, r e i t e r ~ t e d d the availability of "marches a commandes" and also introduced 
a second type of framework arrangement, namely, "marches de clientele"; the latter was an . 
arrangement whereby the c o ~ t r a c t i n g g authority committed to buying all of a particular need (at a 
fixed price) from a given provider over a specified amount of time, but without specifying 
quantity.633 Both marches a commandes and marches de clientele were binding contracts; as 
such, contracting authorities could not step outside of their conduded framework agreements in 
order to obtain the same work/product/service from a different provider.634 
631 Decret n° 56·256 du 13 mars 1956 re)atif aux marches passes au nom de )'Etat, Titre 1, Chapitre 1, Article 8. 
632 Decret n° 62·473 du 13 avril 1962, Article 2. 
633 CMP 1964, Article 76 (origina)). 
634 A. de Laubadere, F. Moderne and P. De)vo)ve, Traite des contrats administratifs (2nd ed) (LGD/: Paris 1984), p: 189. 
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This regime was revised in the 1990s in order to achieve greater flexibility and an easier-to-use 
setup. In 1993, Article 76 of the CMP was rewritten entirely63S, and a new title of "marches a 
bons de commande" was used to describe both previous types of purchasing arrangements. 
Under "marches a bons de commande" arrangements, object and cost had to be specified, and a 
minimum and maximum of either quantity or value. The duration of these agreements was also 
explicitly limited to 3 years. 
Also introduced was a so-called contract of "marches a tranches conditionelles", which could be 
used for 'staged' contracts; a contracting authority would be bound to purchase the first 'stage' of 
a contract, but successive stages were optional and could be called off by the contracting 
authority one by one. Each stage had to represent a complete contract, and defined both the 
object (including quantity) of the contract and its price; it is in that sense distinguishable from 
"marches a bons de commande", which require one or the other. 
Even though the agreements specified above all met the basic requirements of a 'public 
contract' -they all reflect the variety of framework arrangements that result in binding 
commitment on the part of the contracting authority as well as the supplier-eventually, the 
Commission caught wind of a French circular that encouraged contracting authorities to 
conclude identical "marches a bons" agreements with various contractors without any 
commitments on the part of the purchaser to buy.636 As indicated in section 2.3.2, these types of 
non-binding framework agreements were frowned upon by the Commission as they did not 
result in 'public contracts' stricto sensu, and the Commission sent a complaint to the French 
government 
The complaint, as well as clarification from the CJ on the aggregation rules applicable to 
framework agreements637, led to a tightening of the availability of both types of'marches'.63B By 
1999, framework arrangements of either type could only be concluded if, for "economic, financial 
635 Decret nO 92-1025 du 17 septembre 1992; these provisions were extended to local government by Decret nO 93-733 (n 
610). introducing article 273 to the CMP). Both these decrets were both modified by Decret nO 99.331 du 29 avril1999 
636 Circulaire 5 aout 1993. ).0. 31 aoilt 1993, p.12243. • 
637 See Commission v Greece (n 143). 
638 This was made clear in DGCCRF Avis n° 91·134 du 4 mars 1991. (See P. de Gery, "A l'origine de l'accord-cadre : les 
marches ~ ~ bons de commande" (2007) 66 CP-ACCP 32. at 33.) 
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or technical reasons", the scope and purchase rate of the stated requirements could not be 
finalized in the contract notice. 639 
5.3.2.2 eMP 2001-2004 
The 2001 CMP changed little about the definitions of these types of purchasing agreements. 
Other than relabeling them as "marches fractionnees" (split contracts), the earlier provisions as 
well as restrictions transferred over to the 2001 CMP without changes. However, where since 
1993, multi-supplier frameworks were actively discouraged in France, the 2001 CMP made them 
available again (subject to similar restrictions as Single-supplier framework arrangements). 
As the provisions relating to "marches fractionnees" barely changed from the 2001 to the 2004 
CMP, these two texts will be discussed together.640 
5.3.2.2.1 Single Supplier Frameworks 
Single-supplier frameworks under the 2001/2004 CMP were still never readily available. 
However, it is still possible to differentiate between the 'standard' Single-supplier arrangement, 
the 'exceptional' kind, and "marches a tranches conditionelles." 
1. .. Standard, . 
.' 
Procedure 
Article 71.1 contained the rules for the 'standard' single-supplier framework. It required that the 
subject of the contract was clearly specified, and that the contract notice had to contain either 
price or the pricing mechanism. Lastly, the notice had to state a maximum and· minimum value or 
. quantity. ~ h e e minimum had to be purchased, or the contracting authority could be sued for 
639 Decret nO 99-331 du 29 avril 1999, modifying Articles 76 and 273 of the CMP . 
. 640 One obvious change is that the 2004 CMP puts "marches c\ bons de commande" in Article 71 and "marches c\ tranches 
.l. conditione lies· in Article 72. . 
damages; the maximum (which could not be more than four times the minimum) simultaneously 
served as a "threshold" calculator, determining which of the CMP's available contract award 
procedures could be used to award the framework.641 
Actual orders were placed without strict formalities; to call off, all that was required was a 
written request for a specified quantity for one of the products of services tendered In the 
original framework contract notice. 
Duration 
In 2001, the duration of "marches a bons de commande" was limited to three years; the 2004 
CMP amended this to four years, presumably in anticipation of the 2004 directive. In exceptional 
circumstances, the framework agreement could be awarded for a longer period of time. 
Exclusivity 
The 2001 CMP was silent on the subject of exclusivity of the single-supplier framework 
agreement The 2004 CMP, however. makes this issue clearer, by highlighting an exception to 
what appears to otherwise be the general rule: in the event where the contract concerned 
occasional needs only. the contracting authority could buy from other suppliers where the total 
value of any external-to-the-framework purchases amounted to less than 1% of the framework 
agreement, or 10,000 euros. It is unclear if this rule was introduced purely for the sake of slight 
flexibility for the contracting authority, or a different reason-such as potential small-medium 
enterprise involvement for low-value call-offs.642 Nonetheless, relying on this option to purchase 
outside of the framework occasionally did not negate the binding obligation to procure the 
minimum contract amount/value from the framework supplier.643 
641 The CMP operates additional thresholds to the EU, which determine when certain procedures become available' for 
details, see section 5.4.3.1. ' 
64Z Neither the 2004 CMP itself nor the Manual d'Application elaborate on the reasons for the exception. 
64] L. Folliot-Lalliot, "The French Approach to Regulating Frameworks under the New EC Directives· Chapter 4 in 
Arrowsmith 2009 (n 6), at p. 199. ' 
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2. Exceptional 
The non-standard single-supplier framework, found in Article 71.2, permitted the establishment 
of a framework agreement without a minimum or maximum in exceptional circumstances. A 
written report had to be provided on why this type of framework was needed, and the only 
possible justification presented by the CMP was that the nature of contract prevented the 
purchasing requirements or the rate at which call-offs would be placed from being determined. 
3. Marches a tranches conditionelles 
This variant to the "marches a bons de commande" was retained in both the 2001 and 2004 code; 
in the 2004 code, it received a separate article (72), but its provisions remained identical to what 
they had been prior to 2001. 
5.3.2.2.2 Multi-Supplier Frameworks 
As indicated in section 5.3.2.2.2, the 2001/2004 CMP reintroduced the availability of multi-
supplier framework agreements. However, the 2001/2004 CMP did not open up the use of multi-
supplier frameworks completely; instead, the legislators established several situations in which a 
multi-supplier framework could be used. As with single-supplier frameworks, a first 
requirement for use was that the object of the contract in question could not be specified in 
advance due to economic, financial or te'chnical reasons; beyond this, the conditions for use were 
very different 
, 1.' "Standard" 
The CMP only permitted multi-supplier frameworks in exceptional circumstances to begin with; , 
as such, referring to a 'standard' arrangement is misleading. What is meant by it in the following 
. . - . 
" discussion, however, is that the following'conditions' always had to be met 
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Multi-supplier frameworks became available in two circumstances: firstly, when a single supplier 
could not possibly meet all the contracting authority's needs, and secondly, when security of 
supply demanded having more than one supplier on hand. 
The contract in question would be divided up into lots, and the contract terms would stipulate in 
advance how the lots would be awarded; mini-competitions were thus not possible. The 
Instruction attached to the 2001 CMP indicated that it was possible to award the lots 
alphabetically or through a process of successive award rather than through a formal bid 
comparison procedure; this is similar to what the Commission proposes in its Explanatory 
Note.644 
Noteworthy also is the 2001 Instruction's position on parties admitted to this type of framework: 
it states that where security of supply is the cause for setting up a multi-supplier framework, it is 
not possible to add "(author's translation) 3,4 or 5 suppliers" to the framework where 2 
suppliers would guarantee security of supply.645 This is not retained in the 2004 Manuel 
d'Application, presumably because the 2004 directive requires at least 3 parties to a framework 
agreement 
2. Exceptional (General) 
The CMP 2001/2004 also foresaw the possibility of conduding a multi-supplier framework 
without a minimum or a maximum; however, the only available justifications for conduding such 
a framework were a) price volatility of the contract subject; b) rapid obsolescence of the contract 
subject; or c) urgency not attributable to the contracting authority. When one ofthese conditions 
was met, the contracting authority could conclude a framework agreement that required a mini-
competition before call-offs. The mini-competition would take place on the conditions of the 
original framework agreement; award was based on price, and where relevant, the speed of 
completion of the call-off. 
644 Explanatory Note on Framework Agreements (n 142). 
645 ZOOllnstruction, Article 72.4.4: • Ainsi. il ne saurait etre admis que la personne responsable du march/! prevoie 
d'attribuer simultanement Ie marche a 3, 4 ou 5 titulaires si la necessite de stkuriser les approvislonnements peut 
raisonnablement etre assuree par Z titulaires." 
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Because the conditions that made this procedure available implied a high degree of uncertainty 
on the part of the contracting authority, the CMP stipulated that the contracting authority was not 
obliged to place any orders under the framework, but conversely, the suppliers party to the 
framework were bound to supply if call-offs were placed. 
3. Exceptional (Scientific and Technological Research) 
The second 'exceptional' type of multi-supplier framework agreement that could be concluded 
under the 2001/2004 CMP related to purchases that could not be defined in advance because 
scientific or technological research was required to complete contract specifications. 
As with the 'general' exceptional case, these framework agreements required a mini-competition 
at the call-off stage and would then be awarded according to criteria stated in the contract 
documents. However, in three situations a mini-competition was not required: a) call-offs for 
goods or materials worth less than 1500 euros; b) where only one possible product can suffice 
for the authority's need, and it is only supplied by one supplier; or c) where previously obtained 
supplies need to be replaced and obtaining them from a different supplier would result in 
incompatibility or technical difficulties. 
5.3.2.2.3 Multi-User Frameworks • 
France has been a pioneer in the use of multi-user frameworks. The 2001 and 2004 CMP 
contained explicit provisions on the setting up of multi-user framework arrangements, under the. 
banner of either 'grouped' contracts, or a central purchasing agency. 
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1) Ad-Hoc Grouping 
France has a long tradition of government departments grouping together their purchases of 
routine items; Article 34.1 of the 1964 CMP already foresaw for this possibility, but it was 
elaborated on in the 2001/2004 CMP. 
Article 8 contained the rules on grouping. It first stipulated that grouped contracts were 
available to central government as well as to local authorities. To establish a grouped contract, 
Article 8 required a Signed agreement between all participating contracting authotities, and one 
nominated 'coordinator', who would be responsible for organizing and selecting the suppliers 
admitted to the agreement Each contracting authority party to the agreement would then have 
to agree to purchase its indicated needs from the selected suppliers. 
There were no restrictions set on joining one of these agreements, but, as Folliot-Lalliot notes, 
that may not have helped non-members who wanted to join, as an existing agreement did not 
have to be re-advertised.646 
2) Central Purchasing Agency 
The second type of multi-user framework permitted by the 2001/2004 CMP is the use ofa so-
called Central Purchasing Agency (CPA), which coordinates the purchases of unrelated 
government departments. The 2004 directive introduces proviSions on this subject, but prior to 
2004 they were not regulated at the EU level. 
The specific use of a CPA goes beyond the scope of the thesis and its availability here is merely 
highlighted here as an illustration of how the French legislation on repeat purchasing 
arrangements predates related EU initiatives; in fact, it is possible that the French approach to 
regulating repeat purchasing influenced the direction that the directives took in 2004.647 
646 Folliot-Lalliot (n 643). p. 203. 
647 Ibid. p. 204. 
215 
5.3.2.3 Pre-2006 Legislation: Summary 
By 2004, French regulation of framework arrangements was highly complex; rules on various 
types of agreements were found in different parts of the CMP, and the use of most types of 
framework arrangements was still heavily restricted. 
5.3.2.4 Guidance 
Most relevant guidance issued prior to the 2001-and-onward revisions of the CMPs has taken the 
form of circulars. Already mentioned above is the 1993 circular on marches /ractionnees which 
indicated, among other things, that multi-supplier agreements ought to be possible without 
binding commitments. This circular offered a clarification of legal issues, an elaboration on the 
" 
technical requirements needed for contract notices and specifications, as well as 
recommendations on when to employ certain types of frameworks. It is worth highlighting that 
this supplemented the detailed provisions in the 1964 CMP. 
The 1993 circular was replaced in 2000, after the use of framework agreements was severely 
restricted in 1999. The 2000 circular clarified legal obligations, set out administrative 
formalities, and indicated (by example) when certain types offrameworks could or should be 
concluded.64B 
From 2001 onwards in particular, there has also been significant guidance on "marches a bons de 
commande" issued in the explanatory memoranda accompanying the CMPs. The Instruction with 
the 2001 CMP offers clarifications that are not apparent from the legislation itself; such as, that 
when concluding a multi-supplier framework for reasons of security of supply, this had to be 
very strictly interpreted and could not just lead to a generic multi-supplier framework with many 
suppliers. The 2001 Instruction also indicated when it might be useful to conclude "marches a 
tranches conditionelles", or a combination of a "marche a bons de commande" and a "marche a 




tranche conditionelle". It thus ventured beyond explaining the law and instead offered general 
guidance. 
The 2004 Manuel d'Application, issued with the 2004 CMP, operated on a question-answer basis. 
In these rhetorical questions, it highlighted that the maximum value/quantity set for the 
framework agreement would determine its 'value' for the purposes of threshold calculation, 
which was left unstated in the legislation itself. It also emphasized the implicit exclusivity to 
framework agreements unless one of the exceptions apply, which is not inherently clear from the 
2004 CMP's wording. 
In short, the role of guidance on the subject of framework agreements prior to 2006 cannot be 
underestimated; the guidance, in many ways, set out the French legal requirements in a more 
transparent and comprehensible manner than the legislation itself does. 
5.3.2.5 Jurisprudence 
There is little case law on "marches (a bons) de commande" that actually developed the law; the 
most common dispute before the courts concerned the duration of framework agreements-Ie, 
when they could be concluded for longer than the 3-4 years permitted by the CMPs-and/or the 
degree of specificity needed in the subject of the framework agreement 
The latter issue has produced some interesting case law. A 2004 case clearly demonstrates that 
recourse to "marches a bons de commande" under the old regime was, in fact, very limited, by 
annulling a contract that could have been specified enough to use a regular procedure for 
award.649 The case in question concerned a 1-year framework arrangement set up for pavement 
repair works in specific portions of the city; the municipality wanted to use a framework 
agreement so that they could spread out the orders for repair, but the Court concluded this was 
not permissible under the CMP. Conversely, a 2006 judgment concluded that a contracting 
649 eM Bordeaux 27 avril 2004, Cne de Saint-Denis-de-Ia-Reunion, req. nO 00BX01639; see also CAA Bordeaux 24 fevrier 
2005, Region de la Reunion, ~ e q . . n° ~ 0 ~ X 0 1 3 6 1 , , and CAA Marseille 13 mai 2005, SIVOM c/ pre!et du Gard, req. nO 
01MAOZ69Z and CM Versailles 11 JUlllet 2006, Dpt de le'Esson c/ pre!et de L'Esson. req. n° 04VEOO 124. 
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authority had had no right to conclude an 'exceptional' framework agreement The contract in 
question concerned a one-year (but extendable) framework arrangement to buy advertising 
space in national and regional media. Given this limited duration, the court concluded that given 
the object of the contract, the authority was capable of setting a minimum and maximum in 
quantity and so had no legal right to conclude an 'exceptional' framework agreement.650 
Generally, however, the administrative courts did not evolve the use of framework arrangements 
in the same way that they have other areas of administrative law. One can suggest that the 
repeat case law on the subject of 'improper use of framework agreements' is a problem of 
France's own making; by limiting the availability of framework agreements severely, numerous 
disputes arose that could have been avoided had framework agreements been made more 
generally available. 
5.3.2.6 Prior to 2006: Conclusions 
The regime in 2004 was very complicated; not only because there was substantial and frequently 
amended legislation, but especially because the legislation itself was not comprehensible without 
additional guidance. The greatest problem, demonstrated by the case law, stemmed from the 
restrictions on the use of framework agreements; by stating that they could only be concluded 
where there was an inability to specify the contracting authority's needs in advance, framework 
arrangements could not be used to set up regular purchasing for known needs that simply were 
not all needed at once. 
650 eAA Versailles 4 avril 2006. Departement de ['Esson c/ prefet de I'Esson, req. N° 04VE00648. 
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5.3.3 Framework Agreements Since 2006 
5.3.3.1 Legislation 
5.3.3.1.1 eMP 2006 & Ordonnance 2005-649 
With the arrival of the 2004 directives, France repealed its legislation on "marches a bons de 
commande" and chose to adopt the directive's provisions. However, as the non-binding 
framework agreements permitted by the 2004 directive would not normally be considered 
'public contracts' in France, the CMP 2006 distinguishes between "frameworks" on the one hand 
and "public contracts" on the other. It has been argued that by including 'frameworks' as a type 
of contract rather than a procedure to award public contracts, the French legislator has 
essentially created a new type of administrative law contract by implementing the directive.651 
Consequently, the 2006 CMP splits the directive's provisions on "framework agreements" into 
two separate types of contracts. Framework agreements that set all the terms and conditions in 
the original agreement and do not require a competition phase are known as "marches as bons 
de commande" (found in Article 77); those that require a second phase of either tendering or 
clarification of the particular call-off, on the other hand, are known as accords-cadre, or actual 
framework agreements (found in Article 7 6). The Conseil d'Etat has made clear that this 
definitional difference will have no practical consequences at the EU level, by noting that 
"(author's translation) marches a bons de commande in CMP terms are framework agreements in 
the directive's terms."652 
It should be noted here that the provisions that will be discussed below have been copied directly 
into Ordonnance 2005-649 (containing the rules for public bodies covered by the directives but 
not the CMP); these 'public bodies' are also free to conclude framework-type arrangements. 
However, under the CMP framework arrangements have been made available regardless of 
. 651 See Folliot-Lalliot (n 643), Section 4:20. 
652 CE 8 aout 2008, Cne de Nanterre, req. n° 309136. 
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contract value, albeit with identical rules applicable to contracts that fall above the EU thresholds 
and contracts that fall below the EU thresholds653; in the ordinance, there are no specific rules on 
framework agreements for contracts below the EU thresholds, as there are generally no rules on 
contracts below the thresholds in this piece oflegislation (see section 5.2.3.4.1). 
5.3.3.1.2 Marches a bons de commande in 2906 
The provisions on "marches a bons de commande" have been simplified significantly in the 2006 
CMP. Both single-supplier and multi-supplier framework agreements (of all types) are now 
freely available to all contracting authorities. 
Article 76 indicates very clearly that a "marche a bons de commande" does not result in a second 
stage of competition, and requires all specifications (other than quantity needed) to be set out in 
advance. Duration of "marches a bons de commande" is limited to four years, as per the 
directive, and since December 200S-codifying recent French case law on the subject654-they 
can be concluded with a minimum or a maximum in quantity or value. 
It is worth highlighting at this stage that these changes made by France were not required. As 
discussed in section 2.3.4.1, framework agreements may be introduced, meaning that the 
directive's provisions were optional and in any event can be greatly altered in terms of 
restrictions of use. Nothing in the 2004 directive precluded France from keeping framework 
, 'arrangements' available only in very limited circumstances, but France clearly opted to break 
with its traditional method of regulating framework purchasing. 
Two possible reasons for these changes have been suggested: the first being the general goal in 
France, discussed in section 5.1.5 and 5.1.6, to simplify its national procurement laws and to 
653 See Article 76(1} of the 2006 CMP, which states: 'Les accords-cadres definis A I'artic\e 1er sont passes selon les 
procedures et dans les conditions prevues par Ie present code.' [Author's translation: "Framework agreements, defined in 
Article 1, will be concluded using the procedures and in the conditions established in the current Act."J Framework 
agreements can be awarded using all procedures available in the CMP, and can therefore be concluded regardless of their 
value (albeit with different procedures at different value thresholds - see section 5.4.3 for details on the French system of 
thresholds). 
654 CE 24 octobre 2008, Union des Groupements d'Achats Publics, req. nO 314499; see also CE 24 octobre 2008, -
Communaute d'agglomeration de ['Artois, req. n° 313600, where the CE determined that if neither maximum or minimum 
Is stated, the contracting authority has to put an estimate or method of estimation in the contract documents. " 
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introduce greater flexibility to the contracting authority. It was noted in section 5.1.6 that the 
2001 and 2004 reforms of the CMP neither simplified nor increased flexibility to a great extent, 
and it has been suggested that the removal of restrictions on repeat purchasing arrangements 
was introduced to meet these demands for greater flexibility.6SS A second potential reason for 
the simplification is interesting for our purposes, as it has been argued that the reason that the 
EU directives' provisions on framework agreements have been worked into the French CMP in 
such a literal manner is to close the gap between EU regulation of procurement and the French 
regulation ofprocurement656 France's history of Commission complaints was discussed in 
section 5.1 as well, and it is possible that the directive was followed so closely in 2006 in an 
attempt to limit the risk of further complaints following on from these latest changes to the CMP. 
However, this is purely speculative-the only stated reasons issued by the French government 
relate to the greater flexibility offered by the directive's provisions on framework agreements. 
Despite these significant changes to the rules applicable to "marches a bons de commande", some 
other traditional French rules have been retained; for instance, Article 76.11 still permits a 
contracting authority to deviate from the exclusivity requirement of a "marche a bons de 
commande" as long as this is done for a minor, separate portion of the contract 
5.3.3.1.3 Marches a tranches conditionelles in 2006 
This provision has remained wholly unchanged since 2004, and is still found in Article 72: it is 
thus not linked to the "framework agreements" provisions of the CMP and appears to now be 
treated as a different type of 'special purchasing method'. 
655 As was suggested by the Director of Legal Affairs (DAI) of MinE FE; see J-M. Binot, "Jerome Grand d'Esnon: L'accord-
cadre est un outil intelligent qui va ~ e p o n d r e e a la critique p e r ~ a n e n t e e de la lenteur de la commande public", 2 July 2005, 
available at http://www achatpubhc cpm: see also A. Fraisse, Accords-Cadres: l'introduction d'un dispositif soup Ie et 
reactif dans notre system d'achat?", Master Thesis, Universite Lumiere Lyon 2, 2006 (see http;JIdocsril'nc!'S1}o-
lyon f r / R e s s o u r c e s / D o c u m e n t s / E t u d i a n t s / M e m o j r e s / C , y b e r d o c s / M a s t e r S / M S P C P l f r a i s s ; ; i ; d i i f r a j ; ; ; ~ ; d t l a s t t
accessed 1 November 2010). '. 
656 Fraisse, ibid; see also de Gery (n 638), p. 32, w h e ~ e e he highlights that the Introduction of framework agreements in the 
classiC sectors shows at last a compromise between the EU and France on repeat purchasing In the classic sectors. 
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5.3.3.1.4 Accords-Cadre in 2006 
The CMP 2006 implements the directive's on framework agreements stricto sensu nearly 
verbatim, but adds a few particular things that help delineate the award process. 
First of all, in describing the need for a second stage of award, the CMP indicates that call-offs can 
be scheduled either to take place at a time of need, or at a scheduled, regular interval. The 
directive does not appear to preclude either of these choices but also does not make them 
explicit 
This added possibility, however, leads to a set of additional instructions with regard to 
organizing the mini-competition for call-offs; the CMP specifies that where a framework 
agreement is divided into lots, and a call-off takes place at a time of need, only those suppliers 
assigned to the p ~ r t i c u l a r r lots may be included in a call-off. However, where the call-off is a 
regular call-off, all lots have to be automatically included. The directive is silent on the issue of 
which framework suppliers to invite to the call-off, and the French CMP thus offers one possible 
approach to take. 
Also of interest is Article 76.VI, which states that "(author's translation) Contracts awarded on 
the basis of a framework agreement may be marches a bons de commande. They are then 
awarded in accordance with the rules provided by this article and executed according to the rules 
laid down by Art. 77." This provision has been interpreted as permitting "marches a bons de 
commande" to be concluded within the context of a framework, by approaching the framework 
provider/providers and setting up a set purchase order. This may particularly be interesting for 
large purchasing 'groups' who have periodiC regular purchases without necessarily being able to 
set up all the terms for their purchase in advance.651 
657 H. Pongerard-Payet & T. Bangui, "La procedure de I'accord-cadre : un nouvel instrument du droit de la commande 
puhliqueH (2007) AJDA 1055, p. 1058. 
222 
Generally, however, the French legislation has left the directive's provisions on framework 
agreements intact The duration restrictions are also 4 years here, with the directive's possibility 
for extensions in justified cases copied out verbatim, and the minimum of 3 participants to the 
framework agreement is also stated clearly in Article 76. 
5.3.3.1.5 Grouped Contracts 
The provisions on grouped contracts remain unchanged since 2004, with the exception that all 
relevant provisions now reflect the distinction between "marches" and on the one hand and 
"accords-cadre" on the other, thus indicating a permisSiveness of both multi-user framework 
"contracts" and framework "agreements". 
5.3.3.1.6 Legislation: Conclusions 
Even though the French provisions on framework purchasing are not fully identical to those in 
the EU directive, they resemble the directive's provisions far more than they do the provisions in 
the 2001 and 2004 CMP. The EU rules appear to thus have influenced the 2006 French rules 
significantly and directly, resulting in a Simplified and freely-available mechanism for framework 
purchasing in France. 
5.3.3.2 Guidance 
Since 2006, new French guidance has been issued on accords-cadre; one can assume that 
"marches a bons de commande" are not generally covered in detail because they are not 
technically'new'. 
The Manuel d'Application to the CMP 2006658 contained information on framework purchasing, 
albeit without significant changes from what was included in the 2004 Manuel. One specific 
addition, however, was that the provisions on accords-cadre concluded with a list of 'advantages' 
658 2006 Manuel, question 6.2.2. 
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that can be found in accords-cadre, citing such things as quick reactivity to problem situations 
such as shortages, the ability to not cite a minimum and maximum, and better being able to take 
advantage of technological advancements in the products that are being purchased on a repeat 
basis. 
The 2009 Guide de Bonnes Pratiques that has replaced the 2006 Manuel no longer indicates what 
the potential advantages of framework agreements are, but does comment on the use of 
framework agreements in other ways: firstly, it notes that when framework agreements are 
awarded for contracts not covered by the directives, it is possible to negotiate directly with 
framework members prior to organizing a mini-competition. Providing this is done in a manner 
that respects equal treatment and transparency, there are no rules in the TFEU that prohibit a 
negotiation phase-this is consequently a helpful suggestion. 
Added to this is the recently revised Hfiche" on accords-cadre published by the MinEFE659. It aims 
to collate the Commission's Explanatory Note on Framework Agreements, the provisions of Article 
76 CMP, and recent jurisprudence from France itself into one helpful walkthrough of the 
procedure. It first states that a framework agreement stricto sensu is still a contract with binding 
obligations.66o The "fiche" also deals with issues such as which award procedure to use when 
awarding a framework agreement, which is-because of the system of additional thresholds used 
in France, to be discussed in section 5.4.3-a very complex issue in France. Lastly, it stresses 
again the potential advantages of combining a "marche a bons de commande" with an "accord-
cadre", by noting that this combines the "(author's translation) flexibility of the framework 
agreement with the reactivity of the marche a bons de commande".661 
One can imagine that the fiche will be regularly revised in the coming years. as it attempts to 
follow all jurisprudence that influences the interpretation of the Article 76 provisions. 
659 DAI. "Les Accords Cadres· (September 2010) (see 
http://www,economie,gouyJr/directions services/daj Iconseils acheteurs/accords-cadres,pdt last accessed 1 November 
2010): after being originally provided in 2006 alongside the CMP. it was revised in both July Z009 and September 2010. 
albeit with minimal changes in each instance. 
660 It does not address how these binding obligations would manifest themselves in the case of multi-supplier 
frameworks. however; pOSSibly the intended interpretation is that a framework agreement results in a binding obligation 
to purchase the requirement. but not necessarily from any particular supplier. 
661 "Un tel dispositifpermet de conjuguer la souplesse propre a I'accord-cadre et la reactivite permise par Ie marcM a 
bons de commande: 
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5.3.3.3 Jurisprudence 
While there has not been a significant amount of case law in the administrative courts developing 
the new 2006 rules on framework agreements, two important cases on the 2006 CMP's 
provisions on framework purchasing have been decided by the ConseH d'Etat 
The ConseH d'Etat has first of all pronounced that both "marches a bons de commande" and 
" a c c o r d s - c a d r ~ " " are framework agreements for European purposes.662 More importantly, 
however, it has dealt specifically with the last lingering restrictions on availability of the 
provisions on "marches a bons de commande", by concluding that they did not need a minimum 
and a maximum in quantity or value, but either a minimum or a maximum would suffice.663 
Interestingly, in amending the legislation in light of the 2008 global recession, the French 
legislator opted to not only apply this judgment to Hmarches a bons de commande" but also to 
"accords-cadre". 
5.3.3.4 Post-2006 Regulation: Conclusions 
France has seen significant changes in its legislation and guidance on framework agreements 
since the 1990s. Each revision ofthe CMP has, prior to 2006, brought with It additional 
complications in this area, but in 2006, France scrapped all pre-existing rules and Implemented 
those in the directive instead. 
The new legislative package has reduced the need for guidance-this is particularly true when 
contrasted with the 2001 Instruction attached to the 2001 CMP-and may have increased the 
importance of case law. As we saw, the Conseil d'Etat has already had to interpret the provisions 
of the CMP, expanding on them where necessary. 
662 Cne de Nanterre (n 652). 
663 Union des Groupements d'Achats Publics (n 654). 
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The 2006 CMP has brought about a significant change in approach in the legislation of framework 
arrangements-from very restrictive and limited, to very flexible and open. The impact of the 
directives on the 2006 CMP in this area is highly evident Furthermore, unlike the other 
examined guidance (see sections 5.2 and 5.4), the French national guidance piece on framework 
agreements directly refer to the Commission's Explanatory Note. EU law has thus had 
significance influence on the regulation of French framework agreements post-2006. 
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5.4 The General Principles of Equal Treatment and Transparency In France 
5.4.1 Introduction 
This section will examine how the general principles of equal treatment and transparency have 
been approached in French procurement regulation. We will first examine how the development 
of the general principles under the directive has affected French regulation of contracts covered 
by the directives (section 5.4.2); following this, we will examine how the French regulator has 
dealt with the more uncertain obligations set out by CJ case law for contracts outside of the 
directives (section 5.4.3). 
5.4.2 Contracts Covered by the Directives 
5.4.2.1 Legislation 
5.4.2.1.1 CMP 1964 Prior to 1992 
As discussed in section 5.1, France has a long-standing history of extensive legislative regulation 
of public procurement Direct references to the principles of equal treatment and transparency 
were not found in the 1964 CMP, but there were already substantial rules requiring advertising: 
competition was pursued through a general obligation to publiclse public contract notices in the 
Bulletin Officiel des annonces des marches publics.664 It is possible that there is a connection 
between a desire for transparency in the rules and this advertising requirement-however, it is 
more likely that value for money motivated these advertising rules. 
There were also no direct references to the notion of ' equal treatment' in the 1964 CMP; 
however, very interestingly, there does appear to have been a perceived need for 'fairness' that 
led to the inclusion of at least one rule that would be covered by the equal treatment of tenderers 
principles under EU law. The provisions on the appel d'offres procedure contained a specific 
664 eMP 1964, Article 38. 
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paragraph that stated that only compliant tenders received by the deadline stipulated by the 
contracting authority would be opened. By 2001, before the eMP 1964 was replaced by the eMP 
2001, this concept had been expanded; the "appel d'offres" procedure had been split up into two 
separate procedures (an "open" version and a "restricted" version) and in both, the same 
restriction on participation was included. 
It bears stressing that this principle predates EU legislation on public procurement by at least a 
decade, and direct references to equal treatment in case law or legislation by another 20 years. 
5.4.2.1.2 Post-1992 Developments in the CMP 1964 
By 1992, references to a general principle of equal treatment surfaced in the eMP 1964. Article 
47 of the eMP 1964 was modified in 1992, to state that barring the existence of some reserved 
contracts, "(author's translation) [all tenderers] will benefit from equal treatment in the 
consideration of their requests to participate or tenders."665 
The 1992 changes occurred as part of one of the first efforts to simplify the eMP; however, the 
decree that prompted the simplification was not accompanied by further guidance and so it is 
unclear what prompted the inclusion of this new Article 47.666 What can be noted is that in 1992, 
Storebaelt had not yet been decided, so in any event it cannot have been a reaction to CJ 
procurement jurisprudence. 
By 2001, the requirements for publicity had also been expanded on. In the 1980s, changes were 
, introduced to permit advertising in journals other than the Bulletin Officiel where relevant; and 
by 1988, thresholds were introduced to determine the degree of publicity required. These 
changes were not prompted by provisions in the 1988 directives (which were not included in the 
eMP until 1989667) and were not linked to any general principle of'transparency'. 
665 CMP 1964, Art. 47: ... :.Sous reserve des dispositions des articles 61 a 73, ils beneticient d'une egalite de traitement 
dans l'examen de leurs candidatures ou de leurs offres." 
666 Decret n092·1310 du 15 decembre 1992. 
667 Article 380, Introduced by Decret n089·236 du 17 avril 1989. 
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The word 'transparency' was not found in the 1964 CMP; not even when in 1992, Article 38 was 
amended to stipulate what information had to be contained in a contract notice, in detail, and 
also indicated (by reference to Article 104, where the negotiated procedure without a notice was 
found) which contracts did not have to be publicized. This, again, appears to again be a solely 
French initiative to, in this case, streamline the way in which procurement contracts were 
advertised. 
By 2001, the French legislator appeared to be pursuing similar objectives to those the CJ would 
pursue in its jurisprudence in the 1990s: transparent and non-discriminatory public 
procurement However, there are no signs that these French legislative developments were 
inspired by concurrent EU developments. 
5.4.2.1.3 eMP 2001 & 2004 
From 2001 onwards, we see an expansion on earlier principles that reflect upon equal treatment 
and transparency in the CMP. 
5.4.2.1.3.1 Article 1, Paragraph 2: the Principles 
The 2001 CMP for the first time refers directly to both equal treatment and transparency. One 
might speculate that French law influenced EU law here, as Article 1(2) states that: "(author's 
translation) public procurement contracts will respect the principles of ... equal treatment of 
tenderers and transparency ofprocedures."668 (Emphasis added). This is very close to the wording 
of Article 2 in the 2004 directive, but predates it by several years. . 
The 2001 Instruction indicates that (according to the French legislator) these principles do not 
have an EU origin at all. Instead, the Instruction explains that 'equal treatment' is a general 
668 eM? 2001. Article 1. para 2..: "Les marches publics respectent les principes d ' ~ g a l i t ~ ~ de traitement des candidats et de 
transparence des p r o c ~ d u r e s . .
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principle of law in France, and has constitutional value669; it also highlights that it is of particular 
importance in ensuring competitive public procurement, and has been so historically, by citing a 
Conseil d'Etat case of 1939.670 It continues to say that 'equal treatment' is a principle included in 
the CMP to set 'ground rules' that will lead to greater transparency and competition, and finally 
observes that: "(author's translation) equal treatment is equivalent to the non-discrimination 
principle in EU law."671 In the eyes of the 2001 legislator, then, the equal treatment principle is of 
French origins, and merely has an equivalent at the EU level. 
On the subject of transparency, the Instruction explains that the purpose of transparency-is to 
ensure that all contracts are publicized and all procurement procedures used are fair/impartial. . 
Following this, the Instruction comments on Telaustria: "(author's translation) Regarding in 
particular procurements exceeding the [EU] thresholds, the principle of transparency has been 
quoted in [Telaustria], which stated that the principle of non-discrimination 'requires, 
specifically, an obligation of transparency that permits the contracting authority to ensure that 
the [non-discrimination] principle is respected."672 Much like in the Netherlands (several years 
later, see section 4.4.3.1), explanatory materials attached to the CMP thus appear to have· 
interpreted Telaustria of having consequences primarily for contracts above the EU thresholds. 
The 2004 Manuel, on the other hand, explains Article.1(2) of the 2004 CMP as meaning that 
regardless a/their value, public procurement contracts are subject to an equal treatment and 
transparency obligation. In section 8.1, which considers why publicity is necessary, the Manuel 
. notes that 'publicity' is a fundamental principle of public procurement Only in discussing how 
publicity can be satisfied is the notion of transparency mentioned: "(author's translation) one 
must consider that a contract was awarded in conditions that satisfy the transparency 
669 This is a French term relating to the hierarchy of general principles and norms; when they are of constitutional value, 
they cannot be overruled by other norms (such as those found In legislation). 
670 CE 25 juillet 1939, Dame veuve Gautron, Recueil Lebon p. 529 .. 
671 "L'egalite trouve des equivalences en droit communautaire dans Ie principe de non-discrimination", on p. 14. 
672 "S'agissant en particulier des marches d'un montant superieur aux seuils communautaires, ce principe de 
transparence des procedures a ete pose dans I'arret de la Cour de justice des communautes europeennes du 7 dtkembre 
2000 (Telaustria Verlags GmbH), qui dispose que Ie principe de non-discrimination « implique, notamment, une 
obligation de transparence qui pennet au pouvoir adjudicateur de s'assurer que ledit principe est r e s p ~ c t e e » .• , on page 15. 
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requirement when the advertising method used actually permitted interested bidders to be 
informed and led to a substantial variety of offers, thus ensuring genuine competition."673 
A similar approach is taken to equal treatment, which is solely referenced with regards to section 
9.1, which asks "(author'S translation) why use competitive tendering procedures?"674 Here, all 
stated general principles are quoted, but only to indicate that competitive tendering is how they 
are all satisfied. 
The 2001/2004 CMP's references to the principles themselves are very general and bear a 
resemblance to their later enunciation in the directive, but in the case of equal treatment-as 
made clear by the 200 l1nstruction in particular-are not related to it Regarding transparency, 
most of the discussion on publicity relates to where covered contracts have to be advertised, but 
does not consider the consequences of a transparency requirement more generally. 
5.4.2.1.3.2 Transparency Requirements in 2001/2004 
To summarize the 2001 changes, aside from introducing several options made available through 
the directives (such as the PIN notice), the publicity requirements have not been further 
elaborated on than they were prior to 2001. The 2001 CMP also does not respond to the effect 
transparency may have on, for instance, the publication of selection or award criteria, or 
providing timely information to bidders. There are thus no great additions In the field of 
transparency that indicate a great influence of such cases such as Universale-Bau In either 2001 
or 2004. 
5.4.2.1.3.3 Equal Treatment 
On equal treatment, on the other hand, there are some minor additions to the eMP. It was 
already noted that late tenders in the open and restricted procedure could not be opened In the 
673 ·On do it c o ~ s i d e r e r r qu'un m a r c ~ e e ,a ete , ~ a s s e e dans des conditions,satisfaisantes au regard de I'exigence de 
transparence siles moyens de pubhclte utlhses ont reellement permls aux prestataires potentiels d ' ~ t r e e Informes et ont 
abouti a u n e , d i v e r ~ i t e e ~ ' o f f r e s s s ~ f f i s a n t e e pour garantir une vraie mise en concurrence:, at question 8,1. 
614 ·PourquOi faut-II falre une mise en concurrence?", at question 9,1. .• . 
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1964 CMP; this was retained in 2001, and expanded upon, in that late requests to participate in 
restricted procedures also could not be considered.675 Furthermore, some additional changes 
were made to the provisions on award of contract and choice of tenderer; Article 53(U) in 2001 
stated that where a tenderer cannot provide supporting documentation (such as certificates 
proving compliance with social and fiscal obligations) before a set deadline, they (and their bid) 
will be rejected. These changes held over in 2004 as well, and are the only concrete example of 
the French advancing on equal treatment of tenderers in a way not specifically required by the 
directive. 
However, as noted, the general idea that late submissions should be rejected has existed since 
1964, so it cannot be concluded that CJ case law here had any effect on the French legislation; if 
anything, it is worth considering if prohibitions such as these may eventually make their way into 
the directives. 
5.4.2.1.4 eMP 2006 & Ordonnance 2005-649 
The current CMP has, as has been noted in section 5.1.6, barely been changed from previous 
drafts in most areas, and in fact has mostly served to correctly implement the EU directives. 
Like the 2001 and 2004 codes, the CMP 2006 restates the general principles of equal treatment 
and transparency; they are found unchanged in Article 2. 
Regarding equal treatment, where the CMP in past versions went beyond the directives' 
requirements, it continues to do so now. Provisions on disqualifying tenderers who submit 
supportive documentation past a given deadline (Article 46) and the provisions on rejecting late 
tenders and requests to participate are retained. The latter have now been expanded to also 
. apply to the'negotiated procedure and competitive dialogue.676 
,675 Article 62 ofCMP 2001. , 
676 Open procedure: Art. 58; Restricted procedure, requests to participate: Art. 61; tenders: Art. 63; Negotiated procedure, ' 
requests to participate: Art. 65; tenders, Art. 66. Competitive Dialogue: Art. 67. '. 
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Article 52 deals with missing and incomplete information on candidates requesting to participate, 
and states that where a contracting authority notes that supporting evidence about the 
candidates is missing, the tenderers in question can be contacted and granted an additional 10 
day delay during which to complete their request to participate. The second sentence of Article 
52 then adds that all other candidates must also be notified and given an option to "complete" 
their requests. The latter principle in particular shows an application on the equal treatment 
principle in a manner that the CJ has not dealt with as of yet 
The 2005 ordinance that applies the directive to 'public bodies' not covered by the CMP contains 
no additional rules; it recites directive's general principles (Article 6), and copies the rule on the 
disqualifying tenderers who submit supporting documentation after a deadline (Article 18 of the 
decree671 on 'public body' procurement procedures). However, there is no mention of having to 
reject bids/requests to participate if received after deadlines. It is unclear why this is included in 
the CMP and not in the ordinance. 
In general, current French legislation again seems to be mostly non-influenced by EU 
developments. There has been more CJ case law in recent years to indicate that the equal 
treatment provision in particular comes with some requirements that could be legislated on-for 
instance, treatment of the incumbent bidder. The French CMP and 200S ordinance do not 
include any such additions. Instead, expansion of the existing ideas seems to be the primary sign 
of change-such as expanding the late request/tender ban to all other procedures, in the case of 
the CMP 2006. 
5.4.2.2 Guidance 
The contents of the 20011nstruction and the 2004 Manuel were already discussed in section 
5.4.2.1.3.1 above. The 2006 Manuel contains no relevant changes from the 2004 Manuel, and 
thus also provides limited guidance. 
677 . D e ~ r e t t nO 2005· ~ ~742 du 3? d ~ c e m b r e e ~ 0 0 5 5 fixant les ~ e g l e s s applicables aux marches passes par les pouYoirs 
a d J u ~ l c a t e u r s s m e n t I o n n e ~ ~ a I artIcle ~ ~ de 1 o r d o n n a n ~ e e n 2005·649 du 6 juln 2005 relative aux marcMs passes par 
certames personnes pubhques ou pnvees non soumlses au code des marcMs publics. 
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Generally, the guidance offers little practical advice, but does contain an interesting discussion on 
the origins of the general principles. We saw that the 2001 Instruction explained that equal 
treatment and transparency were principles originating from French constitutional values, rather 
than EU law. The 2009 Guide de Bonnes Pratiques, however, offers a different explanation. 
Firstly, it states that the principles in Article 1 of the CMP are derived/rom EU law; and that 
French law knows 'comparable' principles. Why this has been rephrased so as to emphasize the 
EU-origins of the general principles is not clear. The 2009 Guide, however, again stresses 
Telaustria in discussing the EU source of the general principles, which makes it unclear if the 
French legislator is aware of the consequences the general principles may have under the 
directives. 
More generally, it can be noted that none of the guidance documents issued alongside the CMPs 
offer substantial advice on how the general principles affect contracts covered by the directives. 
To illustrate, the 2001 Instruction and the 2004 Manuel are both silent on the reason for rejecting 
late tenders/requests to participate; they merely note that they cannot be opened by the 
committee that assesses the bids.678 
Furthermore, none of the French government procurement websites offer guidance pieces on 
how equal treatment and transparency, or the C}'s case law thereon, affect contracts covered by 
the directives. The role of guidance in shaping practice in this area is thus very limited. 
5.4.2.3 Jurisprudence 
Most case law of the past two decades reflects primarily on requirements set out by the equal 
treatment principle; any cases found on the transparency principle and the publicity requirement 
exclusively tend to follow from 2000 onwards, and bear a strong resemblance to Telaustria by 
explicit references to a complete failure to advertise. Such cases will be discussed in section 
5.4.3.3. 
678 See, for instance, 200 1 Instruction, Article 59. 
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Equal treatment has been, prior to 2009, treated as "French" concept rather than an EU concept 
There is significant case law that cites 'equal treatment' as a reason for contract nUllity or 
annulations,679 and the following discussion will thus present a summary of the courts' general 
approach to the general principles, rather than a complete overview. 
The French courts have first of all used the general principle of equal treatment to decide cases in 
which a clear violation of the substantive rules in the directives has taken place. We see this in 
the 1980s680, the 1990s681, and more recent years. For example, 2005 saw a case where a 
contracting authority offered an advantage in qualification assessment to the incumbent 
bidder682, which violated the CMP (and directive's) rules on selection criteria. The French 
administrative court did not cite the more preCise rules in the CMP that forbid this practice, but 
instead highlighted that equal treatment had been violated. 
In one important recent case, the Conseil d'Etat used the equal treatment principle to ensure that 
the incumbent bidder could participate in a new tendering procedure. Shortly before Fabricom, 
the Conseil d'Etat decided that a tenderer who participated in project conception did not 
automatically have access to information that would have resulted in unequal treatment of 
candidates.683 There have, however, also been various cases in which the Conseil d'Etat has 
annulled contracts because bidders participating in project preparatory work did have 
unreasonable advantages and the equal treatment principle was violated.684 
Other recent cases have mimicked CJ case law on weightings and sub-criteria; the Consell d'Etat 
has recently confirmed that concealing the existence of sub-criteria would violate the equal 
679 Even when attempting to limit cases to only those contracts covered by the CM?, over 100 searches came up In the 
past three years alone. (http://www.Jel:ifrance.fr.l October 2010). 
680 See, for instance, CE 13 mai 1987,Ste HWanner Isoft Isolation", req. n° 39120. 
681 See, for instance, CE 1 avril 1994, Etablissements R. Ducros, req. nO 120121,: CE 19 mars 1997, SU Bull, req. n° 171140: 
CAA Marseille 29 juin 1999, Cne de Vaison-Ia-Romaine, req. nO 97MA00912. 
682 CAA Bordeaux 19 juillet 2005, OPAC de la Communaute urbaine de Bordeaux Aquitanis, req nO 01BX0252B. 
683 CE 29 juillet 1998 Ste Genicorp, req nO 177952: see also CAA Nancy 13 novembre 1997, OPAC des Ardennes elM. Lenoir, 
req. nO 95NC00085-95NC00096. 
684 See, for instance, CE 8 juillet 1991, OPHLM du departement de l'Aisne, req. n° 95305; CE 8 septembre 1995, Cne 
d'Evreux, req. n° 118010.' . 
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treatment and transparency principle.685 In the very important ANPE judgment, the Conseil 
d'Etat applied the general principles of equal treatment and transparency to a Part II B services 
contract-and concluded that, as the award criteria and their weightings were not properly 
specified, this was a violation of Article 1 ofthe CMP (reciting the general principles).686 
Most recently, the Conseil d'Etat set a limit to the case law on award criteria and weightings, by 
stating very clearly that while set award criteria and weightings have to be publicized in the 
contract notice (even for contracts below the directive's thresholds), there is no requirement for 
contracting authorities to also reveal scoring mechanisms used.687 
We can see that both in this case and in ANPE, the Conseil d'Etat actually applied rules on award . 
criteria and weightings to contracts not covered by the directives. 
These French developments may be a consequence of the judgments in Universale-Bau, ATI and 
Lianakis (see section 2.4.2), where transparency requirements for award criteria and weightings 
(as well as sub-criteria) were developed by the CJ; however, the French courts exclusively cite the 
general principles as stated in Article 1 of the CMP as a source for these requirements. It is thus 
difficult to assess what role EU law has played in these developments; it appears that the French 
courts are applying similar principles to those found in the CJ case law even to contracts that are 
not covered by the directives (which may not be subject to the requirements established in 
Lianakis and other cases-the CJ has not yet considered this issue.) 
In summary, the general principle of equal treatment is frequently used to denounce non-
competitive behaviour where there are no specific articles in the CMP to prohibit a given 
practice. However, it is impossible to state with certainty that CJ jurisprudence has had an 
i n f l u e n ~ e e on how the French courts perceive equal treatment, as they do not normally cite the CJ 
in their decisions. 
685 CE 15 decembre 2008, Communaute urbaine de Dunkerque. req. n° 310380. 
686 CE 30 janvier 2009, ANPE, req. n° 290236. 
687 CE 31 mars 2010, Collectivite territorfale de Corse, req. n° 334279. 
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5.4.2.4 Contracts Covered by the Directives: Conclusions 
Despite extensive regulation in the field of public procurement, the French legislator has not 
responded in an obvious manner to CJ-obligations for equal treatment of tenderers and 
transparent procedures in amending the CMP in 2001, 2004 or 2006. 
Any provisions that indicate a requirement for equal treatment or transparency predate the C)'s 
case law on the subject In this respect, it must be assumed that the CJ's case law has not have a 
great effect on French legislation for contracts covered by the directives. 
Case law in France seems to have aligned itself with recent CJ jurisprudence on the general 
principles, although again, it is highly unclear whether or not there is any 'influence' to speak of, 
or whether the French courts have applied the equal treatment principle independently. 
Guidance is minimal, and has until recently argued that the principle of equal treatment in 
particular does not originate from EU law, but rather is a separate and pre-existing principle in 
. 
French procurement law-a perception that is supported by both legislation and national case 
law. 
5.4.3 Contracts Not Covered by the Directives 
5.4.3.1 Legislation 
Because the CJ jurisprudence affecting contracts not covered by the directives was only decided 
in 2000, only the most recent CMP 1964 and subsequent versions will be considered. 
5.4.3.1.1 CMP 1964 in 2001 
By 2001, the 1964 CMP had been greatly revised and contained advertising rules that generally 
covered also those contracts that fell below the thresholds in the EU directives. 
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There were four levels of thresholds in operation at the time, elaborated on in Article 38 (and 
subject to frequent changes): 
a) National Advertising Threshold - below this threshold, no advertising was required. 
Above this threshold, up to the BO Threshold, contracts had to be advertised in either the 
Bulletin Of/kie! (BO) or in a different journal, H(author's translation) entitled to receive 
legal notices".6BB In 2001, this threshold was set at 300,000 francs. 
b) BO Threshold-between the BO threshold and the EU threshold, contracts had to be 
advertised in the national BO. In 2001, this threshold was setat 700,000 francs. 
c) EU Threshold-above the EU threshold, contracts were required to be published in the 
OJEU as well as in the BO. 
The only types of contract that did not have to be advertised were those awarded with the 
negotiated procedure without a notice, and those below the 'national' thresholds. The former 
was compliant with EU law, as the negotiated procedure without a notice can be found in both 
the 1993 and the 2004 EU directives, and the French conditions for use were no different than 
those in the directives. 
From the perspective of the Telaustria jurisprudence, there are only a few problems with- the 
CMP 1964; the National Advertising Threshold set at 300,000 francs, below which neither 
., 
competitive purchasing nor advertising was obligatory, would not have met a requirement to 
':: 
provide a degree of publicity or to act transparently. However, for all contracts above that 
threshold, a 'degree of advertising' was required. 
The CMP 1964 demonstrates that national legislation requiring advertising for (some) contracts 
not covered by the directives was definitely not introduced in response to the CJ case law. These 
national advertising requirements existed long before 2000. 
6BB "Les avis d'appel public a la concurrence et les avis d'attribution sont inseres dans Ie Bulletin officiet des annonces des' 
marches publics ou dans une publication habilitee a recevoir des annonces legales:, Article 38, para 1. 
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5.4.3.1.2 eMP 2001 
The 2001 CMP contained rules that, prima facie, appear to be even more compliant with 
Te/austria-primarily because the thresholds adhered to in the CMP 1964 were lowered. Beyond 
this, the CMP also introduced a new, "simple" procedure for low-value contracts that did require 
advertising. 
Article 28 of CMP 2001, first of all, set the threshold for 'formal tendering' at 90000 Euros. Below 
this, contracts could be concluded without any 'formalities'. Article 29 added to this that below 
thresholds of 130000 Euros for goods and services and 200000 Euros for works, perishable 
foods could be purchased at fairs, markets, or places of production. Article 30 described the 
more limited requirements that certain (what are now known as) Part II B services had to satisfy; 
these included only a requirement to abide by technical specification requirements and to post a 
notice following contract award. There are problems with all of these rules from a Telaustria 
perspective, in that none of them seem to require any sort of competition or publicity at the 
outset 
Secondly, Article 32 described the "mise en concurrence simplifiee" procedure, a Hsimplified 
tender" procedure that could be used for contracts below a threshold of 130000 Euros for goods 
and services and 200000 Euros for works. [Any of the other tendering procedures In the CMP 
could also be used to award these contracts instead, but where these were used, the procedural 
rules applicable to those procedures would apply.] 
Despite its name, the "simplified tender" procedure did require advertising; however, following a 
choice of tenderers, the contracting authority was permitted to simply negotiate with Hseveral" 
tenderers. Use of this procedure places responsibility for Telaustria compliance with contracting 




Despite these generally positive changes, the Commission launched a complaint about the French 
CMP6B9; some of the Commission's complaints dealt with violations of the Treaty general 
principles. Specifically, the Commission criticized Article 30 of the CMP 2001, stating that despite 
the more limited regime that certain types of services were subjected to, a general obligation to 
act in a non-discriminatory and equal manner still stemmed from the Treaty. This is a direct 
reference to Telaustria and how it affected excluded contracts; the Commission highlighted in 
particular that there was an obligation to advertise, and that this could not be ignored simply 
because it was not stated explicitly in the Services directive.690 
The Commission also criticized the Article 28 threshold691, below which no formal procedures 
were required by law at all; again, the Commission reiterated that a lack of procedural 
requirements in the directive did not mean that these contracts were exempt from Treaty 
obligations. 
The advertising regime in the 2001 CMP was thus heavily criticized, with the exception of the 
"mise en concurrence simplifiee" set out in Article 32-which, as noted, required some form of 
advertising. The French legislator nonetheless opted to revisit all of these provisions again in 
2004, in large part to respond to the Commission's critique of Article 28. 
5.4.3.1.3 eMP 2004 
The 2004 CMP again saw some substantial changes to the thresholds employed in 2001, as well 
as a change to the procedure made available for the award of contracts that fell below the 
directives' thresholds .. 
,Article 28 of the 2004 CMP outlined the new procedure, renamed to the "procedure adaptee"-a 
> name chosen because it loosely translates to 'adequate' procedure, in light of EU advertising 
689 Commission, IP /02/1507 (n 591). 
690 Ibid. 
, 691 Ibid. 
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requirements.692 Under the procedure adaptee, the "means of advertising and competition" used 
are set by the contracting authority advertising the contract. The procedure originally was set to 
be used for contracts between a low threshold of 90000 euros, below which no formal 
competition or advertising was required, and the EU-Ievel thresholds. 
However, a decree of November 2004693 modified the 2004 eMP and established a new 'lowest' 
threshold of 4000 euros. Between the threshold of 4000 and the EU thresholds, the procedure 
adaptee could be used, but with different advertising requirements between 4000 and 90000 
euros on the one hand (free choice of advertising method), and 90000 and the EU thresholds on 
the other (required advertising in the French BO or other suitable journal). Only below this new 
threshold of 4000 euros was it possible to award a contract without advertising. It Is possible 
that this change was a response to pressure from the Commission to regulate low-value contracts 
in light of the Cj's case law; however, this is speculative. 
The Commission appears to have accepted this approach. It did not commence an infringement 
procedure before the Cj in 2002; instead, the Commission awaited the 2004 redevelopments of 
the CMP.694 In launching a new complaint about the French CMP 2004695, which still was 
perceived as not entirely compliant with EU law, the Commission merely referred back to the 
"simplified" procedures available for Part II B services-retained from the 2001 CMP without 
changes. The French concept of a very, very low threshold below which no advertising Is 
necessary was thus principally condoned by the Commission. 
69Z Richer 2010 (n 571). p. 450. 
693 Oecret n° 2004·1298 du 26 novembre 2004 relatif a diverses dispositions concernant les marches de l'Etat et des 
collectivites territoriales. . . 
694 See IP 04/1.62 (n 5?5): "The C o ~ m ~ s s i o n n found ~ a ~ ~ the new code adopted on 7 January 2004 did not take Into account 
the 11 complamts whIch the CommIssIon had made m Its reasoned opinion of 23 October 2002 regarding the earli r 
version of the code dated 7 March 2001 (see IP/02/1507).- e 
695 Ibid. 
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5.4.3.1.4 Contracts not Covered by the CMP 
Not all contracts subject to Telaustria jurisprudence are regulated in the CMP; the Commission, 
for instance, has reminded France in its 2004 complaint that any legislative provisions on 
services concessions also have to be compliant with the general principles.696 
Services concessions are regulated in a separate law, as they are not considered 'public contracts' 
as defined in the CMP.697 Services concessions are in fact subject to publication requirements 
regardless of their value; where below the EU thresholds, they have to be advertised in a relevant 
journal entitled to receive legal notices.69B These rules were introduced in 1996, and thus again 
precede relevant CJ jurisprudence requiring advertising for services concessions. 
Also of relevance is the 2005 Ordonnance on 'public bodies' outside of the CMP; as we saw with 
competitive dialogue (in section 5.2.3.4.1), there are no formal procedures in place below 
threshold in this ordonnance, and consequently no advertising 'requirements'. The ordonnance 
and its procedural decree699 are fully silent on how to award contracts below threshold; the 
responsibility for compliance with obligations under the Treaty will thus fall firmly on the public 
bodies awarding these types of contracts. 
5.4.3.1.5 eMP 2006 
The 2006 CMP, when first introduced, changed little about the thresholds established in 2004; 
the 4000 and 90000 euro thresholds reqUirements were retained, presumably because the 
Commission found no fault with the regulatory system in place for low-value contracts. Also 
retained was the 'procedure adaptee', with no changes. 
696 Ibid. 
" 697 See section 5.1.6. 
698 See Article 1 of Decret n093-471 du 24 mars 1993 portant application de I'article 38 de la loi nO 93-122 du 29 janvier 
1993 relatif Ala publicite des delegations de service public 
699 Decret nO 2005-17.42 (n 677). 
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Regarding the contested provisions on Part II B services, the CMP 2006 did introduce a change-
it made the 'procedure adaptee' available for these contracts as well.70o The fact that it was made 
'available', rather than mandatory, however, begs the question as to whether or not this suffices 
in terms of compliance-by making a procedure available, the CMP 2006 has not actually 
ensured that all of these contracts are advertised, especially since Article 30 still explicitly 
excludes Part II-B services from the regular advertising requirements for procurement contracts, 
set out in Article 40(III). However, the Commission has thus far not criticized the approach taken 
in Article 30. 
Though France has always regulated below-threshold contracts, the manner in which it has 
regulated them has changed since 2001-although if this is directly in response to EU 
developments is difficult to deduce. However, what is a helpful indicator in this regard is the way 
that the French government opted to change the 2006 CMP thresholds in light of2008 'recession' 
plans to stimulate the French economy. 
5.4.3.1.5.1 Recent Changes: The Lowest Threshold 
A set of decrees published in December 2008701 aim to enable the use of public procurement 
contracts to quickly boost economic recovery in France. Crucial to these developments are some 
changes to procedural rigidity, which will simplify and speed up procurement procedures. 
The 4000 euro "bottom" threshold was replaced by a 20000 euro threshold instead, hoping to 
encourage fast procurement for low-value contracts; the French legislator is thought to have set 
the new threshold after considering bottom thresholds in various other countries, including the 
United Kingdom-presumably by reference,to individual departmental policy, as no thresholds 
other than the EU thresholds existed in UK legislation (see section 3.4.3.1).702 
700 Article 30, CMP 2006. 
701 See, in particular, Decret n° 2008-1356 and Decret nO 2008-1355 (n 603). 
~ 0 2 2 ~ h e e le,vels of the t,hresholds in other countries were cited,regularly in the French news media at the time, as a 
JustificatiOn for ~ a ~ n g g the change to 2 0 , 0 0 ~ ~ euros; see, for Instance, Secteur Public, ·Simplification des procedures dans 
les marches pubhcs ,4 December 2008, available at http·/Iwwwsecteurpublic{r/public/articJc.tpl?id=15181 (last 
accessed 1 November 2010). . 
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President Sarkozy's speech announcing the forthcoming changes, made on December 42008, 
reveals the reasons for adjusting the threshold; the threshold for non-advertised contracts was 
raised so as to stimulate local enterprises by enabling direct contract award to them.703 This 
measure, despite impacting on the general principles of equal treatment and transparency, thus 
seems to have been taken without any consideration of CJ jurisprudence on the transparency 
obligation. 
However, the change existed only for a very short period of time. The Conseil d'Etat ruled in 
2010 that this raising of the threshold ran contrary to the general principles of equal treatment 
and transparency.704 The Conseil d:Etat stated (author's translation) "that these principles do not 
preclude the [legislator] to enable the contracting authority to decide that the contract will be 
awarded without advertising or without competition, in only those cases where it appears that, 
such formalities are impossible or clearly unnecessary particularly because of the contract, its 
value or the degree of competition in the sector."70S After this general statement, the Conseil 
d'Etat concluded that by releasing all contracts below 20,000 euros from any advertiSing 
obligations, the French legislator contravened the general principles (as stated in the 2006 CMP, 
without specific reference to EU law)-implying that advertising those contracts is neither 
impossible nor 'clearly unnecessary', As the plaintiff in the case merely requested the repeal of 
the 2008 decree that changed the threshold, the advertising threshold is as of 1 May 2010 back at 
4,000 euros-a low threshold below which no advertiSing is generally required thus remains, 
even though the CJ has recently indicated that this may not comply with EU law.706 
5.4.3.1.5.2 Recent Changes: Buyer Profiles 
From the 1st of January 2010 onwards, contracts between 90,000 euros and the EU thresholds 
have to be advertised on mandatory "buyer's p r o f i l e ' ~ ~ sites. This concept has been lifted from the, 
703 A summary of the speech was made available at 
http;//www'\ocaltis,jnfo/cs/ContentSeryer?pagename=Localtjs/arUour/artlour&cid=1228369436380 (last accessed on . 
1 November 2010). 
704 CE 10 fevrier 2010, M. P., r ~ q . . nO 329100. 
70S" ... que ces principes ne font pas obstacle a ce que Ie pouvoir reglementaire puisse permettre au pouvoir adjudicateur ' 
de decider que Ie marche sera passe sans publicite, v o i r ~ ~ sans mise en concurrence, dans les seuls cas ou i\ apparait que . 
de telles formalites sont impossibles ou manifestement inutiles notamment en raison de I'objet du marche, de son 
, montant ou du degre de concurrence dans Ie secteur considere" • 
706 See the discussion on APERMC (n 197) in section 2.4.3.2. 
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EU directives (where it is found in Articles 35 and 36 as well as Annexes VilA and VIII), according 
to the 2009 Guide de Bonnes Pratiques. Mandatory advertising of contracts above 90,000 euros 
on the buyer profile website has been adopted in addition to the pre-existing obligation to 
advertise these contracts in the BO or other relevant industry journals; this is thus different from 
recent UK policy changes (see section 3.4.3.3), where the choice to advertise remains open but 
when advertised, this has to be (additionally) done on an internet portal. 
5.4.3.1.6 Legislation: Conclusions 
The French legislator appears to appreciate the importance of advertising, and advertising 
beyond the scope of the directives has been a part of the French regulatory approach for several 
decades now. A general requirement for publicity thus precedes Te/austria, and in general it 
cannot be stated that by regulating below-threshold contracts, the French CMPs have 
"responded" to new CJ developments. 
Most recently, the French legislator opted to raise the 'no-advertising' threshold to 20,000 euros, 
which it deemed to be 'in line' with what most other European countries were setting as their 
bottom threshold; this was overturned by the Conseil d'Etat, meaning that the 4,000 euro 
threslwld is now back in place. It is unclear whether or not either threshold is compliant with 
the Treaty obligations (as these are not clear), but the Conseil d'Etat's reasoning for moving the 
threshold back-not all of these contracts cannot/should not be advertised-may Indicate 
awareness of the CJ's focus on assessing advertising requirements on a case-by-case basis. 
5.4.3.2 Guidance 
5.4.3.2.1 Guidance on the CMPs 
As discussed above, in the 2001 CMP introduced a general cut-off of 90000 euros, below which 
no advertising was necessary. The 20011nstruction on this subject states that though below this 
threshold no formal procedures are required, "(author's translation) it is nonetheless 
245 
, ,....". ..... H"'411'< ~ F " ' " "
.' ) 
recommended" that the general principles are adhered to, and that the contract is awarded 
competitively where the value and nature of the contract warrant it707 This, however, is the 
most that is said on the subject of the general principles and how they relate to below-threshold 
contracts-noteworthy is that advertising is not mentioned specifically. 
The 2004 Manuel, in section 8.2, considers the advertising thresholds in the CMP. On asking how 
to publicize contracts ofa value ofless than 4000 euros, the Manuel states that: "(author's 
translation) in the event of purchasing contracts of a very small value, advertising can result in 
'ballast' and unnecessary spending."70B This is an interesting point, given that the EU 
procurement rules generally take account of a need to prevent disproportionate costs in the 
procurement process; for example, the restricted procedure is generally available alongside the 
open procedure because the cost of evaluating large numbers of bids is high and not always 
necessary to guarantee competition. When pressed on the issue of contracts of a 'very small 
value', the CJ may thus also conclude that the Treaty does not require advertising contracts when 
the costs of doing so would outweigh the savings. 
On the subject of advertising contracts between 4000 and 90000 euros, the Manuel states that 
despite the fact that choice of advertising method is left to the contracting authority between 
these thresholds, this right is not limitless and can be tested by the courts. It then concludes that 
the method of publicity chosen will be deemed adequate in light of the general principles of 
public procurement if potential candidates can, through the method of advertising chosen, 
become aware of the procedure, in order to achieve a sufficient diversity of tenders so as to 
assure Benuine competition. While not verbatim, this is very close to the reasoning adopted by 
the CJ in the Telaustria jUdgment, although transparency itself is not highlighted in the 2004 
Manuel. This may indicate influence of the case law; however, it should be remembered from the 
discussion in section 5.4.2.1 that the French legislation has always linked publicity to 
competition-this may thus merely be a more explicit statement of a long-standing French 
procurement principle. 
707 20011nstruction, Article 28. 
708 •• " s'agissant d'achats d'un tres faible montant, une publicite peut devenir un element d'alourdissement et de depense 
Inutile:, at question 8.2.1. '. 
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The 2004 Manuel next considers various advertising options in detail; it discusses the usefulness 
of, for example, specialist press options or the internet Neither the UK nor the Netherlands have 
provided this kind of guidance on advertising requirements, but in France, it can presumably be 
attributed to the fact that advertising has been mandatory in most procurement for forty years. 
Nonetheless, it will prove helpful to contracting authorities that are struggling with the concept 
of an appropriate 'degree of pUblicity' as required under the Treaty. 
The 2006 Manuel does not add to the 2004 Manuel to any Significant extent, though it does note 
that "publicity" does not necessarily mean "an advertisement" in the stricter sense of the word-
a suggestion also raised by Advocate-General Sharpston in Commission v Finland.709 
The 2008 changes to the thresholds did not come with specific guidance. While the French 
government did issue a circular on the subject of economic measures taken in light of the 
recession, this circular only noted the 20000 euros threshold without any further explanation.7lO 
As discussed in section 5.4.2.2, the 2009 Guide de Bonnes Pratiques for the first time (In section 
10) refers to Telaustria and the EU origins of the advertiSing rules applicable to contracts below 
the directives thresholds. However, it does not elaborate on any of the requirements established 
by the Te/austria line of jurisprudence, and generally offers identical guidance to that provided in 
the 2006 and 2004 Manuels. 
5.4.3.2.2 Additional Guidance 
There are no mentions of the effects of the C)'s jurisprudence on contracts covered by the TFEU 
in any of the guidance available on either the MinEFE website or Bercy Colloc, although the Bercy 
Colloc jurisprudence collection does list and refer to various cases in which the general principles 
of transparency and equal treatment are discussed. It does not go so far as to offer discussion or 
709 See, for instance, AG Sharpston on Commission v Finland (n 190). 
710 Circulaire du 19 dtkembre 2008 relative au plan de relance de l'economie r r a n ~ a i s e e - augmentation des avances sur 
les marches publics de I'Etat en 2009 (10 n0296, 20 decembre 2008). 
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an indication of what contracting authorities ought to do to comply with the cases that are listed, 
however. 
We have thus seen that the positive obligations stemming from the Treaty are not elaborated on 
in French guidance, although the 2009 Guide de Bonnes Pratiques does reference the existence of 
CJ case law that obliges advertising on account of the transparency principle. This may indicate 
that additional guidance on this case law will be prepared-but at the time of writing, the French 
government websites are unique in the sense that they do not even link back to the Commission's 
Interpretative Communication on contracts not covered by the directives. What little discussion 
there is of advertising requirements solely refers to national thresholds and effective public 
procurement The CJ case law thus does not seem to have had a substantial impact on guidance 
issued either as part of the CMPs or as separate documents; even the 2009 Guide uses Te/austria 
to explain the source of transparency requirements, but does not elaborate on the CJ's conditions 
for advertising, such as cross-border effect 
5.4.3.3 Jurisprudence 
The concept of "transparency" and how it relates to an obligation to publicize contracts has been 
cited in a great number of French public procurement cases.711 However, only recently are there 
explicit references to this principle affecting procurement outside of the directives or the CMP 
and related legislation. What follows are some examples of the types of cases that have been 
considered. 
First of all, the French courts do not hesitate to rely on the transparency principle to annul 
contracts that have not been properly advertised. In the years since 2004 in particular, the lower 
administrative courts have produced judgments that come very close to restating the Te/austria 
principle in cases where the contracts in question were not covered by the eMP or related 
legislation. In these cases, the French courts easily concluded that a complete lack 'of publicity 
711 See, for Instance, CE 28 avril 2003, Federation f r a n ~ a i s e e des courtiers d'assurance et de reassurance et autres, req. n° 
, 233343·233474 and CE 28 avril 2003, Syndicat national des pharmaciens hospitaliers et praticiens hospitaliers 
un;vers;ta;res, req. nO 237717. ' 
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violated the (EU) general principles and subsequently annulled the procurement procedures in 
question.712 
Secondly, the courts have built on the general principles established in Telaustria by critically 
assessing the type of publicity used; an example of this is a 2005 Conseil d'Etat judgment in 
which the Conseil d'Etat concluded that advertising in a local journal and on the internet for a 
total of 15 days did not satisfy the transparency principle in light of the subject of the contract 
(which concerned establishing a 'branch' of the Louvre in Lens).713 
Thirdly, unlike in other areas of French public procurement law, the French courts do on 
occasion cite the Telaustria judgment itself when discussing cases relating to the general 
principle oftransparency.714 The Administrative Appeals Court in Versailles in particular makes 
frequent reference to obligations stemming from Articles 49 and 56 of the TFEU, and how these 
apply to contracts that are not covered by the CMP (or the directive).715 Actual references to EU 
law in French cases are highly unusual-and here, perhaps indicative of the importance of the CJ 
jurisprudence on this subject 
From a comparative perspective, it must be noted that none of the 'transparency' case law in 
France deals with below-threshold contracts specifically; we can assume this is because 
advertising is mandatory for all CMP-covered contracts above 4,000 euros. Consequently, when 
these types of contract award decisions are set aside, they are set aside on the basis of non-
compliance with a particular provision in the CMP, as opposed to on the basis of non-compliance 
with the general principle of transparency. 
712 See, for instance, CM Bordeaux 9 novembre 2004, Ste Sodegis, req. n° 01BX003B1 and CAA Versailles 12 mars 2009, 
Cne de Clichy-Ia-Garenne, req. nO 07VE02221 (both dealing with development agreements): see also, for Instance, TA 
Orleans 10 fevrier 2004, ene de Saint Martin de NigeUes, req. n° 0202B96 (dealing with a below-90000-euros-threshold 
contract under CMP 2001) and recently, CAA Nantes 20 fevrier 2009, SAS Usine Rouge, req. n° OBNT00451 (dealing with 
direct invitation oCB bidders Cor a building works contract that, regardless of value, would have been subject to the eMP 
and Article 1). 
m CE 7 octobre 2005, Region Nord-Pas-de-Calais, req. n0278732; see also CE 1 avril 2009, Communaut4 Urbaine de 
Bordeaux, req. n° 323585, where it was decided that advertising in several national journals with large readerships was 
sufficient even if no EU-wide journals were used. 
714 See, for instance, CM Versailles 6 december 2005, Association Pacte, req. nO 03VE040B l' CM Paris 30 juln 2009 Ville 
de Paris, req. n° 07PA02380, in which a Telaustria-based annulment of a contract was c o n t ~ s t e d d because the c o n t r a ~ t twas 
effectively awarded in-house; and CAA Versailles 15 avril2010,Ste SNC GESTEC, req. nO OBVE03103. 
715 CM Versailles 15 avril 2010, ARTEMIS et autres, req. nO OBVE02791: Cne de Clichy-Ia-Garenne (n 712). 
249 
5.4.4 Conclusion 
If the CJ jurisprudence on the general principles of transparency and equal treatment has had an 
effect on French law, it is primarily in the courts that we find evidence of this influence. The 
jurisprudence in the years since 2004 in particular relies on Telaustria-style reasoning, and 
occasionally even cites relevant CJ judgments. 
The advertising requirements in French legislation have been amended several times in the last 
decade, but it cannot be held that these changes have been introduced in response to CJ 
jurisprudence. In 2001 and 2004, it appears as though Commission complaints have motivated a 
change in national legislation; we have seen that the CMP has been revised in part in the 2004 
and 2006 because previous versions of it, according to the Commission, did not include 
advertising requirements for contracts that did have to be advertised. However, since 2008, it 
appears that the advertising thresholds were moved for reasons unrelated to EU law, such as 
reducing the administrative cost of procurement in order to encourage public spending and 
stimulate the French economy. 
The extremely limited role of guidance on the subject of the TFEU advertising requirements is, 
given the CMP's very low 4,000 euro threshold for mandatory advertising, perhaps unsurprising. 
However, even the Commission's Interpretative Communication has not had any visible influence 
on French guidance-unlike the guidance on competitive dialogue and framework agreements, it 
" 
has not even been reproduced on the relevant government websites. This may be explained, 
, ~ ~
however, by the fact that France (like the UK and the Netherlands) joined Germany in contesting 
the Interpretative Communication.716 
. 716 Commission v Germany (n 98). 
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6. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
The preceding four chapters outlined a series of measures at the EU level, and then examined 
national responses to these measures, whether they be specific contract award mechanisms 
(such as competitive dialogue and framework agreements) or rules that affect contract award 
more generally (such as the principles of equal treatment and transparency). What remains is 
providing an answer to the research question: what influence have recent developments in EU 
procurement law had on the procurement regulation of the three subject countries? 
Chapter 6 will address this question posed in five separate parts. First, section 6.1, examines 
Member States' responses to the directives; section 6.2 will then discuss the influence of less 
certain obligations (imposed by the directive and the Treaty's general principles respectively); 
and section 6.3 considers the extent of impact of the EU rules on areas not strictly covered by 
positive obligations. Section 6.4 then analyzes the national use of the different EU law sources, 
and section 6.5 the question of further harmonization in the area of public procurement. Finally, 
section 6.6 will offer conduding observations and suggestions for further research. 
6.1 Nature and Extent of Implementation of the Detailed ObliBations in the directives 
Two areas of study in this thesis were selected because they offer a clear examination of the EU 
procurement directives' role in national procurement regulation. Competitive dialogue was 
included as a new procedure that Member States could make available for complex procurement 
Framework agreements were also examined-these were already induded In the 1993 Utilities 
Directive, but from 2004 have been made available in the Public Sector Directive. 
The detailed implementation of these procedures was discussed in Chapters 3-5; section 6.1 will 
summarize findings and compare implementation of the procedures in each of the countries 
examined. 
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6.1.1 Nature & Extent of Implementation of Competitive Dialogue 
As discussed in section 2.2, competitive dialogue was a new procedure in the 2004 Public Sector 
Directive; it is also characterised by being an optional award procedure that has quite explicit 
conditions for use-namely, the existence of a particularly complex contract-and various 
unclear elements of execution, including the extent to which bids can be discussed at various 
stages of the process. 
The EU-level hard and soft law on competitive dialogue is, at the time of writing, comprised of the 
provisions of the directive (found in Articles l(l1)(c) and 29) and an Explanatory Note issued by 
the Commission; the CJ has not dealt with questions about the competitive dialogue procedure at 
this time. 
6.1.1.1 Contracts Covered by the Directives 
On the nature of implementation of competitive dialogue, we can be brief: the 2004 Public Sector 
Directive in its entirety, and this includes competitive dialogue procedure, has been implemented 
by legal transposition into national law in all three countries studied. The extent of 
implementation is more interesting to discuss at this stage, largely because the approach taken in 
the subject countries is similar in many ways and yet different on some key points. 
Above the directives' thresholds, all three Member States examined made the procedure 
available to all contracting authorities; this is the most notable development in France, where not 
all contracting authorities are covered by the main national procurement law, and thus an 
explicit choice had to be made to also make the procedure available for other bodies governed by 
public law (see section 5.2.3.4). In addition to not being restricted per users, the procedure is 
also not restricted for specific contracts-none of the countries examined, for instance, restricted 
the use of the procedure to large value procurement or works procurement only. In France, 
section 5.2.3.4.2 highlighted that competitive dialogue was specifically made available as the 




Not only was the procedure not restricted, but it also was not amended in a notable manner in 
any of the countries studied. Legal uncertainties found in the directive (discussed in section 
2.2.5) were not dealt with through either changes or supplements in law. While minor changes 
took place in all countries, these primarily related to numbering and word choice. 
One area where there are differences in national approach is the regulation of the use of bid 
payments (an option not exclusive to competitive dialogue). France permits bid payments for 
competitive dialogue bids in legislation and offers suggestions on how to award them, whereas 
the UK and the Netherlands permit the bid payments in legislation and yet discourage or rule out 
aspects of the use of bid payments through guidance or policy. Generally, however, the above-
threshold implementation of competitive dialogue looks the same in all three of the countries 
examined. 
6.1.1.2 Contracts not Covered by the Directives 
More interesting is the approach to competitive dialogue taken for those contracts not covered 
by the directives. As explained in section 2.1.4, the EU directives do not apply to all types of 
procurement contracts that may be concluded by contracting authorities. Below-threshold 
contracts, works and services concessions, and Part II-B services contracts do not have to be 
awarded using any of the procedures in the directives. Finding that in some of the countries 
examined in this thesis, the directive's rules on competitive dialogue are being used to regulate 
the award of these contracts indicates that EU law has had a significant influence on national 
. procurement regulation. 
The UK has no legislation on these contracts, though there are also no rules prohibiting the use of 
competitive dialogue for contracts not covered by the directive. UK guidance encourages the use 
of the procedure for any type of complex contract, and there are no indications that competitive 
dialogue is not being used to award contracts that are not covered by the procurement directives; 
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examining formal legal regulation alone may thus not provide a comprehensive picture of the UK 
approach to competitive dialogue regulation outside of the directives.717 
Similar obServations can be made about the Dutch approach to service and supplies contracts not 
covered by the directives, where again no legislation either forbidding or allowing the use of 
competitive dialogue exists. On the other hand, the Netherlands does have legislation in place 
that makes competitive dialogue generally available for below-threshold works contracts, 
regardless of their complexity. This added flexibility introduced by the Netherlands can be 
contrasted with the French legislative approach, as from December 2008 onwards, France has 
made competitive dialogue available under the exact same terms as it is available for contracts 
that are covered by the directives (ie, it can only ever be used for particularly complex contracts). 
An interesting consequence of the UK's non-regulatory approach here is that if 'competitive 
dialogue' is used for contracts not covered by the directives, it is not as a regulated procedure 
with specific legal steps that have to be followed-competitive dialogue would merely act as an 
"inspiration" to practice. This can be contrasted with the Netherlands and France, where the 
existence oflegal rules requires use of the procedure as stated in legislation, and any breach of 
the procedural rules is subject to legal remedies. 
Having seen how competitive dialogue has been implemented, it is worthwhile to consider for a 
moment the subject countries' historical approaches to regulation. 
The UK has historically, as was discussed in section 3.1.2, not regulated procurement through 
legislation; and when this became mandatory at the EU level, the UK's approach has consistently 
been to implement to the bare minimum required. We can see that they have maintained this, 
approach when implementing competitive dialogue. 
717 Braun 2001 (n. 287) found that a modified, competitive dialogue·like version of the negotiated procedure was used for 
PFI concession procurement, which Is outside of the directives. 
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Similarly, the Netherlands has added rules on competitive dialogue beyond what the directive 
requires in the field of works, but has not done so for services or supplies; the same approach to 
procurement regulation has existed since the 1970s, as discussed in section 4.1.3. 
The real surprise here, however, is France, which historically has created its own procedures to 
supplement those in the directives, and has worked to make these national procedures compliant 
with the directives. As of2006, however, the national procedure that most resembled 
competitive dialogue has been scrapped, and the directive's rules are copied out in the CMP for 
both above-threshold and below-threshold contracts, as well as for other types of contracts that 
are regulated outside of the CMP. 
There are various possible explanations for this; one is a desire, alluded to in section 5.1.5, to 
condense and simplify the CMP. Implementing only the EU rules and removing similar rules 
results in both space saving and greater Simplicity. Another possible explanation takes into 
account the number ofinfringement procedures started against France by the Commission in 
recent years, all relating to the improper implementation of the directives; it is possible that the 
French government has become concerned about the accuracy of the earlier approach of trying to 
integrate the directive into pre-existing French law, and is now trying a different approach. A 
third possibility is a simple acknowledgement of the fact that since 1993 in particular, the EU 
procurement rules and requirements have become much more substantial, and so perhaps there 
is simply less need to develop detailed 'national' procedures. While this thesis cannot provide a 
definitive explanation for the change in regulatory approach, it is worth noting that the change is 
visible not only with regards to competitive dialogue, but also with framework agreements, as 
discussed in the next section. It thus appears that this is not an incidental approach to 
competitive dialogue, but instead a possible indication of a general change in the French 
regulatory approach. 
255 
6.1.1.3 Summary: the Influence of EU Law 
The influence of EU law in the national implementation of competitive dialogue in all three 
Member States is substantial. All three countries examined have made the procedure available, 
and have effectively copied out the rules in the directive on the procedure without any significant 
changes. The few changes made relate to bid payments, and only in one of the three countries 
examined is that apparent from the legislation; where France changed the law, the Netherlands 
and the UK used guidance and policy to establish the national approach to bid payment use. 
Also striking, when assessing the influence of EU law in national approaches to competitive 
dialogue, is that where the procedure is introduced voluntarily for contracts that are not covered 
by the directives, again, the wording and approach of the directive are generally preserved. 
Illustrative is the Dutch approach, which does away with a requirement of 'complexity' before 
competitive dialogue can be used, but procedurally keeps the procedure identical. 
EU jurisprudence currently plays no role in shaping national regulation of competitive dialogue; 
to date, there has not been a case before the CJ that considers the procedural requirements of 
competitive dialogue. National courts have seen a few competitive dialogue disputes, but these 
generally concern award criteria and/or lack of compliance with the general principle of 
transparency, rather than the choice or use of competitive dialogue as an award procedure. 
Whereas we will see below (in section 6.2) that in the implementation of the general principles of 
equal treatment and transparency case law playa significant role, in the implementation of 
i' 
competitive dialogue only the EU directive has thus far had a significant impact 
The role of EU-Ievel guidance is also minimal. It has not affected national legislation in any 
perceivable way-the rules directly mirror those of the directive without being supplemented by 
suggestions from the Commission's Explanatory Note-and is not referenced in any 
jurisprudence to date. Even more interesting is that the EU guidance is barely referenced in 
national-level guidance; only in the UK is the guidance a combination of the EU suggestions and 
national suggestions, but in other countries, the Commission's document is cited separately (if at 
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all). This finding will be discussed further in section 6.4, when the role of soft law is compared to 
the roles played by binding instruments of EU law. 
6.1.2 Nature & Extent of Implementation of FrameworkAgreements 
The second formal procurement mechanism that was considered in this thesis was framework 
agreements under the 2004 Public Sector directive. While new in the 2004 Public Sector 
directive, framework agreements were available under the Utilities Directive since 1993, and as 
Chapters 3-5 discussed, the Member States examined in this thesis had national approaches to 
public sector framework agreements before 2004. 
The United Kingdom and the Netherlands did not legislate on framework agreements prior to 
2004, but through a combination of jurisprudence and guidance established that certain types of 
framework arrangements, at least, could be used under the public sector directives; interesting 
here is the Netherlands' determination to separate those arrangements with binding obligations 
(considered 'framework contracts') from those that did not have binding obligations (actual 
framework 'agreements') and its conclusion that only the former type were formally covered by 
the public sector directives of 1993. 
France has a different history in regulating framework agreements, in that from the 1960s 
onwards it has had detailed rules on various types of framework arrangements in its legislation. 
These arrangements were of the 'framework contracts' variety; all placed binding obligations on 
public authorities. However, the rules applicable prior to 2004 were very different from the ones 
introduced in the 2004 directive-framework 'contracts' in the public sector were treated as 
exceptional and only made available in very limited circumstances. 
The introduction of the 2004 directive had an impact on the legislative rules In all three of the 
countries studied. Where there was no formal legislation before in the Netherlands and the UK 
. , 
both countries implemented the directive's rules on framework agreements in national 
legislation where the directives apply. The Netherlands has gone further by also making 
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framework agreements available for works contracts that fall below the directive's thresholds, 
thus extending the influence of the EU rules. 
These approaches are identical to the approaches taken to implementing competitive dialogue, 
discussed in section 6.1.1. above; the approach taken for contracts not covered by the directives 
is also identical in both cases, in that again we see that the UK's guidance makes it clear that 
framework agreements can be concluded also for those contracts, while the legislation remains 
silent In the Netherlands, as with competitive dialogue, there are no further rules on framework 
agreements for below-threshold services and supply contracts-furthermore, there is also no 
guidance specifically encouraging use of framework agreements for these contracts. 
The most notable changes have taken place in France, where all pre-existing rules on framework 
arrangements have been replaced by the EU rules on framework agreements; previous 
restrictions applying to framework 'contracts' have thus been eliminated, and the use of non-
binding framework style arrangements has now been explicitly allowed. These types of 
arrangements (both binding and non-binding) can also be concluded below the EU procurement 
thresholds according to the CMP. As we also saw in section 6.1.1 with regards to competitive 
dialogue, it appears that the EU procurement rules have directly influenced all French 
procurement regulation of framework agreements, at the expense of pre-existing national rules. 
The possible reasons as to why this has happened are similar to those suggested in section 
6.1.1.2 with respect to competitive dialogue: there have been ongoing initiatives in France to 
.. , 
simplify the CMP, and there have been ongoing efforts to reduce the number of Commission 
complaints about French implementation of the procurement directives. However, as indicated 
in section 6.1.1.2, this thesis cannot provide a definitive reason for the change; these suggestions 
are speculative. 
Generally, as was noted in section 6.1.1.2 as well, the fact that there is no legislation in place for 
framework agreements not covered by the directives in the UK means that in practice, any such 
'framework agreements' concluded are inspired by, but not restricted by, the rules of the 
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directive. In France and in the Netherlands (for works), on the other hand, the copy-out 
approach to below-threshold regulation of framework agreements means that contracting 
authorities must apply all the stated rules, or risk being subject to legal remedies. 
6.1.2.1 Summary: the Influence of EU Law 
The EU directives have had a visible influence on the regulation of framework agreements at the 
national level; in all three countries examined, the rules of the directive have been implemented 
without significant change. The changes made are in word choice, as they were with competitive 
dialogue (see section 6.1.1.1). The influence of the directive also extends to areas outside of the 
directive in France and the Netherlands, where contracts not covered by the directive are 
subjected ~ o o rules identical to those in the directive; this finding too is similar to the finding about 
competitive dialogue regulation in the subject countries. 
EU jurisprudence is again less visible in the national regulatory regimes, but then-as Is true for 
competitive dialogue-there has not been any significant case law on framework agreements 
since 2004. The national courts have, however, reinforced the rules In the directive (as 
implemented) by applying and interpreting those in various judgments. 
As was observed in relation to competitive dialogue, EU guidance is more difficult to detect In the 
national legal order. In the UK and France, EU-Ievel guidance is cited and worked Into national 
guidance pieces to an extent, but this was not seen in the Netherlands. The UK Is further the only 
country in which EU guidance has been referenced in case law, though this finding must be put In 
context: it has only been cited in one case to date, and as there is very little case law in the UK, 
this is hardly evidentiary of a trend. In the Netherlands in particular, the EU guidance Is merely 




In examining a completely new procedure and a procedure only new to the public sector, we find 
that the influence of the EU directives is substantial, albeit tempered by national traditions in 
procurement regulation in some ways. In the national regulation of competitive dialogue and 
framework agreements, the Public Sector Directive has had a significant influence in two ways: 
a) by replacing all previous national legislation, where existent, for contracts covered by the 
directive; and b) by replacing all previous national legislation, where existent, for contracts not 
covered by the directive. However, in none of the countries examined did the directive result in 
legislation on competitive dialogue or framework agreements for contracts that had previously 
not been subject to national legislation at all-this is most clearly demonstrated by the UK, which 
did not introduce new legislation on, for instance, the use of framework agreements for below-
threshold contracts. Similarly, in the Netherlands the rules were only introduced for below-
threshold works contracts, which were already subject to national legislation. 
It is clear that the most substantial impact of the 2004 directive has been felt in France, where 
national rules on procedures similar to framework agreements and competitive dialogue have 
been effectively replaced by the rules in the directive-even where this was not required. 
Important to highlight here is that the stricter, pre-existing rules on framework agreements in 
France were not incompatible,with the directive; France made a conscious choice to adopt the 
directive's wording instead. In the UK and the Netherlands, on the other hand, there were no 
,. 
previous rules in legislation o ~ ~ public sector framework agreements or competitive dialogue; the 
2004 directive thus introduced rules that did not previously exist 
It is also interesting to note that CJ jurisprudence on competitive dialogue (which does not exist) 
and on framework agreements play essentially no role in national regulation. This can be 
contrasted with the general principles of equal treatment and transparency, discussed In section· 
6.2, where jurisprudence (at both the national and the EU level) is the primary source of 
regulation. In explanation, it must be noted that there is barely any EU case law on framework 
agreements for the national regulator to draw from; a lack of influence is thus unsurprising. 
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In the few national cases on framework agreements that have been decided, the courts rely on 
national legislation for interpretation; as national legislation copies out the directive, the EU's 
secondary legislation is by far the most influential EU law source on these two procurement 
mechanisms. 
Lastly, Commission guidance on competitive dialogue and framework agreements plays a visible 
role only in the UK (both) and France (framework agreements), where EU guidance is 
incorporated into national guidance and thus forms a part of the regulatory approach. In the UK, 
the Commission's Explanatory Note on Framework Agreements was additionally consulted in one 
case to date. In the Netherlands, the influence of EU guidance cannot be found in legislation, 
national guidance or national jurisprudence; however, it is important to remember with regard 
to all three subject countries that although the influence may not be visible in existing legal rules, 
we certainly cannot rule out that it heavily influences procurement practice. 
6.2 The Influence o/Less Certain Obligations 
The second general area of EU law that was considered in this thesis was how the subject 
Member States responded to unclear obligations, represented in public procurement law by the 
Court of Justice's general principles of equal treatment and transparency. These have now been 
included into the directives and apply to all aspects of a procurement procedure, but the 
obligations stemming from the general principles have only been specified by the CJ in a few 
areas. 
The same general principles also apply to procurement outside the directives, as has been 
established by a line of CJ jurisprudence that started with Telaustria; however, the jurisprudence 
has still not specified the exact positive obligations that 'national procurement authorities have to 
comply with. The thesis has also examined how Member States have dealt with the existence of 
obligations outside of the directives. The next two sections will discuss summarize and compare 
findings. 
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6.2.1 The General Principles in the Directives 
As discussed in section 2.4.2, the general principles of equal treatment and transparency have, 
since 2004, been explicitly stated in the procurement directives. However, while it is now clear 
that all parts of procurement procedures covered by the directives are subject to equal treatment 
and transparency obligations, the CJ has only sparingly commented on specific instances where 
these principles are triggered-the national legislator thus has substantial scope to expand on 
the principles in national legislation by encouraging or prohibiting certain types of behaviour. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly given the findings in section 6.1 above, the Netherlands and the UK have 
not amended their national legislation in any perceivable way in response to the general 
principles. While the general principles are restated in national implementing legislation, there 
are no added provisions in national legislation that demonstrate a specific response to the 
existence of the general principles (ie, by introducing a ban on late submissions of documentation 
out of concern for equal treatment oftenderers). 
Instead, awareness of the general principles has been found primarily in national jurisprudence, 
with guidance forming a supplement (albeit to a limited extent). The national courts have 
applied the general principles with regularity, using them to prohibit behaviour relating to lack of 
transparency (such as failing to clearly identify weightings and scorings mechanisms) or equal 
treatment (as in recent cases dealing with time limits for receipt of tenders). 
French procurement legislation, on the other hand, contains at least one concrete rule not found 
in the directive but that could be attributed to the general principles; in France, tenders and 
requests to participate that are submitted after a stated deadline have to be rejected according to 
the CMP. However, it is unlikely that this rule is directly linked to the existence of the general 
principles in the 2004 directive as it can be traced back in French legislation to pre-2001 
versions of the French CM P. Also noteworthy about France is that public bodies not covered by 
the CMP do not have to reject late tenders or requests to participate; the thesis cannot account 
for this difference in approach. 
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As with the other Member States studied, there is very limited French guidance dealing with the 
obligations that can stem from the general principles under the directive. In French case law, 
some influence of EU law is slowly becoming visible, however. The French courts have 
historically relied on, in particular, a general principle of transparency to condemn a failure to 
comply with advertising requirements in the CMP, or to force exclusion of bids that are submitted 
too late, but the ConseH d'Etat has been very consistent in alluding to the 'national' origins of this 
principle. However, as of 2009 onwards, it can be suggested that the ATI/Lianakis cases in 
particular have had an impact, as for the first time we can see that cases relating to the 
publication of award criteria and sub-criteria are being decided using Hgeneral principles". 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine if CJ case law has influenced these recent French 
decisions, as the French courts have not cited the EU cases that first required transparency in 
award and selection criteria. 
The influence ofthe general principles on national regulation is thus very difficult to state with 
certainty; while the national courts acknowledge and apply the principles (even where the CJ 
itself has not yet commented on their applicability), the national legislator and relevant guidance 
issuers have not responded to their existence to any visible degree. In part this can be explained 
by the fact that the prinCiples are very broad, meaning that specific obligations stemming from 
them are potentially limitless; it may be difficult to decide where to start and where to stop 
legislating, and offering guidance can only be done with certainty where the CJ has already 
pronounced on a particular issue. In contrast with the more specific procedures and rules 
discussed in section 6.1, the general principles appear to be too 'general' to have substantial 
influences on national legislation or guidance; the only Member State examined here that has 
used general prinCiples to create additional rules in its national legislation is France, and it has 
seemingly done so independently of EU law .. 
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6.2.2 The General Principles in the TFEU 
Even more uncertain is the role of the general principles under contracts covered only by the 
TFEU, which has been the subject of much academic debate and a number of cases before the CJ· 
What has become clear in recent years is that there is an obligation to provide a degree of 
advertising in procurement procedures outside of the directives where there is cross-border 
interest, but both the concepts of 'a degree of advertising' and 'cross-border interest' have been 
largely left undefined. National law responses were thus examined to see to what extent this line 
ofCJ jurisprudence has influenced national regulation. 
The findings presented in Chapters 3-5 are perhaps the most interesting out of those discussed 
so far, in that all three countries examined responded in a different manner and to a different 
extent 
In the UK, where the Westminster government traditionally does not regulate through hard law 
outside of those obligations stemming from the directives, there is no general legislative 
response to this line of juris prudence. In Scotland, which has the devolved right to determine its 
own procurement policy, the principles found in Telaustria are repeated in the legislation-but 
given that the CJ cases have direct effect, such a legislative response actually contributes very 
little. Actual regulation of contracts not covered by the directives is thus found primarily in the 
UK's limited number of cases on contracts not covered by the directives (where CJ jurisprudence 
is frequently cited, and in one instance, the Commission's Interpretative Communication has been 
referenced), as well as governmental guidance and policy, the latter of which is department-
. specific rather than general. It is unclear whether or not such statements of policy are legally 
enforceable; it is possible that the EU legitimate e x p e ~ t a t i o n s s principle here plays a role and 
would require the contracting authority to comply with its own policy, but this is speculative. 
Without enforcement, the UK's policy-based approach to the advertising requirement is a non-
binding form of regulation. 
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In the Netherlands, we saw that the proposals to change Dutch procurement law were highly 
interesting in light ofthe C)'s jurisprudence. At the time of writing, Dutch procurement 
regulation only covers works contracts not covered by the directive-services and supply 
contracts are, much like they are in the UK, not subject to any specific legislation. However, plans 
to reform the Dutch procurement law in 2006 proposed a threshold of 50,000 euros, above which 
all contracts (works, services and supply) would have to be advertised and awarded 
competitively. The Explanatory Memorandum to the proposed law indicated that this was done 
both for the sake of uniformity and because of an awareness of the EU jurisprudential 
developments. This law was rejected by the Dutch parliament in large part because of the 50,000 
euro threshold, which was perceived as being far too burdensome. We saw that national 
priorities of value for money at the time took precedence over any existing concerns about 
compliance with EU case law. 
In 2009, a second proposed new procurement law was submitted to the Council of State. In this 
new proposal, the positive obligations under the Treaty are spelled out; Article 1 states that the 
general principles also apply to contracts not covered by the directives. This follows a similar 
approach to that taken in Scotland, but the Dutch proposal adds that positive obligations only 
exist where there is likely 'cross-border interest', thus demonstrating an awareness of recent C) 
jurisprudence. 
To offer an explanation of this change in approach, it should be remembered that while the first 
proposed procurement law was being developed, the C) in APERMC7J8 suggested that setting 
thresholds below which advertising is not required is contrary to the TFEU. It is possible that 
this jurisprudence, in addition to the negative response to thresholds in the earlier proposal, 
have deterred the Dutch legislator from incorporating advertising thresholds Into the second 
proposal; instead, an explicitly stated obligation for contracting authorities to consider cross-
border interest when advertising contracts has been included there, and is a more limited-but 
no less visible-response to CJ jurisprudence on Treaty obligations. 
718 APERMC (n 197). 
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Aside from a lack of current legislation for non-works contracts not covered by the directives, 
section 4.4.3.5 also revealed that there is no guidance on the consequences of the general 
principles for procurement not covered by the directives in the Netherlands; the national courts 
thus so far seem to be alone in developing and reproducing the Cj's jurisprudence in the 
Netherlands. Like one llK Court, one Dutch court has also referenced the Commission's 
Interpretative Communication on procurement outside ofthe directives in deciding a dispute. 
The French response to this line of case law is much more difficult to summarize, primarily 
because there were already extensive rules on advertising and competition for contracts below 
the Ell thresholds in France prior to the seminal Telaustria case; even services concessions were 
subject to mandatory advertising rules from 1996 onwards. What was generally examined in this 
thesis was therefore not if rules were introduced because of Ell law, but rather whether or not 
the rules were responsive to Ell law development-for instance, by introducing the concept of 
cross-border interest into national legislation, or by amending the thresholds. 
Section 5.4.3.1 saw that the French legislator appears to have moved the thresholds on 
advertising independently of Ell law. Illustrative is the French 2008 legislative effort on 
economic stimulation, through which the thresholds at which advertising becomes mandatory 
were moved from 4000 euros to 20000 euros. Regardless of how this relates to compliance with 
the C]'s case law, it is clear that the reasons for adjusting the thresholds were not motivated by 
Ell law developments .. 
Even more interesting is that in early 2010, the Conseil d'Etat struck down the 2008 modifying 
decree that moved the threshold up to 20,000 euros, because it was deemed incompatible with 
the general principles of transparency and equal treatment, as stated in the CMP 2006 . 
. While it can reasonably be argued that an advertising threshold of 20,000 euros should be 
perceived as of little significance, as only very few contracts falling beneath it would be of cross-
border interest to begin with, the highest French administrative court nonetheless perceived 
. such a rule as being incompatible with the general principles of transparency. All that mattered 
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was that some contracts may have been of cross-border interest, but would not be advertised 
under the changed threshold. 
As of May 2010 the threshold is back at4000 euros, and the Conseil d'Etat has enforced C] case 
law (and particularly, APERMC719) on the general principles to an extent that we did not see in the 
other two countries investigated. Additionally, the Conseil d'Etat and other French 
administrative tribunals are also regularly setting aside national award procedures on account of 
a failure to comply with TFEU advertising or transparency requirements-occasionally while 
citing the CJ jurisprudence-origins of these rules and obligations. 
The influence of EU law on the French legislation thus appears minimal; much like the 
Netherlands, France opted to introduce and amend additional rules for below-threshold 
procurement for national reasons, and not in response to the CJ case law. In other ways, the 
Netherlands and France are also similar: guidance plays no notable role in implementing this line 
of case law, and the courts do at this time very actively use the principles to decide cases relating 
to contracts not covered by the directive. 
To summarize these findings, it can be observed that in all three countries it was found that 
legislation is not particularly responsive to these developments at the CJ; instead, awareness of 
the Cj's jurisprudence is primarily found in guidance (in the UK) and jurisprudence (In the 
Netherlands and in France, and more limitedly in the UK). 
It is important to note, however, that the C] has itself determined (in Wall) that the general 
principles do not have to be responded to in national legislation so long as contracting authorities 
are compliant, and consequently the approaches taken cannot be criticized. Instead It should be 
remembered that a lack of legislative response can also be seen in national responses to the 
general principles and their applicability to the directives. It is thus more likely that uncertain 
obligations are generally left for individual contracting authorities to comply with and for the 
719 Ibid. 
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national courts to police on a case by case basis, with guidance and legislation playing a far 
smaller or even no role at all. 
6.3 The Role EU Plays Law in Areas without Specific EU Law Obligations 
In addition to examining the national-level responses to different EU law materials, the thesis 
also more generally considers the extent to which EU law influences those areas in which there 
are as of yet no specific EU law obligations, such as for contracts that fall below the EU 
thresholds, or services concessions and Part II B services contracts. This has been addressed in 
parts in Chapters 3-5, discussing award procedures and CJ case law that could potentially affect 
national regulation for contracts outside of the directives or the Treaty, and has also been hinted 
at in sections 6.1 and 6.2 above; however, a clear overview will be helpful in demonstrating the 
different effects EU law has had in different Member States. 
In the UK, as this thesis will have demonstrated, it is very difficult to generally comment on the 
role that EU law has played in areas where EU law is not mandatory. This is in large part due to 
the manner in which the UK has historically regulated public procurement, and continues to do 
so in areas where there is no mandatory EU law present. Sections 6.1 and 6.2 have already 
highlighted that the UK does not regulate in legislation unless the EU directives require it to; 
consequently, EU law has no additional influence on legislation where the directives do not apply. 
What we did find, however, is that there is substantial guidance to supplement the UK 
procurement regulations. The aGe has been the most active central government department 
overseeing procurement in terms of the volume of guidance it has issued; the guidance has also 
been the most specific, as there are stand-alone guidance documents that discuss competitive 
dialogue, framework agreements, and (through procurement notices, and to a lesser extent) the 
, general principles of equal treatment of transparency.' The guidance offered is not specific to 
procurement covered by the directives and thus applies to non-covered procurement as well. It 
. is important to note here that the guidance issued by the OGC (as well as, in the case of 
competitive dialogue, other relevant public bodies), seems to be partially influenced by EU 
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materials-commonly Commission guidance. We saw this through references in the guidance on 
framework agreements and competitive dialogue specifically, discussed in section 3.2.4 and 
3.3.3.2. However, generally, the guidance primarily discusses those parts of public procurement 
that are not addressed by EU law at all, such as best practice and project management 
surrounding complex procurement in the case of competitive dialogue. 
Despite the existence of significant amounts of guidance, it should also be stressed that the 
majority of all non-EU procurement regulation still takes place at the level of individual 
procuring entities, developing internal policy rules. It proved beyond the scope of this thesis to 
evaluate all of these internal policies in order to examine the role that EU law has played in 
shaping this type of policy -examining only a few central government departments may have 
provided an inaccurate picture, and examining all central and local authorities was too big a task. 
From what was examined in this thesis, then, it appears that EU law has had some influence on 
UK central government procurement guidance for contracts outside of the directives; further 
conclusions cannot be drawn on the basis of the study conducted. 
In the Netherlands, we have seen in section 4.1 the long-standing national tradition of having 
additional legislation for works procurement below the directives' thresholds, but not 
establishing such legislation for services and supplies. Noteworthy is that even though below-
threshold works contracts have been traditionally regulated, the 2004 directives have had a 
visible impact on the rules applicable to these contracts: competitive dialogue and framework 
agreements have both been incorporated into the below-threshold regulatory regime. What is 
specific to the Netherlands is that where possible, the procedures have been made more freely 
available and more flexible for below-threshold works procurement-this can be clearly seen in 
the removal of the need for contracts to be 'particularly complex' before contracting authorities 
can use competitive dialogue. EU law here thus has had an influence on legislation, but the 
legislator has considered national needs and amended the E ~ - o r i g i n a t i n g g procedures to suit low-
. value procurement more. 
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In contrast to the UK, EU law has no marked influence on national-level guidance in the 
Netherlands. This finding has to be contextualized, however, by noting that national-level 
guidance only recently has started emerging in the Netherlands; we saw in section 4.2.6 that 
guidance on competitive dialogue was newly introduced in 2009. The few guidance documents 
that do exist, however, exist quite separately from EU-Ievel guidance and law, and generally focus 
on best practice rather than legal clarification. 
However, as guidance plays a far smaller regulatory role in the Netherlands than it does in the 
UK, the fact that legislation for non-directive works procurement has been influenced by the EU 
rules is more illuminating on the role that the EU rules play in Dutch procurement regulation. 
Nonetheless, as section 6.2 discussed, this influence of EU law is tempered by a strong fear of 
'getting it wrong' -so in areas where there may not be obligations to legislate, but the EU has 
established rules that may not be entirely clear (as the CJ has with the general principles of equal 
treatment and transparency), the Dutch legislator has proven reluctant to address these rules in 
national procurement legislation. Clear EU rules were thus found to have an influence even 
where they did not have to-but less certain rules, or developing rules, may be less influential on 
national regulation. 
France has the most legislation-based procurement regulatory system examined in this study. As 
of2006, we have seen that in many instances, the directive's rules have been adopted even for 
contracts that are not covered by the directives. We thus saw in section 5.2.3 that, in addition to 
having made competitive dialogue available for contracts covered by the directives, the French 
legislator has also made it available for below-threshold procurement and for all public-private 
partnership agreements falling under the 2004 PPP ordinance. Similarly, as section 5.3.3.1 
discussed, the French legislator abolished all pre-existing national rules on framework 
agreements in 2006 in favour of adopting the EU's rules on framework agreements; this adoption 
. took plac:e for both procuremen.t covered by the directives and procurement not covered by the 
directives. This is a marked change from earlier French approaches to regulation, wherein EU 
rules were implemented around the existing national legislation, without removing national 
legislation where there was no obligation to do so. 
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In French guidance, much like in the Netherlands, EU law plays little to no role with the exception 
of recent guidance on non-binding framework agreements, which was influenced by the 
Commission's Explanatory Note on the same subject That said, guidance may be of more limited 
importance in France than it is in the UK because of the extensive legislative obligations that exist 
in the CMP and the other laws covering public procurement, as discussed in Chapter 5. 
In summary, the role that EU law has played in regulation where there are no detailed and 
explicit EU law obligations is very different in each of the countries studied. The most general 
conclusion that can be drawn about these three countries is that it appears that countries that 
have legislation that goes beyond the EU requirements to begin with seem more likely to also use 
EU rules where these are not mandatory, but this is a very cautious conclusion and one that 
. 
cannot be assumed to be applicable to other EU Member States. 
6.4. The Relative Role Played by Different EU Instruments 
Having examined three different instruments of EU public procurement law throughout the 
thesis, it is also possible to discuss what the relative effect of these three instruments has been In 
the procurement regulation regimes studied. 
6.4.1 The Role of Directives 
As will have been clear from sections 6.1-6.3, the 2004 Public Sector Directive has played the 
most direct role in influencing national procurement rules; this can in large part be explained by 
its mandatory implementation in law, and the fact that all three countries examined have opted 
to implement by transposing the EU rules into a n a ~ i o n a l l a w . . In addition, it is striking that in 
France and in the Netherlands, this directive has also had a notable impact on procurement that 
is not covered by the directives-procedures in the directive have also been adopted In 
legislation for below-threshold contracts ( g ~ n e r a l l y , , in France, and for works, In the 
Netherlands). 
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A secondary interesting point to consider is that there is very little divergence in how the 
directives are implemented. Despite slight word changes and reordering in each Member State, 
the content of the directive is virtually unchanged on most of the points examined. One clear 
exception is found in the rules on bid payments, where France has legislated in more detail, and 
the UK and the Netherlands have n o t ~ b u t t it must be stressed that one area of clear divergence 
in all the procedures examined is a very small finding. 
6.4.2 The Role ofC] Jurisprudence 
Whilst the role that the directive has played is clearly visible in the national legal orders 
examined, the role of CJ case law is not as apparent in national regulatory systems. As discussed 
in section 6.3, seminal CJ cases are not generally incorporated into national legislation. In the 
Netherlands, unlike in the UK and in France, the fact that the case law develops constantly and 
does not always result in clearly applicable rules is cited in the Explanatory Note to the BAO as a 
reason as to why the legislation does not change concurrently with developments in CJ 
jurisprudence (see section 4.4.3.1). 
However, current proposals to revise Dutch procurement quite clearly aim respond to CJ 
jurisprudence on the Treaty: as discussed in section 6.2.2, these proposals require advertising for 
all below-threshold contracts where cross-border interest can be demonstrated. This concept is 
not defined in the proposal, however, meaning that individual contracting authorities will have to 
determine what cross-border interest is and when it exists; the Dutch approach taken thus still 
illustrates that unclear CJ jurisprudence is very difficult to implement in the form of specific 
rules. ' 
It should be stressed that CJ jurisprudence is not wholly ignored on the formal legal level; rather, 
responses are simply found elsewhere than in legislation. An examination of soft law in the 
countries included in this thesis demonstrates an awareness of the direction that CJ case law is 
going; in some countries, like the Netherlands and France, dedicated procurement websites that 
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follow and summarize CJ case law to procurement professionals have even been set up. These 
guidance websites are possibly more useful than the existing guidance documents, which rarely 
go beyond a general caution to individual procuring entities that they themselves need to be 
aware of these developing rules and ensure compliance with them; an argument could be made 
that such non-binding and non-policy-creating suggestions do not quite amount to s!lft law, in 
that they alert procuring authorities rather than regulate them (see section 6.4.3 below). 
The largest impact of CJ case law, at the national level, is seen in the national courts. These both 
apply and, where relevant, directly cite CJ jurisprudence; perhaps the most surprising find ,on this 
level is that even the French administrative courts, known for their reluctance to cite non-French 
jurisprudence, have quoted Telaustria in a few cases that concern a violation of the general 
principle oftransparency. It was noted in section 2.1.4.1 that 'implementation', by some 
definitions, does not stop with formal legal transposition, but also considers how the national 
judiciary applies EU law; it is submitted that this same importance should be attributed to 
national courts' citing of CJ jurisprudence. Without the courts applying and citing CJ-developed 
principles, it is very possible that CJ-developed rules such as the general principles of equal 
treatment and transparency under the TFEU remain distant and never fully integrate into, 
national legal orders. The frequency with which Telaustria and related cases are cited in the UK 
and the Netherlands, however, has meant that CJ jurisprudence plays a substantial role in the 
overall legal regulation of public procurement at the national level, even despite the limited role 
it plays in shaping national legislation. As indicated above, a similar 'trend' of citing relevant CJ 
jurisprudence may be emerging in France; however, with only a few cases as evidence, we cannot 
conclude this with certainty. 
6.4.3 The Role o/Soft Law 
The inclusion of EU soft law in this thesis is a choice that had to be justified in Chapter 1, as soft 
law is not traditionally considered to be part of a doctrinal evaluation of legal regimes. Section 
1.4 thus aimed to highlight that soft law plays a very distinct role In the European legal order In 
general, and Chapter 2 revealed that it has to date already been the subject of frequent academic 
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discussion in the field of public procurement law. However, despite the existence of a significant 
amount of Commission guidance on competitive dialogue, framework agreements and contracts 
outside of the directives, as well as an ongoing academic debate about these guidance pieces, the 
findings of this thesis do not support that they have significantly influenced legislation, guidance 
or jurisprudence in the countries examined in this thesis. 
This finding arises on three distinct levels. Firstly, when examining the legislative provisions in 
the national procurement laws that implement the directive, their wording follows the directive 
literally even in cases where Commission guidance offers further suggestions on what the 
directive means. In fact, there is nQ trace to be found of the Commission's guidance in any 
country's provisions on framework agreements or competitive dialogue, despite explanatory 
notes on both types of procedures. 
Secondly, in examining national level guidance, the Commission's guidance is usually treated as 
wholly separate. Only the UK's OGC guidance documents generally refer to EU guidance where 
appropriate, but in the other nations examined (with the exception of one piece French guidance 
on framework agreements, see section 5.3.3.2), the EU guidance examined in this thesis is usually 
referenced only as a bibliographical note in national-level guidance, or listed separately on the 
national procurement websites. While this could be considered a sign of influence of EU law, the 
fact that the Commission's guidance is not particularly highlighted in the substantial pieces of 
national guidance produced-for instance, the Dutch guidance on competitive dialogue in PPP 
projects-might suggest that it is not considered to be of great importance. 
This general impression is arguably supported by the fact that all three countries studied in this 
thesis supported Germany's challenge to the Commission's guidance on below-threshold 
procurement, arguing that the Commission was engaged in illegal law-making: if the 
Commission's perspective is disagreed with to this extent, it seems unlikely that the national 
legislator is will promote its views in national-level guidance documents.no 
< ' , 
no See Gennany v Commission (n 98). 
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Thirdly, when examining the role that EU soft law plays in national case law, there is not enough 
'evidence' to speak of a general influence. In the Netherlands, Commission guidance on contracts 
not covered by the directives was considered in a single case. In the UK, Similarly, we have seen 
one instance of the Explanatory Note on Framework Agreements being cited, and one instance of 
the Interpretative Communication on contracts outside of the directives being cited-but as the 
UK sees so few procurement cases, this finding cannot be generalized. In France, Commission 
guidance has not been cited in the courts; the brief format of French judgments may explain this 
finding, but a more likely reason for the exclusion of EU soft law in judicial considerations is that 
it is not considered to be a relevant authority. 
Aside from in the UK, the EU guidance documents examined in this thesis were thus not found to 
have a generally had a substantial impact on the laws (hard or soft) of the Member States 
selected for case studies. These findings have to be contextualized, however; firstly, it cannot be 
held that the Commission's guidance documents on competitive dialogue, framework agreements 
and procurement not covered by the directives have no influence on national procurement 
whatsoever-this thesis has not examined procurement practice, and EU-Ievel guidance may 
playa significant role there. Secondly, these findings cannot be generalized to "EU soft law" in 
general, or even liEU public procurement" soft law; only a few guidance documents were studied 
in detail, and other guidance materials from the Commission may have an impact on practice, 
legal regulation, or both. 
Thirdly, it is worth questioning if the content of EU guidance materials has an impact on what Is 
included in national guidance materials. Sections 6.1 and 6.3 discussed that the guidance issued 
in the UK in particular, but also in the Netherlands and France on competitive dialogue, focuses 
on 'best practice' rather than law. One possible explanation for this is the fact that EU guidance 
covers legal uncertainty to the extent that national guidance would; and consequently, 
referencing EU guidance means that national guidance no longer needs to cover these legal 
uncertainties in detail. 
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6.S Harmonization of Procurement Rules 
The last question to consider is to what extent the examined recent developments at the EU level 
have harmonized procurement regulation in the three Member States considered in this thesis. 
Similar research conducted in 1993721 found that the harmonizing effect of EU law was severely 
limited by the fact that it was not applicable to all parts of national procurement regulation, and 
where national regulation could continue to exist, it did-resulting in very different procurement 
regulation in the Member States examined. 
This updated analysis, on the other hand, shows that far greater harmony has been achieved in 
the years since 1993. We first have seen, in Chapters 1 and 2, that generally, since 1993 the 
scope of coverage of EU law has increased Significantly. The 2004 directives, despite promising 
" 
more flexibility, have introduced more detailed rules than the 1993 directives contained, and 
their coverage has also been extended greatly. This has been illuminated by recent C) case law, in 
which the C) stated explicitly that the procedures found in the directives are exhaustive for 
contracts covered by the directives; it thus rejected the existence of an 'alternative' French 
procedure which was not found in the directives.722 National discretion has thus been limited to 
an unprecedented extent by the existence and development of EU law, which has automatically 
led to greater harmonization in national procurement regulation. 
However, some of the harmonization appears to be more voluntary. Not all procedures in the 
2004 directives have to be made available to national contracting authorities, but all three 
Member States examined made the optional procedures studied (competitive dialogue and 
framework agreements) available to their contracting authorities. Moreover, they made the 
procedures available essentially without changing them:""the procedures are not limited or 
amended to any great extent for contracts covered by the directive. The adoption of this 'copy-
paste' approach of legislation is particularly interesting in a country like France, which until 2006 
developed national procurement rules even for contracts that were covered by the directive. 
721 Fernandez-Martin (n 10).' 
m Case C-299/08 Commission v France. judgment of 10 December 2009, at paras 32-34. 
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This may be indicative of a trend developing at a more European-wide level; while beyond the 
scope of this thesis, it can be noted that the implementation of competitive dialogue In other EU 
states has also been 'copy-paste' where there previously were very detailed national rules on 
p roced ures. 723 
Especially interesting from the perspective of harmonization is the finding that France and the 
Netherlands have actually used procedures In the directive and made them available in 
legislation for contracts not covered by the directive. We have found this to be the case for both 
competitive dialogue and framework agreements, with respect to below-threshold (works) 
contracts. The application of procedures in the directive is at this point wholly optional, and no 
regulation at all is necessary; discovering that two out of the three Member States examined thus 
also copy-pasted the rules in the directive for below-threshold contracts reveals a significant 
extent of voluntary harmonization. 
In terms of regulatory approach taken, rather than regulatory content, however, we continue to 
see great national divergences. In the UK, as the preceding sections have shown, guidance and 
policy continue to play great roles in national procurement regulation, even with an increase In 
national-level legislation on procurement The existence of CJ cases such as Telaustria has not 
suddenly induced a UK effort to introduce below-threshold legislation that mimics above-
threshold legislation. This fits in with the UK's historic approach to procurement regulation, 
which was very much administrative rather than legislative (see section 3.1). 
In the Netherlands, from 2007 through to 2010, a movement to change the manner in which 
procurement is regulated can be observed-but one key reason as to why the revision process of 
the national procurement law has been so slow is national resistance to a greater administrative 
burden by introducing mandatory rules for contracts that are currently not subject to additional 
rules (such as below-threshold services and supplies contracts). Revised proposals in 2010 do 
not in any manner reflect upon an increased general influence ofEU law; however, these 
m Papers p r , e s ~ n t e d d at the recent Global Revolutions IV conference on procurement (Nottingham, 19-20 April 2010) 
r e v ~ a l l that similar cop>:-out approac,hes have been a d , o p ~ e d d in Denmark, Germany, and Spain; conversely, however, the 
Itahan and Portuguese ImplementatIOns have made slgmficant changes to the provisions In the Directive. 
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proposals do suggest that ARW 2005-'like' regulation may come into place for services and 
, 
supplies contracts. If those proposed rules are to resemble the ARW 2005, this would lead to a 
situation where all Dutch procurement regulation (above and below threshold) essentially 
'copies out' the directives' rules; it will thus be interesting to see how these proposals materialize 
in the coming years. 
In France, we have already observed a change in regulatory approach; as section 6.1 highlighted, 
some national procurement rules, such as the procedures that preceded competitive dialogue, 
and the earlier forms of framework agreements present in the CMP 1964, have been replaced in 
their entirety by new EU rules on similar subjects. However, the French regulatory tradition is 
not necessarily swayed by new EU law-as stated in section 6.2, the EU-originating general 
principles seemingly have not changed French law so much as reaffirmed it The ongoing 
existence of French 'national' procurement procedures such as the procedure adaptee (which 
does not contravene EU law) also suggests that there are potentially limits to the extent to which 
France will substitute its national procurement rules for EU rules. Since 2006, we have merely 
seen that national rules that that are very similar to EU rules have been substituted by these EU 
rules; whether or not this will take greater effect, and lead to greater harmony in approach 
between France and countries like the UK and Netherlands is impossible to say. 
In summary, it is difficult to say with certainty to what extent national procurement rules are 
becoming more harmonized on account of the EU law developments studied in this thesis. We 
have seen that in terms of regulatory coverage, there is increasingly more harmony, primarily 
., 
because of the copy-out approach adopted for the formal procedures in directive 2004/18EC by 
all three countries examined. We h a v ~ ~ further seen that in France and in the Netherlands, rules 
in the directive have been copied out for application in areas where this is not required to be 
done at all (either because the procedure is optional to begin with, or because the procedure is 
being copied out to apply to contracts not covered by the directive). As raised in section 1.3.3.2 
of the thesis, the (admittedly limited) findings do support that, much as with general prinCiples of 
EU administrative law, there are visible signs that EU procurement rules are having an impact on 
national procurement regulation even when this is not required. 
278 
One last interesting issue to consider here is whether or not harmonization is a 'goal' of EU 
procurement regulation. Chapter 1 and section 2.1.2 noted that the EU does not have the power 
to legislate purely for the sake of creating harmonized procurement rules, but rather that EU 
rules on procurement exist to support the creation of a European common market However, 
these 'cross border trade' style rules may nonetheless have had as a consequence that a degree of 
harmonization has come to exist in national-level procurement regulation. As Chapter 1 
suggested, this degree of harmonization may, effectively, be helping establish cross border trade 
on a practical level: it is presumably easier to trade in another Member State that has nearly 
identical procurement rules than in another Member State that does not 
6.6 Conclusions 
This thesis has examined the extent to which recent developments in EU procurement law have 
influenced procurement regulation in three Member States. Findings have demonstrated that 
above the thresholds of the directives, a significant degree of convergence can be found, both In 
terms of regulatory content and regulatory approach. 
Below the directives' thresholds, different countries have taken different approaches; this Is the 
area in which the degree of harmonization of approach and content is most limited, if not fully 
absent. France, here, is still typified by a regulatory approach that is focused on legislation, 
where many of the directive's procedures and rules are also applicable to contracts not covered 
by the directives. The UK, on the other hand, still primarily uses guidance and policy to regulate 
procurement not covered by the directives-there are no 'binding' rules in legislation applicable 
to these contracts to this date. The Netherlands has, for the past five years or so, been debating a 
different approach to procurement regulation-with an increasing role for legislation in the 
regulation of procurement not covered by the directiveS-but, as of the summer of2010, has not 
managed to adopt a procurement law that produces additional binding rules for, inter alia, low 
value services and supply contracts. In terms of content, much like in the UK, there are no rules 
applicable to services and supplies procurement not covered by the directive in the Netherlands; 
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in line with procurement history, however, the Netherlands does maintain legislation for works 
contracts not covered by the directives. As of2005, this legislation effectively copies out the 
procedures from the 2004 directives; below-threshold procurement in France is subject to very 
similar regulation. 
In examining three different types of EU legal materials, a few further observations can be made. 
One general impression gained from this analysis is that if the Commission wishes to pursue a 
further role for EU law in the field of procurement regulation, directives are the most effective EU 
law source to achieve this goal; other legal sources are not integrated into the national legal 
order to the same extent This is the key finding presented by examining the below-threshold 
responses to CJ case law on the general principles of equal treatment and transparency, as no 
significant legislative responses were discovered that could be specifically attributed to EU law. 
The role of EU soft law in procurement regulation was not clarified to a great extent by this 
research. It is apparent that EU soft law has had little impact on national procurement 
legislation, but its impact on jurisprudence and national guidance is left unclear. It was also 
beyond the scope of the thesis to examine what role EU soft law potentially plays in creating legal 
effects in practice-all of these issues would be suitable for further research, as the current thesis 
has raised more questions about the role soft law plays than it answers. 
More generally, as a continuance of the findings of this thesis, it would be worthwhile to pursue a 
socio-legal investigation into whether or not the relative roles played by these EU law sources, as 
discussed in this thesis, are perceived in the same manner by the legislators that actually shape 
, the national legal regime. Related research-taking the findings of this purely legal stUdy' and 
examining the attitudes of practitioners to these various sources of EU or national law-could 
also be pursued, and may be of particular interest to the CommisSion, the nationallegis\ator, and 
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